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Abstract
This paper presents an analytical treatment of economic systems with an arbitrary number of agents
that keeps track of the systems interactions and agents complexity. The formalism does not seek to
aggregate agents: it rather replaces the standard optimization approach by a probabilistic description of
the agentsbehaviors and of the whole system. This is done in two distinct steps.
A rst step considers an interacting system involving an arbitrary number of agents, where each
agents utility function is subject to unpredictable shocks. In such a setting, individual optimization
problems need not be resolved. Each agent is described by a time-dependent probability distribution
centered around its utility optimum.
The whole system of agents is thus dened by a composite probability depending on time, agents
interactions, relations of strategic dominations, agentsinformation sets and expectations. This setting
allows for heterogeneous agents with di¤erent utility functions, strategic domination relations, hetero-
geneity of information, etc.
This dynamic system is described by a path integral formalism in an abstract space  the space of
the agentsactions and is very similar to a statistical physics or quantum mechanics system. We show
that this description, applied to the space of agentsactions, reduces to the usual optimization results in
simple cases. Compared to the standard optimization, such a description markedly eases the treatment
of a system with a small number of agents. It becomes however useless for a large number of agents.
In a second step therefore, we show that, for a large number of agents, the previous description is
equivalent to a more compact description in terms of eld theory. This yields an analytical, although
approximate, treatment of the system. This eld theory does not model an aggregation of microeconomic
systems in the usual sense, but rather describes an environment of a large number of interacting agents.
From this description, various phases or equilibria may be retrieved, as well as the individual agents
behaviors, along with their interaction with the environment. This environment does not necessarily
have a unique or stable equilibrium and allows to reconstruct aggregate quantities without reducing the
system to mere relations between aggregates.
For illustrative purposes, this paper studies several economic models with a large number of agents,
some presenting various phases. These are models of consumer/producer agents facing binding con-
straints, business cycle models, and psycho-economic models of interacting and possibly strategic agents.
Key words: path integrals, statistical eld theory, phase transition, non trivial vacuum, e¤ective
action, Green function, correlation functions, business cycle, budget constraint, aggregation, forward-
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1 Introduction
In many instances, representative agent models have proven unrealistic, lacking both collective and emerging
e¤ects resulting from the agentsinteractions. To remedy these pitfalls, various paths have been explored:
complex systems, networks, agent based systems or econophysics (for a review of these topics see [1][2] and
references therein).
However agent based models and networks rely on microeconomic relations that may be too simplistic or
lack microeconomic justications. In these type of settings, agents are typically dened by, and follow, various
set of rules. They allow for equilibrium and dynamics to emerge that would otherwise remain unaccessible
to the representative agent setup. However these approaches are highly numerical and model-dependent.
Econophysics, for its part, rely heavily on statistical facts as well as empirical, aggregate rules to derive some
macroeconomic laws, that ultimately should pose similar problems than ad hoc macroeconomics. Indeed ad
hoc macroeconomic models are prone to the Lucas critique, that led to the introduction of micro-foundations
in macroeconomic theory.
A gap remains between microeconomic foundations and multi agent systems. This paper develops a setup
that models micro, individual interactions along with statistic uncertainty and recovers macroeconomic,
aggregate relationships using physics-like methods to replicate interaction systems involving multiple agents.
This paper presents an analytical treatment of a broad class of economic systems with an arbitrary
number of agents, while keeping tracks of the systems interactions and complexity at the individual level.
In this respect, our approach is similar to the Agent-Based one, in that it does not seek to aggregate all
agents, and considers the interaction system in itself. However, we depart from the Agent Based Model in
that we do not aggregate the agents in several di¤erent types and aim at considering the system as a whole
set of large number of interacting agents. This point of view is close to the Econophysics approach, in which
agents are often considered as a statistical system. Nevertheless, our objective is to translate, at the level
of these statistical systems, the main characteristics of a system of optimizing agents. The goal of this work
is to introduce, at the (possibly approximate) statistical level, the agents forward looking behaviors, the
individual constraints, the heterogeneity of agents or information, the strategic dominations relations.
In that, our approach is at the crossroads of statistical and economics models. From the statistical models
we keep the idea of dealing with a large number of degrees of freedom of a system without aggregating
quantities. From standard economic models, we keep the relevant concepts developed in the past decades to
describe the behaviors of rational, or partly rational agents. A natural question arising in that context is the
relevance of these concepts at the scale of the statistical system, i.e. the macro level. It is actually known
that some microscopic feature may fade away at large scales, whereas some others may become predominant
at the macroeconomic or macroscopic scale. The relevance or irrelevance - in the physical sense - of some
micro interactions when moving from a micro to a macro scale could indirectly shed some lights on the
aggregation problem in economics.
Our work is an attempt and a rst step toward an answer to this matter. Although preliminary, it
demonstrates that translating standard economic models into statistical ones requires introducing some
statistical eld models that partly di¤er from those used usually for physical systems. The models introduced
keep track of individual behaviors. Behaviors in turn inuence the description in terms of elds, as well as
the results, at the macro scale.
The advantage of statistical eld theories are threefold. First, they allow, at least approximatively,
to deal analytically with systems with large degrees of freedom, without reducing it rst to an aggregate.
Second, they provide a transcription of micro relations into macro ones. Last but not least, they display
features that would otherwise be hidden in an aggregate context. Actually, they allow switching from micro
description to macro ones, and vice-versa, and to interpret one scale at the light of the other. Moreover, and
relevantly for economic systems, these model may exhibit phase transition. Depending on the parameters
of the model, the system may experience structural changes in behaviors, at the individual and collective
scale. In that, they allow to approach the question of multiple equilibria.
The statistical approach of economic systems presented here is a two-step process. First, the usual model
of optimizing agent is replaced by a probabilistic point of view. We consider an interacting system, involving
an arbitrary number of agents, in which each agent is still represented by an intertemporal utility function,
or any quantity to optimize depending on an arbitrary number of variables. However we assume that
each agents utility function is subject to unpredictable shocks. In such a setting, individual optimization
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problems need not be resolved. Each agent is described by a time-dependent probability distribution centered
around its utility optimum. Unpredictable shocks deviate each agent from its optimal action, depending on
the shocks variances. When these variances are null, we recover the standard optimization result. It
furthermore takes into account the statistic nature of a system of several agents by including uncertainty
on the agentsbehavior. It nonetheless preserves the analytical treatment by slightly modifying the agents
standard optimization problem.
Note that this form of modelling is close to the usual optimization of an agent when some unpredictable
schocks are introduced. In the limit of no uncertainty, standard optimization equations can, in some cases,
be recovered. However, the uncertainty introduce is not the one usually considered in economic models, but
rather an internal uncertainty about the agents behavior, goals, or some unobservable shocks. As such it is
inherent to the model, and should not be considered as a random and external perturbation.
The system composed by the set of all agents is consequently dened by a composite probability depending
on time, agentsinteractions, relations of strategic dominations, agentsinformation sets and expectations.
This setting allows for heterogeneous agents with di¤erent utility functions, strategic domination relations,
heterogeneity of information, etc.
This dynamic system is described by a stochastic process whose characteristics - mean, variance, etc.-
determine the sytems transition probabilities and mean values. For example, the process mean value at
time t describes the mean state of each agent at time t. Besides, we can dene transition probabilities that
describe the evolution of the system from t to t+1.
This setup is actually a path integral formalism in an abstract space the space of the agentsactions 
and is very similar to the statistical physics or quantum mechanics techniques. We show that this description,
applied to the space of all agentsactions, reduces to the usual optimization results in simple cases, inasmuch
as the unpredictable shocks variances are null. This description is furthermore a good approximation
of standard descriptions and allows to solve otherwise intractable problems. Compared to the standard
optimization, such a description markedly eases the treatment of a system with a small number of agents.
As a consequence, this approach is in itself consistent and useful, and provides an alternative to the standard
modelling in the case of a small number of interacting agents. It allows to recover an average dynamics,
which is close, or in some cases even identical to, the standard approach, and study the dynamics of the set
of agents, as well as its uctuations if we introduce some external shocks. Our main examples will be the
models developed in [3][4][5][6] describing systems of interacting agents, or structures in interactions,where
some of them have information and strategic advantage. We show through this examples the possibilities of
our approach in term of resolution.
However, this formalism becomes useless for a large number of agents. It can nonetheless be modied
into another one, based on statistical elds, that will be more e¢ cient in that case. Nevertheless, this rst
step was necessary since the statistical eds model is grounded on our preliminary probabilistic description.
Actually, this one, by its form in terms of path integrals for a small number of interacting agents, can be
transformed in a straightforward way in a description for large systems. As a consequence, the rst step is
also a preparatory one, needed for our initial goal, a model of large number of interacting agents.
The second step to reach this goal, therefore, consists in replacing the agentspath integrals description
by a model of eld theory that replicates the properties of the system when N , the number of agents, is
large. Actually, in that case, we can show that the previous description is equivalent to a more compact
description in terms of eld theory. It allows an analytical, although approximate, treatment of the system.
This transformation adapts some methods previously developped in statistical eld theory to our context
[7].
Hence, a double transformation, with respect to the usual optimization models has been performed. The
usual optimization system is rst described by a statistical system of n agents. It can then itself be replaced
by a specic eld theory with a large number of degrees of freedom. This eld theory does not represent an
aggregation of microeconomic systems in the usual sense, but rather describes an environment of an innity
of agents, from which various phases or equilibria may be retrieved, as well as the behavior of the agent(s),
and the way they are inuenced by, or interact with, their environment.
This double transformation allows rst, for a small number of agents, to solve a system without recurring
to aggregation, and second, for a large number of agents, to aggregate them so as to shape an environment
whose characteristics will in turn induce, and impact, agentsinteractions. This environment, or medium,
allows to reconstruct some aggregate quantities, without reducing the system to mere relations between
3
aggregates. Indeed, the fundamental environment from which these quantities are drawn can witness uc-
tuations that may invalidate relations previously established. The environment is not macroscopic in itself,
but rather describes a multitude of agents in interaction. It does not necessarily have a unique or stable
equilibrium. Relations between macroeconomic quantities ultimately depend on the state or phaseof this
environment (medium), and can vary with the state of the environment. This phenomenon is the so-called
phase transition in eld theory: The conguration of the ground state represents an equilibrium for the
whole set of agents, and shapes the characteristics of interactions and individual dynamics. Various forms
for this ground state, depending on the parameters of the system, may change drastically the description at
individual level.
For illustrative purposes, this paper presents several economic models of consumer/producer agents facing
binding constraints in competitive markets, generalized to a large number of agents and presenting various
phases or equilibria.
The rst section presents a probabilistic formalism for a system with N economic agents, heterogenous
in goals and information. Agents are described by intertemporal utility functions, or any intertemporal
quantities. However instead of optimizing these utilities, agents choose a path for their action that is randomly
distributed around the usual optimal path. More precisely, the weight describing the agent behavior is an
exponential of the intertemporal utility, which concentrates the probability around the optimal path. This
feature models some internal uncertainty, as well as non measurable shocks. Gathering all agents yields
a probabilistic description of the system in terms of e¤ective utilities. The latters are utility functions
internalizing the forward looking behavior, the interactions and the information pattern of each agent. We
also show that if we reduce the internal uncertainty to 0 one recovers for most cases including the case
of quadratic utilities, in principle if not in practice, the solution usual optimization problem. We end the
section by solving explicitly a basic two agents example to illustrate the main points of the method.
The second section develops a class of models applying the method presented previously. This class of
model has already been used previously by the authors to model single individual agents as an aggregate
of several sub-structures, some having strategical advantages on others. This class of model is quite general
and allows to describe systems with small number of heterogenous agents in interactions. We then provide
some applications to check that our method allows a simpler resolution than the usual optimization, but also
to recover, in good approximation, the results of the last one as the average path of the system.
Section three further details the e¤ective utility of the whole system of agents, as composed of individual
utilities plus possibly some additional contributions. This section stresses the fact that this global e¤ective
utility di¤ers from a collection of individual ones. The agents as whole, are not independent from each other.
Section four turns to the probabilistic aspect of our models. We compute the transition functions of the
stochastic process associated with a system of N economic agents. These transition functions have the form
of euclidean path integrals. We show that, in rst approximation, for agents with quadratic utilities, the
transition functions are those of a set of interacting harmonic oscillators. Some non quadratic interactions
may be added as perturbation expansions. Once diagonalized, the directions corresponding to the harmonic
frequencies correspond to mixed, or fundamental structures, that represent independent agents.
Section ve introduces constraints relevant for individual agents, such as budget constraints. We show
that these individual constraints translate in the path integrals dening the system, into adding some non
local contributions. Some of them may be approximated by inertial terms, i.e. "kinetic energy" contributions.
Moreover, if constraints depend on other agents behaviors, these additional contributions consist of non local
interaction terms.
Section six provides some elements about the Laplace transform of Green functions. It also establishes
that general non local interactions must be considered, even when there are no constraints in the model.
These considerations will prove useful in the next sections.
Section seven modies our formalism to systems with a large number of agents. It shows that, in that
case, the transition functions is computed as correlation functions of a eld theory whose action is directly
dened by individual agentse¤ective utilities. The section provides a back and forth interpretation between
micro quantitities - individual behavior - and macro computations, i.e. collective behavior dened by the
elds. It shows how some features of eld theory, such as non trivial vacuum and/or phase transition, are
relevant to our context. We also introduce non local individual interactions such as constraints at the eld
level. We show how they modify the Green functions of the system, and thus the individual agentstransition
functions.
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Section eight applies our formalism to several standard economic models with a large number of interact-
ing agents. The optimizing consumers/producers model and a simple business cycle model are studied. In
the rst case, interactions appear through the budget constraint, an din the second case, through the interest
rate determined by capital productivity. For consumers/producers, we compute the correlation functions of
the eld version of the system and interpret it at the individual level. We recover the usual consumption
smoothing, but we can also track the e¤ect of the interaction between agents that increase the uctuations
of an individual behavior. In the business cycle model, we show that a non trivial vacuum may appear: for
some values of the parameters, the equilibrium may be shifted in a non continuous manner. The system
enters another phase, with di¤erent individual behaviors.]
Building on previous results, Section nine details the mechanisms of non trivial vacuua for the eld
theoretic version of models presented in section two. Stabilization e¤ects between structures may appear
in eld theoretic formulation through a stabilization potential. This stabilization allows to describe the
system as sets of integrated structures. Unstable patterns that would otherwise be short lived may use
others to stabilize and form larger and more stable structures. The vacuum conguration corresponding to
these integrated structures is di¤erent from the initialsand new features may be present in the resulting
system. The section also developps the notion of e¤ective actions. When several types of agents are present,
the actions of some of them may be integrated out, to be absorbed in the e¤ective action describing the
remaining agents. "Hidden" agents are thus included as external conditions shaping the environment and
inducing possibly some phase transition.
Section ten sketches a method to compute macro quantities from micro ones in the context of the eld
formalism. Introducing a macro time scale may allow, in some cases, to recover approximate macroeconomics
relations between aggregate quantities.
2 Method
2.1 Principle
In this paper, the usual optimization problem of each agent dynamics within the system is replaced by a
probabilistic description of the whole system. Several conditions must be satised to keep track of the system
of agentsmain features. First, at least in some basic cases, the optimization equations in average should be
recovered. Moreover, this probabilistic description needs to take into account the individual characteristic
of the agents. In a context of economic modelling, it means to include each agent constraint, interactions
with other, and last by not least, ability to anticipate others agentsactions.
This probabilistic description involves a probability density for the state of the system at each period t.
In a system composed of N agents, each dened by a vector of action Xi (t), we will dene a probability
density P ((Xi (t))i=1::N ) for the set of actions (Xi (t))i=1::N which describes the state of the system at
t. Importantly, for a large number of agents at least, working with a probability distribution is easier than
solving some, often untractable, optimization equations. This probability distribution may often be designed
to be gaussian and centered around the optimal solution of the utility problem. In that case, if the variance
of this distribution is proportional to an exogenous parameter, one may expect, at least for some particular
cases, that when this parameter goes to 0, then the probability distribution will be peaked around the
optimal, or "classical solution". Then, such a probabilistic description can be seen as a generalization of the
usual optimization problem where some internal uncertainty in agents behavior, uncertainty of each of them
with respect to the others, as in an imperfect information problem, but also to themselves. We justify this
"blured" behavior by the inherent complexity of all agents, their goals and behavior being modied at ech
period by some internal, unobservable and individual shocks, the classical case beeing retrieved when this
uncertainty is neglected.
To develop this point, consider rst the intertemporal utility of an agent i:
U
(i)
t =
X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

where u(i)t+n is the instantaneous utility at time t+n. In the optimization setup, the agent i optimizes on the
control variables Xi (t+ n). The variables in parenthesis: (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i represent the actions of other
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agents. We will also denote (Xj (t+ n  1)) the actions for the set of all agents.
Remark at this point that the term utility used here is convenient for any quantity optimized. It can
encompass a production function, for example in oligopoly models, and/or production and utility functions,
in consumer/producer models. Moreover, this type of model may describe the interaction of several sub-
structures within an individual agent. See for example models of heterogeneous interacting agents L,GL,
GLW, or models of motion decision and control in neurosciences.
Now we will explain how to switch toward a probabilistic representations that satises our requirements.
We start with a simple example and then generalize the procedure. Assume rst that agent i has no infor-
mation about the others, so that their actions are perceived as random shocks by agent i. We then postulate
that rather optimizing U (i)t on Xi (t), agent i will choose an action Xi (t) and a plan (that is recalculated
period after period) Xi (t+ n), n > 0, for its future actions that follow a conditional probabilistic law
proportional to:
exp

U
(i)
t

= exp
0@X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i
1A
This is a probabilistic law for Xi (t) and the plan Xi (t+ n), n > 0. It is conditional to the action variables
Xj (t+ n  1) of the other agents, that are perceived as exogenous by agent i.
Remark that, for a usual convex utility with a maximum, the closest the choices of the Xi (t+ n) to U
(i)
t
optimum, the higher the probability associated to Xi (t+ n). Thus, this choice of utility is coherent with
a probability peaked around the optimization optimum. This choice of utility is therefore coherent with a
probability peaked around the optimization optimum.
To better understand the principle of the probabilistic description, we will start with the simplest case, in
which one agent has no information about the others. In that case, the variables Xj (t+ n) will be considered
as random noises. Thus, agent i will integrate out other agents actions as random noises. The probability
for Xi (t) and Xi (t+ n), n > 0 will then beZ
exp

U
(i)
t

exp
 
 X
2
j (s)
2j
!Y
j 6=i
Y
s>t
dXj (s)
exp

 X
2
j (s)
2j

being the subjective weight attributed to the Xj (s) by i. In general if there is no information
at all, we can assume the 2j ! 1, exp

 X
2
j (s)
2j

!  (Xj (s)) where  (Xj (s)) is the dirac delta function
so that other agents may be considered either as inert or, in lack of any further information, as random
perturbations. Their future actions are set to 0 by agent i, or, which is equivalent, discarded from the agent
planication.
When there are no constraint and no inertia in u(i)t - or, alternatively - when u
(i)
t solely depends on Xi (t)
and other agentsprevious actions (Xj (t  1))j 6=i, the periods are independent. Consequently, exp

U
(i)
t

is
a product of term of the kind exp

nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

that are also independent. As
a consequence, the probability associated to the action Xi (t) is:Z 0@Z expU (i)t  exp
 
 X
2
j (s)
2j
!Y
j 6=i
Y
s>t
dXj (s)
1AY
s>t
dXi (s) / exp

u
(i)
t

Xi (t) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

Each agent is described by its instantaneous utility: the lack of information induces a short sighted behavior.
Each term exp

u
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

is the probability for a random term whose integral
on Xj (s+ n) is set to 1. In absence of any period overlap, i.e. without any constraint, the behavior of agent
i is described by a random distribution peaked around the optimum of u(i)t

Xi (t) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

which
models exactly the optimal behavior of an agent inuenced by individual random shocks.
Having understood the principle of the probabilistic scheme with this simple example, we can now com-
plexify the information pattern, to account for the agentsheterogeneity. The knowledge that some agents
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may have about othersutilities a¤ects the statistical weight describing the agents behavior. Actually, if
agent i has some information about agent j utility, it would be able to forecast its inuence on agent j
through Xi (t) and in turn the delayed reactions Xj (t+ n) of agent j.
Let us more precisely consider, as before, the conditional probability for Xi (t) and the Xi (t+ n), n > 0,
depending on the (Xj (s  1))j 6=i . For s > t we conveniently dene this probability to be proportional to
exp

U
(i)
t

:
P

Xi (t) ; Xi (t+ 1) ; :::; Xi (t+ n) ; ::: j (Xj (s))j 6=i;s>t

/ exp

U
(i)
t

= exp
0@X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i
1A
and this determines the (statistical) behavior of agent i, given other agentsfuture actions. At rst sight
integrating this expression over the (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i;s>t and Xi (t+ n), n > 0 would yield a statistical
weight:
P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i;s>t

(1)
for each agent i. However, we cannot procced this way to nd P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i;s>t

. We
will rather show that all the P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i;s>t

have to be found jointly, as a system
of equations. Actually, in the previous equations, the probabilities
P

Xi (t) ; Xi (t+ n) j (Xj (s))j 6=i;s>t

are conditional to the actions of other agents (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i, as in the simple case of no information.
But now, these variables are themselves forecasted by agent i as depending on Xi (t). One then needs to take
into account this interconnexion to nd P

Xi (t) ; Xi (t+ n) j (Xj (s))j 6=i;s>t

. It leads us to dene (agent
is expectation of) the conditional probability of other agents actions given Xi (t):
Pi

(Xj (t))j 6=i ; :::; (Xj (t+ n))j 6=i ; ::: j Xi (t)

(2)
= Eti
Y
k>0
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

where Eti denotes agent is expectation at time t.
Equation (2) means that agent i, forecasts the probabilities P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

for
other agents, including its dependence in Xi (t+ k) and take into account in its computations of its future
path. Now, we assume that agent i attributes the weight (2) to the path (Xj (t))j 6=i ; :::; (Xj (t+ n))j 6=i ; :::.
Then rather than dening a conditional expectation P

Xi (t) ; Xi (t+ n) j (Xj (s))j 6=i;s>t

we will dene a
joint probability:
exp

U
(i)
t

Eti
Y
k>0
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

which describes the probability attributed by agent i to the joint path:
Xi (t) ; :::; Xi (t+ n) ; ::: (Xj (t))j 6=i ; :::; (Xj (t+ n))j 6=i ; :::
Then, once this weight is attributed, it takes ito account the interrelations between the paths Xi (t+ n)
and (Xj (t+ n))j 6=i. One can now integrate on the (Xj (t+ n))j 6=i to nd the probability for a path
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Xi (t) ; :::; Xi (t+ n) ; ::::
P

Xi (t) ; :::; Xi (t+ n) ; ::: j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

=
Z
exp

U
(i)
t

Eti
Y
k>0
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i
=
Z
exp
0@X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i
1A
Eti
Y
k>0
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i
where d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i stands for
Y
j 6=i
dXj (t+ k). As before, we need to express the behavior of agent i at
time t given past actions:
P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (s  1))j 6=i;s>t

that describes the probability for Xi (t) as a function of Xi (t  1) and (Xj (t  1))j 6=i. To do so, we can now
integrate
P

Xi (t) ; :::; Xi (t+ n) ; ::: j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

over Xi (t+ k + 1) with k > 0, and this will yield P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (s  1))j 6=i;s>t

.
P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (s  1))j 6=i

(3)
=
Z
exp

U
(i)
t

Eti
Y
k
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i dXi (t+ k + 1)
=
Z
exp
0@X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i
1A
Eti
Y
k>0
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i dXi (t+ k + 1)
and the set of these equations with i = 1; :::k where k is the number of agents, denes the set of statistical
weights P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

.
As such, the system of equations (3) depends on agents expectations and this ones have to be dened to
solve (3). To do so, we rst dene the e¤ective utility for agent i at time t, written Ueff (Xi (t)) as:
P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

=
exp (Ueff (Xi (t)))
Ni (4)
where the normalization factor Ni is dened as:
Ni=
Z
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) dXi (t)
The interpretation of Ueff (Xi (t)) is straightforward given our procedure. We express the statistical weight
describing the behavior of agent i at time t as a the exponential of an utility function that has included all
expectations of this agent about the future. In a classical interpretation, the rst order condition applied to
Ueff (Xi (t)), that would express Xi (t) as a function of the Xj (t  1), j 6= i and Xi (t  1) corresponds to
the solution of the dynamics equation for agent i. Given our approach, this is of course not the case, but we
show in Appendix 1, that for quadratic utilities, Ueff (Xi (t)) encompasses this classical result and allows to
recover the optimization solution in the limit of no internal uncertainty.
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Remark that our denition (4) does not include directly the normalization term Ni. It implies that
Ueff (Xi (t)) is not uniquely dened by (4) since it allows to include any term independent from Xi (t).
However, it allows to work with Ueff (Xi (t)) without being careful with the normalization of this function,
and to add the needed factor only when it is necessary, i.e. when computing some expectations. We will
come back to this point later in this section.
The previous denition (4) will allow to rewrite the conditional probabilities in (3) as:
P ((Xj (t)) ; :::; (Xj (t+ n)) ; ::: j Xi (t  1))
= Eti
0@Y
k>0
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))
1A
 Eti exp
0@X
k>0
X
j 6=i
Ueff (Xj (t+ k))
1A
where:
Eti exp
0@X
k>0
X
j 6=i
Ueff (Xj (t+ k))
1A = Y
j 6=i
Eti exp
0@X
k>0
Ueff (Xj (t+ k))
1A
is the expectation at time t of agent i given its own set of information (the upperscript t in Eti is sometimes
understood when there is no ambiguity). Then equation (3) becomes:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp

U
(i)
t
Y
j 6=i
Eti exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
1AY
s>t
dXj (s)
Y
s>t
dXi (s+ 1) (5)
Equation (5) is a system making interdependent the statistical behavior of each agent. In order to solve (5)
and nd the e¤ective utility Ueff (Xi (t)) one needs to compute the expectations Eti exp
P
s>t Ueff (Xj (s))

and to do so, we have to introduce some assumptions about the expectations formulation. Basically, we
generalize what was said before and will consider two cases, that will be su¢ cient for most cases (some
alternative hypothesis could be developped as well). We will distinguish the agents by their relation with
respect to the information they have about the others. An agent i has an information domination (or
strategic domination) over j, if it knows the parameters, or some parameters of the agent j utility and if
j has no information about i0s set of parameters. This allows i to forecast agent js actions and take into
account how it can inuence j as explained above in (3). On its side, agent j perceives agent is actions as
random noises. Moreover, we say that two agents i and j have no information domination on each other, if
they have both information (or both no information) on the other ones utility.
It is convenient for the sequel to dene the rank of an agent with respect to the others in the following
way: When an agent i has an information domination over an agent j one says that rk (j) < rk (i) (or
j < i when there is no ambiguity). We also set rk (i) = rk (j) (or i  j or j  i) if there is no information
domination relation between i and j.
If i has no information about j, an arbitrary weight exp

 X
2
j (s)
2j

is assignated to j. As explained above,
it results in simply discarding the variable Xj (t+ k) in the problem in consideration. We will use this point
below. If i has an information domination over j, rk (j) < rk (i) then we dene:
Eti exp
0@X
k>0
Ueff (Xj (t+ k))
1A = exp
P
k>0
U
ti
eff (Xj(t+k))
2j

Nij (6)
with Nij=
R
exp
P
k>0
U
ti
eff (Xj(t+k))
2j

dXi (t).
The function U tieff (Xj (t+ k)) is the i-th truncated e¤ective utility of j, the e¤ective utility Ueff (Xj (t+ k))
in which all the variables Xk (t+ k) with rk (k) > rk (i) and some (depending on the precise form of the
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model) of the Xk (t+ k) with rk (k) = rk (i) are set to 0. It reects the fact that in that case, agent i has
no information about agents k with rk (k) > rk (i) and for some agents k with rk (k) = rk (i), and as a
consequence, no information on the way k impacts j. Note that Nij depends implicitely on past variables.
To simplify the notations we will redene
U tieff (Xj (t+ k))  2j lnNij ! U tieff (Xj (t+ k))
and (6) becomes:
Eti exp
0@X
k>0
Ueff (Xj (t+ k))
1A = exp
0@X
k>0
U tieff (Xj (t+ k))
2j
1A (7)
The parameter 2j is a measure of agent is uncertainty about agent j future actions. Remark that 
2
j
should in fact be written 2j (i), but, since 
2
j will only appear in intermediate computations of Ueff (Xi (t)),
this dependence in i can be understood. For 2j ! 0, one recovers the full certainty about the agent that
behaves as the usual optimizer. For 2j increasing, this behavior becomes only an average behavior. For
2j !1, agents action is perceived as random. Thus 2j introduces the measure of uncertainty about agents
behavior, i.e. the measure of external shocks. Concerning agent iexpectations Eti , we will also make the
assumption that all agents are perceived as independent, that is, given (Xj (t  1)), one has:
EtiP

(Xj (t))j 6=i j (Xj (t  1))

=
Y
j 6=i
P (Xj (t) j (Xj (t  1)))
and more generally:
EtiP

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

=
Y
j 6=i
P (Xj (t+ k) j (Xj (t+ k   1)))
Other assumptions could be made, the actions of some agents at time t could be bound together, but those
hypothesis would be equivalent to consider some agents as a whole, which would mean to regroup some
utility functions from the beginning.
Ultimately, we will also assume that each agent faces an uncertainty about its own future action. This
is modeled by the fact that in (3), we replace exp

U
(i)
t

by exp

U
(1)
t
2i

where 2i measures the degree of
uncertainty of i about itself, as 2j measures the uncertainty about other agents. In fact, as we will se, in
most case, the factor 2i can be rescaled to 1, but its presence, at least in the beginning, allows to interpret
the results more clearly.
The expression of the conditional probabilities appearing in (3), in terms of the Ueff (Xj (t+ k)) allows
to write the conditional probablities as intertemporal sums. To nd recursively each agent e¤ective utility
Ueff (Xi (t)), we introduce the system of all agents e¤ective utility in the previous formula.
Given our assumptions (5) rewrites:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) (8)
= P

Xi (t) j Xi (t  1) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

=
Z
exp
 
U
(i)
t
2i
!
Eti
Y
k>0
P

(Xj (t+ k))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k   1))

d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i dXi (t+ k + 1)
or, replacing the expectations Eti :
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp
 
U
(i)
t
2i
!
(9)
 exp
0@X
k>0
X
j 6=i
U tieff (Xj (t+ k))
2j
1AY
k>0
d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i d (Xi (t+ k + 1))
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with:
U
(i)
t =
X
k>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ k) ; (Xj (t+ k   1))j 6=i

The system (8) (or (9) denes the Ueff (Xi (t)) that determine ultimately the probabilities (1) describing
the system.
We show in Appendix 1 that, for quadratic utilities, when 2j ! 0 and then 2i ! 0, one recover the
optimization equations of the standard utility maximizing agent. In other words, the agent behavior, is
peaked on the usual optimal path. For non quadratic utilities, one would recover the same results but with
condition to replace the e¤ective utilities Ueff (Xj (t+ k)) in the right hand side of (8) by their by quadratic
approximation around the saddle point solution. More precisely, if we were rather dening the e¤ective
utilities as satisfying:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp
 
U
(i)
t
2i
!
(10)
 exp
0@X
k>0
X
j 6=i
U^ tieff (Xj (t+ k))
2j
1AY
k>0
d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i dXi (t+ k + 1)
where:
U
(i)
t =
X
k>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ k) ; (Xj (t+ k   1))j 6=i

is the intertemporal utility of agent j and:
U^ tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xk (t  1))) =  
1
2
(Xj (t) Xj [(Xk (t  1))])tAjj (Xj (t) Xj [(Xk (t  1))])
is the quadratic approximation of U tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xk (t  1))) at Xj [(Xk (t  1))]. Here, Xj [(Xk (t  1))]
is the solution of the optimization problem of U tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xk (t  1))) in the variable Xj . That is,
Xj [(Xk (t  1))] satises:
0 =

@
@Xj (t)
U tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xk (t  1)))

Xj(t)=Xj [(Xk(t 1))]
for any (Xk (t  1)). Then, Appendix 1 shows that in that case, the integrals in (10) are peaked around the
classical optimization solution when 2j ! 0 and then 2i ! 0.
We do not choose this representation (10), and rather stay with (8), since we present a di¤erent formalism
from the standard one, and the form (8) seems both more natural and more convenient. It is su¢ cient for
our purpose to know that we can recover the standard approach as a particular case for the case of quadratic
utilities, and as a quadratic approximation for general cases.
Note also that for utilities of homogenous form, and of the same degre in the Xi (s), one can rescale
X 0i (s) =
X0i(s)
(2i )
1

, X 0j (s) =
X0j(s)
(2i )
1

where  is the degree of the homogenous utility. In this case this is
equivalent to set 2i = 1 and to redene 
2
j to be equal to
2j
2i
. If we assume that all the 2j are equal to 
2,
thus we will replace 2 by 
2
2i
. The integrals in (8) include some irrelevant constant factor that are powers of
2i that will be absorbed in the normalization of the statistical weight exp (Ueff (Xi (t))). As a consequence,
after integrations (8) reduces to:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) = exp

U
(i)
t

 exp
0@X
k>0
X
j 6=i
Ueff (Xj (t+ k))
2
1A d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i d (Xi (t+ k + 1))
which is a more convenient representation. In that context, retrieving the usual optimization description
corresponds still to let 2j ! 0 (These optimization equations are in fact for the variables X 0i (s), but due to
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the homogenous form of the utilities, the factors in powers of
 
2i
 1
 cancel and one retrieves the equations
for the Xi (s)).
The system (8) is solved given our assumptions on the agents information sets and the form of the ex-
pectations Eti . Given our assumptions on the expectations E
t
i , the computation of exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) will
involve only the structures on which i has an advantage of information or those that are in a relation of
non domination with i. Actually, as said before, the structures about which structure i has no informa-
tion, are considered as random shocks and not included in agent i computation, that is, if rk (i) < rk (j)
Eti exp
P
s>t Ueff (Xj (s))

= 1. In other words, agent i integrates only in its behavior all substruc-
tures possible paths. Its choice, for a given set of Xj (s),Xi (s), j < i, s > t is exp

U
(i)
t

weighted by
exp
P
s>t U
ti
eff (Xj (s))

.
The resolution for the Ueff (Xi (t)) consists then rst, by ranking the agents by their strategic advantages.
The Ueff (Xi (t)) are found recursively for each set of agents with the same rank. Second, the e¤ective utility
just found are reintroduced in the system of equation dening the e¤ective utility of higher rank.
Among a set for a given rank (we use the rescaling 2i = 1 described above) (8) rewrites:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) (11)
=
Z
exp

U
(i)
t
 Y
rk(j)<rk(i)
exp
0@X
s>t
U tieff (Xj (s))
2j
1AY
s>t
dXj (s)

0@ Y
rk(j)=rk(i)
Eti exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
1AY
s>t
dXj (s)
1AY
s>t
dXi (s+ 1)
The Ueff (Xj (s)) with rk (j) < rk (i) are given by hypothesis, and so are the U
ti
eff (Xj (s)) which are
obtained from the Ueff (Xj (s)) by truncation. We are thus left with a set of functional equations between
the Ueff (Xi (t)) of the same rank.
The resolution depends on the model, and on the formation of expectations for rk (j) = rk (i). Several
hypothesis are possible in this case. For example:
Eti exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
1A = 1
Eti exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
1A = exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
2j
1A
Eti exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
1A = exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xi (s))Xi(s)!Xi(s)
2j
1A
In the rst case, structures of the same rank share no information at all. In the second case, they fully share
their information. In the third and last case agents are identical: take agent i utility and replace Xi (s) by
Xj (s) (assuming thus that j is identical to i).
We keep the rst and simplest case Eti exp
P
s>t
Ueff (Xj(s))
2j

= 1 when rk (j) = rk (i). It implies that
in the truncation procedure the Xj (s) with rk (j) = rk (i) are set to 0 in the U
ti
eff (Xk (s)). It means that
in the sequel of the paper we will work with the following recursive system of equations for the e¤ective
utilities:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) (12)
=
Z
exp

U
(i)
t
 Y
rk(j)<rk(i)
exp
0@X
s>t
U tieff (Xj (s))
2j
1AY
s>t
dXj (s)
Y
s>t
dXi (s+ 1)
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Once the Ueff (Xi (t)) satisfying (11), or more generally (12), are found, we can consider the entire system
as being described by an overall weight:
P (X (t+ k) j X (t))  P ((Xi (t+ 1)) j (Xi (t)))
and more generally, by the transition probabilities of the system over k periods:
P (X (t+ k) j X (t))  P ((Xi (t+ k)) j (Xi (t))) (13)
where X (s) = (Xi (s)) is the concatenation of the Xi (s). Equation (13) models the random path of the
whole system. This will be the point of view used in the next sections of this work. There are several ways to
dene (13), all of them depending on some additional hypothesis. If we assume that the individual transition
functions P (Xi (t+ k) j (X (t))) are independent, one has:
P (X (t+ k) j X (t)) = P (X (t+ k) j X (t+ k   1)) :::P (X (t+ 1) j X (t)) (14)
=
 Y
i
P (Xi (t+ k) j (X (t+ k   1)))
!
:::
 Y
i
P (Xi (t+ 1) j (X (t)))
!
These probabilities can be computed through the e¤ective utilities. Yet, more care must be given to the
normalization factors. We rst assume that a non-normalized particular e¤ective utility function satifying
(11) has been chosen (recall that all such functions di¤er by a function of all variables except Xi (t)). Since
the statistical weight dening an agent is proportional to the exponential of the e¤ective utility, one has:
P (Xi (t) j (X (t  1))) = exp (Ueff (Xi (t)))Ni (15)
where the normalization factor is dened by:
Ni=
Z
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) dXi (t)
When gathering all agents, we have to take into account that N depends on (X (t  1)), as seen in (15). As
a consequence, we will write:
P (Xi (t) j (X (t  1))) = exp (Ueff (Xi (t)))Ni (X (t  1)) (16)
and (14) will be given by successive integrals:
P ((Xi (t+ k)) j (Xi (t))) (17)
=
Z
exp
 
kX
l=1
X
i
(Ueff (Xi (t+ l) ; (Xi (t+ l   1)))  lnNi (X (t  1)))
!
kY
l=1
d (Xi (t+ l))
However, other possibilities to dene P ((Xi (t+ k)) j (Xi (t)))may be more relevant. Since we are looking
at the entire system, one may assume that that the independence hypothesis (14) does not hold any more.
Some additional interactions, internal constraints unknown to the individual components, may be relevant
to the system and invalidate (17). One should thus modify the e¤ective utility accordingly. Yet there is a
simpler way to bind all the components of the system, and it is related again to the normalization problem.
We have seen that Ueff (Xi (t+ l) ; (Xi (t+ l   1))) is dened up to any function independent of Xi (t+ l)
(see the discussion after (4)). If we chose a particular form for Ueff (Xi (t+ l) ; (Xi (t+ l   1))) and do not
impose (14), we can dene the transition function for the system as:
P ((Xi (t+ k)) j (Xi (t))) = 1N 0
Z
exp
 
kX
l=1
X
i
Ueff (Xi (t+ l) ; (Xi (t+ l   1)))
!
kY
l=1
d (Xi (t+ l)) (18)
where N 0 is a global normalization factor for the entire system and the whole path between t and
t + k. Such a formula distinguishes between collective and individual behaviors, the utility attributed
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to the system being the sum of individual utilities. Formula (18) will depend on the particular form of
Ueff (Xi (t+ l) ; (Xi (t+ l   1))) among the solutions of (11). The choice of Ueff (Xi (t+ l) ; (Xi (t+ l   1)))
depends on the particular system studied, but one has to remind that the e¤ective utility Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))
encompasses all forward looking and strategic aspects of agent is behavior. Thus, all these aspects being
integrated out, Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) should only take into account one period e¤ect, and describe how
agent is reacts to (Xi (t  1)). A coherent choice for Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) is thus to impose that it
should not include any contributions independent from Xi (t). Introducing such terms would actually model
a concern for other periods, and that was ruled out from the denition of Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1))). As a
consequence, in the sequel we will keep this choice when working with (18).
Recall that in the denition of the e¤ective utilities Ueff (Xi (t+ l) ; (Xi (t+ l   1))), a measure of the
uncertainty about the agents appears through the variances 2j (see (12). Let assume that all the 
2
j are
of same order 2. We have seen that in the limit of no uncertainty 2 ! 0, one recovers, at least for the
quadratic approximation, the usual optimization dynamics. In addition to the fact that the classical case
can be seen as a particular case of our model, we compare the advanges of the two approaches. Usually,
one writes the rst order condition for each Xi (t), then postulates a form for the equilibrium dynamics,
and solve the equation. The di¢ culty comes from the fact that, even if there is no optimization on the
Xi (t+ n), n > 0, those variables enters the dynamic equations, as a consequence of agents anticipations
and possible information domination of some agents, and have to be replaced by the dynamic form of the
solution. There is thus a circularity that implies di¢ culties to identify, analyticaly, the coe¢ cients of this
equilibrium dynamics.
Working with statistical weights avoids computing the solution for each agents. The probabilistic weights
exponential form ensures that actions are taken so that the action Xi (t) and the planned action Xi (t+ n),
for n > 0, will be chosen in probability, close to their expected optimum. The process is performed each
period again, with no commitment to previous expectations. In the end, this results in modeling the all
system by the overall weight (18) and a dynamic centered around the classical optimum. The total e¤ective
utility includes the partial resolution of the agents expectations and strategic interaction with others.
Several use of the weight (18) (or 17) can be made. First, it can be seen as the exponential of an
e¤ective utility for the system, and as such, it can be used, to nd the average path of the system. Actually,
the probability P ((Xi (t)) j (Xi (t  1))) concentrates on its saddle point value which is given by the set of
equations:
rXi(t)Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) = 0 (19)
where again, i runs over the set of agents. This is a usual Euler Lagrange type of equation, and as said before
for quadratic utilities it leads to the usual linear dynamic solution. The computation of the eigenvalues of
the dynamical system being in principle straightforward. Note that the solutions of (19) are di¤erent from
the usual optimization paths for a non nul value of 2.
Some external shocks may also be directly included in this set up. Rather than considering:X
i
Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))
as a full e¤ective utility of the system, one can includes some perturbation terms:X
i
Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) +Xi (t)Lik"k (t)
where "k (t) are some random external perturbations, and Lik the response to this shocks for agent i. The
dynamic equation thus becomes:
rXi(t)Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) + Lik"k (t) = 0
and in the case of linearized dynamics, the response to "k (t) is simply:
(Xi (t+m)) = (Xi (t)) +D
m
eff ("i (t))
where Deff is the matrix describing the linear solution (Xi (t+ 1)) = Deff (Xi (t)) and the parenthesis
("i (t)) denotes the vector of concatenated shocks.
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There is however a second way to use the previous probabilistic description of the system that will be
more central in this paper. Rather than focusing on the mean path approximation (18), we can come back
to the transition probabilities and write them in the continuous approximation. Actually, whatever the
normalization chosen for Ueff (Xi (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) in (18), we can replace the lag variables (Xi (t+ l   1))
by ((Xi (t+ l   1))  (Xi (t+ l))) + (Xi (t+ l)) and identify the di¤erence ((Xi (t+ l   1))  (Xi (t+ l)))
with minus the derivative ddt (Xi (t+ l)) =

_Xi (t+ l)

. We then obtain P
  
X0i (t+ k)
 j  X0i (t) in terms
of the variables (Xi (t+ l)),

_Xi (t+ l)

:
P
  
X0i (t+ k)
 j  X0i (t) = Z Xi(t+k)=(X0i )
Xi(t)=(X0i )
exp
 Z X
i
Ueff

(Xi (t)) ;

_Xi (t)
!
D (Xi (t)) (20)
for two given values of the initial and nal state of the system
 
X0i (t+ k)

and
 
X0i (t)

. The integrand
D (Xi (t)) denotes the sum over all paths from
 
X0i (t+ k)

to
 
X0i (t)

and the probability of transition
between
 
X0i (t+ k)

and
 
X0i (t)

is expressed as a path integral between those two points. We will come
back to this approach in the third section. This formalism, familiar in theoretical physics appear in a
wide range of models, ranging from Quantum Mechanics to statistical physics, and allows to go beyond, the
"classical", or in our context, the average dynamics. The system may then be considered as a fully stochastic
process, whose transition functions are given by (20). Such integrals are usually di¢ cult to compute, except
in the quadratic case. They can however yield many information on the probabilitic nature of the system,
notably through several techniques such as perturbation theory, or Feynman graph expansion. Besides, path
integrals have already been used in nance, to study the dynamics of stock market prices for example [8].
2.2 Basic example. Comparison with intertemporal optimization
Before developping some more general models, we start with a basic example and consider a system with
two agents, with time t utility:
uy (yt) =  

1
2
y2t   ytxt 1

ux (xt) =  

1
2
x2t +
1
2
y2t 1   xtyt 1

Note that this is the model developped in [4] where we considered a two agents interaction model:
U
(1)
t (a1 (t)) =  
1
2
(a1 (t)  a0)2   a1 (t) a2 (t  1)
U
(2)
t (a2 (t)) =  

2
(a1 (t  1))2 + a1 (t  1) a2 (t)  1
2
(a2 (t))
2
where we set  = 0, a0 = 0, to focus on the method of resolution. For comments and interpretations of the
model, see [4]. The agents intertemporal utilities are:
Uy (yt) =
X
n
nuy (yt+n)
Ux (xt) =
X
n
nux (xt+n)
xt has a strategic advantage on yt which traduces here as a strategic - information - advantage. Agent x
knows the utility of agent y and its impact on y (coe¢ cient  1) , as well as the impact of y on him (coe¢ cient
 ). Agent y has no knowledge of agent x utility. It only knows the impact of x on itself, and this impact
is perceived as the action of a random shock. This kind of model of interaction will be generalized in the
next section. Let us remark that this type of model can also represent a dynamic version of the Stackelberg
duopoly model. Actually, in a Stackelberg duopoly, the payo¤ are quadratics:
1 = Pq1   c1q1
2 = Pq2   c2q2
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Where the price is P and c1, c2 the costs, q1 and q2 are the quantities produced. Using the inverse demand
function:
P = A  q1   q2
One is lead to:
1 = (A  q1   q2   c1) q1
2 = (A  q1   q2   c2)
In a dynamic version, agents would optimize the following functions. Given that in the Stackelberg setup,
agent 2 has a strategic advantage and anticipates future actions of the rst agent, the time t rewards become:
1 (t) = (A  q1 (t  1)  q2 (t)  c1) q1 (t  1)
2 (t) = (A  q1 (t  1)  q2 (t)  c2) q2 (t)
The lag in q1 (t  1) transcripts the fact that agent 1 having a strategic advantage, it xes rst its quantity
to match the demand at time t. Up to some constant and normalization, the functions i (t) have the form
of the model considered in this paragraph, except for the term q2 (t) q1 (t  1) in 1 (t) that would need slight
modication of our basic model (inducing some time translation in the computations of the e¤ective utility
for the rst agent), but this is not our purpose here and this will be discussed in the next section.
Back to the resolution of our example, in the optimization set up, this model is solved with standard
methods for optimization with rational expectations (here perfect information). Solving rst for yt
yt = xt 1
leads to an e¤ective utility for xt:
1
2
x2t +
1
2
x2t 2   xtxt 2
and an intertemporal utility for xt:
Ux (xt) =
X
t

1
2
x2t
 
1 + 2
  xtxt 2   2xtxt+2
leads to the optimization equation:
xt
 
1 + 2
  xt 2   2xt+2 = 0 (21)
Postulating a solution of the type:
xt = dxt 1
leads to the characteristic equation:  
1 + 2

d2     2d4
whose solution is:
d = 
s
1
22

1 + 2  
q 
1 + 2
2   422 (22)
On the other side, we apply the formalization scheme developped in the previous paragraph, and then
compare the results with the dynamic solution (22). We then need to compute the e¤ective utilities for both
agents x and y. We start with y and consider its intertemporal utility:
Uy (yt) =
X
n
nuy (yt+n)
Given that yt has no information about x, it will behave according to the statitical weight dened by:
exp (Ueff;y (yt)) =
Z
exp
 X
n
nuy (yt+n)
!
exp

 x
2
t
2
Y
n>0
dxt+ndyt+n+1
=
Z
exp
0@X
n>0
n

1
2
y2t+n   yt+nxt+n 1
1A exp x2t+n 1
2
Y
n>0
dxt+n 1dyt+n
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The integrals Z
exp

n

1
2
y2t+n   yt+nxt+n 1

exp

 x
2
t+n 1
2
Y
n>0
dxt+n 1dyt+n
give a constant result, set to 1 after normalization, so that:
Z
exp
0@X
n>0
n

1
2
y2t+n   yt+nxt+n 1
1A exp x2t+n 1
2
Y
n>0
dxt+n 1dyt+n = exp

1
2
y2t   ytxt 1

which translates in terms of e¤ective utility:
(Ueff;y (yt)) =
1
2
y2t   ytxt 1 = u (yt)
The result previously stated is retrieved: the e¤ective utility of an agent with no information is the initial
time t utility.
Now we can compute the e¤ective utility for agent x. Starting with its intertemporal utility:
Ux (xt) =
X
n>0
nux (xt+n)
=
X
n>0
n

1
2
x2t+n +
1
2
y2t+n 1   xt+nyt+n 1

=
nX
n>0

1
2
x^2t+n +
1
2
y^2t+n 1   
p
x^ty^t 1

where we changed the variables:
x^t+n =
p

n
xt+n
y^t+n =
p

n
yt+n
we apply (11) and we are seeking for (Ueff;x (xt)) dened by:
exp (Ueff;x (x^t)) =
Z
exp (Ux (x^t)) exp
0@0@X
n>0
Ueff;y (y^t+n)
2
1A1AY
n>0
dy^t+n 1dx^t+n (23)
where Ueff;y (y^t+n) has to be normalized. We set:
exp (Ueff;y (yt)) =
exp
 
1
2y
2
t   ytxt 1

N
and impose: Z
exp (Ueff;y (yt)) dyt = 1
which leads ultimately to nd:
exp (Ueff;y (yt)) =
1p
2
exp

1
2
y2t   ytxt 1 +
1
2
x2t 1

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The factor 1p
2
is a constant factor and can be discarded from the computations and (23) becomes:
exp (Ueff;x (x^t)) =
Z
exp (Ux (x^t)) exp
0@0@X
n>0
Ueff;y (y^t+n)
2
1A1AY
n>0
dy^t+n 1dx^t+n (24)
=
Z
exp
0@X
n>0

1
2
x^2t+n +
1
2
y^2t+n 1   
p
x^t+ny^t+n 1
1A
 exp
0@ nX
n>0
 1
2 y^
2
t+n  
p
y^t+nx^t+n 1
2
+
x^2t+n 1
22
1AY
n>0
dy^t+n 1dx^t+n
or, when the variables at time t and those at time t+ n are separated:
exp (Ueff;x (x^t)) = exp

1
2

1 +

2

x^2t +
1
2

1
2
+ 

y^2t +
1
2
y^2t 1   
p
x^ty^t 1  
p

2
y^tx^t 1


Z
exp
 X
n>0

1
2

1 +

2

x^2t+n +

1
2
+ 

y^2t+n

  
p
x^t+ny^t+n 1  
p

2
y^t+nx^t+n 1
!

Y
n>0
dy^t+ndx^t+ndy^t
Now, dene:
Yt =

x^t
y^t

and the e¤ective utility for x^t is written as:
exp (Ueff;x (x^t)) = exp
 
1
2
Y tt
 
1 + 2

0
0
 
1
2 + 
 !Yt  pY tt  0 1
2 0

Yt 1
!
(25)

Z
exp
 X
n>0
 
1
2
Y tt+n
 
1 + 2

0
0
 
1
2 + 
 !Yt+n  pY tt+n 0 1
2 0

Yt+n 1
!!

Y
n>0
dy^t+ndx^t+ndy^t
To compute the integrals we use a result about gaussian integrals for a path of variables

Yt+n =

x^t+n
y^t+n

n>0
.
This result states that the gaussian integrals
Y
n>0
dy^t+ndx^t+n are known to be equal to the (exponential of
the) saddle point value of the integrand in the second exponential of (25), with initial condition (x^t; y^t) and
nal value (0; 0) at t =1. More precisely,Z
exp
 X
n>0
 
1
2
Y tt+n
 
1 + 2

0
0
 
1
2 + 
 !Yt+n  pY tt+n 0 1
2 0

Yt+n 1
!!

Y
n>0
dy^t+ndx^t+ndy^t
= exp (Saddle point of (S))
with:
S =
1
2
Y tt+n
 
1 + 2

0
0
 
1
2 + 
 !Yt+n  pY tt+n 0 1
2 0

Yt+n 1
where the saddle point solution satises the initial condition given just above.
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To compute this saddle point value, dene three matrices A, B and C with A symetric, and C antisymetric
that allow to rewrite the integrand in the exponential as.
A =

0 + 12
+ 12 0

and C =

0   12 + 12 0

so that:
A+ C = 2

0 
1
2 0

and A  C = 2

0 12
 0

The matrix B is dened by:
(B  A) =
 
1 + 2

0
0
 
1
2 + 
 !
so that the quantity in the second exponential of the right hand side (25) is written as:
S =
1
2
X
n>0

Y tt+n (B  A)Yt+n  
p
Y tt+n (A+ C)Yt+n 1

The saddle point equation is then:
2 (B  A)Yt+n  
p
A (Yt+n 1 + Yt+n+1) 
p
C ((Yt+n 1   Yt+n+1)) (26)
We look for a solution of this equation under the form:
Yt+n = DYt+n+1 (27)
and the matrix D satises
 
p
 (A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D  
p
 (A+ C) = 0 (28)
One can check that the solution D of (28) has the form:
D =

0 a
b 0

and (28) leads to two equations for a and b:
a

1
2
 + 1

  
p
   1
2
ab
p
 = 0
b

 +
1
2

  1
2
p
   ab
p
 = 0
whose solutions are:
a =
1
2
p
 (2 + )

1 + 2 + 22 + 2  
q 
2 + 2   2   22 + 1  2 + 2 + 2   22 + 1
(29)
b =
1
a
p


a + 2a  2
p


=
 
2 + 
 2 + 2  q 2 + 2   2   22 + 1  2 + 2 + 2   22 + 1  22 + 1
p


2 + 2  
q 
2 + 2   2   22 + 1  2 + 2 + 2   22 + 1+ 22 + 1
Having foundD, we replace these expressions in the saddle point solution (27). The e¤ective utility Ueff;x (x^t)
can then be obtained by:
exp (Ueff;x (x^t)) =
Z
exp
 
1
2
 X
n>0

Y tt+n (B  A)Yt+n  
p
Y tt+n (A+ C)Yt+n 1
!!
dy^t
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where Yt+n satises (27). The whole integrand
S =
1
2
X
n>0

Y tt+n (B  A)Yt+n  
p
Y tt+n (A+ C)Yt+n 1

(30)
can then be simplied via the dynamic equation (28). This dynamic equation (28) rewrites:
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0
or, since D is invertible:
(A+ C)D 1 =   (A  C)D   2 (B  A)
the sum (30) simplies as:
1
2
X
n>0

Y tt+n (B  A)Yt+n  
p
Y tt+n (A+ C)Yt+n 1

=  
p

2
Y tt+1 (A+ C)Yt
+
X
n>1
1
2
Y tt+n (B  A)Yt+n  
X
n>1
p

2
Y tt+nAYt+n 1  
X
n>1
p

2
Y tt+nCYt+n 1
=  
p

4
Y tt+1 (A+ C)Yt
+
X
n>1
1
2
Y tt+n

(B  A)Yt+n  
p

2
A (Yt+n 1 + Yt+n+1) 
p

2
C (Yt+n 1   Yt+n+1)

= Y tt+1 (A+ C)Yt
=  
p

4
Y tt (A  C)Yt+1 =  
p

4
Y tt (A  C)DYt
The second term vanishes, as a consequence of the dynamic equation (26). Then:X
n>0

1
2
Y tt+n (B  A)Yt+n  
p
Y tt+n (A+ C)Yt+n 1

=  
p

2
Y tt (A  C)DYt
and (24) rewrites:
exp (Ueff;x (x^t)) =
Z
exp

1
2
Y tt (B  A)Yt  
p

2
Y tt (A+ C)Yt 1  
p

4
Y tt (A  C)DYt

dy^t
=
Z
exp

 1
2

Y tt

(B  A)  1
2
(A  C)D

Yt

 
p

2
Y tt (A+ C)Yt 1

dy^t
We can use again the dynamic equation for D:
2 (B  A) 
p
 (A  C)D

= (A+ C)D 1
and the previous relation becomes:
exp (Ueff;x (x^t)) =
Z
exp

1
4
 
Y tt (A+ C)D
 1Yt
  1
2
Y tt (A+ C)Yt 1

dy^t
=
Z
exp

1
4

(Yt  DYt 1)t (A+ C)D 1 (Yt  DYt 1)

dy^t
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The integration on y^t then leads to the following compact expression for Ueff (xt):
Ueff (xt) = (xt   (DYt 1)x)
 
(A+ C)D 1

xx
   (A+ C)D 1
xy
 
(A+ C)D 1

yy
 
(A+ C)D 1

yx
(xt   (DYt 1)x)
= (xt   ayt 1)Nxx (xt   ayt 1)
where the subscript x means the coordinate of a vector (or a matrix) in the x direction. The matrix Nxx
is dened by:
Nxx =
 
(A+ C)D 1

xx
   (A+ C)D 1
xy
 
(A+ C)D 1

yy
 
(A+ C)D 1

yx
=

a
As a consequence, the full system is nally described by the probability weight:
exp ( Ueff (xt)  Ueff (yt))
= exp

  (xt   ayt 1) 
a
(xt   ayt 1) 

1
2
y2t   ytxt 1

whose minimum is given by the dynamic equation:
xt = ayt 1
yt = xt 1
thats is:
xt = axt 2
At this point we have obtained the following result. All computations performed, the mean path followed
by agent x is similar to the classical case, but with a di¤erent coe¢ cient and this has to be compared with
the usual resolution we obtained previously:
xt = dxt 1
and the coe¢ cients a and d2 were given by (22) and (29).
We perform the comparison through a power series expansion in  which allows to compare the e¤ect
of forward looking behavior in both models. Actually, as said previously, we know that both approach are
identical for  = 0. This is checked directly here. Actually, at the fourth order:
d2 = + 2
 
2   1+ 4  22   1  2   1+O  5
a = + 2
 
2   1+ 22  2   12 3 +   2   1 22 + 4  2   12   14 +O  5
For 2 = 0, d2 and a coincide at all orders, and the usual result is recovered as announced in the previous
paragraph. It corresponds to a system with no internal uncertainty and the usual optimization problem is
recovered. For 2 = 1, which corresponds include an uncertainty in agents behavior one nds:
a = + 2
 
2   1+ o  3 = d
To the second order, both approaches coincide. The case 2 = 1 is equivalent to the case in which the
dominant agent x has full information about y. His knowledge about ys uctuation are of same amplitude
as his own, i.e. he knows the most that can be known about y.
At the third and fourth order, for 2 > 0, the results diverge, and a > d2, this is the consequence of
the inherent uncertainty of our model. Whatever the external signals, an internal randomness has been
introduced in each agent behavior. This induces in turn uctuations that destabilizes slightly the system
compared to the usual analysis. Only when 2 = 0, For  ! 0, the two solutions coincide, as explained in
the rst section. The reason is straigntforward. For  = 0, in both formalization, agents only care about
period t, and whatever their way to produce future forecasts, perfect, ordened by statistical weight, it will
be irrelevant.
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For 2 large, the previous series expansion for a breaks down and we have to come back to:
a =
1
 (2 + )

1
2
2 +
1
2
2   1
2
q 
2 + 2   2   22 + 1  2 + 2 + 2   22 + 1+ 1
2
22 +
1
2

=
1


1
2
  1
2
q
(1  2)2 + 1
2
2

for
 
1  2 > 0 and 1


1
2
+
1
2
q
(1  2)2 + 1
2
2

for
 
1  2 < 0
= 
which is the result expected under no information. This is coherent: agent x information is of low relevance
when 2 is large. This coincides also with the result for  = 0, since in that case agents dicard next periods
and the consequences of their own actions.
Varying the parameter 2 therefore allows to interpolate between the full and no information schemes
or, equivalently in this context, between a dynamic Stackelberg and a dynamic Cournot game.
This example suggests two conclusions. First, our scheme allows to switch continuously between a model
with no internal uncertainty (the usual optimization problem) to another model including internal uncertainty
about agents behavior. In other words, it allows to consider the quality of information at disposal for the
agents as a parameter and interpolate between full and no information cases.
Our second conclusion concerns the resolution method. From the exposition above, the standard opti-
mization method seems to yield a mire straightforward answer for the dynamics in the case of no internal
uncertainty. From this standpoint, our formalism, eventhough more general, seems tedious in the 2 ! 0
case. However, its advantages become clear when the number of agents increases. Whereas solving the
optimization equation (21) becomes harder when the number of agents increases, the dynamic equation (28)
will keep the same form. This rst order matricial equation will be easier to solve for some particular values
of 2, such as 2 = 1, thus providing a tool to describe analyticaly the behavior of the agents in a whole
range of systems. The dynamics thus obtained would di¤er from an optimization problem, but will remain
centered around the classical solution, and can be seen as an approximation of this one. Let us also note
that, however approximate, this "probability-based" solution is no less valid nor realsitic than the standard
description of the agent behavior.
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3 Application: Several interacting agents dened by a graph
3.1 Static model of several interacting agents.
Having presented the general formalism and described a representative example, we can now apply the
above formalism to a general class of models that t well with our approach. These type of models describe
interactions between n heterogenous agents, some agents dominating informationally and strategically others.
They are described by a graph ordering the agents by the relations of strategic domination among them (see
[5]). They are equivalent to some dynamic games models, and are close to monopoly or oligopoly models.
These models can also be used to describe dynamic patterns of decision for agents composed of several
sub-structures (see [3][4][5][6]).
We will rst present the static version of this class of model to introduce the agentsutility functions
along with the domination graph that commands the resolution. We will then develop the dynamic version
that will be used. Each agents e¤ective utilities are computed, to derive the whole systems e¤ective utility.
We then consider several examples.
3.2 Strategic relations between agents
The agentsstrategic relations dene the model setup. An oriented graph   whose vertices are labelled by
the agents involved describe these relations. When Agent i has a strategic advantage over Agent j; we draw
an oriented edge from i to j and write i ! j. If there exists an oriented path from i to j, we write the
relation i j, and state that Agent i dominates directly or indirectly Agent j or, equivalently, that Agent
j is subordinated to Agent i. If there is no oriented path from i to j, we write j 6 i; where it is always
understood that i 6= j. In the following, we merely consider connected graphs without loops.
3.3 Matricial formalism
Agents utilities are described by the following matricial formalism. Agents actions are encompassed in
a vector of actions, or control variables. The number of possible actions determine the size of the vector.
Utilities being quadratic, matrices may be associated with them.
Let Xi 2 Rni be Agent is vector of control variables, and ~X(i)j 2 Rni the vector of goals associated with the
variables Xj ; as expected by agent i. We normalize ~X
(i)
j to 0, so that Agent i wishes to achieve Xi = 0 and
Xj = ~X
(i)
j . Agent i
0s utility is given by:
Ui =  1
2
tXiA
(i)
ii Xi  
1
2
X
ji
t

Xj   ~X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj   ~X(i)j

(31)
 
X
ji
tXiA
(i)
ij

Xj   ~X(i)j

 
X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj
In the absence of any interaction, Agent i0s utility is given by the term
 1
2
tXiA
(i)
ii Xi
The variables Xi are normalized so that A
(i)
ii is a fi  ni diagonal matrix whose coe¢ cients are 1 or 0.
If Agent i0s subordinate agentsactions Xj depart from ~X
(i)
j , Agent i
0s will experience a loss of utility of
the form : X
ji
t

Xj   ~X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj   ~X(i)j

The fj  nj matrix A(i)jj of parameters is of course symmetric.
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The impact of Agent j0s action on Agent is utility isX
ji
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj  
X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj
where j  i can be seen as the impact of Agent j0s action on Agent i. In our model, Agent j does not
know the agents to whom he is subordinated, and processes their signals as external ones. The second term
models the strain imposed on Agent i by Agent j to achieve its own objectives for Xi.
Remark 1 Since the linear term in Xj disappears during the resolution,X
j 6i
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj
is equivalent to X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj
Notation 2 By convention, for the ni  nj parameters matrices A(i)ij , we will write tA(i)ij = A(i)ji .
3.4 Dynamic version
This section describes the general model for dynamics interacting structures. We adapt the the procedure
of the previous paragraph by transforming the matricial static utilities in a dynamic context, and assuming
each agent optimizes a forward-looking intertemporal utility function, given its own information set.
The intertemporal utility is of the form :
Vi(t) =
X
m0
mi E
t
iUi (t+m)
where i is Agent i
0s discount factor, and Eti his conditional expectation at time t. Agents compute their
expectations according to the following information pattern. Ui (t+m) is period t + m utility and is a
dynamic version of the static form (31), where the previous remark allows to set ~X(j)i = 0.
Ui (t+m) =  1
2
Xti (t+m)A
(i)
ii Xi (t+m) (32)
 1
2
X
ji

Xtj (t+m  1)  ~X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj (t+m  1)  ~X(i)j

 
X
ji
Xti (t+m)A
(i)
ij

Xj (t+m  1)  ~X(i)j

 
X
j 6i
Xti (t+m)A
(i)
ij Xj (t+m  1)
Which is, up to some constant irrelevant term, a straightforward generalization of the static model utility
function. Actually, in a dynamic context, we consider that agent i perceives external and other agents
signals with a one period delay.
Concatenating Xi(t + k) and the vectors Xj(t + k) for all j  i in one normalized column vector, we
rewrite the utilities:
Yi (t+ k) =


k
2

Xj (t+ k)  X(i)j

ji

where, by convention X(i)i = 0, X
(i)
j =
~X
(i)
j , j < i. We work now with the system of variables Yi (t). For all
i > j, i = j, one has the following map
 : Xj (t+ k) ,! Yi (t+ k)
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dened by: 


k
2Xj (t+ k)

=

0; :::; 
k
2

Xj (t)j>i   X(i)j

; 0; :::0

. Similarly, we dene the injection
0 : Yj (t+ k) ,! Yi (t+ k), given by 0 (Yj (t+ k)) =


k
2

Xj (t+ k)k>j   X(i)j

; 0; :::0

.
When there is no ambiguity, we will still write Xi(t+ k) and Xj(t+ k) for the images of these vectors by
these injections. In other words Xi(t + k) = (Yi (t+ k))i and Xj(t + k) = (Yi (t+ k))j are the i-th et j-th
components of Yi (t+ k) respectively.
With these conventions, the utilities rewrite:
U
(i)
t =
X
k>0
k
0@ Xi (t+ k)A(i)ii Xi (t+ k) +Pj<i Xj (t+ k   1)  X(i)j A(i)jj Xj (t+ k   1)  X(i)j 
+2Xi (t+ k)A
(i)
ij

Xj (t+ k   1)  X(i)j

+
P
j>i 2Xi (t+ k)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t+ k   1))
1A
=
X
k>0
Yi (t+ k)

A
(i)
ii 0
0 0

Yi (t+ k) + Yi (t+ k   1)
 
0 0
0 A
(i)
fjjg
!
Yi (t+ k   1)
+Yi (t+ k)
 
0 
1
2A
(i)
ij

1
2A
(i)
ji 0
!
Yi (t+ k   1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t+ k)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t+ k   1))
We will also add possibility for an inertia term:
 Xi (t) (i)ii Xi (t  1)
to obtain:
U
(i)
t =
X
k>0
Yi (t+ k)

A
(i)
ii 0
0 0

Yi (t+ k) + Yi (t+ k   1)
 
0 0
0 A
(i)
fjjg
!
Yi (t+ k   1)
+Yi (t+ k)
 
  12 (i)ii 
1
2A
(i)
ij

1
2A
(i)
ji 0
!
Yi (t+ k   1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t+ k)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t+ k   1))
3.5 Pattern of information
The full resolution of the model relies on agentsexpectations, that is agentsinformation sets or parameters
knowledge. The pattern of information over the domination graph we propose describes how agents perform
their forecasts. Each agent knows the domination relations of the subtree he strategically dominates, but
ignores the reactivity of the subtrees agents to external, non dominated agents. In other words, Agent i
knows the values of the A(k)k` for i  k and i  `. The remaining coe¢ cients A
(k)
k` are forecasted to 0 for
this agent. Remark that, under our assumptions, agents do not attribute a probability to the coe¢ cients
they forecast, but rather a xed value.
We moreover assume that, at each period t, Agent i knows the signals Xj(t  1) for i j and Xj(t  1) for
j 6 i by which he is a¤ected. From these hypotheses, we can infer some results about the agentsforecasts.
First, Agent i forecasts to 0 all the actions of agents he does not dominate. That is, for j 6 i and m  0
one has:
EtiXj (t+m) = 0
This condition will allow to simplify some computations when computing the e¤ective action of agent "i".
The action variables Xj (t+m) for j 6 i will be discarded.
We conclude this paragraph by remarking that In the case of oligopoly interpretation, the pattern of
information chosen ulimately determines which kind of game is played, Stackelberg, Cournot...
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3.6 E¤ective utility
As explained in the previous section, each agent j behaves at time t with a so called e¤ective utility
Ueff (Xj (t))  Ueff (Xj) whose form is found recursively. As shown before, for the less informed agents -
those for which Xi (t) = Yi (t) - the non normalized e¤ective utility reduces to time t utility:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
X
t
Yi (t)A
(i)
ii Yi (t) 
p
Yi (t  1) (i)ii Yi (t  1) +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
The previous section has shown that (Ueff (Xi (t))), the e¤ective utility that determines the probability of
behavior of agents who dominate others informationially is given by (11):
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp

U
(i)
t
 Y
rk(j)<rk(i)
Y
s>t
exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
2j
1A dXj (s) (33)
Appendix 2 proves that, after coming back to the variable Xi (t), the non-normalized e¤ective utilities
solving (33) have the form:
Ueff (Xj (s)) = Y
e
j (s)

Nii 0
0 0

Y ej (s)  2Y ej (s)

Mii Mij
0 0

Y ej (s  1)
+
X
i>k>j
2s tXj (s)A
(j)
jk (Xk (s  1))
with:
Y
(e)
j (t+ k) =


k
2

Xk (t+ k)  X(j)ek

kj

(34)
where X(j)ek is the e¤ective goal of j for k. Appendix 2 provides a formula for the e¤ective goal given the
parameters of the model, and proves that Ueff (Xi (t)) is given by:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

(35)
 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
The matrices Mii, Mij , Nii, also computed in Appendix 2, are:
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sii (36)
  ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sjj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sji

Mii = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)

ii
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)

ij
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where S stands for the symetrized matrix, and with:
A =
p

0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
B =
0BBBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii
np


A
(i)
ij +A
(j)
ij

; B12
o
np


A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji

; Bt12
o 8>>><>>>:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
p

8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA
C =
p

0BB@
0 A
(i)
ij  A(j)ij
 

A
(i)
ji  A(j)ji
 8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A(j)fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
and
B11 = A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
ji
B12 =

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ; 

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

B22 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ;

 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
t 
A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

;


A
(j)
kj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
S
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
It is shown in Appendix 3 that the matrix D satises the dynamic equation:
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0 (37)
The notation fg used here is convenient to describe concatenated blocks of matrices such as for example8>>><>>>:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
p

8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
9>>>=>>>; to refer to matrices A
(i)
jj , B22,... that are concatenated in
a larger one, say M . The matrix M is built by concatenating the matrices A(i)jj , B22, that are pasted
given their indices. The dimension of M will thus be implicitely determined by its constituing matrices. For
example A(i)jj has elements along the coordinates (j; j). When several matrices have elements at the same
place in M , these elements are simply added.
Alternatively one can also represent the e¤ective utility as:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2
_Xi (t)Mii _Xi (t) 

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

Mij

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

+
1
2

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

N^ii

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

with:
N^ii = Nii +
1
2
Mii
_Xi (t) refers to the discrete derivative, that is _Xi (t) = Xi (t) Xi (t  1).
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Remark that (35) is not in a normalized form. The normalization can be achieved by imposing that:Z
exp ( Ueff (Xi (t))) dXi (t) = 1
and this implies:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

(38)
 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
 1
2
0@Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

+
X
j<i
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
1At
 (Nii) 1 
0@Miip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

+
X
j<i
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
1A
  ln det (Nii)
However the terms depending on contributions for j > i may be discarded due to our pattern of information,
in which Xj (t) with j > i is considered as a random noise by agent i. We are then left with:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

(39)
 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
 1
2
0@Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

+
X
j<i
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej
1At
 (Nii) 1 
0@Miip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

+
X
j<i
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej
1A  ln det (Nii)
and this more precise form is used when needed to compute conditional expectations.
More about this point and the derivation of the normalization is given in Appendix 2. But let us now
consider an application of (39). The important point is that the e¤ective utility remains quadratic, after
integrating both anticipations and interactions between agents.
The probability associated to that utility is then:
/ exp (Ueff (Yi (t)))
Remark that the e¤ective utilities for Xi (t) depend on, and implicitely include the discount factor that
was previously absorbed in the denition of, Yi (t). Considering again (11) and using (4) means that (recall
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the notation Xi(t+ k) = (Yi (t+ k))i and Xj(t+ k) = (Yi (t+ k))j):
P

(Xj (t+ 1))j 6=i ; :::; (Xj (t+ n))j 6=i ; ::: j Xi (t)

= Eti
Y
k
P

(Xj (t+ k + 1))j 6=i j (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i

d (Xj (t+ k))j 6=i
= exp
0@X
j<i
0@X
k>0
Yj (t)

Nii 0
0 0

Yj (t)  2Yj (t)

Mii Mij
0 0

Yj (t  1)
+
X
i>k>j
2 (Yj (t))j A
(j)
jk (Yk (t  1))k
1A1A
then rewriting this expression in terms of the initial variables Xi, Xj and including the normalization:
P

(Xj (t+ 1))j 6=i ; :::; (Xj (t+ n))j 6=i ; ::: j Xi (t)

=
1
2

Xj (t)  X(j)ej

Njj  Mjj (Njj) 1Mjj

Xj (t)  X(j)ej

 1
2
X
i>k>j

Xj (t)  X(k)ej

Nkk

Xj (t)  X(k)ej

 1
2
X
i>k>j

Xk (t)  X(k)ek
t
MkkNkkMkj

Xj (t)  X(k)ej

 1
2
X
i>k>j

Xj (t)  X(k)ej
t
MjkNkkMkk

Xk (t)  X(k)ek

 

Xj (t)  X(j)ej
Mjjp


Xj (t  1)  X(j)ej

 
X
k<j

Xj (t)  X(j)ej
Mjkp


Xk (t  1)  X(j)ek

that is, the probability of future values Xj (t+ k), j 6 i presents a discount behavior. The uncertainty for
future values is increased by the relative absence of concern for future periods.
3.7 E¤ective action for the system
Having found the non normalized form for agent i e¤ective utility in (35):
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
we form the e¤ective utility for the set of all agents by summing over i:X
i
Ueff (Xi (t))
At this point some precisions have to be added. In the previous expression, one could sum over the normalized
utilities dened by: Z
exp ( Ueff (Xi (t))) dXi (t) = 1 (40)
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Normalizing the e¤ective utilities was legitimate when computing Ueff (Xi (t)). Actually to perform its
"random" optimization process each agent was attributing a probability to each other agents action, so
that the normalization was needed. But now, all computations done, Ueff (Xi (t)) describes the utility of a
"blind" agent, since all anticipations are included in the form of Ueff (Xi (t)). These agents participate to a
system composed of N interconnected parts, and for this global system the di¤erent periods are connected.
This is similar, at the individual level, to our procedure attributing a single weight corresponding to the
intertemporal utility.
One can check that imposing (40) would correspond, on average, to let all agents optimize Ueff (Xi (t))
independently. In other words, the normalization condition amounts to consider independent agents. How-
ever, once the e¤ective utilities have been computed, the agentsforward-lookingness, computational skills
and rationality have been fully taken into account and are included within the form of the e¤ective utility.
From this point onward, agents cannot be considered as independent anymore, but must rather be considered
as integral and "blind" parts of a global system, whose elements are interconnected through the di¤erent
periods.
In probability terms, it means that each agent utility at each period cant be normalized independently
from the others, but only the probability dened by the all path. As such, only a joint probability has to be
dened, and the normalization is performed over all agents and the all set of periods. As a consequence, at
the utility level, we will consider the intertemporal e¤ective utility for the system asX
t
X
i
Ueff (Xi (t))
where, in the previous expression, we use the non normalized individual utilities. The global probability
weight considered, will be, up to a global normalization:
exp
 X
t
X
i
Ueff (Xi (t))
!
it describes he system as a whole, whose weight relates all parts of it and all periods as related. Of course,
summing over all agents except i and all periods after t would lead us to retrieve Ueff (Xi (t)) (plus past
contribution that would disappear in a normalization) as needed.
Remark also that this e¤ective utility can be modied by adding also interaction terms between the
agents, that were not taken into account in the derivation of e¤ective utility for any of them. It represents a
system where each agent has adapted his behavior given its information, but this one about the all system
is incomplete, even for the most informed agents.
By summing over i the expressions in (35) and reordering the sums over agents, one obtains the following
expression for the global weight a time t:
Ueff ((Xi (t)))
=
X
i

1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
1A
Dene the Xei as the stationnary solution of the saddle point equation. They satisfy the following system
1
2
Nii   Miip


Xei   X(i)ei

+
X
j>i

A
(i)
ij
Xej  
Mijp


Xej   X(j)ej

+
X
j<i

A
(j)
ij
Xej  
Mijp


Xej   X(i)ej

= 0
that can be rewritten as:
1
2
Nii   Miip


Xei +
X
j 6=i

A
(i)
ij  
Mijp


Xej =  
0@X
j>i
Mijp

X
(j)e
j +
X
j<i
Mijp

X
(i)e
j
1A
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It can be solved as:
Xei =  
 
G 1

ik
0@X
j>k
Mkjp

X
(j)e
j +
X
j<k
Mkjp

X
(k)e
j
1A
with G the concatenated matrix dened by:
Gij =

1
2
Nii   Miip


ij + (1  ij)

A
(i)
ij  
Mijp


Then dene X (t), the concatenation of the Xi (t) and Xe the concatenation of the Xei . Then, the total
e¤ective action rewrites:
Ueff (X (t)) =
1
2
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe (41)
   X (t)  XeM +Op

 
X (t  1)  Xe+ Ueff   Xe
=
1
2
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe   X (t)  XeM +Op

 
X (t  1)  Xe
+
0@1
2
XeN Xe   XeM +Op

Xe  
X
j<i
Xei
Mijp


Xej   X(i)ej
1A
with:
N = (Nii)
M = (Mii)
Oij = A
(j)
ij  M (i)ij if j < i
Oij = A
(i)
ij  M (j)ij if j > i
The second term coming from the general property of a quadratic form plus linear term:
q (X) = XAX +XBX0
for X0 a constant vector. If X is the saddle point of q (X), one can rewrite:
q (X) =
 
X   XA  X   X+ q   X
The quadratic term Ueff
 
Xe

is constant and irrelevant when considering the dynamic over a given time
span T . Its contibution to the e¤ective utility is a constant TUeff
 
Xe

that can be discarded. However,
later we will look at a statistical set of processes with a variable time span T . In that case this term will play
a role when comparing and averagit over these processes. Note ultimately that TUeff
 
Xe

can be negative,
which will be the most interesting case for us. It corresponds to a lowered e¤ective utility, with respect to 0
as a benchmark case, consequence of internal tension between the di¤erent elements composing the system.
Having found the general form for the e¤ective utility, we now describe several examples including di¤erent
patterns of strategic dominations.
3.8 Example: N non strategic agents
Consider the simplest example/case where N agents have no information nor strategic advantage. In this
"N non strategic agents case", which is actually equivalent to a Cournot oligopoly, the utility of each agent
is:
U
(i)
t =  
X
t
t

Xi (t)A
(i)
ii Xi (t)

+
X
j 6=i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
where the individual goals of any agent has been set to 0 for the sake of simplicity. The agents being non
strategic, other agentsactions are perceived as mere external perturbations. In that situation, Xj (s) for
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s > t is seen as a variable independent from Xi (t). As such the integrals over these variables does not a¤ect
the part of the utility depending on Xi (t) and, as explained in the rst section:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =  Xi (t)A(i)ii Xi (t) +
X
j 6=i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
So that the global weight is:
exp
 X
t
X
i
Ueff (Xi (t))
!
= exp
0@X
t
X
i
0@ Xi (t)A(i)ii Xi (t) +X
j 6=i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
1A1A
As a consequence the probability for the system path is centered around the minimum of:
X
t
X
i
0@ Xi (t)A(i)ii Xi (t) +X
j 6=i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
1A
and this minimum satises:
A
(i)
ii Xi (t) =
X
j 6=i
A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
for all t. This dynamic equation is the usual optimization of individual utilities. Our method thus reproduces
the classical optimization problem, including, through the probability distribution, a modelling of random
perturbations on the system. The reason is the following: the absence of any information about the others
leads the agents to behave independently from the others. Arguably, under no information, agents tend to
behave independently, inducing their actions to be randomly distributed around the individual optimums.
3.9 Example: N+1 agents. Domination of one on the others
This case is a generalization of the basic example of section one. It could be interpreted as a Stackelberg
oligopoly with one dominant agent. For the rst, least strategic, type of agent, the procedure is the same as
in the previous example, and its e¤ective utility will be its time t utility:
Ueff (Xj (t)) =  X1 (t)A(j)jj X1 (t) + 2Xj (t)A(j)jk (Xk (t  1)) + 2Xj (t)A(j)j1 (X1 (t  1))
we assume that A(j)jj = A
(1)
jj = 1, A
(j)
kj =  for all j and k, including j = 1 or k = 1.
For the strategic agent, on the other hand, the e¤ective action (35):
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
is computed using the formula (36) given in the previous paragraph. The matricesMii,Mij , Nii are computed
in Appendix 2 and listed above in (36).
We show in Appendix 5 that we obtain (we record the results for N > 1 and the case N = 1 is presented
in the same Appendix):
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N11 =
 
1 + 2

+ 2N
NV +W
N   1
 2 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))2

0BB@

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

N2
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

 
N

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

1CCA
M11 =   (N11)

p
N (1 + 2   W ) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

Mij =   (N11) (1; ::; 1)
p
 (N   1) (1 + 2   W ) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1
((1 + 2) W )

(1 + 2) W +N

(V (N   1) +W +  (N   2))  ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

with:
W =
1
2

1 + 2  
q
42 + 1

and V satises:
N
(N   1)2 +N2 (1 + )
N   1 V
2
+
2

(N   1)2 +N2 (1 + )

+
 
(2 + )N (N   1)2 + (N   3)N2 + (4N   2) +N   1
N   1 V
+
 
(N   1) + (1 + )2W 2 +  (N   1)  N + 22 + 2   2W + (N   1)  (N   1)2 + 1
N   1
The full action for the system of agents is thus:
Ueff (Xj (t)) + Ueff (Xi (t)) =
X
j<1

 Xj (t)A(j)jj Xj (t) + 2Xj (t)A(j)jk (Xk (t  1)) + 2Xj (t)A(j)j1 (X1 (t  1))

+
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

The average dynamics is the saddle path of the previous global e¤ective utility and is thus given by the
dynamic evolution:
Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Xj (t)

= M1
 
Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei
Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej
!
+M2

Xi (t  1)
Xj (t  1)

with:
M1 =

(N11)
 1
M11 (N11)
 1
M1j
0 0

M2 =

0 0
 (1; ::; 1)
t
(1)  1

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where we denote by (1) the matrix lled with 1 in every row. We are mainly interested in the dynamical
pattern of the system and we will thus set X(i)ei = X
(i)e
j = 0, so that the equilibrium is forXi (t) = Xi (t) = 0.
The dynamical pattern is then determined by M and its eigenvalues, and Appendix 5 shows that:
M =

(N11)
 1
M11 (N11)
 1
M1j
 (1)  1

=
  pNm   (1; ::; 1) (N   1)m
 (1; ::; 1)
t
(1)  1

with:
m =
(2  W + 1) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
2N NV+WN 1 +(1+
2)
((1 + 2) W )

(1 + 2) W +N

(V (N   1) +W +  (N   2))  ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

The eigenvalues of M are:
 1; 1
2
(a+ 1) 1
2
s
a2   2 (N   1) a+ 4N (N   1)p

a
with:
a =  

p
N (2  W + 1) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
2N NV+WN 1 +(1+
2)
((1 + 2) W )

(1 + 2) W +N

(V (N   1) +W +  (N   2))  ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

The full study of the dynamical pattern as a function of the parameters being beyond the scope of this paper,
we will merely draw the main characteristics of the results. First, the fact that eigenvalues are propotional
to  means that interactions between dominated agents create instability in the system. Second, when  is
relatively small, W ' 1  and (2  W + 1) ' 3. This implies that a grows with , at least for relatively
low values of this parameter. Interactions may thus become unstable when agents grow more forwardlooking
and attempt to drive the system toward their optimum. Finally, the larger is N , the more unstable the
system is, as shown by the term proportional to N (N   1) in the square root, and the fact that a can
be proved to be of constant magnitude when N increases. Moreover, for large N , the eigenvalues become
imaginary, so that the system presents an oscillatory pattern. The interpretation is that a large number of
dominated agents produces uctuations further amplied by mutual interactions. Under such a setting, no
single dominating agent may stabilize the system.
3.10 Example: the three structure model.
This case considers GLW model involving three agents ranked by their relations of strategic advantage.
Each agent optimizes, given its own information set, a forward-looking intertemporal utility function of
the form:
Vi (t) =
X
m0
mi E
t
iUi(t+m)
The forecasts by Agent i of future quantities is computed given its information set.
The utilities take the following dynamic form:
UB (t) =  1
2
(n (t) + 1  w (t  1))2   n (t) sn (t  1) (42)
UU (t) =  1
2


1  w (t  1)  ef2   1
2
 (w (t  1)  ew)2   1
2
s2n (t) 
1
2
s2f (t) 
1
2
s2w (t)
UC (t) =  1
2
(w (t)  w0)2   1
2
n2 (t  1)  vn (t  1)w (t)  sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ef  sw (t  1)  w (t)  et
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under the constraint: w + f = 1.
Note that in each of the above utilities the agent own action variables appear with a time index t, as
expected for utility at time t, whereas other agentsaction variables appear with a time index t  1
Utilities are quadratic and normalized so that the terms containing the square control variables have
coe¢ cients of   12 or 0.
The reasons for these choices, as well as the interpretation of the variables is detailled in reference GLW.
We give a short acount now.
The utility of the body The body, being an automaton, has no specic goals, and its utility function
UB merely describes its reaction to other agentsactions1 . Without any interaction with the unconscious U,
the body would, in rst approximation, react linearly to the conscious C action, "feeding" :
 1
2
(n (t) + 1  w (t  1))2
The unconscious inuences the body by perturbating its signal
 nsn
Whereas in the absence of the unconscious, the bodys optimum would be reached for
n =  f = 0
This result being suboptimal for Agent U, he will tilt the equilibrium toward its own goal ~f .
Recall that the task performed by the conscious w is not physically demanding, and has no impact on
the bodys response n. Indeed, we do not model physical e¤orts per se, but rather seek to understand how
the unconscious can manipulate an existing equilibrium between the body and the conscious, i.e. the use of
body signals by the unconscious to reach its own goals. By convention  is positive, so that a positive strain
will respond to a positive feeding.
The utility of the conscious In the absence of both the unconscious and the body, the consciousutility
would be :
 1
2
(w   w0)2
so that in the absence of any constraint set on w, Agent C would optimally choose w = w0 > 0.
Body needs a¤ect Agent C through
 1
2
n2   nw
so that the higher is the need, the more painful is the task.
In the absence of Agent U, Agent C sets w = 0 by adjusting the feeding to the anticipated need. The
need is in itself painful since:
 1
2
n2
so we set
 > 0
1 In this setting, endowing the body with specic goals would have allowed it to manipulate the conscious, which was not
our purpose here.
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The above assumption is a direct consequence of dismissing any cost to the feeding f . Here we depart from
standard models where costs, or constraints, are imposed to an agents tasks.Without Agent U, Agent B and
f could be discarded from Agent Cs equilibrium. Once Agent U is included in the system, it indirectly
manipulates Agent C through Agent B by assigning a strategic role to f . However we impose a binding
constraint on the feeding by considering f and w as complementary activities within a given time span, and
set f+w = 1, as previously mentioned. The unconscious imposes its goals ~f and ~w on the conscious through
perturbation terms:
 sf (f   ~f)  sw (w   ~w)
driving Agent Cs actions away from 0 and towards ~f and ~w.
Some additional technical conditions on UC will prove convenient. We will ensure that UC is negative
denite and has an optimum by setting :
   2 > 0
Furthermore, excessive working combined with unsatised needs should induce a loss in Agent C utility.
This is implemented by imposing:
 > 0 for n > 0 and w > 0
Furthermore, excessive working combined with unsatised needs should induce a loss in Agent C utility.
This is implemented by imposing:
 > 0 for n > 0 and w > 0
The utility of the unconscious Agents, conscious or unconscious, build their interpretation of a situation
- and thus its utility function - through an own, specic, grid of lecture. See ([4]) for further details.
Agent U and Agent C will therefore have two completely di¤erent interpretations of a single situation. And
while Agent C will consider f and w as optimal, Agent U will consider other levels of the consciousactivity,
~f , ~w as optimal.
Agent Us goals with respect to Agent Cs activity are:
 1
2
(f   ~f)2   1
2
(w   ~w)2
To insure that UU can have an optimum, we further impose  and  to be positive.
Since the three agents are sub-structures of one single individual, a strain inicted by one agent ends up
being painful for all. The costs incurred are :
 1
2
 
s2n + s
2
f + s
2
w

The information setup follows the order of domination among agents. For the sake of clarity we do not
present here the information set up. It will be fully described in the resolution of the general model. Agent
B, the less informed of all agents, is only aware of the strains hes a¤ected by. Agent C is aware of its own
inuence on Agent B, and of the strains Agent U puts on him. Agent U , the most informed of all agents,
knows the utilities function of both Agent C and Agent B.
The instantaneous utility Ui(t + m) at time t + m reproduces the model described in previous papers. We
assume that each action taken at time t by any agent will only be perceived by the other agents at time
t+ 1.
3.10.1 Resolution
Following our general procedure in this case presents the same pattern as in the previous example. We
compute rst the e¤ective utility for the least informed agent, namely B, then for agent C and ultimately
for agent U. Then all these e¤ective utilities are gathered to form the e¤ective utility of the all system. All
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computations are performed in Appendix 6, and they result in the following..The e¤ective utility for the
system is:
Ueff =

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

Nii

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

 

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

Mij
 
w (t  1)   w(3)
eff
n (t  1)   n(3)
eff
!
+ (1  c)w2 (t) + 2w (t)n (t  1) + sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ~f

+ sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
+ (n (t))
2   2n (t)w (t  1) + 2n (t)   1 0 0  s (t  1)
Appendix 6 displays the computations leading to coe¢ cients matrices Nii,Mij and c and constants
 
s(3)

eff
, 
w(3)

eff
. The average dynamics for such system has the standard form
X (t)MX (t  1) (43)
and the matrix M has three nul eigenvalues, and the two others satisfy:
 = 
p
2 (d+ 2   bd2)
r
Num
Den
with:
Num = d!4 +
 
d2+ f!d2 + d + fd+ !32

2
+
 
d3   d32   d23   fd2 + 32 + f2
Den = d
  
bd2   2   d2   r2 (   bd)
  d!4 +  d2+ f!d2 + d + fd+ !322
+
 
fd22   d32 + d3   fd2 + 32 + f2
where 2 is the degree of uncertainty in agents behavior dened before when designing the e¤ective utilities.
The interpretation is similar to [5][6] : Agent B reacts to Agent Cs feeding in a 1 to 1 ratio, and Agent
Cs will react to Agent Bs need with a ratio , so that both agentsactions will be multiplied by over a
two-period horizon. Agent Us action paying only over a two to three-periods horizon, it is irrelevant when
 = 0, and prevents Agent U from taking it. The myopic behavior among agents leads to an oscillatory
dynamics. Each agent, reacting sequentially, adjusts its action to undo other agentsprevious actions. This
describes cyclical and apparently inconsistent or irrational behaviors in the dual agent. These oscillations
may diverge or fade away with time, depending on the value of . When  is di¤erent from 0 but relatively
small, the system is still oscillatory. When  increases, the time concern will have an ambiguous e¤ect on
its stability. Agent U would tend to stabilize the system through the indirect chanel, but the sensitivity of
agent C, may impair this possibility and the stability of the system depends on the relative strength of the
parameters.
However, as explained previously, our method providing an interpolation between full certainty and full
uncertainty, one can study how the parameter 2 inuences the results. To do so, we compare the results for
the classical dynamics for various degree of uncertainty 2 in agents behaviors. We look at three examples,
mild uncertainty 2 = 1, full uncertainty, 2 !1, no uncertainty 2 ! 0, which converges to the classical
case. The most interesting case for us will be 2 = 1, the two others one being bechmarks cases. The
parameters and eigenvalues of the model for these cases are listed in Appendix 6, we only keep here the main
results.
For 2 ! 0, one nds for the systems eigenvalues, to the second order in :
 = 
r
 
d
= p 

1  
2
2
 
   2+O  3
and we recover the classical results as needed. This conrms the fact that in the case of no uncertainty, one
recover usual optimization results. For the interpretation of this result, see ([6]).
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For 2 !1, one obtains:
 = p 
and the interpretation is straightforward: this results is the same as for 2 = 0,  = 0. When the agents are
facing a full uncertainty concerning the future behaviors, it behaves with a myopic reaction: reacting only
to past signals, and not anticipating about the future.
As said before, the case for 2 = 1 is the most interesting for us, since in general it corresponds to what we
aim at modeling: agents anticipating other agents, but taking into account for uncertain intrinsic behaviors.
The computations to the second order in , simplify to yield the following values for the parameters:
 = p    1
2
2
p   !r2 +    2+O  3
In that case, with respect to the benchmark case 2 ! 0, the amplitude of the oscillations increase. The
agents forecasts others, and take into account their behavior in their action. But the increased internal
uncertainties increase in turn the internal uctuations between the agents. The more uncertain the future
actions, the more agents react to the information at their diposal.
4 General form for the e¤ective action
Previous sections show that each agent is described by an e¤ective utility Ueff (Xi (t) ; Xj (t  1)) and a
probability exp (Ueff (Xi (t) ; Xj (t  1))). We have seen that Ueff (Xi (t) ; Xj (t  1)) can be computed
explicitly for a quadratic utility and is then itself quadratic. If agents utility U (i)t is not quadratic, the
successive integrals dening Ueff (Xi (t) ; Xj (t  1)) do not simplify, but we propose an approximate formula
for the e¤ective utility that we will justify from the model point of view.
Relaxing the condition of quadratic utility, we set the following intertemporal utility:
U
(i)
t =  
X
k
k
0@0@V (i)i (Xi (t+ k)) +X
j<i

V
(i)
j (Xj ((t+ k)  1))

+ 2Xi ((t+ k))A
(i)
ij (Xj ((t+ k)  1))
1A1A
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
Where V (i)i (Xi (t)) and V
(i)
j (Xj (t  1)) are agents i and j arbitrary utilities. We have kept quadratic
interaction terms (or linear response) between agents. We assume that each agent respond linearly to the
external perturbations.
It is useful to rewrite U (i)t with the variables Yi (t) introduced in the previous section, adding the possibility
of an inertia term (i)ii :
U
(i)
t =
X
k>0
Yi (t+ k)

A
(i)
ii 0
0 0

Yi (t+ k) + Yi (t+ k   1)
 
 (i)ii 0
0 A
(i)
fjjg
!
Yi (t+ k   1) (44)
+Yi (t+ k)
 
0 
1
2A
(i)
ij

1
2A
(i)
ji 0
!
Yi (t+ k   1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1)) +
X
k>0
kV
(i)
i
 
Xi (t+ k)

k
2
!
+
X
j<i
 
V
(i)
j
 
Yj ((t+ k)  1)

k 1
2
!!
Using the procedure given in the rst section, we nd recursively the e¤ective utility Ueff (Xi (t)). It is
computed trough the integrals in (11):
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp

U
(i)
t
 Y
rk(j)<rk(i)
Y
s>t
exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
2
1A dXj (s) dXi (s+ 1)
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and depends on the e¤ective utility Ueff (Xj (s)) where rk (j) < rk (i). We prove in appendix 7 that
Ueff (Xj (s)) has the form:
Ueff (Xi (t)) = Yj (t)

Nii 0
0 0

Yj (t)  2Yj (t)

Mii Mij
0 0

Yj (t  1) + V (j)eff (Yj (t)) (45)
+
X
k>j
2Xj (t)A
(j)
jk (Xk (t  1))
where V (j)eff (Xj (t)) is some function ofXj (t) that depends on the potentials V
(i)
i (Xi (t)) and V
(i)
j (Xj (t  1)).
This is very similar to the quadratic case, where an additional potential has been added. The proof is similar
to the one given in Appendix 2.
Gathering the terms in the exponentials, the whole system is modelled by the probability weight:
exp
0@X
j
X
s
Ueff (Xj (s))
1A (46)
= exp
0@X
j
X
s
0@ Yj (t)

Nii 0
0 0

Yj (t)  2Yj (t)

Mii Mij
0 0

Yj (t  1) + V (j)eff (Yj (t))
+
P
k>j 2Xj (t)A
(j)
jk (Xk (t  1))
1A1A
as needed to show the recursive form of (45). The fact that the e¤ective action is very similar to the one
obtained for the quadratic case, allows to nd directly the e¤ective action fo the system as a whole (without
normalization). It is obtained by adding to the quadratic action the corrections due to the e¤ective potentials:
Ueff (Xj (t)) =
1
2
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe  X (t)  XeM +Op

 
X (t  1)  Xe+Veff (X (t)) (47)
where:
Veff (X (t)) =
X
j
V
(j)
eff (Xj (t))
The inclusion of an intertemporal constraint will be modeled in ad hoc way by adding a termX
j
Z
Xj (s)Xi (t) dsdt
in the e¤ective utility, for a nal result:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
X
j6i
 1
2
_Xi (t)Mij _Xj (t)  V (i)eff (Xi (t)) +
X
j
Z
Xj (s)Xi (t) dsdt
4.1 Extensions: measure of uncertainty and optimal control
Our formalism allows to recover, in the limit of no "internal uncertainty" for the agents, the usual opti-
mization dynamics of system. But our formalism may encompass other kinds of models : actually, models
including an exogenous dynamics for a state variable which is accessible only through an indicator variable
would t our set up provided that we extend our basic model of interaction between agents. This extension
will include a particular type of uncertainty of information for every agent about other structures which is
an intermediate possiblity between full/no information.
4.1.1 Exogenous dynamics, indicator variables and Kalman lters
Consider a dynamic system for an arbitrary variable Xj (t) (the "state of the world"):
Xj (t) = AXj (t  1) +BXi (t  1) + "j (t) (48)
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with gaussian shocks "j (t) of variance covariance matrix . The vector Xi (t) is the control variable for an
agent "i" that inuences Xj (t) and is in turn inuenced by Xj (t). This type of model appears for example
in neuroscience motor control theory. Agent i has an - instantenous - objective function
Xi (t)A
(i)
ii Xi (t) +Xj (t  1)A(j)ii Xj (t  1)
similar to the one studied in Appendix 4. However the di¤erence here is that agent i does not measure
directly Xj (t  1) at time t, but only an indicator function Zj (t  1) related to Xj (t) through:
Zj (t) = HXj (t) + !j (t)
where !j (t) is gaussian of variance covariance matrix 
.
This model ts in our context providing few modications. First, the state of the world Xj (t) can be
considered as describing a single non strategic agent - or equivalently as an aggregate of such agents - and
as such have no forward looking plan with respect to "i". The statistic weight associated with (48) is:
exp

  (Xj (t) AXj (t  1) BXi (t  1))t  1 (Xj (t) AXj (t  1) BXi (t  1))

(49)
Actualy, (Xj (t) AXj (t) BXi (t)) is gaussian with variance covariance matrix . The probability asso-
ciated to Xj (t) is thus proportionnal to (49).
This set up is thus encompassed in the two agents model developed in Appendix 4. Since the weight (49)
represents a probability at time t , the method used to derive (35) can be applied here, and the contributions
depending only on t  1 in (49) can be discarded. As a consequence, (49) is equivalent to:
exp

  (Xj (t))t  1Xj (t) + 2 (Xj (t))t
 
 1A
S
Xj (t  1) + 2 (Xj (t))t
 
 1B
S
Xi (t  1)

(50)
where
 
 1A
S
and
 
 1B
S
are the symetrization of  1A and  1B.
Since agent j is not strategic, its e¤ective utility (50) can be rewritten as:
(Xj (t))
t
A
(j)
jj Xj (t) + 2 (Xj (t))
t

(j)
jj Xj (t  1) + 2 (Xj (t))tA(j)ji Xi (t  1)
with:

(j)
jj =
 
 1A
S
A
(j)
ji =
 
 1B
S
The e¤ective action for agent i can thus be directly taken from Appendix 4, except that Xj (t  1) being
unknown, it will be replaced by Xj (t  1 j t  1), agent i forecast of Xj (t  1) given all its information at
the beginning of period t, i.e. Zj (t  1) and Xi (t  1).
Ueff (Xi (t)) =  

(Xi (t))i
MSiip

Xi (t  1)

 
 
(Xi (t))
MSijp

Xj (t  1 j t  1)
!
+
1
2
(Xi (t))
t
(Nii)Xi (t)
(51)
with:
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Nii =
p
A
(j)
ij
 
G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ji
t 1
V (1)m ; 0

A
(j)
ji
t
; G

0; V
(1)
l
t!
+ 1
 
p
A
(j)
ij
0@ +  ( (j)jj
2
)! 1
VlA
(j)
ij
t
G (Vl)
t
 11A 1

p

(
 (j)jj
2
) 
G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ji
t 1
V (1)m ; 0

A
(j)
ji
t
; G

0; V
(1)
l
t!
Mii =   (Nii)   1
 


G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1( (j)jj
2
) 
t
 1
+ 1
!
 t
Mij =   (Nii)   1
 


G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1( (j)jj
2
)
+ t
!
where the matrices E, F , G are dened as a function of H:
E =
0B@pA(j)ij
0B@
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji
1CA B12G
1CA
(52)
F =
p
A
(j)
ij
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
(53)

0B@A(i)jj + A(j)jj 
eff
; B22

H +
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA B12H
G = H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(j)
ji (54)
and H satises a quadratic equation. Dening:
H 0 = H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
+
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
the relation dening H 0 and then H is:0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1 
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p


H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 1!

0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
= 

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 
p

p
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + (H
0) 1
 1
(55)
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The matrix Vl is dened such that dim (Vl) = dim

A
(i)
ji

= m  (m+ k) (m and k are given by the
problem), and Vl is the concatenation in column of a nul m  k matrix and m m identity. The matrix
V
(1)
m ; 0

is the concatenation in column of V (1)m which is m  k matrix with the m m nul matrix. The
matrix V (1)m is the concatenation in line of a kk identity and a (m  k)k nul matrix if m > k. Otherwise
it is the concatenation in column of a mm identity and a m (k  m) nul matrix if m < k.
We also dene:

G (Vl)
t

= X 1

VlA
(j)
ij
t
, G = X 1

A
(j)
ij
t
  =
p
A
(j)
ij ,  =
p

(
 (j)jj
2
)
 =
n
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

+B22
o
B22 = 


(j)
jj
t 
A
(j)
jj
 1 

(j)
jj

where the matrix X solves:p
X 1 + 

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + 1


0@ ( (j)jj
2
)! 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p
X
 ( (j)jj
2
)! 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1A
=  



A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
+
p
X 1

The solution is unique, since it is imposed to have a series expansion in  that ts with the  = 0 case.
With matrices Nii MSii and M
S
ij at hand, we nd the usual reaction function for agent i by assuming
full certainty about agent i0s behavior. Under the assumption of the variance of its e¤ective action being
nul, agents i action is given by its quadratic action minimum, and its response to agent j is given by the
optimization of (51)
Xi (t) =
 
(Nii)
 1
MSiip

Xi (t  1)
!
+
 
(Nii)
 1
MSijp

Xj (t  1 j t  1)
!
(56)
= Xi (t  1) + Xj (t  1 j t  1)
supplemented by:
Xj (t) = AXj (t  1) +BXi (t  1) + "j (t) (57)
Zj (t) = HXj (t) + !j (t) (58)
with !j (t) an unknown error of (known) variance matrix 
.
These three equations, respectively for the state variable Xj (t), the indicator variable Zj (t) and the
reaction function Xi (t) for agent i, describe the system in interaction.
We also assume, as is usually done in this type of model, that expectations for Xj (t) are updated through
a linear projection ([9] 13.12.13):
Xj (t j t) = Xj (t j t  1) +K (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1)) (59)
with:
K = E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1))t


n
E

(Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1)) (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1))t
o 1
= Ptjt 1H
 
HtPtjt 1H + 

 1
42
and Ptjt 1 is dened as:
Ptjt 1 = E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1))t

and where (58) has been used.
Given (58), equation (59) is also equivalent to:
Xj (t j t) = Xj (t j t  1) +KH (Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) +K!j (t) (60)
To solve the dynamics of system, we proceed by nding the Kalman matrix K and the form of the expecta-
tions:
To nd Ptjt 1 and K, we follow [9] and rst dene an other squared expectation denoted Ptjt, given by:
Ptjt = E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t))t

Using eq. 4.5.31 and 13.12.16 in [9]
Ptjt = E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t))t

= E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1))t

 E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1))t



E

(Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1)) (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1))t
 1
E

(Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1))t

or, using (58):
Ptjt = Ptjt 1   Ptjt 1H
 
HtPtjt 1H + 

 1
HtPtjt 1 (61)
To nd the terms Ptjt and Ptjt 1, we rst use (57)
Xj (t+ 1) = AXj (t) +BXi (t) + "j (t+ 1)
and introduce the dynamic equation (56), which leads to:
Xj (t+ 1) = AXj (t) +B (Xi (t  1) + Xj (t  1 j t  1)) + "j (t+ 1)
and then, one obtains an expression for Pt+1jt as a function of Ptjt and an expression for Pt+1jt as a function
of Ptjt:
Pt+1jt = E

(Xj (t+ 1) Xj (t+ 1 j t)) (Xj (t+ 1) Xj (t+ 1 j t))t

= AE

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t))t

At + 
= APtjtAt + 
which leads, using (61), to the dynamic equation for Pt+1jt:
Pt+1jt = A

Ptjt 1   Ptjt 1H
 
HtPtjt 1H + 

 1
HtPtjt 1

At + 
Given our system we look for a stationary solution that is Pt+1jt = P which satises:
P = A

Ptjt 1   Ptjt 1H
 
HtPtjt 1H + 

 1
HtPtjt 1

At + 
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The Kalman Matrix is then given by:
K = PH
 
HtPH + 

 1
Having found K, the system reduces to:
Xi (t) = Xi (t  1) + Xj (t  1 j t  1)
Xj (t) = AXj (t  1) +BXi (t  1) + "j (t)
Zj (t) = HXj (t) + !j (t)
Xj (t j t) = Xj (t j t  1) +K (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1))
= Xj (t j t  1) +KH (Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) +K!j (t)
= (1 KH)Xj (t j t  1) +KHXj (t) +K!j (t)
The variable Xj (t j t  1) is found by taking the expectation by agent i at time t  1 of equation (57):
Xj (t j t  1) = AXj (t  1 j t  1) +BXi (t  1)
We are thus left with a system with three dynamic variables:
Xi (t) = Xi (t  1) + Xj (t  1 j t  1)
Xj (t) = AXj (t  1) +BXi (t  1) + "j (t)
Xj (t j t) = (1 KH)AXj (t  1 j t  1) + (1 KH)BXi (t  1) +KHXj (t) +K!j (t)
= (1 KH)AXj (t  1 j t  1) +KHAXj (t  1) +BXi (t  1) +K!j (t) +KH"j (t)
of matricial form:0@ Xi (t)Xj (t)
Xj (t j t)
1A =
0@  0 B A 0
B KHA (1 KH)A
1A0@ Xi (t  1)Xj (t  1)
Xj (t  1 j t  1)
1A+
0@ 0"j (t)
K!j (t) +KH"j (t)
1A
whose solution for dynamic starting at t = 0 is:0@ Xi (t)Xj (t)
Xj (t j t)
1A = tX
s=0
0@  0 B A 0
B KHA (1 KH)A
1At s0@ 0"j (s)
K!j (s) +KH"j (s)
1A
4.1.2 Uncertainty in observations and agents interactions
We have used our formalism to model the interaction between an uncertain exogenous medium and an
optimizing agent. The reverse point of view is straightforward to develop, in order to introduce some
uncertainty of measurement in our formalism.
For the general form of e¤ective utility (62) in the quadratic case, introducing uncertainty in the infor-
mation agent i receives from other agents j amounts to replacing past actions Xj (t  1) by Xj (t  1 j t  1).
We thus obtain
Ueff (Xi (t)) = Yj (t)

Nii 0
0 0

Yj (t)  2Yj (t)

Mii Mij
0 0

Yj

t  1 j (t  1)i

(62)
+
X
k>i
2Xj (t)A
(j)
jk Xk

t  1 j (t  1)i

where Yj

t  1 j (t  1)i

denotes agent i forecast of Yj (t  1) at t 1. The statistical weight exp (Ueff (Xi (t)))
associated to agent Xi (t) implies that the reaction function of agent i is given by:
Xi (t) = (Nii)
 1
MiiXi (t  1) +
X
j<i
(Nii)
 1
MijXj

t  1 j (t  1)i

+
X
k>i
A
(j)
jk Xk

t  1 j (t  1)i

+ "i (t)
(63)
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with "i (t) of variance (Nii)
 1.
The forecasts Xj

t  1 j (t  1)i

and Xk

t  1 j (t  1)i

are obtained as in the previous paragraph
through indicator variables and Kalman matrices. We also assume indicator variables for Xj (t  1) and
Xk (t  1):
Zj (t) = HjXj (t) + !j (t) (64)
Zk (t) = HkXk (t) + !k (t)
where !j (t) and !k (t) have variances 
j and 
k respectively. For the sake of simplicity we will assume
all agents have common indicator variables. However some specialized indicators to some of agents could be
introduced. To be consistent with our previous assumptions, we assume that agent i has no information
about Xk (t) apart from Zk (t), and that:
Xk

t  1 j (t  1)i

= Zk (t) = HkXk (t) + !k (t) (65)
a random variable of variance:
H
^kH
t + (Nkk)
 1
Up to some details, the forecasting procedure is thus the same. Agent i faces an exogenous dynamic given
agents j, j < i and k is perceived as a random shock. For i the dynamic of the "state of world" is then:
X
(i)
j (t) = (Njj)
 1
MjjXj (t  1)+
X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlXl

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl Xl

t  1 j (t  1)j

+"j (t)
(66)
Given our initial (rst section) assumptions, the actions of agents l > i, being unknown to i, are discarded.
The vector X(i)j (t) is the dynamic for j anticipted by i which is di¤erent from Xj (t), given the terms for
l > i that have been discarded)). Then:
X
(i)
j

t j (t  1)i

= (Njj)
 1
MjjXj

t  1 j (t  1)i

+
X
l<i
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl X (i)l

t  1 j (t  1)j

Note that agent i having more information than agent j we have used that Xl

t  1 j (t  1)j j (t  1)i

=
Xl

t  1 j (t  1)j

in the previous expression.
As before, the actualization of forecast is given by (we remove temporarily the upperscript (i) in the
forecast):
Xj (t j t) = Xj (t j t  1) +K (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1)) (67)
with:
K = E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1))t


n
E

(Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1)) (Zj (t)  Zj (t j t  1))t
o 1
= Ptjt 1Hj
 
HtjPtjt 1Hj + 

 1
and Ptjt 1 is dened as:
Ptjt 1 = E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1))t

and where (64) has been used. Given (64), equation (67) is also equivalent to:
Xj (t j t) = Xj (t j t  1) +KHj (Xj (t) Xj (t j t  1)) +K!j (t) (68)
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Following the same procedure as in the previous paragraph, one nds the Kalman matrix K, by dening Ptjt
which is given by:
Ptjt = E

(Xj (t) Xj (t j t)) (Xj (t) Xj (t j t))t

that satises
Ptjt = Ptjt 1   Ptjt 1Hj
 
HtjPtjt 1Hj + 

 1
HtjPtjt 1 (69)
Now, we use the dynamics equations (66) and (63) to nd Ptjt and Ptjt 1. Starting with (66)
X
(i)
j (t) = (Njj)
 1
MjjXj (t  1) +
X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

(70)
+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl X
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+ "j (t)
and then, since X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl X
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

is known to agent i at time t  1 (agent i has more information than agent j), then0@0@X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl X
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j
1A j (t  1)i
1A
=
X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl X
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

one thus obtain an expression for Pt+1jt as a function of Ptjt:
Pt+1jt = E

X
(i)
j (t+ 1) X(i)j (t+ 1 j t)

X
(i)
j (t+ 1) X(i)j (t+ 1 j t)
t
=

(Njj)
 1
Mjj

E

X
(i)
j (t) X(i)j (t j t)

X
(i)
j (t) X(i)j (t j t)
t
(Njj)
 1
Mjj
t
+ (Njj)
 1
=

(Njj)
 1
Mjj

P ttjt

(Njj)
 1
Mjj

+ (Njj)
 1
Leads, using (69), to the dynamic equation for Pt+1jt . We reintroduce now an index j to recall that the
probabitity Pt+1jt is computed for Xj and an index i to stand for the fact that the expectations are computed
by agent i:
P i;jt+1jt =

(Njj)
 1
Mjj

P i;jtjt 1   P i;jtjt 1Hj

HtjP
i;j
tjt 1Hj + 

 1
HtjP
i;j
tjt 1

(Njj)
 1
Mjj
t
+ (Njj)
 1
Given our system, we look for a stationary solution, Pt+1jt = P , which satises:
P i;j =

(Njj)
 1
Mjj

P i;j   P i;jHj
 
HtjP
i;jHj + 

 1
HtjP
i;j

(Njj)
 1
Mjj
t
+ (Njj)
 1
The Kalman Matrix is given by:
Ki;j = P i;jHj
 
HtjP
i;jHj + 

 1
which produces the forecast
X
(i)
j

t j (t)i

= X
(i)
j

t j (t  1)i

+Ki;j

Zj (t)  Zj

t j (t  1)i

= X
(i)
j

t j (t  1)i

+Ki;jHj

Xj (t) X(i)j

t j (t  1)i

+Ki;jHj!j (t)
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which, using (70) and (65), is equal to:
X
(i)
j

t j (t)i

= X
(i)
j

t j (t  1)i

+Ki;j

Zj (t)  Zj

t j (t  1)i

= X
(i)
j

t j (t  1)i

+Ki;jHj (Njj)
 1
Mjj

X
(i)
j (t  1) X(i)j

t  1 j (t  1)i

+Ki;jHj (!j (t) + "i (t))
= (Njj)
 1
MjjX
(i)
j

t  1 j (t  1)i

+
X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl X
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+Ki;jHj (Njj)
 1
Mjj

X
(i)
j (t  1) X(i)j

t  1 j (t  1)i

+Ki;jHj (!j (t) + "i (t))
= Ki;jHj (Njj)
 1
MjjX
(i)
j (t  1) +
 
1 Ki;jHj

(Njj)
 1
MjjX
(i)
j

t  1 j (t  1)i

+
X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl (HlXl (t  1) + !l (t  1))
+Ki;jHj (!j (t) + "i (t))
and, supplemented by the three equations:
Xi (t) = (Nii)
 1
MiiXi (t  1) +
X
j<i
(Nii)
 1
MijX
(i)
j

t  1 j (t  1)i

(71)
+
X
k>i
A
(j)
jk Xk

t  1 j (t  1)i

+ "i (t)
= (Nii)
 1
MiiXi (t  1) +
X
j<i
(Nii)
 1
MijX
(i)
j

t  1 j (t  1)i

+
X
k>i
A
(j)
jk (HkXk (t  1) + !k (t  1)) + "i (t)
X
(i)
j (t) = (Njj)
 1
MjjX
(i)
j (t  1) +
X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl X
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+ "j (t)
= (Njj)
 1
MjjX
(i)
j (t  1) +
X
l<j
(Njj)
 1
MjlX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
i>l>j
A
(j)
jl (HlXl (t  1) + !l (t  1)) + "j (t)
X
(i)
l6j

t j (t)j

= X
(i)
l6j

t j (t  1)j

+Kj;l

Zl (t)  Zl

t j (t  1)l

= Kj;lHl (Nll)
 1
MllX
(i)
l (t  1) +
 
1 Kj;lHl

(Nll)
 1
MllX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
p<l
(Nll)
 1
MlpX
(i)
l

t  1 j (t  1)j

+
X
j>p>l
A
(j)
lp (HpXp (t  1) + !p (t  1)) +Kj;lHl (!l (t) + "j (t))
47
leads to the dynamic system:0BBBB@
Xi (t)
X
(i)
fjg (t)
X
(i)
fjg

t j (t)i

X
(i)
fl6jg

t j (t)j

1CCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
(Nii)
 1
Mii 0 (Nii)
 1
Mij 0
A
(j)
ji Hi
(
(Njj)
 1
Mjj ;n
A
(j)
fjlgHl
o
l>j
)
0
n 
Nfjjg
 1
Mfjlgl<j
o
A
(j)
ji Hi
(
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5 Transition functions (Green functions)
5.1 General form for the transition function
As explained previously, the mean path dynamics, i.e. the mean time evolution of the interacting agents, is
obtained as the saddle path solution of the e¤ective action of the interacting system. This saddle path is
relatively easy to compute since all anticipations and forwardlookingness have been absorbed in the e¤ective
action. However we have also seen that (20) the path integral of the e¤ective action allows to model the
stochastic nature of the interacting system. It provides more precise results about the agents actions
uctuations and their transition probability between two states, thus allowing to represent the stochastic
paths associated to the system. Moreover, Because this approach will also prove important when we shift
to the eld representation for a large number of agents, this section will detail the form of the transition
functions, and their interpretation.
To do so, let us start with the system as a whole. As in (20) we dene:
X (t) = (Xi (t))
the concatenated vector of all theXi (t) with i running on the set of all agents. Moreover, Ueff

(Xi (t)) ;

_Xi (t)

is the total e¤ective action found in the rst section (see (41)):
expUeff (X (t)) = exp

 

1
2
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe   X (t)  XeM  X (t  1)  Xe
where we redened O+Mp

as M . The quantity:
P
  
X0 (t+ k)
 j  X0 (t) = Z Xi(t+k)=(X0i (t+k))
Xi(t)=(X0i )
exp
Z
Ueff

X (t) ; _X (t)

D (X (t)) (72)
is the transition probability from a state
 
X0

of the global system at time t, to a state
 
X0

at time t+ k.
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To understand better this quantity, it is useful to use a continuous time representation. To do so, we
rst rewrite the quadratic e¤ective utility in a convenient manner. In the formula (41):
Ueff (X (t)) =  

1
2
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe   X (t)  Xe Mp

 
X (t  1)  Xe
Decompose M = MS + MA where MS and MA are symetric and antisymetric respectively. Then, since
Ueff (X (t)) will be summed over t, rewrite the rst contribution to
P
t Ueff (X (t)):X
t
1
2
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe
as: X
t
1
2
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe
=
X
t

1
4
 
X (t)  XeN  X (t)  Xe+ 1
4
 
X (t+ 1)  XeN  X (t+ 1)  Xe
=
X
t

X (t) +X (t+ 1)
2
  Xe

N

X (t) +X (t+ 1)
2
  Xe

+
1
4
(X (t+ 1) X (t))N (X (t+ 1) X (t))
On the other hand, the second contribution in Ueff (X (t)) can be transformed by expressing the symetric
part of
 
X (t)  Xe Mp

 
X (t  1)  Xe as:
 
X (t)  XeMSp

 
X (t  1)  Xe
=

X (t) +X (t+ 1)
2
  Xe

MSp


X (t) +X (t+ 1)
2
  Xe

  1
4
(X (t+ 1) X (t)) M
S
p

(X (t+ 1) X (t))
Ultimately, the remaining term in Ueff

X (t) ; _X (t)

 
X (t)  XeMAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe
can be rewritten: 
X (t)  XeMAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe
=
1
2
 
X (t)  XeMAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe+ 1
2
 
X (t)  XeMAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe
=
1
2
 
X (t)  Xe +  X (t  1)  XeMAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe+ 1
2
 
X (t)  XeMAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe +  X (t)  Xe
=

X (t) +X (t  1)
2
  Xe

MAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe+  X (t)  XeMAp


X (t) +X (t  1)
2
  Xe

since MA is antisymetric. And thus,
 
X (t)  XeMAp

 
X (t  1)  Xe
= (X (t) X (t  1)) M
A
p


X (t) +X (t  1)
2
  Xe

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Gathering these terms allow to write ultimately:X
t
Ueff (X (t)) =

X (t) +X (t+ 1)
2
  Xe

N   M
S
p


X (t) +X (t+ 1)
2
  Xe

+
1
4
(X (t+ 1) X (t))

N +
MSp


(X (t+ 1) X (t))
  (X (t) X (t  1)) M
A
p


X (t) +X (t  1)
2
  Xe

We can then switch to a continuous time formulation of the e¤ective action by using the mid point approxi-
mation between X (t) and X (t+ 1), that is replacing X(t)+X(t+1)2 with X (t) (and t is a continuous variable)
and introducing
_X (t) = X (t) X (t  1)
so that
P
t Ueff (X (t)) becomes:Z  
X (t)  XeN   MSp

 
X (t)  Xe+ 1
4
_X (t)

N +
MSp


_X (t) +
 
X (t)  XeMAp

_X (t)

dt
If we add a potential Veff (X (t)) with:
Veff (X (t)) =
X
j
V
(j)
eff (Xj (t))
then (we include the factor
 p

 1
in the denition of MS and MA):
Ueff (X (t)) =
Z 
1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe (73)
+
 
X (t)  XeMA _X (t) + Veff (X (t)) dt
and the path integral dening the transition probability between two states is:
P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t (74)
=
Z
exp
 Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
X
i

1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe
+
 
X (t)  XeMA _X (t) + Veff (X (t))D (X (t))
External perturbations - shocks - may be added by the mean of a linear term X (t) J (t) often refered to
as "the source terme". It describes the linear response of the system to a general and arbitrary external
perturbation. The form of the transition function, or Green function, in (74) allows to compute, analyticaly
for a quadratic e¤ective action, or as a series expansion (see below) when Veff (X (t)) is introduced, the
stochastic pattern of a system deviating from its static equilibrium Xe.
5.2 Transition function for the quadratic case
Putting aside the perturbations V (Xi (t)) + X (t) J (t), but keeping the quadratic potential term which is
relevant for usual dynamic systems, the Green function associated toZ t
0
dtUquadeff (X (t)) =
1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t)+
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe+ _X (t)MA  X (t)  Xe
(75)
is obtained in a way similar to the discrete case arising in the individual agent problem (basic example of the
rst section or Appendix 2 ). Since the e¤ective utility (75) is quadratic, the computation of (74) reduces to
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a saddle point computation. We thus need to compute (75) for a classical solution Xc of the Euler Lagrange
equation :
1
2
 
N +MS

X (t) +

M (A)
t
 M (A)

_X (t)  2  N  MS X (t)   ~X = 0 (76)
That will be inserted in the action:
 

1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe+ _X (t)MA  X (t)  Xe
with initial conditions:
X (t) = X0 and X (t+ s) = X1
and the exponential of the result, after a suitable normalization, will be P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t.Z t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t))
=  
Z t
0

1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe+ _X (t)MA  X (t)  Xe dt
=  

1
4
_Xc (t)
 
N +MS

Xc (t)
t
0
+
Z t
0

1
4
Xc (t)
 
N +MS

Xc (t)   Xc (t)  XeMA _Xc (t)   Xc (t)  Xe  N  MS  Xc (t)  Xe dt
Given, the equation of motion for Xc (t), the second term becomesZ t
0

1
4
Xc (t)
 
N +MS

Xc (t)   Xc (t)  XeMA _Xc (t)   Xc (t)  Xe  N  MS  Xc (t)  Xe dt
=
Z t
0

1
2
 
Xc (t)  Xe   MAt  MA _Xc (t) + 2  N  MS Xc (t)   ~X
   Xc (t)  XeMA _Xc (t)   Xc (t)  Xe  N  MS  Xc (t)  Xe dt
=  1
2
Z t
0
 
Xc (t)  Xe  MAt +MA _Xc (t) dt
= 0
since M (A) is antisymetric, and we are led to:Z t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) =  1
4
h 
Xc (t)  Xe  N +MS _Xc (t)it
0
To nd this last expression one needs to compute Xc (t). We rewrite (76) as:
X (t) +A _X (t) +B
 
Xc (t)  Xe = 0
with:
A =

1
2
 
N +MS
 1  
MA
t  MA =  4   N +MS 1MA (77)
B =  

1
2
 
N +MS
 1  
N  MS
and set
 
Xc (t)  Xe = exp   At2 X 0 (t) so that X 0 (t) satises:
A
2
2
X 0 (t) + X 0 (t)  A
2
2
X 0 (t) +BX 0 (t) = 0
X 0 (t) +

B   A
2
4

X 0 (t) = 0
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Diagonalizing A
2
4  B allows to nd
q
A2
4  B and
 
Xc (s)  Xe = exp As
2
 
exp
 r
A2
4
 Bs
!
+ exp
 
 
r
A2
4
 Bs
!

!
Now we can use the initial conditions:
Xc (0) = x
Xc (t) = y
to nd the coe¢ cients  and :
x 

~X

= + 
y  

~X

= exp

 At
2
 
exp
 r
A2
4
 Bt
!
+ exp
 
 
r
A2
4
 Bt
!

!
and ultimately, the classical solution is:
 
Xc (s)  Xe = exp As
2
0BB@ sinh
q
A2
4  B (t  s)

sinh
q
A2
4  Bt
 x   ~X+ expAt
2
 sinhqA24  Bs
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt
 y    ~X
1CCA
Therefore the statistical weight we are looking for is:Z t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t))
=  1
4
h
Xc (t) 

~X
  
N +MS

_Xc (t)
it
0
=  1
4

y  

~X
  
N +MS

0@ A2 y    ~X  exp   At2 
q
A2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt
 x   ~X
+ cosh
q
A2
4  Bt
 q
A2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt
 y    ~X
1A
+
1
4

x 

~X
  
N +MS

0@ A2 x   ~X  coshqA24  Bt
q
A2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt
 x   ~X
+ exp
 
At
2
 qA2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt
 y    ~X
1A
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which can be written:Z t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) (78)
=  

y  

~X

2
2664 N +MS
0BB@cosh
 r
A2
4
 Bt
! q
A2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt

1CCA
3775

y  

~X

2
 

x 

~X

2
2664 N +MS
0BB@cosh
 r
A2
4
 Bt
! q
A2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt

1CCA
3775

x 

~X

2
+

y  

~X

2
0BB@
0BB@ N +MS exp At2
 qA2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt

1CCA+
0BB@ N +MS expAt2
 qA2
4  B
sinh
q
A2
4  Bt

1CCA
t1CCA


x 

~X

2
The normalization can be now introduced, as usually done for propagation of quadratic potential:
P (y; t+ s j x; t) = 1q
det
 
M

 expZ t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t))

Where M is the matrix dened by:
Z t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) =
0@ x   ~X
y  

~X
 1AtM
0@ x   ~X
y  

~X
 1A
This is a direct expression of the propagation kernel for a time span of t. We will give below an example of
computation for the transition function P (y; t+ s j x; t) in the two agents model previously studied. However
before doing so, and to ease the interpretation, it will be useful to separate this expression in two types of
contribution.
5.3 Interpretation: harmonic oscillations around the equilibrium
In the previous expressions for
R t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)), a change of variable:

Xc (s)  ~X
0
= U
r
(N +MS)
2

Xc (s)  ~X

(79)
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where U diagonalizes
q
A2
4  B, i.e.
q
A2
4  B = UU 1 leads to replace the relevant quantities inR t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) by: 
N +MS

2
! 1
A !  2
 r
(N +MS)
2
! 1
MA
 r
(N +MS)
2
! 1
B !  
 r
(N +MS)
2
! 1  
N  MS r (N +MS)
2
! 1
r
A2
4
 B ! 
exp

 At
2

! U 1 exp

 At
2

U
so that the e¤ective quadratic action becomes:Z t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) =  1
2

y0   ~X 0
 
tanh (t)

y0   ~X 0

(80)
 1
2

x0   ~X 0
 
tanh (t)

x0   ~X 0

+

y0   ~X 0
 
sinh (t)

x0   ~X 0

+
1
2

y0   ~X 0

exp

 At
2

  1


sinh (t)
+

sinh (t)

exp

 At
2

  1

x0   ~X 0

The last term in the right hand side represents the interaction between structures induced by the interaction
term A. It can be neglected if MA, which measures the asymetry between the various agents, is relatively
small with respect to the other parameters of the system. If we do so, the three rst terms on the right
hand side describe a sum of harmonic oscillators whose frequencies are given by the eigenvalues of . These
oscillator are not the initial structures, but rather some mixed structures involving all the initial agents.
They represent some independent and stable patterns arising from the interactions of the system.
This formulation of the e¤ective utility allows in turn to model the system in terms of deep - i.e.
fundamental - independent structures whose internal frquencies are given by the i (t). The combination of
their uctuations, plus some interaction leads to the apparent behavior, as an interaction between cycles of
di¤erent time scales.
5.4 Example of transition function
We will illustrate the computation of the transition functions using the basic example from the rst section.
The exponential of the e¤ective utility for the two agentssystem is then:
exp
 
 
X
t
(Ueff (xt) + Ueff (yt))
!
= exp
 
 
X
t
(xt   ayt 1) 
2a
(xt   ayt 1) 
X
t

1
2
y2t   ytxt 1
!
= exp
 
 
X
t
 
2a
x2t   xtyt 1

 
X
t

1
2
y2t   ytxt 1
!
= exp
 
 
X
t


2a
x2t +
1
2
y2t   xtyt 1   ytxt 1
!
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where a was dened in (29):
a =
1
2 (N + )

1 +N +N2 + 2  
q 
N + 2   2  N2 + 1  N + 2 + 2  N2 + 1
The e¤ective utility has the form of (41) with:
X (t) =

xt
yt

, N =

1 0
0 a

, M =

0 
1 0

MS =

0 1+2
1+
2 0

, MA =

0  12  12 0

(81)
The diagonalized transition function (80)Z t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) =  1
2

y0   ~X 0
 
tanh (t)

y0   ~X 0

 1
2

x0   ~X 0
 
tanh (t)

x0   ~X 0

+

y0   ~X 0
 
sinh (t)

x0   ~X 0

+
1
2

y0   ~X 0

exp

 At
2

  1


sinh (t)
+

sinh (t)

exp

 At
2

  1

x0   ~X 0

can now be computed. The matrices A and B are given by (77) and (81) :
A =  4   N +MS 1MA =  4 1 1+21+
2 a
 1
0  12  12 0

=
 
 4 (+1)( 1) 2+4a 2 1   8a( 1) 2+4a 2 1
8( 1)
 2+4a 2 1
4(+1)( 1)
 2+4a 2 1
!
B =  

1
2
 
N +MS
 1  
N  MS =  2 1 1+21+
2 a
 1
1   1+2  1+2 a

=
0@ 2(2+4a+2+1)2 4a+2+1   8a(+1)2 4a+2+1
  8(+1)2 4a+2+1
2(2+4a+2+1)
2 4a+2+1
1A
A2
4
 B =
 
2 6+4a 
2 1
 2+4a 2 1  8a +1 2+4a 2 1
 8 +1 2+4a 2 1 2 6+4a 
2 1
 2+4a 2 1
!
The change of variables (79) is:
Xc (s)  ~X
0
= U
r
(N +MS)
2

Xc (s)  ~X

with:
U =

1 1
  1a
p
a 1a
p
a

r
(N +MS)
2
=
1p
2
0@ 12q  12X + 12a+ 12 X+a 1X   12 (+ 1)
p
  12X+ 12a+ 12
X
1
2
q
1
2X +
1
2a+
1
2
X a+1
X
1
2 (+ 1)
p
1
2X+
1
2a+
1
2
X
1A
for X =
p
a22   2a+ 2 + 2+ 2
and the diagonal matrix  is dened by:r
A2
4
 B = UU 1 with  =
0B@
r
2
1+2 (6+4a+4pa+4pa)
1+2 4a+2 0
0
q
2 1+
2+4
p
a+4
p
a (6+4a)
1+2 4a+2
1CA
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For  > 1 close to 1 the interaction term
1
2

y0   ~X 0

exp

 At
2

  1


sinh (t)
+

sinh (t)

exp

 At
2

  1

x0   ~X 0

between the two oscillators is negligible, since A is close to 0 so that
 
exp
  At2   1 << 1 for any nite
span of time. considering  close to 1 is reasonable since it describes mutual interactions between the two
agents that are of the same order of magnitude.
We can check that for relatively large degree of uncertainty N and for  close to 1, a is of order , and
the two eigenvalues 2 1+
2+4
p
a+4
p
a (6+4a)
1+2 4a+2 and 2
1+2 (6+4a+4pa+4pa)
1+2 4a+2 are positive with:s
2
1 + 2   (6+ 4a+ 4pa+ 4pa)
1 + 2  4a+ 2 >
s
2
1 + 2 + 4
p
a+ 4
p
a  (6+ 4a)
1 + 2  4a+ 2
In our range of parameters the smallest one is close to 0, and the other one is of order 1.
As explained previously, computing the transition function between two states reduces to evaluating the
exponential along a "classical" path:
P (y; t+ s j x; t) = 1q
det
 
M

 expZ t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t))

and, given our assumptions,
R t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) reduces approximatively toZ t
0
dtUquadeff (X
c (t)) =  1
2

y0   ~X 0

1

1
tanh (1t)

y0   ~X 0

1
 1
2

x0   ~X 0

1

1
tanh (1t)

x0   ~X 0

1
+

y0   ~X 0

1

1
tanh (1t)

x0   ~X 0

1

where 1 is the eigenvalue:
1 =
s
2
1 + 2   (6+ 4a+ 4pa+ 4pa)
1 + 2  4a+ 2
The subscript 1 assigned to the vectors represents their coordinate along the eigenvector corresponding to
1. This eigenvector describes a mixed structure of xt and yt.The transition function for

y0   ~X 0

1
= 0
and

x0   ~X 0

1
= x is proportionnal to
exp

 1
2
x

1
tanh (1t)

x

A short time approximation looks like a Brownian path with transition function exp

 x22t

which describes
a di¤usion process without interaction. However this approximation is not correct for longer time scales,
and the di¤usion allows for transitions between far states.
5.5 Non quadratic contributions, perturbation expansion
Up to now we have described the classical - or mean value - dynamics of the whole system of interacting
structures, as well as its associated random di¤usion process in the case of quadratic utilities through the
transition function P (x; y; t) . For non quadratic corrections, the interaction potential V (Xi (t))+X (t) J (t)
can be introduced as a perturbation. It allows to describe Gfull (x; y), the Green function for the whole
system, as a perturbative series in V (Xi (t)) +X (t) J (t).
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External shocks can aso be introduced through X (t) J (t). Both term are now included in Veff (X (t)).
The computation of the Green function P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t is computed by decomposing
P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t (82)
=
Z
exp
Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0

1
4
_X (t)MS _X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe
+ _X (t)MA
 
X (t)  Xe+ Veff (X (t))D (X (t))

Z
exp
 Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0

Uquadeff (X (t)) + Veff (X (t))
!
D (X (t))
and expanding exp
RX(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
(Veff (X (t)))

in series. One then nds P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t as a sum:
P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t (83)
=
Z  X
n
1
n!
exp
 Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
Uquadeff (X (u)) du
!Z t+s
t
Veff (X (u)) du
n!
D (X (t))
=
Z 0@X
n
1
n!
Z
t<ui<t+s
Y
ui;i=1:::n
dui
Z
exp
 Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
Uquadeff (X (u)) du
! Y
ui;i=1:::n
Veff (X (ui))
1AD (X (t))
=
X
n
1
n!
Z
t<ui<t+s
Y
ui;i=1:::n
dui
0@Z exp Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
Uquadeff (X (u)) du
! Y
ui;i=1:::n
Veff (X (ui))D (X (t))
1A
This expression can be simplied by using the convolution properties of:
exp
 Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
Uquadeff (X (u)) du
!
D (X (t))  P0
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t
which are, in terms of integrals over X (t):
P0
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t = Z P0 X1; t+ s j X 0 ; t+ uP0  X 0; t+ u j X0; t dX 0
and more generally, for arbitrary ui; i = 1:::n, with ui < uj for i < j and t < uj < t+ s:
P0
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t
=
Z (
P0
 
X1; t+ s j Xn; un
 Y
i=1:::n 1
P0 (Xi+1; ui+1 j Xi; ui)
!
P0
 
X1; u1 j X0; t
) Y
i=1:::n
dXi
As a consequence (83) becomes:0@Z exp Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
Uquadeff (X (u)) du
! Y
ui;i=1:::n
Veff (X (ui))D (X (t))
1A
=
Z Y
i=1:::n
dXi

P0
 
X1; t+ s j Xn; un

Veff (X (un))

 Y
i=1:::n 1
P0 (Xi+1; ui+1 j Xi; ui)Veff (X (ui))
!
P0
 
X1; u1 j X0; t
)
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and the propagator we are looking for becomes a series of convolutions:
P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t (84)
=
Z  X
n
1
n!
exp
 Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
Uquadeff (X (u)) du
!Z t+s
t
Veff (X (u)) du
n!
D (X (t))
=
Z 0@X
n
1
n!
Z
t<ui<t+s
Y
ui;i=1:::n
dui
Z
exp
 Z X(t+s)=X1
X(t)=X0
Uquadeff (X (u)) du
! Y
ui;i=1:::n
Veff (X (ui))
1AD (X (t))
=
X
n
1
n!
Z
t<ui<t+s
Y
ui;i=1:::n
dui
Z Y
i=1:::n
dXi

P0
 
X1; t+ s j Xn; un

Veff (Xn)

 Y
i=1:::n 1
P0 (Xi+1; ui+1 j Xi; ui)Veff (Xi)
!
P0
 
X1; t+ u1 j X0; t
)
This series can be understood a series of Feynman graph without loops.
For each n, draw n + 1 lines connecting t, u1, u2..., t + s. Label each point ui with Veff (X (ui)). This
graph represents the propagation of the system between t and t+ s. During the intervall of time ui, ui+1, it
propagates "freely" from Xi to Xi+1, i.e. with probability P0 (Xi+1; t+ ui+1 j Xi; t+ ui). Then, at ui+1, a
perturbation occurs, of magnitude Veff (X (ui+1)), and the system propagates again freely between ui and
ui+1. The total contribution to P
 
X1; t+ s j X0; t coming from this graph is then:
P0
 
X1; t+ s j Xn; un

Veff (Xn)
 Y
i=1:::n 1
P0 (Xi+1; ui+1 j Xi; ui)Veff (Xi)
!
P0
 
X1; t+ u1 j X0; t

The overall transition function is an innite sum over all possibilities of perturbations at ui, where the
ui are the times at which the perturbation occurs, and Xi, the points where they occurs.
Let us remark that the previous series can also be obtained through a Laplace transform by dening:
G (x; y) =
Z
dt exp ( t)P (x; y; t) (85)
In that case, the convolutions in time - the integrals over the ui - are replaced, after Laplace transform, by
products of terms. Dening the free propagator:
G0 (x; y) =
Z
dt exp ( t)P0 (x; y; t)
the laplace transform ofX
n
1
n!
Z
t<ui<t+s
Y
ui;i=1:::n
dui
Z Y
i=1:::n
dXi

P0
 
X1; t+ s j Xn; un

Veff (Xn)

 Y
i=1:::n 1
P0 (Xi+1; ui+1 j Xi; ui)Veff (Xi)
!
P0
 
X1; t+ u1 j X0; t
)
in (84) becomes:
=
X
n
1
n!
Z Y
i=1:::n
dXiG
0

 
X1; Xn

Veff (Xn)
 Y
i=1:::n 1
G0 (Xi+1; Xi)Veff (Xi)
!
G0
 
Xi+1; X
0

(86)
which is easier to compute. The graphical interpretation is similar to the one developped for (84), Except
that the time variable has disappeared. We rather sum over perturbations regardless their time of occurence.
The nth term occuring in (86) correspond as before to n + 1 segments of "free" propagation, purturbed n
times by external inuences or shocks. ultimately, all these perturbation terms can be formally added, before
retrieving the time representation P (x; y; t) by inverse Laplace transform.
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The green function G (x; y) not only eases computations : besides its meaning it will prove usefull, for
a large number N of agents, to compute the transition function for nitely lived agents whose probability of
transition between x and y is a process of random duration t, with Poisson distribution of mean 1 . It then
describes the mean transition probability for a process with average lifespan of 1 and  is a characteristic
scale for the system with a large number of agents. We will come back to this point later.
6 Introduction of constraints
Up to this point, no constraint has been included in the behavior of the agents. For usual models in
Game theory, such as simple oligopolistic models, or independent interacting structure models, this is not
a problem. It may however represent a limitation for producers/consumers models, or systems including
global constraints in the interactions between independent agents. We will now consider the introduction of
constraints, in an exact way for simple cases, or as rst approximation in the general case.
To start with an example, we will consider the introduction af a budget constraint for an economic agent
optimising a quadratic utility. We will then extend the result to N agents with quadratic utilities and bound
by linear arbitrary constraints. We will nally suggest an approach to the general case of arbitrary utility.
6.1 Example: Single agent budget constraint
Consider the example of an agent, endowed with a quadratic utility, whose action vector Xi (t) reduces to
its consumption. Successive periods are linked through a current account intertemporal constraint of the
following form:
Cs = Bs + Ys  Bs+1 (87)
where Ys is an exogenous random variable, such as the revenue in the standards optimal control models.
For the sake of simplicity, we will discard any discount rate here. The inclusion of a discount rate will be
considered later in the context of a large number of agents described by a eld theoretic formalism.
Since the successive periods are interconnected through the constraint, when replacing Cs by the state
variable Bs, the probability weight studied previously becomes:
exp
 
U (Cs) +
X
i>0
U (Cs+i)
!
= exp
 
U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) +
X
i>0
U (Bs+i + Ys+i  Bs+i+1)
!
(88)
This measures the probability for a choice Cs and Cs+i, i = 1:::T with T the time horizon, or alternatively
the probability for the state variable B, to follow a path fBs+igi>0 starting from Bs. The time horizon
T represents the expectation at time s of the interaction process remaining duration. It should depend
decreasingly on s, but will later be supposed a random following a poisson process. As a consequence, the
mean expected duration will be a constant written T , whatever s. Integrating over the fBs+igi>2 yields a
probability of transition between Bs and Bs+1 written hBs+1j jBsi. The latter is the probability to reach
Bs+1 given Bs and is equal to
hBs+1j jBsi =
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) +
X
i>0
U (Bs+i + Ys+i  Bs+i+1)
!
Computing hBs+1j jBsi rather than the transition function for Cs does not change the approach developped
previously. It merely has to be applied to the state variable Bs rather than to the control variable Cs.
However, due to the overlapping nature of state variables, the probability transition hBs+1j jBsi now measures
a probability involving two successive periods. The whole point will be to rebuild the probability for the
path fCsgi>0 from the data hBs+1j jBsi.
To do so, consider a usual quadratic utility function, or at least its second order approximation, of
the form, U (Cs) =  
 
Cs   C
2
, with objective C. Then rescale    Cs   C2 !  C2s for the sake of
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simplicity. The constant C can be reintroduced at the end of the computation. The transition probability
between two consecutive state variables thus becomes:
hBs+1j jBsi =
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
U (Cs) +
X
i>0
U (Cs+i)
!
Cs
=
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
   Cs   C2  X
i>0
 
Cs+i   C
2!
=
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
   Bs + Ys  Bs+1   C2  X
i>0
 
Bs+i + Ys+i  Bs+i+1   C
2!
= exp
0@   Bs + Ys  Bs+1   C2   1
T
 
Bs+1 +
X
i>0
 
Ys+i   C
!21A (89)
with Bs ! 0, s ! T to impose the transversality condition. The number of periods, T , is itself unknown,
but as said before T is the expected mean process duration.
If Ys+i is centered on Y with variance 2,
P
i>0 Ys+i centered on Y with variance T
2, integration over
Ys+i yields
Z Y
dYs+i exp
0@  1
T
 
Bs+1 +
X
i>0
 
Ys+i   C
!2   1
2
TX
i=1
 
Ys+i   Y
21A
=
Z Y
dY 0s+i exp
0@  1
T
 
Bs+1 +
TX
i=1
 
Y 0s+i  
 
C   Y !2   1
2
TX
i=1
 
Y 0s+i
21A
with Y 0s+i = Ys+i   Y . The exponential rewrites:
exp
0@  1
T
 
Bs+1 +
TX
i=1
 
Y 0s+i  
 
C   Y !2   1
2
TX
i=1
 
Y 0s+i
21A
= exp
 
  1
T
 
Bs+1   T
 
C   Y 2   2
T
 
Bs+1   T
 
C   Y  TX
i=1
Y 0s+i  

1
2
+
1
T
 TX
i=1
 
Y 0s+i
2!
and the integration over the Y 0s+i leads to a weight:
exp
 
  1
T
 
Bs+1   T
 
C   Y 2   2
T
 
Bs+1   T
 
C   Y  TX
i=1
Y 0s+i  

1
2
+
1
T
 TX
i=1
 
Y 0s+i
2!
= exp

  1
T
 
Bs+1   T
 
C   Y 2 + 2
T (2 + T )
 
Bs+1   T
 
C   Y 2
= exp

  1
T + 2
 
Bs+1   T
 
C   Y 2
We can now write Bs+1 as a function of the past variables:
Bs+1 =
X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i (90)
Along with the expression Bs + Ys  Bs+1   C = Cs   C to write the global weight (89) as:
60
exp
0B@   Cs   C2   1
T + 2
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i   T
 
C   Y 
1A2
1CA
' exp
0B@   Cs   C2   1
T
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i   T
 
C   Y 
1A2
1CA
for a time scale large enough, so that T >> 2. The statistical weight thus becomes:
exp
0B@ T + 1
T
0@Cs   T
T + 1
C   1
T + 1
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i<0
Cs+i   T
 
C   Y 
1A1A2
1CA
= exp
0B@ T + 1
T
0@Cs   1
T + 1
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i<0
Cs+i + T Y
1A1A2
1CA
= exp
0B@ T + 1
T
0@Cs   Y   1
T + 1
0@X
i60
 
Ys+i   Y
 X
i<0
 
Cs+i   Y
1A1A2
1CA
For T >> 1, the last expression reduces to:
exp
0B@ 
0@Cs   Y   1
T
0@X
i60
 
Ys+i   Y
 X
i<0
 
Cs+i   Y
1A1A2
1CA
and dening C^s = Cs   Y , we are left with:
exp
0B@ 
0@C^s   1
T
0@X
i60
Y^s+i  
X
i<0
C^s+i
1A1A2
1CA (91)
Now, to dene the global statistical weight for the system over all periods, we use the convention for e¤ective
utilities chosen in the rst section. It amounts to dene the e¤ective utility of the agent at time t by cancelling
in (91) all terms independent from the state variable at time t. In terms of probability weight, it leads to
replace:
exp
0B@ 
0@C^s   1
T
0@X
i60
Y^s+i  
X
i<0
C^s+i
1A1A2
1CA / exp
0@ C^s2 + 2C^s
T
0@X
i60
Y^s+i  
X
i<0
C^s+i
1A1A
The global weight, over all periods is then:
exp
0@ X
s

C^s
2
  1
T
X
s1;s2
C^s1C^s2 +
2
T
X
s1>s2
C^s1 Y^s2
1A (92)
As a consequence, the introduction of a constraint is equivalent to the introduction of non local interaction
terms. The non local terms may, in some cases, be approximated by some terms in the derivatives of Cs.
Actually, remark that the quadratic terms
1
T
X
s1;s2
Cs1Cs2
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can be approximated by a sum of local terms through a taylor expansion of Cs2 . Indeed, writing the n -
arbitrary - lag contribution:
1
T
X
s1
Cs1Cs1 n =
1
T
X
s1
Cs1
 
Cs1 n   Cs1 (n 1) + Cs1 (n 1)   :::+ Cs1

(93)
introduces derivatives of Cs1 . For example, the term for n = 0, i.e.
1
T
P
s1
Cs1Cs1 shifts the quadratic
potential, and the term for n = 1
1
T
X
s1
Cs1Cs1 1 =
1
4T
X
s1
(Cs1 + Cs1 1)
2   (Cs1   Cs1 1)2
becomes in the continuous approximation
1
T
Z
(Cs)
2
ds  1
4T
Z 
d
ds
Cs
2
ds
Similarly, (93) can be written in the continuous approximation as a linear combination of terms;
1
T
Z
Cs
 
nX
p=1
ap
dp
dsp
Cs
!
with integer coe¢ cients ap. Integrating by parts and neglecting the border terms we are led to a sum:
  1
T
Z 0B@ nX
p=1
p even
( 1)p ap

d
p
2
ds
p
2
Cs
21CA (94)
These terms do not, in general, have to be expanded very far. Actually, when several agents interact through
short term interactions, some inertia naturally appears. When an inertia term   R   ddsCs2 ds is added in
the utility   (Cs)2, the characteristic time of interaction is of order 1p , and the agent is behaving in rst
approximation as an oscillator described by an e¤ective utility:
  (Cs)2   
Z 
d
ds
Cs
2
ds
and in that case, in rst approximation:
Cs  Ct cos

s  tp


so that Z
dtdsCsCt  C2t cos

s  tp


=
Z
dtC2t
as a consequence, the interaction term 1T
P
s1
Cs1Cs1 1 reduces to a correction to the quadratic term. We
will see later how to deal with the whole contribution 1T+2
P
s1;s2
Cs1Cs2 when considering a large number
of interacting agents in the context of a eld formulation. However, if one is interested in only one agent
behavior, one can, in rst approximation, keep only the one lag correction term to account for an action
including the constraint:
exp
 
 
X
s

Cs   
2
T + 2
C
2
  1
T + 2
X
s
CsCs 1 +
2
T + 2
X
s1;s2
Cs1 (Es1Ys2)
!
or, which is equivalent, using (94):
exp
 
 
X
s

Cs   
2
T + 2
C
2
  1
T + 2
X
s

d
ds
Cs
2
+
2
T + 2
X
s1;s2
Cs1 (Es1Ys2)
!
(95)
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6.2 Case of N>>1 agents
Until now, computations in this section were performed under the assumption that the constraint included
some exogenous variable Ys. For a system of N agents however, constraints are more likely imposed on
agents by the entire set of interacting agents. For example, in the previous paragraph, the variable Ys in the
constraint (87) represented the agents revenue. In the context of N interacting agents, this variable depends
on others activity, or in our simple model, on their consumption. Actually, in a system of consumer/producer,
the othersconsumption generates the ow of revenue Ys. In other word, agent i revenue Y is depends on
other agentsconsumptions Cjs - or possibly C
j
s 1 if we assume a lag between agents actions and their e¤ect.
More generally, for a system with a large number of agents, the revenue Y is , may depend on endogenous
variables that can still be considered as exogenous in agent i0s perspective. Thus our benchmark hypothesis
in this section will be that agents are too numerous to be manipulated by a single agent. Therefore the
procedure developped in the previous section to introduce a constraint for a single agent remains valid and
can be generalized directly. Again, we will impose a constraint for each agent and encode it in Ys or Y .
First Ys will be considered as exogenous by the individual agent and thus (95) will apply. Then (95) will be
modied to take into account the fact that Ys depends endogenously on other agents. Assume for example
that Y is =
P
ijC
(j)
s 1. The term
2
T
P
s1;s2
Cs1
 
Eis1Y
i
s2

can then be replaced in (92): Es1Ys2 !
P
ijC
(j)
s2 1
if s2 < s1. We will need to nd Eis1 C
(j)
s2 1 for s2 > s1 If we assume that agents forecasts C
(j)
s2 1 have a
gaussian random error and the number of agents N is large, the sum of errors in
P
ijC
(j)
s2 1 cancels out.
Note that here we rule out a collective mistake that could otherwise be reintroduced. As a consequence one
can replace 2T
P
s1;s2
Cs1
 
Eis1Y
i
s2
!Ps1;s2 ijCs1C(j)s2 1.
Thus the interaction terms for an agent i in (92) becomes:
2
T
X
s1;s2
C(i)s1 (Es1Ys2)!
X
j
Z Z
ijC
(i)
s C
(j)
t dsdt (96)
To sum up, the introduction of several agents translates the constraints as some non local interactions
between agents, and each agent constraint is shaped by the environment others created. Similarly, the
quadratic term becomes:
  1
T
 X
s1;s2
(Es1Ys2)
!2
!   1
T
X
j1;j2
Z Z
ij1
i
j2C
(j1)
s C
(j2)
t dsdt
This cannot be integrated out, but yields a contribution to the systems statistical weight:
2
T
X
i;j
Z Z
ijC
(i)
s C
(j)
t dsdt 
1
T
X
i;j1;j2
Z Z
ij1
i
j2C
(j1)
s C
(j2)
t dsdt
=
1
T
X
i;j
Z Z  
2ij  
X
k
ki 
k
i
!
C(i)s C
(j)
t dsdt
and consequently, for the system as a whole, including the constraint leads considering the term in the
e¤ective utility:
1
T
X
i;j
Z Z  
2ij  
X
k
ki 
k
i
!
C(i)s C
(j)
t dsdt 
X
i;j
Z
V

C(i)s ; C
(j)
t

dsdt (97)
Writing the constraints in term of a potential terms V

C
(i)
s ; C
(j)
t

allow taking into account, when necessary,
some non linear constraints modelled by the form of the potential V

C
(i)
s ; C
(j)
t

. Gathering these results
leads the global statistical weight for the set of agents as a continuous time version of (92):
exp
 
Ueff

= exp
0@ X
i
Z  
Cis
2
ds  1
T
X
i
Z Z
CisC
i
tdsdt 
1
T
X
i
Z Z
CisC
j
t dsdt 
1
T
X
i;j
Z Z
V

C(i)s ; C
(j)
t

dsdt
1A
(98)
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Keeping only the rst contributions of inertia terms 1T
R R
CisC
i
tdsdt as in the previous paragraph would lead
to:
exp
 
Ueff

= exp
 
 
X
i
Z 
1 +

T
  
Cis
2
ds  
T
Z Z 
d
ds
Cis
2
ds (99)
  1
T
X
i
Z Z
CisC
j
t dsdt 
1
T
X
i;j
Z Z
V

C(i)s ; C
(j)
t

dsdt
1A
where  and  are constants depending on the expansion of
P
i
R R
CisC
j
t and the parameters of the system.
6.3 Quadratic e¤ective utility with constraints, general case for large N
We can now apply these methods to the more general model of interacting agents with quadratic utilities
presented above. Recall the form for the e¤ective action without constraint (35)
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
It is found recursively by starting from the less informed agents. Including a linear constraint can be done
in the following way. Assume as before a constraint of the form:
Xi (t) = Bi (t) + Zi (t) Bi (t+ 1) (100)
where Zi (t) is other agentsexogenous inuence. Due to the large number of agents involved in the inter-
action process, we suppose each agent may at best inuence those surrounding agents on which it has a
strategic advantage. We can therefore assume that their weight in the whole set of agents is negligible. As
a consequence, the term Zi (t) being the other agents inuence, and beyond the control of any agent, it
must be considered exogenous.. Once this is specied, we can then introduce in the e¤ective utility a term
Xi (t)Mi

E
(i)
t
P
s Zi (s)

with E(i)t Zi (s) = Zi (s) for s 6 t and E
(i)
t Zi (s) = constant for s > t , where Mi
is found recursively, which yields:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

(101)
 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
X
j6i
Xi (t)K
(i)
ij
 
E
(i)
t
X
s
Zj (s)
!
and apply the methods presented in Appendix 2 to nd Ueff (Xi (t)) given the Ueff (Xj (t)), j < i .
Note however that we have included agent i constraint by replacing Xi (t) = Bi (t) + Zi (t)   Bi (t+ 1),
and imposed the transversality condition Bi (t) ! 0, t ! T ). For detailed computations and results, see
Appendix 4.
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The matrices are given by:
Nii =
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ii
(102)
   P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1
ij
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
jj
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ji

+

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pi
Mii = (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ii
+

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pi
Mij = (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ij
Mi =

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pi
K
(i)
ij =
 
Nii +Mii Mij

0BBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii

B12; 2
p


A
(i)
ij
S

Bt12; 2
p


A
(j)
ji
S 8><>:

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22;
2


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
S
9>=>;
1CCCCCA
 1

0BB@
B
(3)
12
2 (Njj)
 1
K
(i)
ij
P
j6iE
(i)
t
P
s Zj (s)
(
A
(j)
jj

eff
; B"22;
B
(3)
22
2 ;
p



(j)
fkjgk6j
2

eff
)
(Njj)
 1
K
(i)
ij
P
j6iE
(i)
t
P
s Zj (s)

1CCA
where D is the solution of (37) and:
P =

Pi 0
0 1j

; ~P =

0 0
0 1j

Pi =

(1 D)
D (1 DT )

1j = identity matrix for the block j < i
The e¤ective utility thus obtained includes the constraint
P
j6iXi (t)K
(i)
ij

E
(i)
t
P
s Zj (s)

that mixes the
agent action with some external dynamic variable, that may include the contribution of the whole set of
agents perceived as an externality, as in (96). Note that, compared to (92), a quadratic but non local in time
termXi (t)Xi (s) arises in the e¤ective utility. The reason is that we have considered the same approximation
as in the example of the consumer with a budget constraint (the rst example of the previous paragraph)
and kept only in these quadratic interactions the most relevant terms, Xi (t)Xi (t  1). Appendix 8 shows
however that the full analog of (92) as well as an exact e¤ective utility with constraint could be retrieved,
for a total result of:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

N
(0)
ii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
M (0)iip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

(103)
 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
M (0)ijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
X
j6i
Xi (t)K
(i)
ij
 
E
(i)
t
X
s
Zj (s)
!
+
X
j6i
X
s<t
Xj (s) 
(i;n)
ij Xi (t)
that includes the quadratic terms
P
j6i
P
s<tXj (s) 
(i;n)
ij Xi (t) that were, in (101), reduced to the "one lag"
approximation.
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6.4 Non quadratic utilities with constraints
We conclude this section by considering some constraints within the context of non quadratic utilities. To
do so, we start with a simple example and consider the budgent constraint (87) for a single agent:
Cs = Bs + Ys  Bs+1 (104)
At time t, the agents statistical weight has the general form (88):Z Y
i>1
exp
 
U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) +
X
i>0
U (Bs+i + Ys+i  Bs+i+1)
!
dBs+i (105)
Performing the following change of variables for i > 1:
Bs+i ! Bs+i  
X
j>i
Ys+j
Bs+i + Ys+i  Bs+i+1 ! Bs+i  Bs+i+1
the statistical weight (105) become:
Z Y
i>1
exp
0@U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) + U
0@Bs+1  Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A+X
i>1
U (Bs+i  Bs+i+1)
1A dBs+i (106)
Except for the case of a quadratic utility function, the successive integrals
Z Y
i>1
exp
0@U
0@Bs+1  Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A+X
i>1
U (Bs+i  Bs+i+1)
1A dBs+i (107)
arising in (106) cannot be computed exactly, . However, we can still dene a function U (Bs+1) resulting
from the convolution integrals (107):
exp
0@ U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A1A = Z exp
0@U
0@Bs+1  Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A+X
i>1
U (Bs+i  Bs+i+1)
1AY
i>1
dBs+i
(108)
The function U can be approximatively computed - we will comment on that later in the paragraph - however
its precise form is not needed here. Instead, we use the general formula (108) to write (106) as:
exp
0@U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) + U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A1A (109)
Here again (see the rst paragraph of this section), we can get rid of the variables Ys+i by considering them
to be gaussian random variables centered on Y for i > 1. The transition probability for Bs is obtained by
integrating (109) over the variables Ys+i :
Z Y
dYs+i exp
0@U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) + U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A  1
2
X
i>0
 
Ys+i   Y
21A (110)
This expression can be simplied. Actually, in the gaussian integrals:
Z Y
dYs+i exp
0@ U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A  1
2
X
i>0
 
Ys+i   Y
21A (111)
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the variable
P
i>1 Ys+i has mean T Y and variance T
2. As a consequence, if we assume T large enough so
that
p
T >> , then X
i>1
Ys+i ' T Y 
p
T ' T Y
in rst approximation. This allows to simplify (111):
Z Y
dYs+i exp
0@ U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A  1
2
X
i>0
 
Ys+i   Y
21A
' exp   U  Bs+1 + T Y 
so that, using the constraint (104) to write Bs+1 as a function of the past variables:
Bs+1 +
X
i>1
Ys+i =
X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i +
X
i>1
Ys+i
'
X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + T Y
the weight (110) results in:
Z Y
dYs+i exp
0@U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) + U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A  1
2
X
i>0
 
Ys+i   Y
21A (112)
' exp
0@U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1) + U
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + T Y
1A1A
We can consider that the term: X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + T Y
has relatively small uctuations with respect to its average T Y , we can approximate U by its second order
expansion:
U
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + T Y
1A ' C   
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + Y
1A2
the values of C and  depending on (108). Then, up to the irrelevant constant C, (112) simplies to the
second order approximation:
exp
0B@U (Bs + Ys  Bs+1)  
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + Y
1A2
1CA (113)
= exp
0B@U (Cs)  
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + Y
1A2
1CA
a result similar to the rst example of this section. The constraint can be introduced as a quadratic and non
local contribution to the utility U (Cs). This result is not surprising. The constraint being imposed on the
whole path of the system, the inclusion of its intertemporal quadratic expansion enforces the constraint on
average, as needed.
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Ultimately, the system statistical weight (113) can be summed over all periods, to give:
exp
0B@X
s
U (Cs)  
X
s
0@X
i60
Ys+i  
X
i60
Cs+i + Y
1A2
1CA
We can modify the previous expression accordingly, as we did in the case of a quadratic utility, when the
variables Ys+i and Y depend on the interactions with other agents. The procedure leading to (98) can
therefore be followed and yields the statistical weight for a set of agents with non quadratic utilities and
constraints:
exp
 
Ueff

= exp
0@ X
i
Z
U
 
Cis

ds  
T
X
i
Z Z
CisC
i
tdsdt 

T
X
i
Z Z
CisC
j
t dsdt 
1
T
X
i;j
Z Z
V

C(i)s ; C
(j)
t

dsdt
1A
(114)
In (98), the rst terms represent the individual utilities, the second and the third model the constraint
binding the agents, and V is an arbitrary potential of interaction between agents.
Let us close this section by quickly discussing the form of the function U dened by (108):
exp
0@ U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A1A = Z exp
0@U
0@Bs+1  Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A+X
i>1
U (Bs+i  Bs+i+1)
1AY
i>1
dBs+i
(115)
These integrals can be approximatively computed with the saddle path approximation technique devel-
opped in the rst and second sections. The saddle path result is not exact for a non quadratic utility, but
constitutes a su¢ cient approximation for us. The saddle path (115) for the function inside the exponential
can be written as a di¤erence equation Bs+i with i > 1:
U 0 (Bs+i  Bs+i+1)  U 0 (Bs+i 1  Bs+i) = 0 for i > 2
and:
U 0 (Bs+1  Bs+2)  U
0@Bs+1  Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A for i = 2
Once the saddle path Bs+i is found, it can be introduced in (115) to yield:
exp
0@ U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A1A = exp
0@U
0@Bs+1   Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A+X
i>1
U
 
Bs+i   Bs+i+1
1A
and a rst approximation for U is thus:
U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A = U
0@Bs+1   Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A+X
i>1
U
 
Bs+i   Bs+i+1

(116)
Some corrections to the saddle path can be included if we expand the RHS to the second order around the
saddle point by letting
Bs+i = Bs+i+1 + Bs+i
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and then integrate over Bs+i:
exp
0@ U
0@Bs+1 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A1A (117)
= exp
0@U
0@Bs+1   Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A+X
i>1
U
 
Bs+i   Bs+i+1
1A

Z
exp
0@U 00
0@Bs+1   Bs+2 +X
i>1
Ys+i
1A (Bs+2)2
+
X
i>1
U 00
 
Bs+i   Bs+i+1

(Bs+i   Bs+i+1)2
!Y
i>1
dBs+i
The log of the integrals in (117) will yield some corrections to (116), but we will not inspect further the
precise form of these corrections.
7 Fundamental structures and non local interactions: toward large
N systems
The system studied until now had a relatively small number of interacting agents. To later adapt the
formalism to a system with a large number of agents, two points have to be developped. First we will justify
the need for non local (in time) interactions between an arbitrary number of agents, even without constraints.
Second, it is usefull to come back to the Laplace transform of the Green function, and give a more accurate
account of its necessity.
7.1 Fundamental structures and non local interactions
We have found the transition functions for quadratic e¤ective utilities. The potential term acting as an
interaction term was developped perturbatively and provided an expansion for the transition functions for
any interaction potential. In the following, we will show how some simplication may arise and reduce the
system to sums of independent subsystems, called the fundamental structures.
To do so, rewrite the action (73):
Ueff (X (t)) =
Z 
1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe+ _X (t)MA  X (t)  Xe
+Veff (X (t))) dt
and rescale the variables: p
N +MSX (t) ! X (t) (118)p
N +MS
 1
M (A)
p
N +MS
 1
! M (A)p
N +MS
 1  
N  MS pN +MS 1 !  N  MS
where
p
N +MS is a square root obtained through the Jordan form of N+MS obtained through the Jordan
form. The matrix
p
N +MS is symmetric. Consequently, the e¤ective utility rewrites:
 1
2
_X (t) _X (t)  _X (t)M (A)

X (t) 

~X

 

X (t) 

~X
  
N  MS X (t)   ~X
=  1
2

_X (t) +M (A)

X (t) 

~X

_X (t) +M (A)

X (t) 

~X

 

X (t) 

~X

N  MS  

M (A)
t 
M (A)

X (t) 

~X

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The fact thatM (A) and
 
N  MS can be simultaneously diagonalized by blocks - for example if  N  MS
is proportional to the identity as will be assumed here - leads to a sum of independent subsystems:
!  1
2
 :
X^ (t) +

M
(A)
k

X^ (t) 

~X
 :
X^ (t) +

M
(A)
k

X^ (t) 

~X

 

X^ (t) 

~X
 
N  MS
k
 

M
(A)
k
t 
M
(A)
k

X^ (t) 

~X

=
X
k
 1
2
 :
X^k (t) +M
(A)
k

X^k (t) 

~X
 :
X^k (t) +M
(A)
k

X^k (t) 

~X

 

X^k (t) 

~X
 
N  MS
k
 

M
(A)
k
t 
M
(A)
k

X^k (t) 

~X

where

M
(A)
k

and
 
N  MS
k
are block diagonal matrices, whose blocks are written respectivelyM (A)k and 
N  MS
k
. Change the coordinates according to the eigenblocks of . Each X^k (t) denes an independent
structure, or equivalently the whole set of
n
X^k (t)
o
are of di¤erent type or species. These species correspond
to mixed structures, combinations of several agents or substructures. In a psycho-economic perspective, they
account for both conscious-unconscious structures. Note that it is a vague reminder of the Lacan/Mobius
strip. We will call these mixed structures, the fundamental structures. Remark that if each block is itself
diagonalized so that
 
N  MS
k
 

M
(A)
k
t 
M
(A)
k

! ef then, by a change of basis
 1
2

_Xef (t)  ~MefXef (t)

_Xef (t)  ~MefXef (t)

+
1
2

Xef (t) 

Y^ (1)

ef

ef

Xef (t) 

Y^ (1)

ef

(119)
represents a sum of n independent structures, each having its own fundamental frequencies given by ef .
This translates the independence of these structures in terms independent oscillations.
Remark also that, in a more comprehensive setting, the appearance of ~Mef reminds of the evolution of a
system on a curved manifold. The connexion of this space is tracked in ~Mef and takes into account internal
tension inside an independent structure. This tension induces a non trivial, i.e. curved, trajectory. The
apparent coherence of motion reects the independence and internal coherence of each of these structure.
Inversely, a break down in coherence, i.e. continuity of the motion may come from a singularity in the metric.
Once the fundamental blocks or structure are isolated, they evolve independently. This is the mark of the
stationnarity or stability of the system. The only interactions are local and internal to each block, tracked
by the curved classical trajectory.
For psychological agents/structures however, the local in time interaction may not be relevant. Actually,
for this type of models we are rather interested in "structures to structures" interactions, independent
from any causality. By this, we mean a type of interaction involving the global form of each structures.
Mathematically, it translates into a non local interaction involving the whole dynamic path of each interacting
structure: i.e. the interaction cannot be reduced to time to time action/reaction schemes.
Besides, we saw that for models including a binding constraint between agents, these constraints where
not local, but involved all periods as a whole. In large scale models, each agent participate to others
environment. As such, in this case also, interactions are seen, not as time to time action-reaction scheme,
but rather as global.
Large scale or global interaction between structures must therefore be introduced in our formalism. They
may take several forms, and describe inter and intra species inter-relations. These interactions will be added
through constraints representing long term, and not local in time, interaction.
Thus, whatever the kind of system consider, be it a large N economic system, or a large population of
structures with long-term interactions, non-local in time interactions have to be added to the system. We
have shown above that these interactions have the form:X
n
Z
Vn (X1 (s1) :::Xn (sn)) ds1:::dsn
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where the variables Xi (si) dene the control variables of a fundamental structure "i" and Vn stands for any
potential of interaction (including the case of a linear constraint). We will see later how the formalism can
be modied to account for these terms when the number of agents is large.
7.1.1 Green function as a kernel of operator
Alternatively, the Green function can be described through an operator formalism that will prove useful for
a larger N . Using the generic e¤ective action (73):
Ueff (X (t)) =
Z 
1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe+ _X (t)MA  X (t)  Xe
+Veff (X (t))) dt
and rewriting it to include MA in the kinetic term.
Ueff (X (t)) =
Z 
1
4

_X (t) + 2
 
N +MS
 1  
MA
  
X (t)  Xe  N +MS


_X (t) + 2
 
N +MS
 1
MA
 
X (t)  Xe
   X (t)  Xe N  MS    MAt  N +MS 1MA  X (t)  Xe+ Veff (X (t)) dt
The transition function associated to this functional is known satisfy (see [10]) :
@
@t
P (x; y; s) = r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe
   x  Xe N  MS    MAt  N +MS 1MA  x  Xe
A Laplace transform of the above equation replaces the derivative in times by a multiplication by , and
G (x; y; ), the Laplace transform of P (x; y; s) saties:
 (x  y) =

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe (120)
+
 
x  Xe N  MS    MAt  N +MS 1MA  x  Xe+ 
G (x; y; )
Namely, the propagator G (x; y) (85) satises (120). It is thus the kernel of a di¤erential operator, and as
such satises:
G 1 (x; y; ) =

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe (121)
+
 
x  Xe N  MS    MAt  N +MS 1MA  x  Xe+   (x  y)
As an example, if we were to specialize to the fundamental structure k that appeared in the previous
paragraph and whose e¤ective action (119) after change of variable was
 1
2

_Xef (t)  ~MefXef (t)

_Xef (t)  ~MefXef (t)

+
1
2

Xef (t) 

Y^ (1)

ef

ef

Xef (t) 

Y^ (1)

ef

one would obtain the green function as the inverse of a di¤erential operator for each fundamental structure.
More precisely:
G 1 =  1
2
(rk)

rk   ~Mef

X^k  

~X

k

+
1
2

X^k  

~X

k

ef

X^k  

~X

k

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Ultimately, and more generally, the analogy between non quadratic utility and the dynamic on a curved
variety mentionned above leads us to consider the possibility of Green function in a more general form:
G 1 =
1
2
(ri)mia (x)

rjmja (x)  ~M 0x

+
1
2

x 

Y^ (1)

N^

x 

Y^ (1)

(122)
where mia (x) is the vielbein associated to the metric M
 1
ij = miamja. This possibility would stem from non
quadratic utility contributions included in the coecients mia (x). The idea remains the same however: the
internal tension inside each structure induces a kind of "curved" trajectory.
The utility of representing the green function as the inverse of a diferential operator will appear in the
next section, but the idea is the following: for a large number of agents, a di¤erent point of view is necessary.
Rather than describing an assembly of N agents, it is more usefull to consider a medium constituted by
the assembly of agents, in which we can study the actions and interactions of an agent with others. The
Green function previously described participates to this description. The second order di¤erential operator
associated to G 1 will model the basic displacement operator, i.e. the di¤usion process, associated to an
agent in the surrounding.
8 Half Phenomenological model for interactions between large
number agents
We now use the results of the previous sections to transform the formalism in a collective representation, in
terms of elds, that will allow modelling systems with large number of agents.
8.1 Transition toward eld theoretic formulation. Laplace transform
The results of the previous section can be summed up as follows. We described a set of several individual
economic agents by a stochastic process dened in a space whose dimension depends of the number of degrees
of freedom, that is number of state variables, of the system. For the sake of the exposition, we will choose a
simplied version of the model developped previously, in its continuous time version. Each agents behavior
can be represented during a time span of s by a probability weight for each possible path of actions. For a
path x (t) of actions - such as consumption, production, signals - for t 2 [0; s] , the weight is:
exp
 
 
Z x(s)=y
x(0)=x

_x2
2
(t) +K (x (t)) dt
!
where K (x (t)) is a "potential term" whose form depends explicitely on the agents utility function, or any
other intertemporal function the agent optimizes.
The term _x
2
2 (t) represents an inertia term that may be induced by the externalities, the agentss envi-
ronment, or some constraint function in rst approximation. We may associate to this probability weight
the probability of transition between states x and y, that is the sum of these probabilities for all possible
paths:
P (x; y; s) =
Z
Dx (t) exp
 
 
Z x(s)=y
x(0)=x

_x2
2
(t) +K (x (t)) dt
!
(123)
It represents the probability for an agent to reach y starting from x during the time span s. It is the
probability of social mobility - moving from point x to y - for an agent in the social space. Written under
this form, the probability transition (123) is given by a path integral: The weight in the exponential includes
a random, brownian motion, plus a potential K describing the individual goals as well as social/economical
inuences. It can be seen as an intertemporal utility whose optimization would yield the usual brownian
noise plus some external determinants.
Now we can consider interactions between N agents in two ways. The rst one is local. Interactions
between agents are direct: an agents action implies a reaction at the next period, and the weight associated
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to the system has the form:
exp
0@  Z x(s)=y
x(0)=x
0@X
i
_x2i
2
(t) +
X
i
K (xi (t)) dt+
X
i;j
i;jxi (t) _xj (t)
1A1A
The quadratic interaction term xi (t) _xj (t) between agents could be generalized by a potential
V (x1 (t) ; _x1 (t) ; :::; xi (t) ; _xi (t) ; :::; xN (t) ; _xN (t))
This type of interaction describes strong interactions as well as possibly strategic domination relations
between agents.
This inclusion of local interactions can be set in a more compact form. By concatenating the agents
actions in one vector X (t) whose dimension is the sum of the dimension of the xi (t). The total weight for
X (t) has the form:
exp
 
 
Z x(s)=y
x(0)=x

1
2
_X (t)M _X (t) +K (X (t))

dt
!
(124)
where the matrix M encompasses the terms with derivatives (inertial or interaction terms). In other words,
the whole system can be described by a single path integral in a space of conguration which is the sum of
the individual conguration space, reecting the strong interaction between agents.
The second kind of interactions is non local in time and may arise in two cases. The rst one arises from
constraints agents impose on others. In standard economic models, the consumption function is subject
to the budget constraint, itself determined by a ow of income. This ow of income depends in turn on
the overall agentsbehavior. This implies interactions between the systems various agents. Besides, when
forward looking behavior and usual intertemporal optimization are accounted for, the resulting interaction
becomes non local. The actions e¤ective utility then becomes:
exp
0@  Z x(s)=y
x(0)=x
0@X
i
_x2i
2
(t) +
X
i
K (xi (t)) dt+
Z X
i;j
V (xi (t) ; xj (s)) dsdt
1A1A
and the potential term V (xi (t) ; xj (s)) reects the interaction through the constraint and the potential term
V (xi (t) ; xj (s)) reects the interaction through the constraint.
The second case where non local interaction may arise in our context comes back to (124). The e¤ec-
tive utility may, in some cases, be diagonalized in some fundamental structures, and written as a sum of
independent terms:
1
2
_X (t)M _X (t) +K (X (t)) =
X
k

1
2
_Xk (t)Mk _Xk (t) +Kk (Xk (t))

Since the probability weight of the system is a product of each structure weight, these structures have
independent dynamics. However, one may want to include some previously neglected interactions. Since each
structure has a long term persistence, one may assume that the whole set of agents shapes the environment
of each agent, considered individually. This type of interaction may be modelled by constraints, or more
generally non local interactions.
Including these types of interactions yield the following e¤ective utility:
 
X
k

1
2
_Xk (t)M _Xk (t) +K (Xk (t))

+
NX
l=1
X
k1;:::;kl
V (Xk1 (s1) ; :::; Xkl (sl))
and the path integral:
exp
0@ X
k
Z s
0

1
2
_Xk (t)Mk _Xk (t) +Kk (Xk (t))

dsk +
X
l
Z
0<si<s
X
k1;:::;kl
V (Xk1 (s1) ; :::; Xkl (sl))
1A
DX1 (s1) :::DXn (sn) (125)
73
where the potential terms include all possible non local interactions between the several fundamental
structures. This type of model includes the several cases mentionned just above. The local interactions are
included in a system from which some fundamental structures emerge. Then the non local interactions and
constraints arise as non local interactions between these fundamental structures.
Our aim would now be to deal with such models, but for a large number of agents. However, since
the number of variables Xk (t) increases with N , (125) becomes untractable when N becomes large. As a
consequence our formalism needs to be simplied or modied to deal with a large number of agents.
We can do so by rst supposing that the agents involved in (125) are not so entirely heterogenous that
they would have di¤erent e¤ective utilities. We rather expect agents to belong to broad classes or types.
Inside each class, di¤erences arise from the internal uncertainty present from the beginning, from interaction
terms among a class, or with the other classes. It is these internal uncertainty and interactions that will
provide statistical di¤erences results among the various types of agents.
Second, since (125) describes an interaction process with a duration - or agents lifespan s -we might
assume that this duration, for a large number of agents, may vary among interacting agents, or group of
agents.
To model this, we use the single agent transition function P (x; y; s) and compute its Laplace transform:
GK (x; y; ) =
Z
exp ( s)
Z
Dx (t) exp
 
 
Z x(s)=y
x(0)=x

_x2
2
(t) +K (x (t)) dt
!
ds
This expression models the transition function between x and y for an agent whose lifespan is a Poisson
process of average 1 . It ts well for a large number of agents whose interaction duration varies among the
population. The Poisson law has the advantage, among others, to describe a memory-free process. So that,
at each period, the same law will model the probability for the remaining time of interaction. Describing
the system in terms of GK (x; y; ) is a step toward the modelling of large N systems. It models a mean
transition function for a set of agents with random lifespan duration (or more generally, the duration of the
interaction process), where agents are themselves unaware of the length of this duration.
The green function GK (x; y; ) is the one worked out in the previous section for an arbitrary e¤ective
utility, along with a kinetic term _x
2
2 (t) induced by interactions, inertia, and or constraints. We quoted
previously that GK (x; y; ) can be seen as the inverse of an operator. Actually, it is the laplace transform
of P (x; y; s), with P (x; y; s) solving the usual laplacian equation:
@
@s
P (x; y; s) =

1
2
r2  K (x)

P (x; y; s)
As a consequence its Laplace transform GK (x; y; ) satises:
 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

GK (x; y; ) =  (x  y) (126)
Considering the description in term of Laplace transforms, the path integral to consider for the whole set of
agents becomes:Z
exp ( s) ds
Z
exp
 
 
X
k
Z s
0

1
2
_Xk (t)Mk _Xk (t) +Kk (Xk (t))

dsk (127)
+
X
l
Z
0<si<s
X
k1;:::;kl
V (Xk1 (s1) ; :::; Xkl (sl))
1ADX1 (s1) :::DXn (sn)
Or, if we consider di¤erent average lifespan for the various agents:Z Y
i
exp

 is(i)

dsi
Z
exp
 
 
X
k
Z s
0

1
2
_Xk (t)Mk _Xk (t) +Kk (Xk (t))

dsk (128)
+
X
l
Z
0<si<s
X
k1;:::;kl
V (Xk1 (s1) ; :::; Xkl (sl))
1ADX1 (s1) :::DXn (sn)
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Up to the Laplace transform, (128) is the description we adopted in the previous sections. The third
adaptation we have to perform on the model starts with formula (128). Indeed, the sum of potentialsP
l
R
0<si<s(i)
P
k1;:::;kl
V (Xk1 (s1) ; :::; Xkl (sl)) accounts for interactions between several types of agents,
some of whom may involve numerous structures. Our description being statistical, it should average over
interactions involving a variable number of agents of various types, which would allow to describe both the
interactions of a large number of agents in average, and the evolution of a small number of structures in the
whole set of agentsenvironment. This can be performed by resorting to the following device: rather than
considering (128) directly with a large number of agents (that is a sum for k = 1; :::; N with N large), where
among the sum, the agents are divided into few classes of identical agents, one will sum over systems with
variable number of agents from 1 to N !1. Consider a single type of identical agents. We will generalize
the procedure to di¤erent types later. The so called Grand Partition Function for a set of N interacting
individual paths associated to the partition function (128):
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt

(129)
 
AX
k=2
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (t1) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
1A
Up to the sum over N , this is the - Laplace transformed - transition function for a system of N identical
agents interacting through the potentials Vk (x1 (t) :::xk (t)). We assume arbitrary interaction processes
through the potentials Vk (x1 (t) :::xk (t)), with A standing for the maximal number of agents in interaction.
Recall that the Nth term in (129) computes the transition probability between fxigi=1:::N and fyigi=1:::N
for a system with N agents during a time interval s.
As said before, the sum over N implies the possibility of interaction processes involving a variable number
of agents. The N ! reects the fact that agents are identical in that context.
Some di¢ culties arising from the computation of (129) can be avoided by considering the potential
K (x (t)) as a source term. To do so, we follow the presentation of [7]. and adapt this one to our context.
Starting with the simplest case of no interaction, i.e. Vk (x1 (t) :::xk (t)) = 0, the function of interest to us is:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
(130)
Each of these integrals being independent from each others, the results for (130) is:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
=
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
GK (xi; yi; )
(131)
which is a mixed sum over N of transition functions for N agents. Each product 1N !
NY
i=1
GK (xi; yi; ) com-
putes, as needed, the transition probability from fxigi=1:::N to fyigi=1:::N for N ordered agents during a
process of mean duration 1 . Thus the sum can be seen as a generating series for these probabilities with
N agents. However, between identical agents, order is irrelevant, so that the probability of transition of the
system from fxigi=1:::N to fyigi=1:::N is the sum over the permutations with N elements of the terms on
(131) rhs. Since these terms are equal, the "true" probability of transition is
NY
i=1
GK (xi; yi; ). The whole
problem at stake is to recover the case with interaction (129) from the "free" case (130). The benchmark case
interaction contribution (130) can be recovered using the following method. Using the functional derivative
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with respect to K we write:

K (xi1)
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
=
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!

(
 
X
i
Z xi1 (s)=yi1
xi1 (0)=xi1
dt (xi1 (t)  xi1)
)
where  (xi1 (t)  xi1) is the delta of Dirac function. By extension, this generalizes for any function V (xi1),
to: Z
dxi1V (xi1)

K (xi1)
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
=
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!

(
 
X
i
Z xi1 (s)=yi1
xi1 (0)=xi1
dtV (xi1 (t))
)
and for any function of several variables, to:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
(132)

X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (tk) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
=
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik

( 1)k
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)


X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
To nd (129) from (130), the next step is to exponentiate (132) as:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t)
 exp
0@ X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt

 
AX
k=2
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (t1) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
1A
= exp

 
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)


X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
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In other words, using (131) one nds the partition function for the system of agents in interaction:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t)
 exp
0@ X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt

 
AX
k=2
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (t1) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
1A
= exp

 
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)

K0

X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
GK (xi; yi; )
This would allow to compute the transition functions, or average quantities for interactions processes in-
volving all agents. However, there exists a more compact and general way to compute the same results
and, eventually, to obtain more results about the nature of the interacting system. This implies a switch
in representation from the N agents system to the collective surrounding description of these N agents.
We can actually infer from (126) that the determinant of operator GK whose kernel is GK (x; y; ) can be
expressed as an innite dimensional integral di¤erent from the ones studied up to now:
(det (GK))
 1
=
Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x)

D	D	y (133)
where the integrals over 	 (x) and 	y (x) are performed over the space of complex-valued functions of one
variable x. The function 	y (x) is the complex conjugate of 	y (x).
The formula (126) is simply the generalization in innite dimension of the gaussian integral formula
(det (M))
 1
=
Z
exp
  X (M)XyDXDXy
where (126) is used.
Introducing a source term J (x) 	y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x), we claim that:R
exp
  	 (x)    12r2 + +K (x)	y (x) + J (x) 	y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)D	D	yR
exp
  	 (x)    12r2 + +K (x)	y (x)D	D	y (134)
= exp
 
J (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)
 1
Jy (x)
!
= exp
 
J (x)GK (x; y; ) J
y (x)

This comes directly when changing the variable 	 (x)! 	 (x) + J (x) in the numerator of (134).
The terms in (130) can thus be recovered from (134). Actually, the transition function for N agents
(134):
NY
i=1
GK (xi; yi; ) (135)
providing that 1N ! in (131) accounted for a chosen order among agents, and that we multiplied N ! to restore
the indentity between the agents, can directly be written as:
NY
i=1
GK (xi; yi; ) =


J (xi1)

Jy (yi1)

:::


J (xiN )

Jy (yiN )

exp
 
J (x)GK (x; y; ) J
y (x)

J=Jy=0
Consequently, we now have an innite dimensionnal integral representation for the transition functions for
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N agents:
NY
i=1
GK (xi; yi; )
=


J (xi1)

Jy (xi1)

:::


J (xiN )

Jy (xiN )

J=Jy=0
:
R
exp
  	 (x)    12r2 + +K (x)	y (x) + J (x) 	y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)D	D	yR
exp
  	 (x)    12r2 + +K (x)	y (x)D	D	y
=
1R
exp
  	 (x)    12r2 + +K (x)	y (x)D	D	y



J (xi1)

Jy (xi1)

:::


J (xiN )

Jy (xiN )

J=Jy=0
:
Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x) + J (x) 	y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)

D	D	y
The normalization factor
1R
exp
  	 (x)    12r2 + +K (x)	y (x)D	D	y
is usually implied and will thus be - whenever possible - omitted in the formula. The transition functions
are computed by taking the derivatives with respect to J (x) and Jy (x) ofZ
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x) + J (x) 	y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)

D	D	y
However, the source term is also usually implied and only reintroduced ultimately, at the end of the compu-
tations. As a consequence,Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x)

D	D	y (136)
will describe the same system of identical non interacting structures. We will use this representation occa-
sionally.
On the other hand we have seen how to introduce interactions between agents. It amounts to make an
operator act, namely
exp

 
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)

on the transition functions. In other words, the quantity
exp

 
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)


Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x) + J (x) 	y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)

D	D	y
allows to compute, by di¤erentiation with respect to the source terms J (x) and Jy (x), the transition
functions for a system of N interacting particles. The action of the functional di¤erential operator can be
written:
exp

 
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)

(137)

Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x)

D	D	y
=
Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x) 	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	y (xi1) :::	y (xik)

D	D	y
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The above formula can be directly extended by considering all types of interaction process involving k
identical agents where k > 2. We can sum up the previous development by asserting that the quantity
Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x) (138)
 
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik) + J (x) 	
y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)
1AD	D	y
computes, by successive derivatives with respect to J (x) and Jy (x), the transition functions of a system
of innite number of identical agents, with e¤ective utility Xi (t)
   12r2 +K (x)Xi (t), and arbitrary, non
local in time, interactions Vk (Xi1 (t1) :::Xik (tk)) involving k agents, with k arbitrary. The constant  is
the characteristic scale of the interaction process, and 1 the mean duration of the interaction process, or
alternately the mean lifespan of the agents. The transition functions are given by:
GK (fxig ; fyig ; ) (139)
=


J (xi1)

Jy (yi1)

:::


J (xiN )

Jy (yiN )
Z
exp

 	 (x)

 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x)
 
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik) + J (x) 	
y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)
1AD	D	y
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J=Jy=0
and GK (fxig ; fyig ; ) is the probability of transition for N agents from a state fxig to a state fyig.
Remark that this formulation realizes what was announced before. The switch in formulation induces that
the transition of the agents, i.e. their dynamical and stochastic properties, takes place in a surrounding.
Instead of computing directly the dynamic of the system, we derive this behavior from the global properties
of a substratum, the global action for the eld 	 (x). By global action we denote the functional, or action:
S (	) =
Z
dx
0@	 (x) 1
2
r2 + +K (x)

	y (x) +
AX
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik)
1A
The innite dimensional integral (139), the so-called "path integral", can be written as a shortcut when the
source terms are omitted: Z
exp ( S (	))D	
This point of view is usual both in quantum and in statistical eld theory. The latter, that is the closest
to our approach, deals with system with large degrees of freedom. To reach an analog degree of formalism, we
built the notion of e¤ective utility, starting from interacting and strategic agents. This notion has then been
used to nd the action functional for a eld describing a large number of structures. The individual features
of the e¤ective utilities render the action functionals more specic than their analog physics. Moreover, the
physics and the symetry laws generally at stakes in statistical physics ultimately constrains the form of the
global action. These constraint are not present here, and we will see that the form of the problems involved
by the systems of socio/ eco interacting agents lead to very di¤erent forms of global actions than the one
studied in physics. These symmetries are absent here. Besides, systems of socio/economic interacting agents
lead to very di¤erent forms of global actions than those studied in physics. However, some basic ideas and
principles remain valid and will conduct the use of this formalim.
The rst application of this formalism asserts that in the expression
S (	) =
Z
1
2
 
	y (x)
 r2 + +K (x)	 (x) dx+Z AX
k=2
V (x1; :::; xk) 	 (x1) 	
y (x1) :::	 (xk) 	y (xk) dx1:::dxk
(140)
the contibutions of the potential V (x1; :::; xk) to the computation of the two points Green functions can be
obtained as a series of Feynman Graphs. This one represents also the "sum over all histories" and will yield
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the statistic "fate" of a single path through the various interaction processes These graphs actually compute
how the path of single agent is perturbed by interaction processes with one, two... and more agents. Each
of these interaction processes will contribute in probability to the transition of the agent from one state to
another. That is, the series of graphs models the environment impact on the trajectory of a structure.
More generally, n points correlation functions give the probability of transition between 2 sets of states
for n agents: given a certain process with n agents and initial values, it yields the probability value for the
outcome.
The second application of the formalism of statistical physics is the possibility of non trivial vaccua and
phase transition. The system (140) can be studied independently from the system of agents it represents.
The functional S (	) may present some non trivial minima, and these minima modify the properties of
the correlation functions of the system. The eld 	 for which S (	) reaches its minimal value describes
the phase of the system. Given the parameters of the model, the phase may change and confer di¤erent
properties to the system. The properties of individual behavior will then depend on the phase of the system
as a whole.
Both possibilities will be studied in the next sections, but before doing so, we will conclude this section
by generalizing our results to the models developped in the previous sections.
Remark that the rst term in (140):
1
2
Z  
	y (x)
 r2 + +K (x)	 (x)
can be identied with:
1
2
Z
	y (x)
 
G 1K (x; y)

	 (x)
Besides, GK (x; y) is the Green function for the e¤ective utility of a single agent, or a single subset of several
interacting structures, or some fundamental structure.
As a consequence of the previous discussion, the formalism may be generalized for curved space of
congurations that appeared in the previous section, and which represents the most general form of quadratic
e¤ective utility. Actually, consider a single interacting system with e¤ective action (73), in which we now
include the term derived in (41) and previously discarded:
Ueff (X (t)) =
Z 
1
4
_X (t)
 
N +MS

_X (t) +
 
X (t)  Xe  N  MS  X (t)  Xe
+
 
X (t)  XeMA _X (t) + Veff (X (t)) + Ueff   Xe dt
The associated Green function G (x; y; ) is the inverse of a di¤erential operator given by (121):
G 1 (x; y; ) =

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe
+
 
x  Xe N  MS    MAt  N +MS 1MA  x  Xe+ Ueff   Xe+   (x  y)
and then G (x; y; ) satises:
 (x  y) =

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe
+
 
x  Xe N  MS    MAt  N +MS 1MA  x  Xe+ Ueff   Xe+ 
G (x; y; )
Gathering the potential terms 
x  Xe N  MS    MAt  N +MS 1MA  x  Xe+ Ueff   Xe+ + Veff (x)! m2 + V (x)
allows to write the e¤ective utility and associated inverse Green function as:
G 1 (x; y) =  r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe+ V (x) (141)
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with:
m2 = + Ueff
 
Xe

(142)
note that m2 can be positive or negative, depending on Ueff
 
Xe

-  is always positive, but we keep this
notation by analogy with the mass term in eld theory.
Formula (141) leads to the eld formulation of large number of interactions:
S (	) =
Z
1
2

	y (x)

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	 (x) dx
+
Z X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik) dx1:::dxk (143)
If we change the coordinates
 
x  Xe! pM (S) +N  x  Xe to normalize M (S) +N to 1, we have:
S (	) =
Z
1
2

	y (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	 (x) dx (144)
+
Z X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik) dx1:::dxk
That describes a set of fundamental structures over the whole relevant time span, as well as their potential
temporal realizations.
The rst contribution describes the dynamic of a set of identical structure whose fundamental state - or
classical solution - is bended by its own internal interactions and constraints as explained in the previous
sections. The second term represents the possibly non local interactions between agents. Each interaction
type creates a surrounding constraining the individual structures.
8.2 Introduction of several type of agents
The previous paragraph has introduced a eld theoretic description of a large number of interacting identical
agents, or structures. To di¤erentiate between fundamental structures, one introduce the di¤erent species,
either by diagonalizing the initial system and replicating it, and then adding non local interactions, either
directly by introducing some original bricks and their interactions. Each of these types corresponds to a
eld living in a space whose dimension is given by the dimension of each block Xk (t). We denote them
	(k)

X^k

. The coordinate X^k describes the space, or variety, of characteristic variables of the fundamental
structure k.
The treatment of these several species is straightforward given the previous paragraph. Without inter-
action, each fundamental structure is described by a quadratic action similar to the ones described in the
previous paragraph (see (141)). Recall that:Z
exp ( S (	))D	
computes the probability weight for a system. Gathering the various systems of identical fundamental
structures, the path integral to consider reduces to the product of the weights of each system of fundamental
structures. The non interacting blocks Path Integral is then:Z Y
k
D	

X^k


 exp
 X
k
Z
dX^k

 1
2
	(k)y

X^k

(rk)

M
(S)
k +Nk
 1 
rk  M (A)k

X^k  

~X

k

+ V

X^k

	(k)

X^k
!
where V

X^k

includes 12

X^k  

~X

k

Nk  M (S)k

X^k  

~X

k

.
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The inclusion of the interaction potential between fundamental structures follows the same previous steps
and leads to the decomposition for the full action of the system with an innite number of agents divided in
M type, or species, of structures:
S
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M

=
X
k
Z
dX^k

 1
2
	(k)y

X^k
 h
(rk)

Nk  M (S)k

rk  M (A)k

X^k  

~X

k

+m2k + V

X^k
i
	(k)

X^k

+
X
k
X
n
Vn
n
X^
(i)
k
o
16i6n
 Y
16i6n
	(k)y

X^
(i)
k

	(k)

X^
(i)
k

| {z }
intra species interaction
(145)
+
X
m
X
k1:::km
X
n1:::nm
V(k1;n1):::(km;nm)
 
X^
(inj )
kj

16inj6nj
!
mY
j=1
Y
16inj6nj
	(kj)y

X^
(inj )
kj

	(kj)

X^
(inj )
kj

| {z }
inter species interaction
The variables X^(i)k are copies of the coordinates on the fundamental structure k. The intra type/species in-
teraction terms describes then the interactions between several structures of the same kind. The inter-species
interaction term rather involves coordinates X^
(inj )
kj
on di¤erent manifolds, and describes then interactions
between di¤erent types of agents. The potential V(k1;n1):::(km;nm) involves n1 copies of structures k1,..., nm
copies of structures km.
8.3 Computation of Green functions. Graphs
We start with the system composed an innite number of agents of one type, whose action is described by
(143). Without interaction, we have seen that the Green function for 2n independent variables through (139)
G0K (fxig1:::n ; fyig1:::n ; ) (146)
=


J (xi1)

Jy (yi1)

:::


J (xin)

Jy (yin)

Z
exp

 	 (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x) + J (x) 	y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)D	D	y
J=Jy=0
The upperscript 0 has been added on G0K (fxig1:::n ; fyig1:::n ; ) to denote the Green function without
interaction potential between the di¤erent agents. Equation (146) can also be rewritten as :
G0K (fxig1:::n ; fyig1:::n ; ) =
Z
	 (xi1) 	
y (yi1) :::	 (xin) 	
y (yin) (147)
exp

 	 (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)D	D	y
And the left hand side of (147) can be rewritten as a product when there is no interaction potential (see
(135)), so that:
X
2n
nY
j=1
G0K
 
xij ; y(ij); 

=
Z
	 (xi1) 	
y (yi1) :::	 (xin) 	
y (yin) (148)
exp

 	 (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)D	D	y
This is known as the Wick theorem (see [11]) and is the basis to compute perturbatively the 2n points Green
function when a potential is added to the action.
Now, consider the full 2n points Green function including an interaction potential as in (139), but with
the general action (143):
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GK (fxig ; fyig ; )
=


J (xi1)

Jy (yi1)

:::


J (xiN )

Jy (yiN )


Z
exp

 	 (x)

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)
 
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik) + J (x) 	
y (x) + Jy (x) 	 (x)
1AD	D	y
35
J=Jy=0
Exactly in the same way as for the case without interaction, the 2n points Green function can also be
written:
GK (fxig ; fyig ; ) =
Z
	 (xi1) 	
y (yi1) :::	 (xin) 	
y (yin) (149)
 exp

 	 (x)

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)
 
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik)
1AD	D	y
and given the Wick theorem, this can be computed in the following way as a function of the Green function
without interaction G0K
 
xi; y(i); 

.
Actually, expanding the exponential term containing the potential Vk (xi1 :::xik):
exp
0@ X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik)
1A
=
Z 1X
l=0
Y
kj>2
16j6l
n
Vkj

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj
 h
	

x
(kj)
i1

:::	

x
(kj)
ikj

	y

x
(kj)
i1

:::	y

x
(kj)
ikj
i
dx
(kj)
i1
:::dx
(kj)
ikj
o
And using the Wick theorem, contributions like:Z
	 (xi1) 	
y (yi1) :::	 (xin) 	
y (yin) exp

 	 (x)

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)150)

Z Y
16j6l
n
Vkj

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj
 h
	

x
(kj)
i1

:::	

x
(kj)
ikj

	y

x
(kj)
i1

:::	y

x
(kj)
ikj
i
dx
(kj)
i1
:::dx
(kj)
ikj
o
D	D	y
for a given sequence fkj > 2g, j = 1; :::; l, are equal to:
nX
n1=0
X
2n;02n
X
^22N
X
fx1;:::;x2ng= [
16j6l
^

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj
G0K

xi(n1+1) ; yi0(n1+1) ; 

:::G0K

xi(n) ; yi0(n) ; 

(151)
G0K
 
xi(1) ; x1; 

G0K

yi0(1) ; x2; 

:::G0K

xi(n1) ; x2n1 1; 

G0K

yi0(n1) ; x2n1 ; 

NY
p=n1+1
G0K (x2p 1; x2p; )
Y
kj>2
16j6l
n
Vkj

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj

dx
(kj)
i1
:::dx
(kj)
ikj
o
where N =
Pl
j=1 kj and with the convention that the contributions are nul for 2n1 > N . The Green
function is obtained by summing over l from 0 to 1 and over the sequence fkj > 2g, j = 1; :::; l . Remark
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that the sums have to be performed only on sequences corresponding to connected graph, as explained just
now above.
Actually, these integrals have convenient graph representations. Draw the 2n external points labelled
by xi1 , then for j = 1 to l draw l vertices with k1,...kl legs and labelled by Vkj

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj

. Then draw
2n lines joining the external vertices to the legs of any internal one. Then link all remaining internal legs
together in all possible ways labelling them by the points they are joining, such a way that the resulting
graph is connected Finally link all remaining internal legs together in all possible ways, and label them by
the points they are joining, in such a way that the resulting graph is connected. This gives a series of graphs,
each providing a contribution to GK . The contribution of any graph is computed in the following way:
For each internal or external line, associate a factorG0K

xin ; x
(kj2n 1)
p2n 1
; 

orG0K
 
x

kmi2j 1

ri2j 1 ; x

kmi2j

ri2j
; 
!
where the variables in the function G0K represents the points the line is connecting. Then multiply by the
factors Vkj

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj

associated to the internal points. Then integrate the results over all internal points.
The fact that only contributions corresponding to connected graph is explained for example in [11] but can
quickly be understood as follows. Recall that the path integrals for n-points correlation functions like (150)
have to be normalized by dividing by the "zero point" correlation functions:Z
exp

 	 (x)

 r

M (S) +N
 1  r+  MA  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x) (152)

Z Y
16j6l
n
Vkj

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj
 h
	

x
(kj)
i1

:::	

x
(kj)
ikj

	y

x
(kj)
i1

:::	y

x
(kj)
ikj
i
dx
(kj)
i1
:::dx
(kj)
ikj
o
D	D	y
and the contributions to (152) given by (151) are precisely given by (any) product of graph made of cycles
(due to the fact that there are no external points). These contributions cancel precisely the non connected
graphs in (151), that is those containing themselves cycles.
The method of graphs computations can be useful to nd corrections to the individual propagators G0K .
However, given the particular form of our model, it will often be more useful to use some other aspects of
the collective eld representation, as will be explained later.
This formula can be generalized for interactions beween various types of structures. Starting from (145),
a computation similar to the previous ones yields the following contributions to the transition functions
GK
 
(fxig ; fyig)n1 ; :::; (fxig ; fyig)nA ; 

for 2n1 points of type 1,...., 2nA points of type A:
AY
B=1
26664
nBX
(n1)B=0
X
2nB ;02nB
X
^22NB
X
fx1;:::;x2ng=^

[
16j6l

x
(kj)
i1
:::x
(kj)
ikj
G0;BK

xi(n1+1) ; yi0(n1+1) ; 

 (153)
:::G0;BK

xi(nB)
; yi0(nB)
; 

 G0K
 
xi(1) ; x1; 

G0K

yi0(1) ; x2; 

:::G0K

xi(n1) ; x2n1 1; 

G0K

yi0(n1) ; x2n1 ; 
 NBY
p=n1+1
G0K (x2p 1; x2p; )
#

lY
p=1
(
Vf(k1;n1):::(km;nm)gp
 
x
(inj )
kj

16inj6nj
!
d

x
(inj )
kj

16inj6nj
)
withNB =
Pl
j=1 (nB)p where (nB)p is the number of copies of the species kB appearing in f(k1; n1) ::: (km; nm)gp
. The Green function is obtained by summing over l from 0 to1 and over the sequences f(k1; n1) ::: (km; nm)gp,
p = 1; :::; l.
84
8.4 Non trivial vacuum, phase transition (one type of agent)
8.4.1 Principle: Vacuum value and Green function
The previous perturbative computation relies on a development around the Green functions of a system of
non interacting agents. However, this expansion may not be valid in (139). The e¤ective action arising
in the exponential of (149) may have a non trivial minimum 	0 (x) in some cases. Changing the coor-
dinates
 
x  Xe ! pM (S) +N  x  Xe for the sake of simplicity, the Green functions are then better
approximated by expanding:
S (	) =
Z
1
2

	y (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	 (x) dx
+
Z X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik) dx1:::dxk
to the second order around 	0 (x). The Green function is then recovered by computing the integral of the
second group of terms over 	 (x), plus higher order contributions. The possibilities of non trivial minima
	0 (x), depending on the parameters of the model, is related to the phenomenon of phase transition (for
a short account see Pesh). Given the particular form of action functional S (	) involved in this context,
its minima are quite di¤erent from the one obtained in usual models in eld theory. Hower, the principle
remains the same. Assume a non zero minimum 	0 (x) for
 	 (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)
 
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik)
i.e.
0 =


	 (x)

 	 (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)
 
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik)
1A35
	(x)=	0(x)
Then, expanding
S (	 (x)) =  	 (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x)	y (x)
 
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik)
with:
	 (x) = 	0 (x) + 	 (x)
yields:
S (	0 (x) + 	 (x)) = S (	0 (x))  	 (x)

 r2 +rM (A)  x  Xe+m2 + V (x) 	y (x) (154)
 
AX
k=2
X
i1;:::ik
X
ij
	
 
xij

	0 (xi1) :::	^0
 
xij

:::	0 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik)
	y0 (xi1) :::	^y0
 
xij

:::	y0 (xik) 	
y  xij
+higher order terms in 	
 
xij

where the hat over 	
 
xij

and its conjugate 	y
 
xij

means that these terms are omitted. In other words,
the potential term in the individual action has been shifted from K (x) to
K (x) 
AX
k=2
X
i1;:::ik
X
ij
	0 (xi1) :::	^0
 
xij

:::	0 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y
0 (xi1) :::	^
y
0
 
xij

:::	y0 (xik)
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yielding a change in the individual Green function and in turn, in the individual e¤ective utility. The
inuence of a large number of interactions induces a non trivial collective minimum: it shifts the individual
behavior. Actually, the new individual action term:
 	 (x)
0@ 1
2
r2 + +K (x) 
AX
k=2
X
i1;:::ik
X
ij
	0 (xi1) :::	^0
 
xij

:::	0 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) (155)
 	y0 (xi1) :::	^y0
 
xij

:::	y0 (xik)

	y (x) dxi1 :::d^xij :::dxik
modifyies the inverse of the Green function by some "constant", independent from 	 (x), inducing a damped
or extended dynamic. In other words the individual uctuations can be frozen or magnied, justifying the
use of the term phase transition. We will see below that the presence of a non trivial minimum may also
shifts the equilibrium values for individual agents.
Remark that the higher order terms in (154) model the e¤ective several agents interactions in the new
phase at stake after expansion around 	0 (x). These results t with the change of representation implied by
the use of eld theory. The study of the set of agents as a continuum substratum leads to modications of
individual transitions as a result of the uctuations from this medium.
8.4.2 Shift in equilibrium values
The second consequence of a phase transition is the shift in equilibrium value. The expansion around a non
trivial vacuum leads to a quadratic term (155) that impacts the agents e¤ective utility. Actually, considering
the reciprocal link between individual dynamics and collective uctuations, we can assert that the form of
the e¤ective action impacts the e¤ective utility. Facing a phase transition, the correction term in the e¤ective
action (155) would lead to an individual e¤ective utility of the form:
_x2i
2
(t) +K (x (t)) + V^ (x (t))
with:
V^ (x (t)) =  
AX
k=2
X
i1;:::ik
X
ij
Z
	0 (xi1) :::	^0
 
xij

:::	0 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::x (t) :::xik) 	
y
0 (xi1) :::	^
y
0
 
xij

:::	y0 (xik)
dxi1 :::d^xij :::dxik
This e¤ective utility has a new saddle point x with respect to the individual case, which satises:

x

K (x) + V^ (x (t))

= 0
As a consequence, the possibility of phase transition, i.e. the existence of non trivial minimum	0 for S (	 (x))
depending on the parameters, induces a shift in each agents individual equilibrium. The collective system
impacts directly the individual ones and prescribes a di¤erent e¤ective potential from the one describing
initially the system at the micro level.
8.5 Several possibilities of Interactions
Having described the formalism of collective elds and its possible use, we now detail two examples of
interactions between fundamental structures.
8.5.1 Reciprocal interactions between identical agents
By reciprocal interaction we mean the introduction of a symetric potential of any form:
V (xi1 ; xi2 ; :::; xin)
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between agents of the same species. It models the mutual inuence of these agents when none of them have
a strategic advantage over the others. The graph expansion for the Green functions with this potential is
given by (151) with a single type of agent, i.e.GK (fxig ; fyig ; ):
GK (fxig ; fyig ; ) (156)
=
Z X
p1;:::;p2n2fi1;:::ing
l1;:::l2n2fi1;:::ing
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The various individual propagators G0K

xi1 ; x
(l1)
p1
; 

::: can be obtained through Laplace transform of the
general formula (78). However for later purpose it will be more useful to use a di¤erent way.
We consider G0K for an individual e¤ective utility of quadratic form. As shown in the previous section,
if we neglect the curvature e¤ects for individual fundamental structures, and if we consider a system of
coordinates where the potential is diagonalized (see (119)), the inverse propagator for block k (i.e. i1 or i2)
is:  
G0K
 1
=  r2k +m2k +
 
(xi)k   Yeff

(i)k
 
(xi)k   Yeff

m2k can be positive or negative depending on the parameters of each fundamental system (see (142)). The
kernel of this operator can be computed through its egenvalues and eigenfunctions. Actually we can cast the
previous di¤erential operator in the form:
 r2k +m2i +
 
(xi)k  
 
Yeff

k

(i)k
 
(xi)k  
 
Yeff

k

=
X
n
 n (x)

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
n+
1
2

(i)k

 n (y)
Such an operator has a kernel (i.e. the Green function) such that:
 r2k +m2i +
 
(xi)k  
 
Yeff

k

(i)k
 
(xi)k  
 
Yeff

k

f ((xi)k) =
Z
G ((xi)k ; (yi)k) f ((yi)k) d (yi)k
for any function f ((xi)k). For such operator, the Kernel can be written in terms of its eigenfunctions:X
n
 n (x)

m2i +

n+
1
2

(i)k

 n (y) (157)
where  n is the nth Hermite polynomials, times a gaussian term with shifted variable (xi)k  
 
Yeff

k
.
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p
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
 1
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1
2nn!
Hn

a
1
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
exp

 
p
a
2
x2

where the Hn

a
1
4x

are the Hermite polynomials. Some details are given in Appendix 9. The Green function
can thus be found directly and is given by:
G (x; y) =
X
n
'n (x)'
y
m (x)
(n+ 1)
p
a+ 
Applying this results to our problem yields G (x; y): 
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
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This form of Green function is usefull to deal with (151). Actually, the innite sum here can be truncated
if we assume in rst approximation that only a nite number of "harmonic" n participate to the dynamic
of the system. This kind of truncature, or cut o¤, will also be used below. We can insert formula (158) in
(151). Dening: Z Y
kj>2
16j6l
Vkj

x1+
Pj 1
m=1 kj
; :::; xkj+
Pj 1
m=1 kj

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
one uses the permutation symetry of the Vkj to write (151) as:
nX
n1=0
X
2n;02n
X
^22N
G0K

xi(n1+1) ; yi0(n1+1) ; 

:::G0K

xi(n) ; yi0(n) ; 

V^fkj>2;16j6lg

xi(1) ; yi0(1) :::; xi(n1) ; yi0(n1) ; q2n1+1; :::; qN


NY
p=1
1
m2i +
 
qp +
1
2

(i)k
with kj =
Pl
j=1 kj . Then summing over l and the kj yields:
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8.5.2 Non reciprocal interactions
We want to model an interaction potential where one type of agent imposes a stress on another one to drive
it towards, or push it away, from a certain equilibrium position.
It is useful for agents with strategic advantage models, such as those presented in the second section. We
assume two types of agents, the rst one imposing a strain on the second one. We choose:
V (xi1 ; xi2) = V

xi2   x^(i1)i2

where x^(i1)i2 is the objective function set for i2 by i1. We will later consider an example with
V (xi1 ; xi2) = 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
The formula for the Green function (153) simplies, since the rst agent is not involved in the potential, and
the Green functions reduces to a product of Green functions for both agents:
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
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The function G(0)K
 
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
is the free Green function with 2n1 points for the rst type of agents,
since there is no potential for this type of agent. while GK
 
(fxig ; fyig)n2 ; 

is the Green function with
2n2 points for the second agent. The function GK
 
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
includes a sum of contributions given
by (151) for a potential depending on one variable only.
nX
n1=0
X
2n;02n
X
^22N
X
fx1;:::;x2ng=^

[
16j6l

x
(kj)
i1
G0K

xi(n1+1) ; yi0(n1+1) ; 

:::G0K

xi(n) ; yi0(n) ; 

G0K
 
xi(1) ; x1; 

G0K

yi0(1) ; x2; 

:::G0K

xi(n1) ; x2n1 1; 

G0K

yi0(n1) ; x2n1 ; 

NY
p=n1+1
G0K (x2p 1; x2p; )
Y
kj>2
16j6l
n
Vkj

x
(kj)
i1
  x^(i1)i2

dx
(kj)
i1
o
N =
Pl
j=1 kj . However, since the potential depends only on one variable, these contribution can be re-
summed to produce a free Green function shifted by the potential V

xi2   x^(i1)i2

.
(GK)
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=  r2k +m2k +
 
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
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 
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
+ V

xi2   x^(i1)i2

Thus the system describes a free e¤ective utility for the rst agent, and a potential, e¤ective utility for the
second agent, that is shifted by a term driving it towards or away x^(i1)i2 , given the sign of V

xi2   x^(i1)i2

.
8.6 Introduction of constraints
When agents face constraints, like the budget constraint for example, some additive terms have to be added
to (145). Recall that, for a set of interacting individual agents, a linear constraint binding the agents implies
to include, in the e¤ective utility, a term of the form (98):
  1
T + 
X
i
Z s
0
Cisds
Z s
0
Citdt 
1
T + 
X
i
Z s
0
Z T
0
CisC
j
t dsdt (159)
where Agent i is dened by an action Cis, and T and  are some parameters of the model. As explained when
(98) was introduced,  measures the uncertainty about the future, and T is proportional to the characteristic
time scale of the interaction process. As explained before, we assume that each agent estimates at each
moment the remaining duration of the interaction process by a Poisson process of mean T . We also assume
that among the set of interacting agents, the statistical mean of the estimated duration reaches the true
value s. That is, we suppose unbiased estimations. We will inspect less restrictive assumptions at the end
of this paragraph, and show that this does not modify the result.
If we moreover neglect , the uctuation term with respect to the duration of the interaction process,
we are left with the following expression for (98):
 1
s
X
i
Z s
0
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0
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X
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0
Z s
0
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j
t dsdt
and (98) can be generalized for any type of vector of action Xi (s) or constraint:
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X
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2
  1
s
X
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Z s
0
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0
a1;2X
i
1 (s)X
j
2 (t) dsdt (160)
and ai;j describes the interdependence of two di¤erent species through the constraint.
The second term in (160) has already been described in the eld theoretic formulation. It amounts to
include a potential:
 a1;2
Z Z 
	(1)y
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X^1	
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
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
	(2)y
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X^2
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X^2

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in the global action. The rst term requires some additional computations. We compute the Green function
of the individual agents with e¤ective utility including a term:
 
X
i
Z
Xi1 (s) ds
2
We start with:Z
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!
and neglecting the potential K (xi (t)) that can be reintroduced as a perturbation term, one thus has to
compute:
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which is the Green function for an agent under constraint. It can also be written:
G (x; y) = P (0; s; xi; yi)
*
exp
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Where X (u) a brownian motion starting at xi at time 0 and reaching yi at time s and
exp

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X (u) du
Z s
0
X (u) du

is the expectation value of exp

1
s
 R s
0
X (u) du
2
given the process X (u).
The appearance of the factor P (0; s; xi; yi) in (162a) comes from the fact that in (161) the measure is
not normalized, and (161) is computed for the measure of a free Brownian motion. Thus the global weight
for the path starting at xi at time 0 and reaching yi at time s is not equal to 1 but to P (0; s; xi; yi). We
compute G (x; y) in Appendix 10, and show that, when  < , s being of order 1 , and individual uctuations
measured by p

are negligeable with respect to the mean path x+y2 over the all duration of interaction, one
has in rst approximation:
G (; x; y) = L
24exp 1
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These assumptions are quite always satised since  = 1T , with T the mean duration of all interaction
processes. We furthermore expect the sum of uctuations on this period, i.e. the sum of the uctuations on
the global time span, to be lower than one, or equivalently, the uctuation per unit of time  to be lower
than 1T . By a similar reasonning, we assume that the uctuations over the all time span, measured by
p

or equivalently by 
p
s, are lower than the mean value of the path, i.e. x+y2 . The formula (163) has an
interpretation in term of individual agents uctuations. Actually, in (163) G (; x; y) saties:
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; x; y) =
Z
exp
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x+ y
2
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This is easy to see: G (; x; y) is the Laplace transform of the usual brownian transition function
exp
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2
2
. By a change of variable:
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Up to the factor
r
+( x+y2 )
2

 , which is constant with respect to s, this is the Laplace transform of a gaussian
path with variance:
(0)2 =

+
 
x+y
2
22
Recall that there is usually no inertia in the standard models of utility optimization under constraint.
This amounts to setting 2 ! 1 in our formalism, to model no other interconnexion between periods
than the constraint. Recall however that (163) was derived under the assumption that 2 <<
 
x+y
2
2
. As a
consequence, the introduction of the constraint leads us to describe the individual agent following a brownian
path with (0)2 << 1. Considered at the scale of the overall processes - i.e. compared to the unit of time
which is much lower than s - this variance (0)2 is of order 1, and the agent is described by a brownian path
with variance of order 1. The introduction of the contraint has thus transformed the individual dynamics
into an apparent brownian noise. This replicates the usual result in classical consumption smoothing theory
(see [12] for example).
The eld theoretic counterpart of the Green function G (; x; y) is obtained by nding a di¤erential
operator whose inverse is G (; x; y) or equivalently, a di¤erential equation satised by G (; x; y). Appendix
10 shows that G (; x; y) satises:
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and the term in brackets is the operator whose kernel is G (; x; y). The Appendix 10 also shows that, given
our assumptions, this reduces in the limit of small uctuations, to:
 (x  y) =
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G (; x; y)
Reintroducing the potential K (x), the eld theoretic formulation of the problem for a single type of agent
with e¤ective action (159) reduces to describing the set of individual agents by the e¤ective action:Z
exp

 	 (x)
h 
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 1
+K (x)
i
	y (x)

D	D	y (166)
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which discards temporarilly interactions among agents. Of course, when we remove the constraint, G (; x; y)
reduces to G (; x; y), and (G (; x; y)) 1 =   12r2 ++K (x), as in the previous cases. In developped terms,
the exponential in (166) becomes:
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In the case of  << 1 considered here, in which individual uctuations are relatively small, it remains:
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This form of propagator has a direct interpretation in terms of constraint. The rst term ensures that the
mean of x + y is centered on its expectation value, which is nul here by normalization. The second term
ensures that x and y are equal in means. Both contributions thus describe a smoothing behavior, which
is characteristic of long-run binding constraints. The path for X (s), apart from a white noise contribution
 (s), is constant in time:
X (s) = X (s  1) +  (s)
We also recover the results of (94) and its subsequent formulae. For x   y << 1, we recover the series
expansion in gradient:
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Then, introducing the constrained propagator (167) in (145) yields:
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Appendix 11 shows how to generalize this result in presence of a discount rate and we show that in that
case, in the approximation r >> 1, which means that the time span of interaction is long enough for the
discount rate to be e¤ective:
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constraint, collective level
We conclude this paragraph by inspecting other assumptions about the expected time horizon T . Assume
that agents have some hint about the true duration s, and, as a consequence the Poisson distribution is
no more accurate. These informations translate into the fact that T depends on the time at which it is
evaluated. For example T (v) = s   f (v) where f is a slow varying and increasing function. Under this
hypothesis, the quadratic term due to the constraints becomes:
exp
Z s
0

1
s  f (v)X (v)
Z v
0
X (u) du

dv

and since f (v) varies slowly, one can approximate f (v) by its mean over [0; s] in the integral:
Z s
0

1
s  f (v)X (v)
Z v
0
X (u) du

dv
'
Z s
0

1
s  f (s)X (v)
Z v
0
X (u) du

dv =
1
1  f(s)s
1
s
Z s
0

X (v)
Z v
0
X (u) du

dv
The term 1s
R s
0
 
X (v)
R v
0
X (u) du

dv is the one we dealt with before and
f(s)
s can be considered as a pertur-
bation. Since
f(s)
s varies slowly, it can be approximated by 
f
 
1


where 1 is the mean duration process.
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We are thus left with:
G (; x; y) = L
24*exp 1
1   f   1 1s
Z s
0
X (u) du
Z s
0
X (u) du
!+ exp  (x y)22s p
s
35
' L
24exp 1
1   f   1s

x+ y
2
2! exp  (x y)22s p
s
35
= : exp
0@
 
x+y
2
2
1   f   1 @@
1A : exp   p2 x y p
2
=
exp
 
 
s
2

+
( x+y2 )
2
(1  f( 1 ))
 x y

!s
2

+
( x+y2 )
2
(1  f( 1 ))

where the notation : exp

( x+y2 )
2

1  f( 1 )
@
@

: denotes the ordered product, i.e. all the derivative are set on the
right after expansion. As a consequence, the introduction of a varying time horizon shifts the mean path 
x+y
2

to
 
x+y
2
q
1  f( 1 )
!
but all the previous results are kept, when this shift is included.
9 Examples
9.1 Consumers/Producers with current account constraint
9.1.1 Case 1: One type of agents
We consider N identical agents that are consumers/producers. Each of them is producing one good that
is consumed by other agents in constant proportion.The production/revenue Y (i)s is proportionnal to other
agents consumption (plus some exogenous constant ow):
Ys =
X
j
f

C(j)s

+ Y (169)
with Nf = 1. Each agent is facing the C.A. balance constraint:
C(i)s = B
(i)
s + Y
(i)
s  B(i)s+1
which rewrites, given (169):
Cs = Bs +
X
j

f

C(j)s

+ Y

 Bs+1
We have seen that, with such a constraint, we obtained the following weight (99):
exp
 
Ueff

= exp
0@ X
i
X
s

C(i)s
2
  1
T
X
i
X
s1;s2
C(i)s1 C
(i)
s2 +
2
T
f
X
i;j
X
s1>s2
C(i)s1 C
(j)
s2
1A
Here, the consumption variable was shifted by substracting its optimum, i.e. as before  C2s stands for
   Cs   Y 2 and Ys for Ys + Y . When we consider a large number of identical agents, we can follow the
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procedure given above (see (96), (97), (98),(99)). The main point is that Ys is endogeneized. The e¤ective
action in the continuum approximation is:
exp
 
Ueff

= exp
0@ X
i
Z 
C(i)s
2
ds+
1
T
Z
C(i)s1 C
(i)
s2 ds1ds2

+
f
T
X
i;j
Z Z
C(i)s C
(j)
s2 ds1ds2
1A
To write the eld theoretic equivalent of this expression, one has to recall that the time horizon T may
depend on s, the duration of the interaction process. We show in Appendix 12 that this dependence implies
the following eld action functional:
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
"
 r2 + 
2
+ x2

 (x  y) +
 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x  y
2
#
	 (y) dxdy
  f
2R
	y (x) 	y (x) dx
Z
	 (x) 	y (x) (xy) 	 (y) 	y (y) dxdy
Remark that, since the variable x stands for C   Y ! x, x is not constrained to x > 0. If no inertia is
initialy present in the description of the agents, the eld functional S (	) reduces to:
S (	) '
Z
dx	 (x)
 
x2 + 2

	y (x) +
Z
dxdy	y (x)
" 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x  y
2
#
	 (y) (170)
  f
2R
	y (x) 	y (x) dx
Z
	 (x) 	y (x) (xy) 	 (y) 	y (y) dxdy
ith 2 = 2 . As a consequence of (170) one can directly compute the graph expansion for the Green functions.
In rst approximation we can replace the denominator of the second term in (170)Z
	y (x) 	y (x) dx
by
R
G0K (x; x; ) dx, where G
0
K (x; y; ) is the Green function of the operator:
 2r
2
2
+ + x2

 (x  y) +

x+ y
2
2
(171)
For 2 << 1, G0K (x; x; ) ' 1+2x2 and
R
G0K (x; x; ) dx ' p2 . Then, redening
f2R
	y (x) 	y (x) dx
! f
we can apply (151) which yields the two points correlation functions:
GK (x; y; ) = G
0
K (x; y; ) (172)
+
X
l>0
( f)lG0K (x; y1; ) y1G0K (y1; y2; ) y2:::y2lG0K (y2l; y; )
As explained before, the term
 
x+y
2
2
in (171) induces a smearing in the behavior of the agents, due to the
constraint. The contributions in (172) can be resummed so that:
G 1K (x; y; ) =
 
G0K
 1
(x; y; ) + f2xG0K (x; y; ) y
and thus GK (x; y; ) is the Green function of the operator:
 2r
2
2
+ + x2

 (x  y) +

x+ y
2
2
+ f2xG0K (x; y; ) y
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Now, given that
xG0K (x; y; ) y = G
0
K (x; y; )
 
x+ y
2
2
 

x  y
2
2!
and that the term
 
x y
2
2
can be neglected under our basic assumption of low uctuations, the inclusion of
the interaction with other structures modies the smearing potential
 
x+y
2
2
by:
x+ y
2
2  
1 + f2G0K (x; y; )

Inserting this result in (165), leads to model the apparent behavior of the agent as a brownian path, whose
variance is modied from:
(0)2 =

+
 
x+y
2
22
to
(0)2 =

(+ (1 + f2G0K (x; y; )))
2
In other words, the variance of the movement is reduced by the presence of other agents. The interaction
reinforces the e¤ect of the constraint and imposes smaller variations for the individual agents.
9.1.2 Case 2. Several types of agents
If we consider several types of agents denoted by greek indices f:::g, we can dene C(i);s as the consumption
of agent i belonging to type . The constraint becomes:
C(i);s = B
(i);
s +
X
i;

f

C(j);s

+ Y

 B(i);s+1
the coe¢ cients f dene the fraction of consumption of an agent  spent in the good produced by agents
of type . They satisfy: X

Nf = 1
where N is the number of agents of type , so that
P
N = N with N the total number of agents. As in
the previous paragraph, the e¤ective utility for the system becomes:
exp
 
Ueff

= exp
0@ X
i
 Z  
Cis
2
ds

+
1
T
Z
C(i)s ds
2!
+
1
T
X
i;
Z Z
C(i);s
0@X
j;
fC
(j);
t
1A dsdt
1A
Which leads to the eld theoretic description (see Appendix 12):
S ((	)) (173)
=
X

 Z
dx	
y (x)
  r2 + x2 + 2	 (x) + Z dxdy	y (x)
" 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x   y
2
#
	 (y)
!
  1P

R
	y (x) 	 (x) dx
X
;
f
Z
	y (x)x	 (x)
 Z
	y (x)x	 (x)

As in the previous paragraph, we can approximate
P

R
	y (x) 	 (x) dx byX

Z
	y (x) 	 (x) dx '
X

Z
GK (x; x; ) dx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where GK (x; y; ) is the Green function of (171). Following the same computations as those following (171),
one has: X

Z
	y (x) 	 (x) dx '
mp
2
where m is the number of di¤erent types of agents.
The two points Green functions associated to (173) can be computed similarly to the previous case. In
term of graphs, the term f
R
	y (x)x	 (x)
 hR
	y (x)x	 (x)
i
implies that vertices  with two
legs are connected to vertices ,  6=  with two legs through a line labelled f . The factors f can be
absorbed by x !
p
fx. Keeping only connected graphs, one nds:
GK

x(); y(); 

= G0K

x(); y(); 

(174)
+
X
l>0
( 1)l f ()l G0K

x(); y
()
1 ; 

y
()
1 G
0
K

y
()
1 ; y
()
2 ; 

y
()
2 :::y
()
l G
0
K

y
()
l ; y
(); 

where f ()l includes the modications to G
0
K (x; y; ) due to the interactions with all other type of agents:
f
()
l =
E( l2 )X
k=0
(f)
k
X
1;:::;l k
f1 :::fl k 
Z
G
0(;l k)
K
Y

G
0(;](1;:::;l k))
K
where ]
 
1; :::; l k

is the number of times  appears in the set
 
1; :::; l k

and with
G
0(;p)
K =
Z
y
()
1 G
0
K

y
()
1 ; y
()
2 ; 

y
()
2 G
0
K

y
()
3 ; y
()
4 ; 

:::y
()
p 1G
0
K

y
()
p 1; y
()
1 ; 

dy
()
1 :::dy
()
p
For f = 1, and thus f = 0 for  6= , so that one recovers the one type of agent case:
G 1K

x(); y(); 

=
 
G0K
 1 
x(); y(); 

+ x()

x(); y(); 

y()
For f = 0
f
()
l =
X
1;:::;l
f1 :::fl 
Z Y

G
0(;](1;:::;l))
K
=
Z 0@X

fx
()G0K

x(); y(); 
1Al
where  denotes the convolution product, and (174) becomes:
GK

x(); y(); 

= G0K

x(); y(); 

+
X
l>0
( 1)l
0@X

fG
0
K

x(); y(); 
1Al
G0K

x(); y
()
1 ; 

y
()
1 G
0
K

y
()
1 ; y
()
2 ; 

y
()
2 :::y
()
l G
0
K

y
()
l ; y
(); 

That can be resummed as:
G 1K

x(); y(); 

= G 1

x; y(); 

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9.2 A simple business cycle model
In this section we use again the single type of agent model, but we indentify the saving variable Bs with the
stock of capital involved in the production function, as is usually done standard business cycle models. As
a consequence, the budget constraint becomes:
Ci (s) = rKi (s)  _Ki (s) + Yi (s)
We also endogeneize Yi (s) and consider this variable as a function of the capital: Yi (s) = Fi (Ki (s)). The
budget constraint can thus be written as:
Ci (s) = rKi (s)  _Ki (s) + Fi (Ki (s))
Now, introduce the interest rate r given by the mean productivity of the set of agents:
r =
1
N
X
i
F 0i (Ki)
The inclusion of the budget constraint with an interest rate is performed in Appendix 11. We show in this
Appendix that the e¤ective utility for agent i with constraint writes (assuming r slowly varying):
Ueff (Ci) =
Z
C2i (t) dt+
2r
exp (rT )  1
Z
t>s
exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Ci (s)Ci (t) dsdt
  2r
exp (rT )  1
Z
t>s
Ci (t) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Yi (s) dsdt
For relatively small r we can consider that: rexp(rT ) 1 ' 1T . As before, the time horizon T is correlated
to the duration of the interaction process. However, due to the particular form of the factor rexp(rT ) 1 and
given that r could also vary, we will rather replace rexp(rT ) 1 by an average value  of the same magnitude
as 1T and  (which justies the notation ). We thus rewrite the e¤ective utility as:
Ueff (Ci) =
Z
C2i (t) dt+2
Z
t>s
exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Ci (s)Ci (t) dsdt 2
Z
t>s
Ci (t) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Yi (s) dsdt
This is computed in Appendix 12, and the result in rst approximation in r is:
Ueff (Ci) =
Z
C2i (t) dt  2
Z
Fi (Ki (t))Ki (t) dt+ 2
Z
r (t)K2i (t) dt+ 4
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s)Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
At this point, it is more convenient to switch to a representation in the Ki (t) variable. Replace
R
C2i (t) dt
by: Z
C2i (t) dt =
Z 
rKi (t)  _Ki (t) + Fi (Ki (t))
2
dt
=
Z
_K2i (t) dt+
Z
(rKi (t) + Fi (Ki (t)))
2
dt
 2
Z
_Ki (t) (rKi (t) + Fi (Ki (t))) dt
and write the last term as a border contribution (with Fi = G0i):Z
_Ki (t) (rKi (t) + Fi (Ki (t))) dt =

1
2
rK2i (t) +Gi (Ki (t))
T
0
Since we rule out accumulation of capital at 0 and T , we discard border terms, and this term can be neglected.
As a consequence: Z
C2i (t) dt =
Z 
rKi (t)  _Ki (t) + Fi (Ki (t))
2
dt
=
Z
_K2i (t) dt+
Z
(rKi (t) + Fi (Ki (t)))
2
dt
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and Ueff for agent i becomes at the rst order in r:
Ueff =
Z
_K2i (t) dt+
Z  
F 2i (Ki (t))  2Fi (Ki (t))Ki (t)

dt
+2
Z
r (t)
 
K2i (t) +Ki (t)Fi (Ki (t))

dt+ 4
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s)Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
Summing over all agents, the global action for the system is:X
i
Ueff =
X
i
Z
_K2i (t) dt+
Z  
F 2i (Ki (t))  2Fi (Ki (t))Ki (t)

dt
+2
Z
r (t)
 
K2i (t) +Ki (t)Fi (Ki (t))

dt+ 4
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s)Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
=
X
i
Z
_K2i (t) dt+
Z  
F 2i (Ki (t))  2Fi (Ki (t))Ki (t)

dt
+
2
N
X
i;j
Z
F 0j (Kj (t))
 
K2i (t) +Ki (t)Fi (Ki (t))

dt+
4
N
X
i;j
Z
t>s
F 0j (Kj (s))Ki (s)Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
And since agents are identical, we can assume that in rst approximation the two last terms are: 
K2i (t) +Ki (t)Fi (Ki (t))
 '  K2j (t) +Kj (t)Fj (Kj (t))
Ki (s) ' Kj (s)
the error in this approximation being of order lower than r. In that approximation:
2
N
X
i;j
Z
F 0j (Kj (t))
 
K2i (t) +Ki (t)Fi (Ki (t))

dt = 2
X
j
Z
F 0j (Kj (t))
 
K2j (t) +Kj (t)Fj (Kj (t))

dt
and this individual potential term is of order r, through F 0j (Kj (t)). As a consequence, it can be neglected
with respect to Z  
F 2i (Ki (t))  2Fi (Ki (t))Ki (t)

dt
We then end up with:X
i
Ueff =
X
i
Z
_K2i (t) dt+
Z  
F 2i (Ki (t))  2Fi (Ki (t))Ki (t)

dt
+
4
N
X
i;j
Z
t>s
F 0j (Kj (s))Ki (s)Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
Assuming agents are identical, so that Fi  F , such an e¤ective utility for the system has for Field theoretic
equivalent:
S (	) = 	y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x	 (x)+4
N
Z  
	y (x)F 0 (x)x	 (x) dx
 Z
	y (y)F (y) 	 (y) dy
In the sequel, for the sake of simplicity, we will normalize  to 1. It corresponds to rescale some parameters
and variables in the model, and this will not modify the conclusions of this paragraph.
Depending on the sign of
 
F 2 (x)  2F (x)x, the action S (	) may present some non trivial saddle point.
To inspect this possibility, write the saddle point equation 	S (	) = 0 as:
0 =
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x	 (x) (175)
+
4
N
F 0 (x)x
Z
	y (y)F (y) 	 (y) dy

	 (x) +
4
N
Z
	y (y)F 0 (y) y	 (y) dy

F (x) 	 (x)
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Now, let:
	 (x) =
p
	1 (x)
with k	1 (x)k = 1, so that (175) can be written in function of 	1 (x):
0 =
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x	1 (x)
+
4
N

F 0 (x)x
Z
	y1 (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy + F (x)
Z
	y1 (y)F
0 (y) y	1 (y) dy

	1 (x)
If
 
F 2 (x)  2F (x)x < 0, then, a solution for  6= 0 may exist. Actually, for such a solution we can compute
(175):
S (	) = 	y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x	 (x) + 4
N
Z  
	y (x)F 0 (x)x	 (x) dx
 Z
	y (y)F (y) 	 (y) dy
=  
Z
2
4
N
	y1 (x)

F 0 (x)x
Z
	y1 (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy + F (x)
Z
	y1 (y)F
0 (y) y	1 (y) dy

	1 (x)
+
4
N
Z  
	y (x)F 0 (x)x	 (x) dx
 Z
	y (y)F (y) 	 (y) dy
=  4
2
N
Z
	y1 (x)

F 0 (x)x
Z
	y1 (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy + F (x)
Z
	y1 (y)F
0 (y) y	1 (y) dy

	1 (x)
< 0
Which is below S (0). The solution of (175) may thus present a non trivial minimum, as asserted before.
To prove this point, we have to show that among the set of possible solutions of (175), the action S (	) is
bounded from below. Moreover, the second order variation of S (	) around the solution with the lowest value
of S (	) has to be positive. We write this second order variation 2S (	). A straightforward computation
yields:
1
2
2S (	) = 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x' (x) + 4
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
 Z
	y1 (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy
+
4
N
Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx
Z
'y (y)F (y)' (y) dy
+
8
N
Re
Z
'y (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

Re
Z
'y (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy

(176)
and we require that 2S (	) > 0 at the saddle point. The question of stability may be adressed if a more
precise form for F (x) is given, and this will be done below. However, rewriting 2S (	) in a more compact
form will be useful in each case. This rewriting is done in Appendix 12.
To better understand the possibility of a non trivial vacuum, we will assume some particular forms for
F (x). The rst case we will consider will be:
F (x) = c (x  f (x))
with 1 < c 6 2, to allow for the possibility of a phase transition, and f (x) slowly increasing with f (0) = 0.
It models a production function with some economies of scale, up to a certain level of capital x to nally
reach a constant return to scale when x is large. In that case:
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x	 (x) dx+ 4
N
Z  
	y (x)F 0 (x)x	 (x) dx
 Z
	y (y)F (y) 	 (y) dy
'
Z
	y (x)
 r2 + c (x  f (x)) ((c  2)x  cf (x))	 (x) dx
+
4c2
N
Z
	y (x)x	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x) (x  f (x)) 	 (x) dx

where we used that f 0 (x) ' 0.
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We assume that the integrals are all performed on the range x > 0, since the variable it represents, the
capital stock, is positive. Moreover, we also assume that the parameters are such that our model has a non
trivial solution to the saddle point equation. We choose c = 2 to have a simple example. In that case:
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
  r2   4f (x) (x  f (x))	 (x) dx+16
N
Z
	y (x)x	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x) (x  f (x)) 	 (x) dx

(177)
We show in Appendix 12 that a minimum exists for a non trivial value of the eld, namely: 	 (x) = a	1 (x)
	1 (x) = Ai
0@ 3r16Aa2
N
  4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16a
2B
N

1A1A
where Ai (x) is the Airy function,  is a normalization constant such that k	1 (x)k = 1, a is a factor satisfying
an equation determined by the saddle point equation, and where the constants A and B are dened as:Z
R+
	y1 (x)x	1 (x) dx = AZ
R+
	y1 (x) (x  f (x)) 	1 (x) dx = B
The second case we consider is:
F (x) = x+ cx2 (178)
with 0 < c < 1. The denition (178) models increasing return to scale. In that case:
S (	) = 2
Z
	y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x	 (x) dx+ 44
N
Z  
	y (x)F 0 (x)x	 (x) dx
 Z
	y (y)F (y) 	 (y) dy
= 2
Z
	y (x)
 r2 +  x+ cx2  cx2   x	 (x) dx
+
44
N
Z
	y (x) (1 + 2cx)x	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

' 2
Z
	y (x)
 r2 +  c2x4   x2	 (x) dx+ 44
N
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ 2cx2

	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

where 	 (x) is normalized to 1 and  is a parameter for the norm. The saddle point equation is:
 r2 + c2x4 +

4c2
N
(A+ 2B)  1

x2 +
4x2
N
(A+B)

	 (x) = 0
with:
A =
Z
R+
	y (x)
 
x+ 2cx2

	 (x) dx

B =
Z
R+
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

We show in Appendix 12 that the action S (	) is bounded from below and that it has a minimum obtained
as a rst order correction in c ot the function :
	0 (x) =  exp
0@ 
q
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
2

x+
2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
21A
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This modied eigenvector 	00 (x) is expressed as a series of c:
j	00 (y)i = j	00 (y)i   c
1X
l=1
h	l (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
2l
j	l (y)i
+c2
1X
l=1
1X
m=1
h	l (x)jx4 j	m (y)i h	m (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
4lm
j	l (y)i
 c2
1X
l=1
h	0 (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i h	l (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
4l2
j	l (y)i
 c
2
2
1X
l=1
h	0 (x)jx4 j	l (y)i h	l (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
4l2
j	0 (y)i
To conclude, let us stress that we could also introduce interactions between di¤erent agents via technology.
We neglect the interest rate and the interaction related to it, and supposeKi (s) is enhanced by a technological
factor depending on the accumulated capital, with:
Fi (Ki (t)) =
vuuutG
0@ 1
N
X
j
Z t
0
Kj (s) ds
1AF (0)i (Ki (t))
If we expand G

1
N
P
j
R t
0
Kj (s) ds

in series:
G
0@ 1
N
X
j
Z t
0
Kj (s) ds
1A = X
n
gn
0@ 1
N
X
j
Z t
0
Kj (s) ds
1An
then, given that to our order of approximation:Z 
_Ki (t)
2
+ (Fi (Ki (t)))
2

dt+ 2
Z
t>s
Fi (Ki (s))Fi (Ki (t)) dt
can be replaced with: Z 
_Ki (t)
2
+ (Fi (Ki (t)))
2

dt+ 2
Z
t>s
F 2i (Ki (t))
2
dt
As a consequence, the technological factor becomes
G
0@ 1
N
X
j
Z t
0
Kj (s) ds
1A F 2i (Ki (t))
2
=
X
n
gn
0@ 1
N
X
j
Z t
0
Kj (s) ds
1An
=
X
n
gn
X
i
Z
dt
0@ 1
N
X
j
Z t
0
Kj (s) ds
1An F 2i (Ki (t))
2
=

1
N
n Z 0@ X
j1;::jn
Z t
0
:::
Z t
0
Kj1 (s1)Kj2 (s2) :::Kjn (sn) ds1:::dsn
1A F 2i (Ki (t))
2
dt
=
X
n
gn
1
2 (n+ 1)

1
N
n Z
:::
Z X
j1;::jn+1
Kj1 (s1)Kj2 (s2) :::Kjn (sn)F
2
jn+1
 
Kjn+1
 
sjn+1

ds1:::dsndsn+1
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whose eld theoretic equivalent is:X
n
gn
1
2 (n+ 1)

1
N
nZ
	y (x)x	 (x) dx
nZ
	y (x)x2	 (x) dx

=
1
2
Z
	y (x)x2	 (x) dx

G^
Z
	y (x)x	 (x) dx

for G^0 = G. The e¤ective eld action is thus:
 	y (x)

 r2 +

2 +

2

x2G^
Z
	y (x)x	 (x) dx

 (x  y)

	 (y)
The quartic term
 

2 +

2
Z
	y (x)
h
x2G^ (x  y)
i
	 (y)
Z
	y (x)x	 (x) dx

models an interaction term resulting from the tchnological factor, as announced. We will not pursue this
trail here.
10 Interactions between Fundamental Structures and Phase Tran-
sitions. Non trivial Vaccua and integrations of structures
10.1 Interaction between similar Fundamental Structures
In the two previous examples, no phase transition appeared. The constraint implied a single vacuum for any
parameter of the system.
In our context, multiple vacua may arise only if the elds considered are dened on a space of at least
two dimensions without constraint, that is when agentsactions are multicomponent. Actually, in that case,
we saw that the e¤ective global utility functions (see (141), (142) (122)) have the form:
Ueff (X) =  1
2
_X (t)

M (S) +N

_X (t)  _X (t)M (A)

X (t) 

~X

(179)
 

X (t) 

~X

N  M (S)

X (t) 

~X

+ Veff (X (t))
Recall that in the second section, we noticed that a constant term has to be added to this e¤ective
utility. It was discarded when looking at the dynamics of a single system. However, now that we consider a
large number of such systems, this constant has to reintroduced. Actually, recall that our model considers
interacting copies of the same system, each system interacting over a variable time span s, previously denoted
T . For such systems, we sum over the possible time spans through a Laplace transform. In that context,
adding a term sUeff
 
Xe

in Ueff (X) leads to shift  by Ueff
 
Xe

after Laplace transform.
Recall (120) that the Laplace transformed Green function becomes, without the potential Veff :
G 1 (x; x1) =

 1
2
r

M (S) +N
 1
r+M (A)

x 

~X

+

x 

~X

N  M (S) +M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)

x 

~X

+ 

 (x  x1)
Then, adding the Ueff
 
Xe

term and letting y =

x 

~X

leads to the eld action:
S (	) =
1
2
Z
	y (y)

 1
2
r

M (S) +N
 1
r+ yM (A)r+m2 (180)
+y

N  M (S) +M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)

y + V (y)

	 (y) dy
+
Z AX
k=2
V (x1; :::; xk) 	 (x1) 	
y (x1) :::	 (xk) 	y (xk) dx1:::dxk
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where V (x1; :::; xk) is any interaction potential between the various agents, and where we set:
m2 =
 
+ Ueff
 
Xe

(181)
As said in the second section, Ueff
 
Xe

can be negative. It is a direct consequence of costly, in utility
terms, tensions between the components of the considered structure. Then, depending on the parameters of
the system, m2 can be positive or negative. We nevertheless keep the notation m2 by reference to the usual
mass term in eld theory.
The possibility of a non trivial minimum for S arises from two possible mechanisms. To describe this two
possibilities we rst assume V (y) = 0, in order to focus on the e¤ect of the interaction term V (x1; :::; xk).
The rst part in S (	):Z
1
2

	y (y)

 1
2
r

M (S) +N
 1
r+ yM (A)r+ y

N  M (S) +M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)

y +m2

	 (y)

dy
will be expressed in a diagonal form. Consider the concatenated vector (x; p)t with p  r the "momentum"
we can rewrite: 
 1
2
r

M (S) +N
 1
r+ yM (A)r+ y

N  M (S) +M (A)M (S)M (A)

y +m2

= (p; x)
t
  
M (S) +N  M (A)
   M (A)t N  M (S) +M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)
!!
p
x

+m2
Now, given that we can decompose the matrix 
M (S) +N  M (A)
   M (A)t N  M (S) +M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)
!
as:  
M (S) +N  M (A)
   M (A)t N  M (S) +M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)
!
=

1 0
   M (A)t  M (S) +N 1 1


 
M (S) +N 0
0

N  M (S) +M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)   M (A)t  M (S) +N 1M (A)
!


1    M (S) +N 1  M (A)
0 1

=

1 0
   M (A)t  M (S) +N 1 1
 
M (S) +N 0
0 N  M (S) + 2M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)
!


1    M (S) +N 1  M (A)
0 1

we dene the change of variable
x0
p0

=

1    M (S) +N 1  M (A)
0 1

x
p

which satises [x0; p0] = [x0; p0] =  1. We can thus rewrite the di¤erential operator K as:
K =

 1
2
r

M (S) +N
 1
r+ yM (A)r+ y

N  M (S) +M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)

y +m2

= (x0; p0)t
 
M (S) +N 0
0 N  M (S) + 2M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)
!
x0
p0

+m2
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which describes a set of coupled oscillators. A second change of variables allows to diagonalize M (S) +N =
ODOt and to obtain K in a standard form. We let:
x1
p1

=
 
O
p
DOt 0
0 O
p
D
 1
Ot
!
x0
p0

=
 p
M (S) +N 0
0
p
M (S) +N
 1 ! 1    M (S) +N 1  M (A)
0 1

x
p

This change of variable preserves the commutation relations between x and p and leads to the following
expression for K :
K = (x1; p1)
t
 
1 0
0
p
M (S) +N

N  M (S) + 2M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)pM (S) +N
!
x1
p1

+m2
(182)
Thus, K may present some states with 	 (y) 6= 0 and S (	) < 0 in three cases. First, if M (S) +N has some
negative eigenvalues, second if
N  M (S) + 2M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)
presents some negative eigenvalues, or ultimately, if the term m2, which represents the internal tension
between components of a fundamental structures is negative and large enough to lower the minimum of
S (	) to some negative value.
The two rst possibilities are similar, and di¤er from the third one. We will focus on this last possibility.
Actually, the two rst possiblities represent an unstable system that will quickly break out, and thus no
stability can be achieved. The third possibility rather describes a milder instability with a certain persistance
in the dynamic system.
However, this latter kind of instability may be turned into a stable minimum, through a mechanism of
interaction between similar structures.
Consider for example, that we add to K an interaction potential modelling the simplest form of long
term interactions between two fundamental structures:
V (y1; y2) = U (y1)U (y2)
where U (y) > 0 and such that the minimum for U is reached at y = 0. We assume that m2 < 0 and that K
has a nite number of negative eigenvalues, which means that the rst eigenvalues of the harmonic oscillator
are lowered to a negative value by m2.
We also assume that the matrix elements of U (y1) between the eigenfunctions of K are positives. This
is often the case for standard examples, if we choose U (y1) = (y1)
t
C (y1) with C denite and positive.
Actually, up to the perturbation term yM (A)r, K is of harmonic oscillator type. For such operators, the
matrices elements of (y1)
t
C (y1) are positive.
Given the sign of U (y1), it models an attractive force between two types of similar structures (note in
passing the analogy with neural activity, where neurons, ring together, tend to bind together). The saddle
point equation including this potential is then:
0 = K	 (y) + 2U (y) 	 (y)
Z  
	 (y2)U (y2) 	
y (y2)

dy2
We show in Appendix 13 that for a potential of large enough magnitude and peaked around the minimum
of K, the saddle point presents a non trivial solution which is a minimum: 	 (x) =
p
	1 (x) where 	1 (x)
has norm 1 and satises:
	1 (y) =
h	1jK j	1i
h	1jU j	1iK
 1U (y1) 	1 (y)
The vector j	1i is a combination of the eigenvectors of K with negative eigenvalues, so that h	1jK j	1i < 0.
Moreover the norm of 	 (x) is:
 =  1
2
h	1jK j	1i
(h	1jU j	1i)2
> 0
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Appendix 13 shows also that the same results hold if internal tensions are modelled by a more general
potential V (y) than a simple shift m2 < 0. It is su¢ cient that the potential V (y) has a negative minimum
of large enough magnitude.
10.1.1 Example, the three agent model
In Appendix 6, we show that the e¤ective action for the three agents model is given by:
Ueff (X (t)) =
 
X (t)  X  N  MS  X (t)  X (183)
+
1
2
(X (t) X (t  1))  N +MS (X (t) X (t  1))   X (t)  XMA  X (t  1)  X
+
 
X   Xe N   (M  M 0)S   X   Xe   X   X(2)2 M 0 X
where the matrices and vectors involved are dened in section 1 and Appendix 6. The vector X is computed
in Appendix 6, and represents the equilibrium value reached by the three agentssystem. The vectors X(2)2
and Xe represent the goals, i.e. the desired values for X, for agents 2 and 1 respectively. Due to these
competing objectives, the equilibrium X is a combination of these two vectors. Appendix 6 shows that:
X = Xe +
 
N  MS 1 N +MS Xe   1
2
(M 0)t X(2)2

(184)
The term in bracket in (183):
Ueff
 
X

=
n 
X   Xe N +MS   (M  M 0)S   X   Xe   X   X(2)2 M 0 Xo
represents the loss in utility due to the competing goals between the di¤erent elements of the structure. Even
if, globally, it is optimal to stabilize around X, each sub-component experiences a loss from the di¤erence
between X and its own goal. As a consequence, at least for some values of the parameter, this term is
negative. Actually, assume that, due to its strategic advantage and the magnitude of the stress it can impose
to its subcomponents, the third agent is able to drive X close to Xe. Then:
Ueff
 
X
 '   X   X(2)2 M 0 X (185)
and given the denition of M 0, this last term measures the loss experienced by the second agent when X,
i.e. the equilibrium value of X (t) is away from X(2)2 , thus Ueff
 
X

< 0. Then, the term (185) induces an
instability in the system by lowering the lowest eigenvalue of the Green function. To get more insight about
this phenomenon, we computed the matrices involved in Ueff (X (t)) for  ! 0:
Ueff (X (t)) =
 
X (t)  X  I  MS  X (t)  X (186)
+
1
2
(X (t) X (t  1))  I +MS (X (t) X (t  1))   X (t)  XMA  X (t  1)  X
+

(1 M) 1X1
t  
M tM   2M (1 M) 1X1
Appendix 6 shows that the operator appearing in (182), except the mass term:
~K = (x1; p1)
t
 
1 0
0
p
M (S)

N  M (S) + 2M (A)  M (S) +N 1M (A)pM (S)
!
x1
p1

has positive eigenvalues for a range of parameters of relatively small magnitude, so that the stability is
preserved. We also show that, as previously said, competing objectives between the components of the
system imply the possibility of a constant term
(1 M) 1X1
t  
M tM   2M (1 M) 1X1
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of negative sign. The stability may also be impaired by any internal negative potential in the direction of
the lowest eigenvalue of ~K. As one could expect, this direction corresponds to a state of maximal strain
imposed by agent 3 to agent 2. These states may be more easily turned into an unstable one than others by
some perturbation.
However, as explained in the previous paragraph, any positive interaction potential between di¤erent
structures, and pointing in the direction of instability may restore the stability to produce some composed
states. Thus, this is the relative instability of such states that makes possible, in an indirect manner, the
aggregation into integrated structures with more degreees of freedom.
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10.2 Interaction between di¤erent types of fundamental structures
10.2.1 Non trivial saddle point, e¤ective action and integrated structure
The whole procedure of the previous paragraph can be generalized when di¤erent types of structures interact.
Having chosen a system of coordinates such that the eld action ultimately takes the form:
S (	) =
Z
1
2

	yk (y)

 1
2
(ri)2   yM (A)k ri + yDky + V (yk)

	k (y)

dy (187)
+
Z AX
k=2
V (x1; :::; xk) 	i1 (x1) 	
y
i1
(x1) :::	ik (xk) 	
y
ik
(xk) dx1:::dxk
In (187), operators of the form
Ki =

 1
2
(ri)2   yM (A)k ri + yDky + V (yk)

appear. If some of them have negative eigenvalues due to a negative minimum of V (yk), and if the interaction
potentials V (x1; :::; xk) are positive, then the saddle point equations:
0 =

 1
2
(ri)2   yM (A)l ri + yDly + Vl (y)

	l (y) (188)
+
 
@
@	yl (y)
Z AX
k=2
V (x1; :::; xk) 	i1 (x1) 	
y
i1
(x1) :::	ik (xk) 	
y
ik
(xk) dx1:::dxk
!
	l (y)
may have non trivial minima. This possibility is studied in Appendix 13. We show that for a potential
V (x1; :::; xk) oriented towards the lowest eigenstates of the operators Ki, the whole system has a non trivial
minimum with S (	) < 0. This minimum is a composed state made of the lowest eigenstates of the Ki along
their directions of instability. In the rest of the paragraph we will detail this statement and its implications,
in particular the form of the composed state and its interpretation in terms of integrated structure.
To do so, we need to precise some notations. In the sequel we will write 	(0)i (xi) for the lowest eigenstates
of the operators Ki and 	
(ni)
i (xi) for the other eigenstates of the Ki. We can write a composed states in the
following way: Assume that the potential connects p1 copies of structure 1, p2 copies of structure 2 and so on
until pr copies of structure r. Thus, we can write the potential V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xk)pr

with p1 + :::+ pr = k
where (xi)pi represents pi independent copies of xi. In other words, (xi)pi is a coordinate system for Fi :::Fi with Fi the manifold of states for structure i. Given these notations, a composed state for the various
structures writes as a sum of eigenstates:X
(n1)p1
;(n2)p2
;:::;(nr)pr
a(n1)p1 ;(n2)p2 ;:::;(nr)pr
h
	
(n1)
1 (x1)
i
p1
:::
h
	
(nl)
l (xl)
i
pl
:::
h
	(nr)r (xr)
i
pr
where
h
	
(ni)
i (xi)
i
pi
is a product of pi copies of eigenstates for structure i:
h
	
(ni)
i (xi)
i
pi
= 	
(ni)1
i ((xi)1) 	
(ni)2
i ((xi)2) :::	
(ni)pi
i

(xi)pi

The interaction involves then pi copies of the i-th structure. We will also denote, as a shortcut for identical
copies of the lowest eigenstate:h
	
(0)
i (x1)
i
pi
= 	
(0)
i ((xi)1) 	
(0)
i ((xi)2) :::	
(0)
i

(xi)pi

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To precise the condition on the potential that allows for a non trivial saddle point, we write the potential
V (x1)p1 ; :::; (xr)pr as a kernel in an operator formalism, whose form in the eigenstate basis is:
V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xr)pr ; (y1)p1 ; :::; (yr)pr

(189)
=
X
(n1)p1
;(n2)p2
;:::;(nr)pr
V(n1)p1 ;(n2)p2 ;:::;(nr)pr
h
	
(n1)
1 (x1)
i
p1
h
	
(n1)y
1 (y1)
i
p1
:::
h
	
(nl)
l (xl)
i
pl
h
	
(nl)y
l (yl)
i
pl
:::
h
	(nr)r (xr)
i
pr
h
	(nr)yr (yr)
i
pr
where the coe¢ cients V(n1)p1 ;(n2)p2 ;:::;(nr)pr are dened by:
V(n1)p1 ;(n2)p2 ;:::;(nr)pr
=
Z h
	
(n1)y
1 (x1)
i
p1
:::
h
	
(nl)y
l (xl)
i
pl
:::
h
	
(nl)y
l (xl)
i
pl
V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xr)pr

(190)

h
	
(n1)
1 (x1)
i
p1
:::
h
	
(nl)
l (xl)
i
pl
:::
h
	(nr)r (xr)
i
pr
h
	
(nl)y
l (xl)
i
pl
Our hypothesis is that the potential localizes around the ground states of each structure. This translates in:
V(n1)p1 ;(n2)p2 ;:::;(nr)pr
<< V(0)p1 ;(0)p2 ;:::;(0)pr
if some (ni)pi 6= (0)pi (191)
where (0)pi denote multi-indices with all their components set to zero. Actually, this condition means that
in 189, the terms proportional to the tensor products of ground states:h
	
(0)
1 (x1)
i
p1
h
	
(0)y
1 (y1)
i
p1
:::
h
	
(0)
l (xl)
i
pl
h
	
(0)y
l (yl)
i
pl
 :::
h
	(0)r (xr)
i
pr
h
	(0)yr (yr)
i
pr
dominate, as required. As a consequence of the assumption 189, the matrix elements of 190 rewrite:
V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xr)pr ; (y1)p1 ; :::; (yr)pr

= V0
h
	
(0)
1 (x1)
i
p1
h
	
(0)y
1 (y1)
i
p1
:::
h
	
(0)
l (xl)
i
pl
h
	
(0)y
l (yl)
i
pl
:::
h
	(0)r (xr)
i
pr
h
	(0)yr (yr)
i
pr
+
X
(n1)p1
;(n2)p2
;:::;(nr)pr ;
not all (ni)pi are nul
V(n1)p1 ;(n2)p2 ;:::;(nr)pr
h
	
(n1)
1 (x1)
i
p1
h
	
(n1)y
1 (y1)
i
p1
:::
h
	
(nl)
l (xl)
i
pl
h
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Appendix 13 shows that under some conditions on V0, a non trivial saddle point exists and satises:
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Considering the correspondence between the micro and the collective interpretation of the system, we
can wonder about the implications of this non trivial saddle point at the individual level of e¤ective utilities.
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To do so we consider the second order uctuations of the eld action around the saddle point. Coming back
to the system described by (187):
S (	) =
Z
1
2

	yk (y)

 1
2
(ri)2   yM (A)k ri + yDky + V (yk)

	k (y)

dy
+
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V (x1; :::; xk) 	i1 (x1) 	
y
i1
(x1) :::	ik (xk) 	
y
ik
(xk) dx1:::dxk
we can describe these uctuations around the minimum by decomposing:
	l (xl) = 	^l (xl) + 	l (xl)
where 	^l (xl) satises (192). Let

	^l (xl)

be the concatenated vector with components 	^l (xl). The second
order variation for S (	) is then:
S (	) = S

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
+
Z X
l
	yl (xl)Kl	l (xl) (193)
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l
where the indices l; l and n run over the copies of xl and xn, so that l = 1; :::; pl and the same for l,
and n = 1; :::; pn. The implications of the phase tansition at the individual level can be understood starting
from the e¤ective action (193). Each term of (193) is the eld counterpart of some e¤ective utility term.
The rst contribution in (193): Z X
l
	yl (xl)Kl	l (xl)
is simply the action describing a non interacting set of structures - the initial structures from which the
model was built. The second term in (193) can be interpreted as a potential for these individual initial
structures. Actually, for a given structure l:
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can be integrated over the (xn)pn with n 6= l to yield:
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l
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Since the two structures (xl)l and (xl)l involved in this expressions are identical, the potential can be
considered as symetric, and, up to a symetrization factor pl (pl   1), reduces to:
Vl =
Z
	yl (x)V
(e)
l (x; y) 	l (y) dxdy
This term has a straightforward interpretation. It represents a non local auto-interaction of structure l with
itself, as the constraints studied in the previous section: interactions with other structures globally sum up
and produce this overall binding on structure l. Mathematicaly, it corresponds to modifying the e¤ective
utility of structure l by adding a non local potential:Z
Ueff (Xl (t)) dt!
Z
Ueff (Xl (t)) dt+
Z
V^l (Xl (t) ; Xl (s)) dtds
This potential V^l (x; y) di¤ers from V
(e)
l (x; y) because it includes some corrections depending on the char-
acteristics of the system. Interactions involving the copies of the same structures (xl)l can nevertheless be
assumed to be "quite" local, so that these copies interact at the same point. In that case:
Vl =
Z
	yl (x)V
(e)
l (x; x) 	l (x) dx (194)
and this local interaction corresponds, at the individual level, to replacing
R
Ueff (Xl (t)) dt by:Z
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Z
V
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Some non local corrections can be added if we approximate the non diagonal contributions of V (e)l (x; y) by
some additional derivative terms:Z
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r	yl (x)Z(e)l (x)r	l (x) dx
and those corrections add some inertial term to the e¤ective action. They have the form:Z
W
(e)
l (Xl (t))
_Xl (t) dt+
Z
_Xl (t)Z
(e)
l (Xl (t))
_Xl (t) dt
Having interpreted the two rst contributions in (193), we can turn to the third type of term:
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l
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for l 6= n. As before this can be integrated over all the variables, except (xn)n and (xl)l to obtain:
Vnl =
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V
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
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l

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
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with:
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(195)
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As for the derivation of V (e)l , the symetry existing between the copies (xn)n on one side, and the copies
(xl)l on the other side, allows to simplify, up to some symetry factor plpn:
Vnl =
Z
	yn (x)V
(e)
nl (x; y) 	l (y) dxdy (196)
From the perspective of the individual initial agents, this term has no equivalent. Actually, an interaction
between two di¤erent structures should involve, at the eld theoretic level, a quartic contribution, i.e. having
the form: Z
	n (x) 	
y
n (x) 	l (y) 	
y
l (y) dxdy
Being of order 2, the potential (196) must be interpreted as an individual, non local, contribution to some
e¤ective utility. However, the variables involved in (196) belong to the coordinate spaces of 2 di¤erent
structures, n and l. Consequently (196) can be interpreted as a utility contribution for a single integrated
structure "nl", di¤ering from "n" or "l", and absent from the initial model.
The fact that interactions should be non local describe a "non causal" dynamics for the whole set of
interacting structures: in the eld formulation, the set of structures acts as a global environment for the
others. The existence of a non trivial minimum at the eld theoretic level, i.e. the fundamental state,
translates in the emergence of an integrated structure at the individual level. Its behavior breaks the causal
dynamics of the initial structures as individual systems. The integrated structure emerging from the non
trivial vacuum has to be understood as some "average" or typical structure, and the system of agents is in fact
an assembly of such integrated structures. They interact together, through non local e¤ective potentials. At
the individual level, this leads to a non local self interaction for the representative structure of the assembly,
the non locality modeling the action of the environment created by the set of structures on the representative
one.
10.2.2 E¤ective utility for the integrated structures
To conclude let us model an e¤ective utility for these integrated structures. Looking back to (196) leads us
to consider extended coordinate systems to model an integrated structure. Dene the concatenated vector:
Xnl (t)  (Xn (t) ; Xl (t))
This concatenated vector models the extended, or integrated, aspect of the structure "nl". To nd an
e¤ective utility Ueff (Xnl (t)) for Xnl (t) and include the di¤erent contributions relative to the structure
"nl", we rst study its eld theoretic counterpart. It gathers contributions proportional to Kl and Kn in
(193) plus (194) for n and l, and (196). This results in e¤ective action written Snl:
Snl =
Z
	yl (xl)Kl	l (xl) +
Z
	yn (xn)Kn	n (xn) + Vl + Vn + Vnl (197)
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Since Vnl mixes some structures, our aim is to nd an action Snl (	nl (xl; xn)) depending on an "extended"
eld 	nl (xl; xn) of the two variables xl and xn. This will yield the same Green functions as those computed
with Snl. To do so it will be su¢ cient to compute the four points functions and we will explain why in the
sequel. Recall that the four rst contributions of Snl, when considered as eld actions for two independent
structures, yield a Green function that is a product of the two independent Green function:
Gl (xl; yl)Gn (xn; yn)  (Kl + Vl) 1 (Kn + Vn) 1
To compute the Green functions of Snl we include Vnl in the following way: we rst rewrite Snl in a more
convenient form:
Snl =

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	n (xn)
y 
Kl + Vl V
(e)
l;n
Vn;l Kn + Vn
!
	l (xl)
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
(198)
and dene:
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!
From this set up, the computation of the four points Green function is straightforward:
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For (198), the function G
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Moreover A 1 can be computed to yield:
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and one obtains straightforwardly:
G

x
(2)
l ; x
(2)
n ; x
(1)
l ; x
(1)
n


D
(	l)
y

x
(2)
l

(	n)
y

x(2)n

	l

x
(1)
l

	n

x(1)n
E
=

Kl + V
(e)
l

  V (e)l;n

Kn + V
(e)
n
 1
V
(e)
n;l
 1 
x
(2)
l ; x
(1)
l



Kn + V
(e)
n

  V (e)n;l

Kl + V
(e)
l
 1
V
(e)
l;n
 1 
x(2)n ; x
(1)
n

+

Kl + V
(e)
l

  V (e)l;n

Kn + V
(e)
n
 1
V
(e)
n;l
 1
V
(e)
l;n

Kn + V
(e)
n
 1 
x
(2)
l x
(1)
n



Kn + V
(e)
n

  V (e)n;l

Kl + V
(e)
l
 1
V
(e)
l;n
 1
V
(e)
n;l

Kl + V
(e)
l
 1 
x(2)n ; x
(1)
l

113
From this result one can derive the following identity:
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which implies that:Z (
1 +

V
(e)
l;n

Kn + V
(e)
n
 1
x
(2)
l ; xn

V
(e)
n;l

Kl + V
(e)
l
 1
x(2)n ; xl
 1)
(199)


Kl + V
(e)
l

  V (e)l;n

Kn + V
(e)
n
 1
V
(e)
n;l

(xl; x
0
l)

Kn + V
(e)
n

  V (e)n;l

Kl + V
(e)
l
 1
V
(e)
l;n

(xn; x
0
n)

G

x0l; x
0
n; x
(1)
l ; x
(1)
n

dx0ldx
0
ndxldxn
= 

x
(2)
l   x(1)l



x(2)n   x(1)n

which leads ultimately to the expression for the four points Green functions of Snl:
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If we consider V (e)l;n relatively of small magnitude, a rst approximation is:
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Since the rst term does not mix the coordinates xl and xn, it describes the two structures independently.
The three rst terms on the contrary introduce the interactions that induces the integration of the two
structures into one.
Having found the four point functions for Snl, let us turn to the interpretation in terms of integrated
structures. In this interpretation, the four point Green function
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has been dened to satify (199). The form of the Dirac function in the RHS, 
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is in fact a two points transition function in the coordinate
space (xl; xn):
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This function should thus be the two points Green function for 	nl (xl; xn) to recover the same result of the
initial e¤ective action Snl. As a consequence, we directly nd the required e¤ective action for 	nl (xl; xn)
that computes this Green function:
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This formula a-posteriori justies, the need for the four point Green functions of Snl. Note that, using the
previous approximation (200) we can also write:
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This formula dening the e¤ective action for an assembly of integrated structures may be set in a more
readable form if we consider some approximations. We assume the following form for the operators Kl+V
(e)
l
and Kn + V
(e)
n (which implies that V
(e)
l and V
(e)
n are locals)
Kl + V
(e)
l =  
1
2
(rl)2   Ul (xl)
Kn + V
(e)
n =  
1
2
(rn)2   Un (xn)
as well as a low inertia:
(rl)2 < < Ul (xl)
(rn)2 < < Un (xn)
These further simplications yield:
Snl (	nl) (202)
'
Z
	ynl (xl; xn)

 1
2
Un (xn) (rl)2   1
2
Ul (xl) (rn)2   Ul (xl)Un (xn)  2V (e)l;n (xl; xn)V (e)n;l (xl; xn)

	nl (xl; xn) dxldxn
 
Z
	ynl

x
(2)
l ; x
(2)
n

V
(e)
l;n

x
(2)
l ; x
(1)
n

V
(e)
n;l

x(2)n ; x
(1)
l

	nl

x
(2)
l ; x
(2)
n

dx
(1)
l dx
(2)
l dx
(1)
n dx
(2)
n
Ultimately, it is straightforward to nd a rst approximation of the e¤ective utility for an integrated struc-
tures which corresponds to (202):Z 
1
2
Un (Xn (s)) _X
2
l (s) +
1
2
Ul (Xl (s)) _X
2
n (s) + Ul (Xl (s))Un (Xn (s))

ds
 2
Z
V
(e)
l;n (Xl (s) ; Xn (s))V
(e)
n;l (Xl (s) ; Xn (s)) ds 
Z
V^n;l (Xl (s1) ; Xn (s2)) ds1ds2
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where V^n;l is equal to V
(e)
l;n V
(e)
n;l plus some inertia corrections, similarly to the derivation of V
(e)
l (see (194).
This mixed utility presents some local aspect as for a usual utility in the concatenated control variable
(Xl (s) ; Xn (s)). It presents also non local contibutions resulting from the constraints this agent imposes on
itself through its subcomponents and its environment. Note also that the inertia terms _X2l (s) and _X
2
n (s)
are factored by variable contributions. This models the non trivial trajectory for the structure in the space
(Xl; Xn) as a consequence of internal interactions between the structures subcomponents.
10.3 Extension: Several type agents, e¤ective eld action
10.3.1 Principle
In the previous section we have studied the possibility of emergence for an integrated e¤ective structure
that was absent from the initial interacting system. The integrated structure includes several previously
independent structures and possess characteristics of its own, that were not present in initial ones. However
taking an other point of view and studying the aggregation of several di¤erent elements can be interesting in
some cases. Rather than aggregating all types of structures, one may integrate the behavior of one or some
of them. so that its inuence only appears as a substratum for the dynamics of other structures.
It amounts to consider a system with one type of agent less, but with a modied action which takes into
account the interactions with the suppressed agent as a global modication of the system. This representation
ts well for systems with "hidden" agents if, for some purposes, we are interested in the behavior of one (or
several) particular types of agents. By integrating out the remaining types of agents, one can focus on the
dynamic of a certain class, given an integrated landscape.
The general principle is the following. Consider the computation of the path integralZ
exp

 S
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M

D
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M
(203)
where we take the most general form of action:
S
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M

(204)
=
X
k
Z
dX^k

 1
2
	(k)y

X^k
 h
(rk)

rk  M (1)k

X^k  

~X

k

+m2k + V

X^k
i
	(k)

X^k

+
X
k
X
n
Vn
n
X^
(i)
k
o
16i6n
 Y
16i6n
	(k)y

X^
(i)
k

	(k)

X^
(i)
k

| {z }
intra species interaction
+
X
m
X
k1:::km
X
n1:::nm
Vn1:::nm
 
X^
(inj )
kj

16inj6nj
!
mY
j=1
Y
16inj6nj
	(kj)y

X^
(inj )
kj

	(kj)

X^
(inj )
kj

| {z }
inter species interaction
and partition M as M = M1 + M2. We aim at getting rid of the structures M2 + 1:::M . To do so, the
integration over

	(k)
	
k=M2+1:::M
in (203) can be performed using the methods given in the previous
paragraphs (by graphs, saddle point approximation, or both). Though it is usually impossible to get an
exact result (we will give below examples for which it is), in principle, the integrals over

	(k)
	
k=M2+1:::M
,
will leave us with: Z
exp

 S
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M2

D
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M2
(205)
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where:
Seff
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M1

=
X
k
Z
dX^k

 1
2
	(k)y

X^k
 h
(rk)

rk  M (1)k

X^k  

~X

k

+m2k + V
eff

X^k
i
	(k)

X^k

+
X
k
X
n
V effn
n
X^
(i)
k
o
16i6n
 Y
16i6n
	(k)y

X^
(i)
k

	(k)

X^
(i)
k

+
X
m
X
k1:::km
X
n1:::nm
V effn1:::nm
 
X^
(inj )
kj

16inj6nj
!
mY
j=1
Y
16inj6nj
	(kj)y

X^
(inj )
kj

	(kj)

X^
(inj )
kj

The individual potential V eff

X^k

is also a¤ected. Actually, in the integration process, interaction terms
involving only "integrated structures" plus one "non integrated one" leave us with the modied individual
potential V eff

X^k

, and implies a modied individual behavior. Besides, the interaction process between
remaining structures is itself modied by its surrounding.
10.3.2 Example: two types of agents
To be more precise, consider a simple two agents model, with a one dimensional space of conguration for
each agent: the propagator for a block (i.e. a fundamental structure) k (here k will take two values, i1 or
i2) is:
 r2k +m2k +
 
(xi)k   Yeff

(i)k
 
(xi)k   Yeff

where the matrix (i)k is p p and the mass term being dened by (see (181) for example):
m2 =
 
+ Ueff
 
Xe

Depending on the parameters of the system, m2k can be positive or negative. Moreover, we consider a non
reciprocal interaction term:
V (xi1 ; xi2) = 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
(206)
i.e. this models a strain imposed by type 1 agents on type 2 agents. This choice introduces conveniently
an asymmetry between agents. Thus, we do not expect the same results for the e¤ective actions of the two
agents: the landscape created by the dominating agent is di¤erent from the one created by the dominated
one. This fact will appear while considering the possibilities of phase transitions.
Gathering the potential (206) with the propagators for each structure yields the action of the two agents
system:
S (	i2 (xi2) ; ) = 	i1 (xi1)

 r2 +m2i1 +

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

i1

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

	yi1 (xi1)
	i2 (xi2)

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

	yi2 (xi2)
+
Z
dxi2	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2)

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
Two possibilities arise from the general method developped in the previous paragraph. One integrate the
behavior of one of the two structures, and inspect the implications for the remaining one. We will start by
integrating the behavior of the second agent and nd an e¤ective action for the rst one:
117
E¤ective action for the rst agent We consider the initial action of the second agent:
	i2 (xi2)

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

	yi2 (xi2)
+
Z
dxi2	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2)

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
= 	i2 (xi2)

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

+

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1) 	
y
i2
(xi2)

Up to some normalization that we will reintroduced later, the integral for the exponential of this expression
is straightforward and yields:
exp

 	i2 (xi2)

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

(207)
+

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1) 	
y
i2
(xi2)

D	i2 (xi2) 	yi2 (xi2)
=

det

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

+ 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
 1
= exp

 Tr

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

+ 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)

This term can thus be reintroduced in the action for the remaining eld 	i1 (xi1), and thus the integration
over the second strucure eld leads to an e¤ective action for 	i1 (xi1):
Sef: (	i1 (xi1))
= S (	i1 (xi1))
+Tr ln

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

+ 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)

Recall now that the spectrum for the operator:
 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

(208)
is given by 
n+
1
2

(i2) +m
2
i2 (209)
We assume that the eigenvalues of the diagonal matrix i2 are positive to ensure the stability of the system.
The trace of (208) is: X
n

n+
1
2

(i2) +m
2
i2
Here we have used the notation
 
n+ 12

(i2) to write the product between a vector of m half integers 
n1 +
1
2 ; :::; nm +
1
2

and the p eigenvalues of i2 .
Actually, as explainded in Appendix 9, the kernel of (208) is:
G (x; y) =
X
n
 n (x)

m2i +

n+
1
2

(i)k

 n (y)
Then:
Tr

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

=
Z
G (x; x) dx
=
X
n

m2i +

n+
1
2

(i)k

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due to the orthonormality of the eigenfunctions  n (x), and (209) follows. As a consequence, for an operator:
 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

+ 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)

which is quadratic in potential, the spectrum is similar to the spectrum of (208) and can be found by writing:
 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

+ 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)

(210)
=  r2 +m2i2
+
0@xi2   i2
 
Yeff

i2
+ x^
(i1)
i2

R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
i2 + 
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
1A


i2 + 
Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
0@xi2   i2
 
Yeff

i2
+ x^
(i1)
i2

R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
i2 + 
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
1A
+
i2
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
i2 + 
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
This is again an operator with quadratic potential, with an additional positive constant and a shift of
variables. Its trace is then similar to (209):
Tr

ln

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

+ 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2 Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)

=
X
n
ln
 
n+
1
2

i2 + 
Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)

+m2i2 +
i2
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
i2 + 
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2!
for n integers. As a consequence:
Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) = S (	i1 (xi1))
+
X
n
ln

n+
1
2

i2 + 
Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)

+m2i2
+
i2
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
i2 + 
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2!
= S (	i1 (xi1))
+
X
n
ln

n+
1
2

i2 +m
2
i2


0BB@1 +
 
n+ 12


R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1) +
i2
R
dxi1	i1(xi1)	
y
i1
(xi1)
i2+
R
dxi1	i1(xi1)	
y
i1
(xi1)
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
 
n+ 12

i2 +m
2
i2
1CCA
1CCA
We can now come back to the problem of normalization mentioned before. We showed before that for
normalization reasons, (207) has to be divided by its value for a nul interaction potential. As a consequence,
we can normalize this sum by substracting its value for a nul interaction, i.e.:
exp

 	i2 (xi2)

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

	yi2 (xi2)

D	i2 (xi2) 	yi2 (xi2)
= exp

 Tr

 r2 +m2i2 +

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

i2

xi2  
 
Yeff

i2

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whose value is: X
n
ln

n+
1
2

(i2) +m
2
i2

by virtue of (207). This value has thus to be substracted to Sef: (	i1 (xi1)), and as a consequence, one has:
Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) (211)
= S (	i1 (xi1))
+
X
n
ln
0BB@1 +
 
n+ 12


R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1) +
i2
R
dxi1	i1(xi1)	
y
i1
(xi1)
i2+
R
dxi1	i1(xi1)	
y
i1
(xi1)
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
 
n+ 12

i2 +m
2
i2
1CCA
However, this sum does not converge in n. This is a standard phenomenom when dealing with innite
degrees of freedom. Several methods exist to rule out this problem, and usually in physical problems, methods
of renormalization are used. Nevertheless, we can use here a more simple solution. Actually, for a system
in interaction, all frequencies of oscillations need not always be assumed to participate to the dynamics. At
least we can assume high frequencies to be quickly dampened. As a consequence, the sum in (211) will be
regularized in a realistic way if we introduce a cut o¤ in this sum. It amounts to assume bounded frequencies
for the eld 	i2 . We assume n 6 N . Moreover, for later purpose we normalize the eld, by introducingR
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1) =  and rescale
	i1 (xi1)!
p
	i1 (xi1)
with now 	i1 (xi1) of norm 1.
Ultimately, the e¤ective action for agents of type 1 is thus:
Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) = S (	i1 (xi1)) +
X
n6N
ln
0B@1 +
 
n+ 12

 +
i2
i2+
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
 
n+ 12

i2 +m
2
i2
1CA (212)
E¤ective action for the second agent Reversing the roles and integrating over 	i1 (xi1) will yield the
e¤ective action for 	i2 (xi2). Skipping some details from the previous paragraph procedure, the e¤ective
action for 	i2 (xi2) is obtained as:
Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) = S (	i2 (xi2)) + Tr ln
0@  r2 +m2i1 +

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

i1

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

+
R
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2)
1A
= S (	i2 (xi2)) +
X
n
Z
dxi1 n

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

 n

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

 ln

n+
1
2

i1 +m
2
i1 + 
Z
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2)

= S (	i2 (xi2)) +
X
n
ln
0@  r2 +m2i1 +

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

i1

xi1  
 
Yeff

i1

+
R
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2)
1A
As before, we normalize this expression by substracting some reference quantity:X
n
ln

n+
1
2

i1 +m
2
i1

which leads us to:
Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) = S (	i2 (xi2)) +
X
n
ln
0B@1 + 
R
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2) 
n+ 12

i1 +m
2
i1
1CA
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As in the previous paragraph, we regularize this quantity by allowing only a nite number of Fourier com-
ponents, n  N . The result is then:
Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) = S (	i2 (xi2)) +
X
nN
ln
0B@1 + 
R
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2) 
n+ 12

i1 +m
2
i1
1CA
Normalizing the eld 	i2 (xi2):
	i2 (xi2)!
p
	i2 (xi2)
will yield ultimately:
Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) = S (	i2 (xi2)) +
X
nN
ln
0B@1 + 
R
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2) 
n+ 12

i1 +m
2
i1
1CA
10.3.3 Possibility of phase transition
The interesting di¤erences between the e¤ective actions Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) and Sef: (	i2 (xi2)), are embedded
in the possibility of phase transition in each case. This requires to study the possibility of a minimum for
Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) and then for Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) with  > 0. This possibility depends on the parameters involved
in each e¤ective utility. A detailled study is performed in Appendix 14, and the results are the following:
First agent: We consider several cases, depending on the parameters of the system.
For  > 0, if:
1
2
(i2) m2i1 < 0
1
2
(i1) m2i1 + 
X
n6N
 
n+ 12

+
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
 
n+ 12

(i2) +m
2
i2
< 0
and if there is an 0 such that
1
2
(i1) m2i1 +
X
n6N
 
n+ 12

 +
(i2)
2

(i2+0)
2
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
 
n+ 12

(i2 + 0) +m
2
i2
+
i20
i2+0
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2 > 0 (213)
then there exists 1 6= 0 such that
	
(0)
i1
(xi1) =
p
1
p
a

 1
4
exp

 
p
a
2
x2i1

is a minimum for the action Sef:. Remark that, since the RHS of (213) is increasing for 0 > 0, the condition
(213) is fullled for some values of the parameters. As a consequence a non trivial vaccum exists. Implications
of this result have been explained earlier.
For  < 0 the conditions are simpler. If:
1
2
(i2) m2i1 > 0
1
2
(i1) m2i1 + 
X
n6N
 
n+ 12

+
 
Yeff

i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
 
n+ 12

i2 +m
2
i2
< 0
then there is  6= 0, such that p	(0)i1 (xi1) is the minimum of Sef: (	i1 (xi1)).
For all other cases the minimum for Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) is reached for  = 0 and no phase transition occurs.
The possibillity for several minima is the consequence of the strain imposed by the rst agent on the
second. Given the values of the parameters, the rst agent may adapt to the behavior of the second one and
lead the system toward an other equilibrium.
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E¤ective action for the second agent Appendix 14 shows that the expectation value h	i2 (xi2)i is nul,
and then, that no phase transition occurs. This is the consequence of the asymmetric potential of interaction
between the agents. If actions of the rst type of agents are integrated out, for reasons such as di¤erent
time scale for these actions, or large uctuations among the rst type of agents, the second type of agents
integrate these behaviors as an external medium and only one equilibrium is reached. The characteristic of
this equilibrium is studied in the next paragraph.
10.3.4 Consequence of phase transition
We can now inspect the consequences of the phase transition for the two agents. For the rst agent, two
phases may appear. Consider its e¤ective action where the notation
R
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1) =  has been
reintroduced.
Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) = S (	i1 (xi1)) (214)
+
X
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 
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R
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 
n+ 12

i2 +m
2
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We will compute the second order approximation of (214) for of each of these phases.
In the case of a trivial background expectation 	i1 (xi1) = 0, the second order expansion of Sef: (	i1 (xi1))
is:
Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) = S (	i1 (xi1)) +
X
n6N

n+ 12 +
 
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
i2
  x^(i1)i2
2
 
n+ 12

i2 +m
2
i2
Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1)
In the phase where the minimum of Sef: is reached for a eld 	0i1 (xi1) 6= 0, we shift 	i1 (xi1)! 	i1 (xi1) +
	0i1 (xi1), which leads to:
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 
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
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The interpretation is the following. In both cases, the e¤ective action for the rst type of agent is shifted by
a quadratic term in 	i1 (xi1) of the type:

Z
dxi1	i1 (xi1) 	
y
i1
(xi1) + 
Z
dxi1
 
	0i1 (xi1)

(	i1 (xi1))
y
+ (	i1 (xi1))
 
	0i1 (xi1)
y2
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Coming back to the individual behaviors, we have seen in the previous paragraph that it amounts to modify
the utility of an individual agent by a constant term. In other words, the introduction of surrounding type
2 agents does not change the equilibrium value. However the introduction of this constant quadratic term
dampens the oscillations around he equilibrium. In fact, this shift in the action corresponds to a shift in m2i1 ,
or, equivalently, a shift in , the parameter which measures the inverse of interaction duration for type 1
agents. It means that integrating the behavior of second-type agents is equivalent to reduce the duration for
the interaction process of type 1 agents. Type 1 agents spend time controling type 2 agents, which is a loss
of time/energy. As a consequence type 2 agents act as stabilizers. The dampening e¤ect in the oscillation
depends on the phase of the system.
Now, switching to the e¤ective action for the second agent:
Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) = S (	i2 (xi2)) +
X
nN
ln
0B@1 + 
R
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
y
i2
(xi2) 
n+ 12

i1 +m
2
i1
1CA
We have seen that there is no phase transition (i.e. the minimum of Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) is for 	i2 (xi2) = 0). At
the second order approximation, the e¤ective action Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) is then:
Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) = S (	i2 (xi2)) +
X
nN

R
dxi2

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
	i2 (xi2) 	
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(xi2) 
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
i1 +m
2
i1
= S (	i2 (xi2)) +
0@X
nN
 
n+ 12

i1 +m
2
i1
1AZ dxi2 xi2   x^(i1)i2 2 	i2 (xi2) 	yi2 (xi2)
Here, the situation is di¤erent with respect to type 1 agents. Coming back to the individual utilities
corresponding to this colllective eld, the rst order correction due to agent 1 is to shift the e¤ective action
by a term 

xi2   x^(i1)i2
2
: the attractive (for  > 0) or repulsive (for  < 0) potential. The only consequence
for the second agent is thus a shift hat for the second species is shifted is the frequencies of oscillations
i2 ! i2 +
0@X
nN
 
n+ 12

i1 +m
2
i1
1A
depending on the sign of , fasten ou dampened. The center of oscillation is also shifted as a combination
of
 
Yeff

i1
and x^(i1)i2 . In terms of e¤ective utility it means that the equilibrium value of the second type of
agent is shifted. By a computation analog to (210), the shift in the equilibrium value is:
 
Yeff

i2
!
i2
 
Yeff

i2
+ x^
(i1)
i2
P
nN

(n+ 12 )i1+m2i1

i2 +
P
nN

(n+ 12 )i1+m2i1

As a consequence, the background initiated by the rst type of agents modies both the systems equilibrium,
which is shifted towards the goals of the rst agents, and the frequencies of oscillations around the equilibrium.
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11 Introducing macro time scale and aggregated quantities
This section studies the possibility to dene aggregated quantities in a system with a large number of agents.
These quantities have to be relevant at the scale of the whole system. The eld formalism is appropriate for
this since it allows to connect micro and macro scales.
To do so, we start with the probabilisitic description of a system with N agents whose e¤ective statistical
weights is (128):
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z Z
Dxi (t) exp
0@ X
i
Z s
0

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt

 
AX
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X
i1;:::ik
Z s
0
Vk (xi1 (t1) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
1A
(215)
The expectation of
R s
0
P
i xi (t) dt can then be computed by adding a linear potential Jixi (t) to K (xi (t))
and by taking the derivative at J = 0 of (215):Z
exp ( s)
*Z s
0
X
i
xi (t) dt
+
ds (216)
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 Pi R si0  _x2i2 (t) + (K (xi (t)) + Jxi (t)) dt
 PAk=2Pi1;:::ik R si0 Vk (xi1 (t1) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
!!!
J=0
The quantity
P
i xi (t) is the agregated value of the quantities xi (t) over the set of agents,. We will explain
later why we integrate this quantity over the whole duration of the interaction by integrating for t between
0 and s.
To switch to the eld representation, we need to compute the Laplace transform of

R s
0
P
i xi (t) dt

:Z
exp ( 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X
i
xi (t) dt
+
ds (217)
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!!
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Which amounts to compute the average, over time, of

R s
0
P
i xi (t) dt

with a mean duration process of 1 .
Now, switching to the eld formalism, the RHS of (217) can be computed by using the eld theoretic
action:(145):
S
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
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inter species interaction
In the line of our general formalism, di¤erent types of agents have been introduced. To replicate the result of
(217) we have to modify the potential in the eld formalism. Actually, the introduction of J
R s
0
P
i xi (t) dt
in (217), or more generally of J
R s
0
P
ik
xik (t) dt if several types of agents are considered, translates at the
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eld level by replacing V

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
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
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
+ JX^k in (218). As a consequence, the aggregated quantityR
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And the quantity
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can be recovered by the inverse laplace transform of the previous quantity:*Z s
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Remark that the eld formalism allows to compute an average quantity over the all duration process,
R s
0
P
i xi (t) dt

but that we cannot di¤erentiate the quantity
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with respect to s to get:*X
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Actually, in

R s
0
P
i xi (t) dt

the bracket term, the expectation over the path depends itself on s through the
weight appearing in (215). Thus, the eld formalism
However, remind that T = 1 can be seen as the mean time for the process of interaction between the
agents of the system, one can interpret
R
exp ( s) 
R s
0
P
i xi (t) dt

ds as the mean quantity X =
P
i xi (t)
aggregated over a period T . This a static view however, since nothing in the interaction process makes a
di¤erence between two di¤erent time span, T and T 0 except the fact that a di¤erent length of the process
will yield a di¤erent result.
Three di¤erent and non exclusive ways connect our formalism with a dynamic evolution of the macro
quantities X (T ). The rst is to assume that all parameters in (218) depend exogenously on T . It repre-
sents the evolution of interactions, technology, or any quantity external to the system. The evolution of the
parameters may imply some phase transitions in the system. The second way is to consider each individ-
ual agents equilibrium values as given. This comes as an external condition:

~X

k
= 1NT
 
X (T   1)
k
(rewritten also
 
X (T   1)
k
for the sake of simplicity). The third way, which is also the more usual and
more direct, comes from the inclusion of constraints that encompass some exogenous quantities. For exam-
ple, a budget constraint includes the average endowment Y at time t for an agent. We can consider this
average endowment to be given by some past average accumulated quantities, say X (T   1) and to replace
it by Y ! 1NT
 
X (T   1) which is proportionnal to X (T   1). For several types of agents, the average
endowment Yk for the type k can thus replaced by Xk (T   1). The contributions of these terms, that are
like Y X^k, are linear terms and can by themselves be integrated in the constants

~X

k
.
The rst of these ways is exogenous, the two others are endogenous. Combining these posibilities allows
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to reintroduce some macro time dependence leads to consider the e¤ective action:
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where now some exogenous dependencies in T have been introduced in the interaction parameters, through
the interaction potentials and in m2k (T ). To point the relation with more usual models of statistical physics,
these exogenous variations are usually responsible for phase transition of a system. As explained above the
macro quantity
 
X (T   1)
k
satises a recursive equation:
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The exploration of such recursive system is left for future works.
11.1 From micro to macro relations
Would some micro relations between some quantities be stable when switching to the macro scale ? Consider
at the micro level a quantity that can be written:
zik (t) = h (xik (t))
where xik (t) is the control variable at time t for an agent of type k, and compute its aggregated version over
the duration of the interaction process:
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Then, similarly to (220):
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(221)
We also need the aggregated quantity corresponding to the xik (t):
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A consequence of (221) is that if h is linear, h

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
= X^k with  an arbitrary constant, then after
agregation
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and the micro relation is preserved at the macro level. However for a more general
relation this is not the case: Actually, computing the derivative in (221):
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nition of the interaction Green function:
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To compare with
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we can specialize to h (x) = x to write:
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and the comparison between (223)and (224) shows that the relation 
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
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is not valid for a general function h. Only if translation invariance is present in the model, that is G (x; y) =
G (y   x) and thus G (x; x) = G (0; 0), then some simple macro relations can be found (normalizing G (0; 0)
to 1). Actually, in that case:
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Assuming that the lower bound is equal to 0 in both integrals, we change the variable u = x
2
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integral to get:  
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k
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However, in the models at stake in this work, involving e¤ective utility of harmonic oscillators plus interaction
terms, the translation invariance is not preserved, and no simple macro relation can be found.
11.2 E¤ect of phase transition on aggregated quantities
Aggregated quantities are given by average quantities in the eld formalism, and as such, they should be
a¤ected by phase transitions occuring with the parameters evolution. To inspect this phenomenon, we start
with the expression for an aggregated quantity:
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Assume a non zero vacuum expectation value for the 	(k)
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rst order condition that de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the saddle point:
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The rst order condition (227) can be used to compute the J dependency of the two rst terms in the right
hand side of (226). Actually:
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and (225) becomes at the second order approximation: 
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where we dene for any eld dependent quantity A
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(k1)
0

X^k1



	
(k2)
0
y 
X^k2

1CA
1CA
Jk=0
(229)
can also be found by using again the rst order condition (227). Actually, di¤erentiating (227) with respect
to Jk and then letting Jk = 0 yields:
2S
n
	
(k)
0

X^k
o
k=1:::M



	
(k)
0
y 
X^k



	
(k)
0

X^k

0@@	(k)0

X^k

@Jk
1A
Jk=0
+ X^k	
(k)
0

X^k

= 0
which implies: 0@@	(k)0

X^k

@Jk
1A
Jk=0
=  
0B@ 2S
n
	
(k)
0

X^k
o
k=1:::M



	
(k)
0
y 
X^k



	
(k)
0

X^k

1CA
 1
X^k	
(k)
0

X^k

(230)
so that (229) can be expressed as:0B@ @
@Jk
0B@ 2S
n
	
(k)
0

X^k
o
k=1:::M

	
(k1)
0

X^k1



	
(k2)
0
y 
X^k2

1CA
1CA
Jk=0
=
0B@ 3S
n
	
(k)
0

X^k
o
k=1:::M

	
(k0)
0

X^k0

	
(k1)
0

X^k1



	
(k2)
0
y 
X^k2

1CA
0@@	(k0)0

X^k0

@Jk
1A
Jk=0
=  
0B@ 3S
n
	
(k)
0

X^k
o
k=1:::M

	
(k0)
0

X^k0

	
(k1)
0

X^k1



	
(k2)
0
y 
X^k2

1CA
0B@ 2S
n
	
(k)
0

X^k
o
k=1:::M



	
(k0)
0
y 
X^k0



	
(k0)
0

X^k0

1CA
 1
X^k0	
(k0)
0

X^k0

From this relation, one can deduce that, in the quadratic approximation, i.e. if interactions terms in
S
n
	
(k)
0

X^k
o
k=1:::M

are relatively low compared to the quadratic contributions, the last term in (228)
can be neglected, and one is left with: 
X (T )

k
=
Z
	
(k)y
0

X^k

X^k	
(k)
0

X^k

dX^k +
Z
	(k)y

X^k

X^k	
(k)

X^k

dX^k

n
	
(k)
0 (X^k)
o
k=1:::M
(231)
In most cases the second term in (231) is centered around the equilibrium value

~X

k
(see (218)). The rst
term in (231) is the macro quantity
 
X (T )

k
evaluated in the phase dened by the state 	(k0)0 . In other
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words, the aggregated value
 
X (T )

k
depends on the phase of the environment. When there is no phase
transition we get:  
X (T )

k
=

~X

k
and the aggregated value matches with the micro equilibrium value. But when a phase transition occurs, we
rather have:  
X (T )

k
=

~X

k
+
Z
	
(k)y
0

X^k

X^k	
(k)
0

X^k

dX^k
and the systems interactions have moved the system to an other equilibrium.
If we were to consider the last contribution to (228), this term would represent a correction due to the
uctuations of the environment, that depend themselves on the phase of the system.
12 Conclusion
This work has investigated the dynamical patterns of a system with N heterogenous economic agents. For
a small number of agents, relaxing the optimizing behavior for a probabilist description centered around the
optimal path allows to deal with some otherwise untractable systems. The classical optimization solution can
be retrieved, in some cases, as the average dynamics of our formalism. Moreover, this probabilitic treatment
can conveniently describe the uctuation patterns of agents behaviors. The transition functions of the
system are computed by path integrals. They describe the system as a random process, whose uctuations
are deviations from the classical path. For large N , collective behaviors are better studied by switching
to a eld formalism, as usually done in statistical physics. Techniques of perturbation expansion, non
trivial vacuua and phase transitions yield some insights about the relevant quantities of the system. Some
aggregate or e¤ective structures absent in the initial micro description, may appear, and become relevant at
the collective level. A phenomenon of emergence is thus possible.
Moreover, our formalism allows to interpret the inuence of the dynamics of the system as a whole at the
individual level. This approach presents some circular features. On the one hand, while resulting from the
individual relations, the macro scale cannot be reduced to a sum of individual systems. On the other hand,
individual behaviors are shaped by the environment.
Our work ends with a short inspection of the aggregation issue in our context. We show that some
agregated quantities can be retrieved from the eld formalism. We introduce a macro time scale that should
allow to derive an approximate dynamics for the macro quantities, based on the eld formalism. This
extension is left for future researches.
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Appendix 1
We show that, as claimed in the rst section, that our probabilistic denition of the agents behavior encom-
passes the usual optimization behavior in the limit of no uncertainty. For 2j ! 0 and then 2i ! 0, we aim
at showing that (9)
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp
 
U
(i)
t
2i
!
 exp
0@X
k
X
j 6=i
U^ tieff (Xj (t+ k))
2j
1A d fXj (t+ k)gj 6=i d fXi (t+ k)g
is peaked around the classical optimization solution, where:
U
(i)
t =
X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

is the intertemporal utility of agent j and
U^ tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xk (t  1))) =  
1
2
(Xj (t) Xj [(Xk (t  1))])tAjj (Xj (t) Xj [(Xk (t  1))])
with Xj [(Xk (t  1))] is the solution for Xj of
0 =

@
@Xj (t)
U tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xk (t  1)))

Xj(t)=Xj [(Xk(t 1))]
for a given (Xk (t  1)). The function U tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) has been dened in the rst section as the
i-th truncated e¤ective utility for agent j.
To do so, recall rst that in the classical set up, agent i optimizes:
U
(i)
t = E
t
i
X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

knowing the impact of Xi (t) on (Xj (t+ n  1)). Then, agent i optimizes U (i)t , taking into account that
the agents j about which agent i has the knowledge of their behavior, act by optimizing a certain utility
function U (j)eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1))). Thus, the (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i are not independent variables, but depends
on Xi (t  1) through agent j rst order condition:
@
@Xj (t)
U
(j)
eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) = 0 (232)
The classical solution of optimization problem for agent i:
@
@Xi (t)
U
(i)
t =
@
@Xi (t)
Eti
X
n>0
nu
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

= 0
becomes, using (232):
0 =
@
@Xi (t)
u
(i)
t

Xi (t) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

(233)
+Eti
X
n>2
X
j
@Xj (t+ n  1)
@Xi (t)
n
@
@Xj (t+ n  1)u
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

and the Xj (t+ n  1) satisfy:
0 = Eti
@
@Xj (t)
U
(j)
eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) (234)
=
@
@Xj (t)
U tieff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))
132
One can nd

@Xj(t)
@Xk(t 1)

from this relation by di¤erentiation:
0 =
X
k

@Xj (t)
@Xk (t  1)

@
@Xk (t  1)
@
@Xj (t)

U
(j)
eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))

+
@
@Xj (t)
@
@Xj (t)

U
(j)
eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))

which yields:
@Xj (t)
@Xk (t  1)

=  
X
k

@2
@Xk (t  1) @Xj (t)

U
(j)
eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))
 1
 @
2
@Xj (t) @Xj (t)

U
(j)
eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))

and @Xj(t+n)@Xi(t) is found recursively:
@Xj (t+ n)
@Xi (t)
=
X
l 6=i
@Xj (t+ n)
@Xl (t+ n  1)
@Xl (t+ n  1)
@Xi (t)
the sum is for l 6= i since the Xi (t), Xi (t0) are independent variables on which agent i optimizes.
Now, we show that we recover these optimization equations when the uncertainty in our description goes
to 0. In the weight:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp
 
U
(i)
t
2i
!
exp (235)
 exp
0@X
k
X
j 6=i
U^ tieff (Xj (t+ k))
2j
1A d fXj (t+ k)gj 6=i d fXi (t+ k)g
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp
 
U
(i)
t
2i
!
 exp
0@X
k
X
j 6=i
U^ tieff (Xj (t+ k))
2j
1A d fXj (t+ k)gj 6=i d fXi (t+ k)g
Given that U^ tieff (Xj (t+ k)) are positive, for 
2
j ! 0, the path localizes around the maximum of U^ tieff ,
solution of:
U^ tieff (Xj (t+ k)) = 0
so that Xj (t+ k) is set to Xj [(Xk (t+ k   1))] which is solution of the saddle point equation for U tieff :
0 =

@
@Xj (t+ k)
U tieff (Xj (t+ k) ; (Xk (t+ k   1)))

Xj(t)=Xj [(Xk(t 1))]
That is the value of Xj (t) that are solutions of:
@
@Xj (s)
U tieff (Xj (s) ; (Xi (s  1))) = 0 for s > t
Solving for the Xj (s), j 6= i allows to express recursively all the Xj (s), j 6= i as functions of Xi (t), Xi (s),
s > t and Xj (t  1), j 6= i, then, the integrations reduce to a sequence of integrals on the Xi (s), s > t.
Ultimately, for 2i ! 0, the path localizes around the solutions of:
0 =
@
@Xi (t+ k)
U
(i)
t for k > 0
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where the Xj (s), j 6= i for s > t have been replaced as functions of Xi (t), Xi (s), s > t and Xj (t  1), j 6= i,
which yields for k > 0:
0 =
@
@Xi (t+ k)
u
(i)
t

Xi (t+ k) ; (Xj (t  1))j 6=i

+
X
n>k+2
X
j
@Xj (t+ n  1)
@Xi (t+ k)
n
@
@Xj (t+ n  1)u
(i)
t+n

Xi (t+ n) ; (Xj (t+ n  1))j 6=i

This is the sequence of optimization equations, as planned by agent i at time t with Xj (t+ k) satifying
0 =
@
@Xj (t+ k)
U tieff (Xj (t+ k) ; (Xk (t+ k   1))) for k > 0
as needed. As a consequence, the result is proved.
Note that for quadratic utilities: 
@Xj (t)
@Xk (t  1)

= (Ajj)
 1
Ajk
and
Ueff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1))) =  1
2

Xj (t) + (Ajj)
 1
Ajk (Xk (t  1))
t
Ajj

Xj (t) + (Ajj)
 1
Ajk (Xk (t  1))

= U^eff (Xj (t) ; (Xi (t  1)))
and the result rewrites as:
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp
 
U
(i)
t
2i
!
 exp
0@X
k
X
j 6=i
U tieff (Xj (t+ k))
2j
1A d fXj (t+ k)gj 6=i d fXi (t+ k)g
which peaks on the optimization solution for 2j ! 0 and then 2i ! 0, as claimed in section 1.
134
Appendix 2
As recorded in the text, we rewrite the utilities in terms of the variables Yi (t)
U
(i)
t =
X
t
t
0@X
j<i
 
Xi (t)A
(i)
ii Xi (t) +

Xj (t  1)  X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj (t  1)  X(i)j

+2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))  X(i)j
!
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
1A
=
X
t
Yi (t)

A
(i)
ii 0
0 0

Yi (t) + Yi (t  1)
 
0 0
0 A
(i)
fjjg
!
Yi (t  1)
+Yi (t)
 
0 
1
2A
(i)
ij

1
2A
(i)
ji 0
!
Yi (t  1) +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
expected utilty at t.We will also add possibility for an inertia term:
 Xi (t) (i)ii Xi (t  1)
Each agent j behaves at time t with a so called e¤ective utility Ueff (Xj (t))  Ueff (Xj) whose recursive
form for the non normalized Ueff (Xj) is assumed to be:
Ueff (Yj (s)) = Y
(e)
j (s)
 
A
(j)
jj

eff
0
0 0
!
Y
(e)
j (s)  2Y (e)j (s)
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
0 0
!
Y
(e)
j (s  1)
+
X
i>k>j
2Xj (t)A
(j)
jk (Xk (t  1))
where Y (e)j has been dened in (34):
Y
(e)
j (t+ k) =


k
2

Xk (t+ k)  X(j)ek

kj

The normalization of exp (Ueff (Yj (t))) is obtained by letting (we omit temporarily the upperscript (e)):
C
Z
exp (Ueff (Yj (t))) (d (Yj (t))) = 1
writing:
Ueff (Yj (t)) =
0@Y (e)j (t) + A(j)jj  1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A1At A(j)jj 
eff

0@Y (e)j (t) + A(j)jj  1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A1A
 
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1At


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A
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yields the normalization factor (introducing again the upperscript (e)):
1
N = exp
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) +
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Y
(e)
j (t  1)
1At


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) +
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Y
(e)
j (t  1)
1A
and the normalized e¤ective utility becomes:
U
(n)
eff (Yj (t)) =
0@Y (e)j (t) + A(j)jj  1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A1At A(j)jj 
eff

0@Y (e)j (t) + A(j)jj  1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A1A
Given the denition of Y (e)j (s) one can concatenate all the vectors Y
(e)
j (s) for i < j to form a vector
Y
(e)
j (s)

j<i
and given the denition of Yi (s) one can write:
Y
(e)
j (s)

j<i
= (Yi (s))j<i + 
s t

X
(i)
j   X(j)ej

j<i
where the subscript j < i means that we only concatenate the component vectors of Yi (s) for j < i. This is
Yi (s) without its component along i. Concatenate this vector with (Yi (s))i, that is adding the component
along i one obtains a composed vector:
Y^i (s) =

(Yi (s))i ;

Y
(e)
j (s)

j<i

We will also need to dene:
~Yi (s) =

(Yi (s))i ; (Yi (s))j<i + 
s t

X
(i)
j

j<i

The normalization factor has to be added to the global weight (i.e. the normalized e¤ective utility) to be
taken into account for agent i is then (in the sequel, the sum over j < i is always understood):
Ueff (Yi (t)) =
X
t>0
t
0@X
j<i
 
Xi (t)A
(i)
ii Xi (t) Xi (t) (i)ii Xi (t  1) +Xj (t  1)A(i)jj Xj (t  1)
+2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
!
+ U
(n)
eff (Yj)
1A
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
=
X
t>0
Yi (t)
 
A
(i)
ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj
!
Yi (t) + 
1
2Yi (t)

 (i)ii 2A(i)ij
0 0

Yi (t  1)
+
X
t>0
Y
(e)
j (t)
 
0 0
0

A
(j)
jj

eff
!
Y
(e)
j (t) + 
1
2Y
(e)
j (t)
0@ 0 0
0


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
 1AY (e)j (t  1)
+
1
2
i
~Yi (t)
 
0 0
2A
(j)
ji
n
2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o ! ~Yi (t  1) +X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+ ~Yi (t)

B11 B
0
12
(B012)
t
B022

~Yi (t) + Y
(e)
j (t)

0 0
0 B"22

Y
(e)
j (t) +
~Yi (t)
0@ 0 B(3)12
B
(3)
12
t
B
(3)
22
1AY (e)j (t)
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where, by convention Y (e)j (t) has been extended with a nul component in the coordinate i, that is: Y
(e)
j (t)!
0
Y
(e)
j (t)

. Then, Ueff (Yi (t)) can be written:
Ueff (Yi (t)) =
X
t>0
Yi (t)
 
A
(i)
ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj
!
Yi (t) +
X
t>0
Y
(e)
j (t)
 
0 0
0

A
(j)
jj

eff
+B"22
!
Y
(e)
j (t) (236)
+
1
2
i
~Yi (t)

B11 B
0
12
(B012)
t
B022

~Yi (t) + ~Yi (t)
0@ 0 B(3)12
B
(3)
12
t
B
(3)
22
1AY (e)j (t)
+
1
2Yi (t)

 (i)ii 2A(i)ij
0 0

Yi (t  1) + 
1
2
i
~Yi (t)
 
0 0
2A
(j)
ji
n
2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o ! ~Yi (t  1)
+
1
2Y
(e)
j (t)
0@ 0 0
0


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
 1AY (e)j (t  1) +X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
We aim at writing Ueff (Yi (t)) under the form:
Ueff (Yi (t)) =
X
t>0
Y
(e)
i (t)
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22
 1AY (e)i (t) (237)
+2
1
2Y
(e)
i (t)
0@  (i)ii A(i)ij
A
(j)
ji


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AY (e)i (t  1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
where:
B11 = A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
ji (238)
B12 =

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ; 

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

B22 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ;

 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
t 
A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff



A
(j)
kj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
S
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
B012 = A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk (239)
B022 = A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk
B"22 = 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
t 
A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

B
(3)
12 = 

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

B
(3)
22 = 

A
(j)
kj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
S
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with MS = 12 (M +M
t) for any matrix M , and where we have dened:
Y
(e)
i (s) = 
s t
2

Xj (s) 

X
(i)e
j

j6i
For a vector

X
(i)e
j

to be determined. Given the form of (237), is the equilibrium value of (236) when
Xj (t  1) = 0 for j > i. Thus, X(i)ej is found as the solution of the rst order condition @@Yi(t)Ueff (Yi (t)) = 0
when Xj (t  1) = 0 for j > i. This equation yields: 
A
(i)
ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj
!
X
(i)e
j   X(i)j

+
 
0 0
0

A
(j)
jj

eff
+B"22
! 
X
(i)e
j  
 
0
X
(j)e
j
 !!
+
1
2
i

B11 B
0
12
(B012)
t
B022

X
(i)e
j +
1
2
0@ 0 B(3)12
B
(3)
12
t
B
(3)
22
1AS X(i)ej
+
1
2
0@ 0 B(3)12
B
(3)
12
t
B
(3)
22
1AS  X(i)ej  
 
0
X
(j)e
j
 !!
+
1
2

 (i)ii 2A(i)ij
0 0
S 
X
(i)e
j   X(i)j

+ 
1
2
i
 
0 0
2A
(j)
ji
n
2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o !S X(i)ej
+
1
2
0@ 0 0
0


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
 1AS  X(i)ej  
 
0
X
(j)e
j
 !!
= 0
The constant terms in this equation are 
A
(i)
ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj
!
X
(i)
j +
 
0 0
0

A
(j)
jj

eff
+B"22
! 
0
X
(j)e
j
 !
+
1
2
0@ 0 B(3)12
B
(3)
12
t
B
(3)
22
1AS  0
X
(j)e
j
 !
+
1
2

 (i)ii 2A(i)ij
0 0
S
X
(i)
j + 
1
2
0@ 0 0
0


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
 1AS  0
X
(j)e
j
 !
and the equation for X(i)ej becomes:
0@0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22
 1A
+ 
1
2
0B@  2(i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(j)
ji +A
(i)
ji 2


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
S
1CA
1CA X(i)ej 
=
  
A
(i)
ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj
!
+ 
1
2
 
 (i)ii A(i)ij
A
(i)
ji 0
!!
X
(i)
j

+
0@ 0 0
0

A
(j)
jj

eff
+B"22
!
+
1
2
0@ 0 B(3)12
B
(3)
12
t
B
(3)
22
1A+  12
0@ 0 0
0


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
S 1A1A 0
X
(j)e
j
 !
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with solution:
X
(i)e
j =
0BBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii

B12; 2
p


A
(i)
ij
S

Bt12; 2
p


A
(j)
ji
S 8><>:

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22;
2


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
S
9>=>;
1CCCCCA
 1
(240)

8><>:
0B@ A(i)ii  
p


(i)
ii
2

B
(3)
12
2 ;
p
A
(i)
ij


B
(3)
12
t
2 A
(i)
jj +
B
(3)
22
2
1CA X(i)j 
+
0B@ 0
B
(3)
12
2
B
(3)
12
t
2
(
A
(j)
jj

eff
; B"22;
B
(3)
22
2 ;
p



(j)
fkjgk6j
2

eff
) 1CA 0 X(j)ej 
!9>=>;
Including the terms Xi (t)A
(i)
ii Xi (t), Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1)) and Ueff (Yj) at t. Using Yj (t  1) ,!
Yi (t  1), by extension of notation

Y^j

eff
,!

0; :::;

Y^j

eff
; :::0

in the sum
X
t>0
t
0@X
j<i

Xi (t)A
(i)
ii Xi (t) Xi (t) (i)ii Xi (t  1) +Xj (t  1)A(i)jj Xj (t  1) + 2Xi (t)A(i)ij (Xj (t  1))

+ Ueff (Yj)
1A
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
=
X
t>0
Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22
 1AYi (t) (241)
+
1
2Yi (t)
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1)
 
X
t>0
2Yi (t  1) :

Y^j

eff
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
X
t>0
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fkjgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1At


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fkjgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A
The second lower part of Yi (t) includes all substructures of Xi (t). Then A
(i)
fjjg (written latter as A
(i)
jj for
the sake of implicity) is a Block matrix including all interaction between j and k for j and k < i.
A
(i)
fjjg +

A
(j)
jj

eff
;

A
(j)
fkkgk<j

eff

matrix obtained by letting A(i)fjjg +

A
(j)
jj

eff
in place (j; j) and
A
(j)
fkkgk<j

eff
in place (k; k). The bracket denotes this operation for the all collection of j substrctrs. Same
operation for

A
(j)
fjkgk<j ; A
(j)
fkjgk<j

eff
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j

.
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Dene also
A
(i)
ji =

A
(i)
ij
t

(j)
fjkgj>k =


(j)
fkjgj>k
t
and rewrite:
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1A =
0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
+
0BB@
0 A
(i)
ij  A(j)ij
 

A
(i)
ji  A(j)ji
 8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A(j)fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
The two rst terms in (241) can thus be rewritten as:
Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22
 1AYi (t)
+
p
Yi (t)
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1)
= Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22
 1AYi (t)
 
p

2
(Yi (t)  Yi (t  1))
0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA (Yi (t)  Yi (t  1))
+
p

2
Yi (t)
0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCAYi (t)
+
p

2
Yi (t  1)
0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCAYi (t  1)
+
p
 (Yi (t)  Yi (t  1))
0BB@
0 A
(i)
ij  A(j)ij
 

A
(i)
ji  A(j)ji
 8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A(j)fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCAYi (t)
As a consequence, discarding the terms quadratic or linear in Yi (t  1) since they are absorbed in the
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normalization at time t, the sum in (241) starting from t+ 1 is then:
X
s>t
Yi (s)
0BBBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii
np


A
(i)
ij +A
(j)
ij

; B12
o
np


A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji

; Bt12
o 8>>><>>>:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
p

8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCAYi (s)
 
p

2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))
0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))
+
X
s>t
p
 (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))
0BB@
0 A
(i)
ij  A(j)ij
 

A
(i)
ji  A(j)ji
 8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A(j)fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCAYi (s  1)
 2
p
Yi (s) :

Y^i +

Y^j

eff

+
p

2
Yi (t)
0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCAYi (t)
=
X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1)
+
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)

X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) +

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

B

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

+ (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1) + Yi (t)BYi (t)
+
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t) (242)
A =
p

0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA (243)
B =
0BBBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii
np


A
(i)
ij +A
(j)
ij

; B12
o
np


A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji

; Bt12
o 8>>><>>>:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
p

8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA
C =
p

0BB@
0 A
(i)
ij  A(j)ij
 

A
(i)
ji  A(j)ji
 8<:


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
 A(j)fkjgi>k>j ; A(j)fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
The sum includes the potential at time t but not the inertial term.
The e¤ective action for Yi (t) is computed in the following way: it is know ([?]) that for a quadratic
weight as the one obtained in (242), the integral over future variables Yi (s) localizes around the classical
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solution of motion starting at Yi (t) and such that Yi (s)! 0 for s!1. That is, to compute the integrals
of (242) on Yi (s) it is enough to minimize (242) on the Yi (s), s > t with Yi (t) as initial condition and to
compute (242) for this solution.
The equation for the classical solution of (242):

X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1)(244)
+Yi (t)BYi (t) +
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
is of the usual Euler Lagrange type:
Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

A (Yi (s+ 1)  2Yi (s) + Yi (s  1))+2Yi (s)BYi (s) 

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

C (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s  1)) = 0
(245)
and its solution is of the kind:
Yi (s) = D
t sYi (t) (246)
We show in Appendix 1.b. that the matrix D saties:
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0 (247)
We also give a recursive equation for D in this appendix.
We now compute each term of the actionX
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s))A (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + Yi (s+ 1)CYi (s) (248)
along this classical solution to nd our e¤ective utility. We to rst rewrite the rst term in (248) as a discrete
version of the integration by part:X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s))A (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s))
=
X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s))A (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s))
=
1
2
Yi (t)A (Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t)) + 1
2
X
s>t
Yi (s)A (Yi (s+ 1)  2Yi (s) + Yi (s  1))
We gather all these contributions with the second term in the classical action (248) and use (245) as well
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as (246) to nd:.X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s))A (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + Yi (s+ 1)CYi (s) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
=
X
s>t
1
2
Yi (s)A (Yi (s+ 1)  2Yi (s) + Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + Yi (s+ 1)CYi (s)
+
1
2
Yi (t)A (Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t)) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
=
X
s>t
1
2
Yi (s)A (Yi (s+ 1)  2Yi (s) + Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s)  1
2
Yi (s+ 1)CYi (s)
+
1
2
Yi (t)A (Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t)) + 1
2
Yi (t+ 1)CYi (t) +
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
 1
2
Yi (t)A (Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t)) + 1
2
Yi (t+ 1)CYi (t) +
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
=
1
2
Yi (t)A (Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t)) + 1
2
(Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t))CYi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
=
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1))Yi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t) (249)
To nd the e¤ective utility for agent i, that is Ueff (Yi (t)), we also include the time t contribution that was
rst discarded in our computation and consider the intermediate e¤ective utility:
U inteff (Yi (t)) =
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1))Yi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
+Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
1AYi (t) +pYi (t)
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
This is still not Ueff (Xi (t)) since it depends on the Xj (t) that should also be integrated out.
Before doing so, we can simplify U inteff (Yi (t)), by neglecting the contributions depending on t   1 only
(we will use the notation  each time we neglect such terms):
U inteff (Yi (t)) =
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1))Yi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t) (250)
+Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
1AYi (t) +pYi (t)
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
=
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1) + 2B)Yi (t)  1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t) + Yi (t) (A+ C)Yi (t  1) +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
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Since C is antisymetric, this is also equal to:
U inteff (Yi (t)) =
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1) + 2B)Yi (t)  1
2
Yi (t) (A  C)Yi (t) + Yi (t) (A+ C)Yi (t  1) (251)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
=
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Yi (t) + Yi (t) (A+ C)Yi (t  1)  Yi (t) Y^i +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
=
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1) + 2B)Yi (t)  1
2
(Yi (t)  Yi (t  1))A (Yi (t)  Yi (t  1)) + Yi (t)CYi (t  1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
and then:
U inteff (Yi (t)) 
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Yi (t) + Yi (t)AYi (t  1) + Yi (t)CYi (t  1) +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
 1
2

Yi (t) + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 ((A+ C) (Yi (t  1)))

 ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)

Yi (t) + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 ((A+ C) (Yi (t  1)))

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
Now, the Integration on Xj (t) for j < i yields:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Yi (t) + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 ((A+ C) (Yi (t  1)))

i
(252)
 (Nii)

Yi (t) + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 ((A+ C) (Yi (t  1)))

i
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
  1
2
((Yi (t))iMii (Yi (t  1))i + T ) 
1
2

(Yi (t))Mij (Yi (t  1))j + T

+
1
2
(Yi (t))i (Nii) (Yi (t))i +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
where the matrices used in the previous expression are given by:
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ii   ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)jj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ji

Mii = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ii
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
and where the "T" means the transpose of the expression in the same parenthesis.
It can also be written in a form reminding the continuous time description:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =  1
2
_Xi (t) M^ii _Xi (t) 

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

t

Mij

1p

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

(253)
+
1
2

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

N^ii

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
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where we dened:
_Xi (t) = (Xi (t) Xi (t  1))
and where the matrices used in the previous expression are given by:
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ii   ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)jj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ji

M^ii =

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ii
(Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ii
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
N^ii = Nii +Mii
Adding up all e¤ctv weight for all structres leads to consider the termX
i
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
= 2
X
i;j
Xi (t) A^ijXj (t  1)
with A^ij = A
(i)
ij if j < i, 0 otherwise.
By the same trick as before it leads in the continuum to the result:X
i;j
Xi (t)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
Xj (t  1)
+
X
i;j
Xi (t)

A^ij  

A^ji
t
Xj (t  1)
=  1
2
(Xi (t) Xi (t  1))

A^ij +

A^ji
t
(Xj (t) Xj (t  1))
+
1
2
Xi (t)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
Xj (t) +
1
2
Xi (t  1)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
Xj (t  1)
 1
2
X
i;j
Xi (t)

A^ij  

A^ji
t
(Xj (t) Xj (t  1))
Later in the sum on t, 12Xi (t)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
Xj (t) +
1
2Xi (t  1)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
Xj (t  1) will re-
placed by Xi (t)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
Xj (t) for an overall weight:
 1
2
X
i;j
_Xi (t)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
_Xj (t)
+
X
i;j
Xi (t)

A^ij +

A^ji
t
Xj (t)  1
2
X
i;j
Xi (t)

A^ij  

A^ji
t
_Xj (t)
=  1
2
X
i;j
_Xi (t) A^
(s)
ij
_Xj (t) +
X
i;j
Xi (t) A^
(s)
ij Xj (t) 
1
2
X
i;j
Xi (t) A^
(a)
ij
_Xj (t)
The total e¤ective action is then:
 1
2
_Xi (t) M^ii _Xi (t) 

Xi (t)  Y^ (1)i

Mij

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

+
1
2

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

N^ii

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

 1
2
X
i;j
_Xi (t) A^
(s)
ij
_Xj (t) +
X
i;j
Xi (t) A^
(s)
ij Xj (t) 
1
2
X
i;j
Xi (t) A^
(a)
ij
_Xj (t)
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We want to rewrite the quadratic terms in a form that will be useful when looking at the continuous
approximatio. Introduce:
X (t) = (Xi (t)) and

Y^ (1)

=

Y^ (1)

i

and rewrite the various terms in the previous form:
 

Xi (t)  Y^ (1)i

Mij

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

  Xi (t)Mij

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

   (Xi (t) Xi (t  1))Mij

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

=   (Xi (t) Xi (t  1))Mij (Xj (t  1))
+ (Xi (t) Xi (t  1))Mij

Y^
(1)
i

j
The second term is a derivative that will cancel when integrating on t. We are then led to:
  1
2
_X (t)M _X (t) +
1
2

X (t) 

Y^ (1)

N^

X (t) 

Y^ (1)

+X (t) A^(s)X (t)  _X (t) ~MX (t)
where:
M^ =

M^ii + A^
(s)
ij

, N^ =

N^ii

, ~M =

~Mij   1
2
A^
(s)
ij

Since the symetric part of ~M cancels when integrating over t, ~M can be considered as antisymetric, and M
and A symetric. We can write:
 1
2
_X (t) M^ _X (t) +
1
2

X (t) 

Y^ (1)

N^

X (t) 

Y^ (1)

+X (t) A^(s)X (t)  _X (t) ~MX (t)
=  1
2

_X (t)  ~M 0X (t)

M^

_X (t)  ~M 0X (t)

+
1
2

X (t) 

Y^ (1)

N^

X (t) 

Y^ (1)

+X (t)

N^ 0

X (t)
where:
N^ 0 = A^(s) + ~MM^ 1 ~M
~M 0 = M^ 1 ~M
146
Appendix 3
The quadratric action has to a classical solution whose Equation is:
A (Yi (s+ 1)  2Yi (s) + Yi (s  1)) + 2B

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

  C (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s  1)) = 0
The solution of this second order di¤erence equation with initial condition Yi (t) is:
Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

= Dt s

Yi (t)  Y^ (1)i

(254)
where the matrix D satises:
A
 
D2   2D + 1+ 2BD   C  D2   1 = 0 (255)
(A  C) (D   1)2 + 2 (B   C) (D   1) + 2B = 0
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0 (256)
Writing B = A+  one obtains:
(A  C)D2 + 2D + (A+ C) = 0 (257)
The unicity of D is granted by the problem at hand. We look for a solution whose  expansion is obtained
recursively, and whose rst term is identical to the one obtained for  = 0 in the initial problem. To do so,
we can nd, at least, a recursive solution to this equation. Rescaling A! Ap

, C ! Cp

, D can be obtained
as a series expansion in
p
,
P p

n
Dn. Equation (257) becomes:
p
 (A  C)
 
1 
1X
n=1
p

n
Dn
!2
  2

 +
p
 (A  C)
 
1 
1X
n=1
p

n
Dn
!
+ 2

 +
p
A

= 0 p
 (A  C) +
1X
n=2
p

n 
(A  C)
 
nX
k=1
DkDn 1 k
!
+ 2Dn
!!
  2

I +
p
 (A  C)

+ 2

 +
p
A

= 0 p
 (A  C) +
1X
n=2
p

n 
(A  C)
 
nX
k=1
DkDn 1 k
!
+ 2Dn
!
+ 2
p
D1
!
+ 2
p
C = 0
(A+ C) +
1X
n=1
p

n 
(A  C)
 
nX
k=1
DkDn k
!
+ 2Dn+1
!
+ 2D1 = 0
As a consequence, the rst term is
D1 =   1A+ C
2
and
Dn+1 =   1 (A  C)
2
 
nX
k=1
DkDn k
!
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Appendix 4
To solve the class of models presented in the text, the equation (257) can be cast into the block form:
0 =
p

0BB@
 (i)ii
2 A
(j)
ij
A
(i)
ji
(
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
) 1CCAD2 +
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
 1AD
+
p

0BB@
 (i)ii
2 A
(i)
ij
A
(j)
ji
(
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
) 1CCA
with:
D =

E F
G H

is the block decomposition of D imposed by the matrices (i)ii , A
(j)
ij ...
In most systems, the "per se" inertia (i)ii is nul. If moreover A
(i)
ji = 0, that is agent i is sensitive to his
substructures goals, but not directly to their actions, one can nd E and F as functions of the other matrix
blocks. Actually, given that in that case (257) writes as:
0 =
p

0B@ 0 A
(j)
ij
0
(
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
) 1CAD2 +
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
 1AD
+
p

0B@ 0 0
A
(j)
ji
(
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
) 1CA
one can divide the equation (257) in two blocks:
0 =
p

0B@ A
(j)
ij(
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
) 1CA (GE +HG) (258)
+
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
 1A E
G

+
p


0
A
(j)
ji

and:
0 =
p

0B@ A
(j)
ij(
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
) 1CA GF +H2 (259)
+
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
 1A F
H

+
p

0B@ 0( (j)fjkgk6jeff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
) 1CA
The rst one (258) allows to nd E. Actually, the two equations of (258) yield:
(GE +HG) =  
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
Bt12E +

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji

(260)
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and
0 =

A
(i)
ii +B11

E +B12G 
p
A
(j)
ij
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1


Bt12E +

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji

so that:
E =
0B@A(i)ii +B11 pA(j)ij
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
Bt12
1CA
 1
(261)

0B@pA(j)ij
0B@
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji
1CA B12G
1CA
normalize A(i)ii = 1, and use that

A
(j)
jj

eff
can be considered as symetric.
B12 = A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
B11 = A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
ji
B22 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ;

 (
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)!
A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 (
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)!

2
 
A
(j)
kj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 (
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)
+
(
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)!!
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ;

 (
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)!
A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 (
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)!
;

2
 
A
(j)
kj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 (
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)
+
(
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)!!
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
0B@A(i)ii +B11 A(j)ij
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
Bt12
1CA
 1
=

1  A(j)ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
ji +B11
 1
= 1
Thus, the expressions for E simplify as:
E =
p
A
(j)
ij
0B@
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji
1CA B12G
(262)
149
Similarly, the second block (259) leads to:
0 =
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>; GF +H2+B21F +

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H (263)
+
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
yielding
 
GF +H2

:
 
GF +H2

=  
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
(264)

0B@Bt12F +A(i)jj + A(j)jj 
eff
; B22

H +
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
and after coming back to (259), the expression for F :
F =
p
A
(j)
ij
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
(265)

0B@A(i)jj + A(j)jj 
eff
; B22

H +
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA B12H
The resolution of the problem is thus reduced to a system of two remaining equations:p
A
(j)
ij G+

A
(i)
ii +B11

E +

B12 +
p
A
(j)
ij H

G = 0 (266)p
A
(j)
ij G+

A
(i)
ii +B11

F +

B12 +
p
A
(j)
ij H

H = 0 (267)
where E and F are given in (261) and (53).
Multiply the second equation (267) by H 1G and compare with (266) one obtains:
FH 1G = E
This can used to write that:  
GF +H2

H 1G = (GE +HG)
and, using (260) (264), one is led to:0B@Bt12F +A(i)jj + A(j)jj 
eff
; B22

H +
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CAH 1G
=

Bt12E +

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji

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and using again that FH 1G = E:0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CAH 1G = pA(j)ji
One can thus express G as a function of H:
G = H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(j)
ji (268)
The all problem then reduces to nd H. To do so, one uses (263):
0 =
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>; GF +H2+B21F +

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H (269)
+
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
which is, after expanding the terms involved in this equation:0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(j)
ji +B21
1CA(270)

0B@A(j)ij
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1

0B@A(i)jj + A(j)jj 
eff
; B22

H +
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA B12H
1CA
+
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H2
+

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H +
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
This equation completes the resolution by yielding H. However it is simpler to solve if we cast it into an
other form through a change of variable. Actually, using (268) and (53), equation (263) can be organized in
the following way. Regroup the terms proportional to F and let:
H 0 = H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
+
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
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then:
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>; (G+B21)F
=
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(j)
ji
+ 
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CAA(j)jj  1
eff
A
(j)
ji
1CAF
=
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
0B@H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
+
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CAA(j)ji F
=
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H 0A(j)ji F
=
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H 0A(j)ji A(j)ij
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H 0  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

+
p


  
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CAH 0   A(j)jj  1
eff
1CA

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
The remaining terms
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H2+

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H+
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
can also be factored:
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p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H2 +

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H (271)
+
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
=
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
0B@pH H 0   A(j)jj  1
eff

+
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1


A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H 0  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

+
p



8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
And (271) becomes:
0 =
p
 H 0A(j)ji A
(j)
ij
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1


A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

+
p


  
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CAH 0  p A(j)jj  1
eff
1CA
+
p
H

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

+
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1


A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

+
p


or equivalently:
0 =
p
H 0A(j)ji A
(j)
ij + 1
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1


A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

+
p


 
p
H 0A(j)ji A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CAH 0  p A(j)jj  1
eff

+
p


H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CAH 0  p A(j)jj  1
eff

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factor by
 (
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)!
H 0  p

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

on the right, multiply by (H 0) 1 and fac-
tor by
p
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + (H
0) 1

on the left yields:
0 =
p
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + (H
0) 1


0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1

 
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p


H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 1!0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
 
p
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + (H
0) 1

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
+
p

or, which is equivalent:
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1 
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p


H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 1!

0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
= 

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 
p

p
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + (H
0) 1
 1
(272)
For later purpose, note that the transpose of this equation shows that (H 0)t is solution for the same equation.
Given the unicity of solution when  ! 0, (H 0)t = H 0, thus H 0 is symetric.
This equation, once solved, allows to nd E, F , G by (280), (53) and (268), and then the dynamical
matrix D from which we derive the e¤ective action, as explained in appendix 1. The dynamical matrix D is
then:
D =
1p


E F
G F

We now include the coe¢ cient 1p

in the denition of E, F , G, H.
Having found D, we recover the matrices needed to compute the e¤ective action, by nding an expression
for 12 ((A  C)D + 2B)S . However, since,
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)
= ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A)) + 2C
and C is antisymetric,
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S = ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))S
Which can be rewritten:
1
2
((A  C)D + 2B)S =

0  
0 

E F
G H

+

1 B12
B21 2
S
=

 G+ 1  H +B12
G+B21 H + 2
S
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with:
  =
p
A
(j)
ij
 =
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1 = A
(i)
ii +B11
2 =

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

and A(i)ii normalized to 1. By construction, 1 and 2 are symetric matrices. Given (280), (53), (54) (270)
and (272) it yields:
 G+ 1 =
p
A
(j)
ij H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(j)
ji + 1 (273)
= A
(j)
ij

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

A
(j)
ji + 1
 H = A
(j)
ij

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
G =
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(j)
ji
=
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

A
(j)
ji
Since H 0 is symetric, as explained before, and since

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
is symetric by construction, then  G + 1 is
symetric and moreover  H = (G)t. Moreover,
H =
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;

H 0  
p


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
is also symetric. As a consequence:
1
2
((A  C)D + 2B)S = 1
2
((A  C)D + 2B) =

 G+ 1  H +B12
G+B21 H + 2

and:

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)
=

1   ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)2
  (H + 2) 1 (G+B21)1 2



0 0
 	

=
   ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12) 2   ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12) 2	
2 2	

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where:
1 =

( G+ 1)  ( H +B12) (H + 2) 1 (G+B21)
 1
2 =

H + 2   (G+B21) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)
 1
The matrices intervening in the e¤ective action (252)
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ii   ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)jj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ji

=  G+ 1   ( H +B12) (H + 2) 1 (G+B21)
Mii = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)

ii
=   (Nii) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)

H + 2   (G+B21) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)
 1
 t
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
=   (Nii) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)

H + 2   (G+B21) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)
 1
t
Where the various matrices are given by (273).
When A(j)ij is (m+ k)m (that is, A(j)ij has more rows than columns), one can go further in the resolution
and obtain more tractable relation than (270). The reason is that in that case, the dominating agent has a
number of action variables greater or equal to the number of substructures. This over determination creates
some symetries (possibilities of switching the way of action to get equivalent results).
These symetries reect in the following way: Consider k matrices Vl l = 1:::k where dim (Vl) = dim

A
(i)
ji

which is m (m+ k). Each Vl is lled with 1 in m places and 0 elsewhere, such that rank (Vl) = m.
Coming back to (266) and (267), we multiply the rst equation (266) by (Vl)
t on the right allows for
expressing H as a function of G.p
A
(j)
ij G+

A
(i)
ii +B11

E (Vl)
t
+

B12 +
p
A
(j)
ij H

G (Vl)
t
= 0 (274)p
A
(j)
ij G+

A
(i)
ii +B11

F +

B12 +
p
A
(j)
ij H

H = 0 (275)
Then multiply the rst equation by

G (Vl)
t
 1
and (267) byH 1. Then, since
p
A
(j)
ij G+

A
(i)
ii +B11

is a square matrix one obtains:
E (Vl)
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
= FH 1
Given (52) and (53) it is equivalent to:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

 B12

+
p


VlA
(j)
ij
t 
G (Vl)
t
 1 
=
0B@A(i)jj + A(j)jj 
eff
; B22

 B12

+
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;H 1
1CA
that is: 
VlA
(j)
ij
t 
G (Vl)
t
 1
=
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;H 1
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That expresses H as a function of G:
H =

G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 18><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
With E, F , H expressed as functions of G, the all problem consists now in nding G. However, given (268):
G = H
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(j)
ji
one obtains:
G =

G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1
A
(j)
ji
 X 1

A
(j)
ij
t
with X =

VlA
(j)
ij
t 
G (Vl)
t
 1
. Then, the all system reduces to nd

G (Vl)
t

, or equivalently X
which appears to be a more convenient variable. With that choice of variables, H rewrites:
H = X 1
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
However, the independence of H in l yields k   1 constraint equations, that ultimately reduce the free
parameters to

G (Vl)
t

. Actually when l 6= m:
H =

G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 18><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
=

G (Vm)
t

VmA
(j)
ij
t 18><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
that is: 
G (Vm)
t

=

G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1
VmA
(j)
ij
t
If Vm is partitionned in two matrices:
Vm =

V (1)m ; V
(2)
m

and V (1)m is transverse to Vl (by transverse we mean that the 1 of the submatrix V
(1)
m are not in the same
columns as the 1 of Vl), the constraint allows to express rank

V
(1)
m

parameters of Vl in function of

G (Vl)
t

that remain the parameters to determine:
G

V (1)m ; 0
t
=

G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1
V (1)m ; 0

A
(j)
ij
t
This allows to nd G as a function of

G (Vl)
t

.
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Actually, 
G

V (1)m ; 0
t
=

G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1
V (1)m ; 0

A
(j)
ij
t
or:
G

V (1)m
t
= G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1 
V (1)m

A
(j)
ij
t
allows to compute G

A
(i)
ii
 1p
A
(j)
ij in the following way:
Partition G and

A
(i)
ii
 1p
A
(j)
ij along V
(1)
m and Vl:
G =

G

V (1)m ; 0
t
; G

0; V
(1)
l
t
=

G

V (1)m
t
;

G (Vl)
t

p
A
(j)
ij =

V
(1)
m
Vl
p
A
(j)
ij
where V (1)l is dened by Vl =

0; V
(1)
l

.
As a consequence:p
A
(j)
ij G+

A
(i)
ii +B11

=
p
A
(j)
ij X
 1

A
(j)
ij
t
+

A
(i)
ii +B11

and the equation (266) becomes:p
A
(j)
ij X
 1

A
(j)
ij
t
+

A
(i)
ii +B11

E (Vl)
t
+

B12 +
p
A
(j)
ij H

G (Vl)
t
= 0
which is equivalent to:p
A
(j)
ij X
 1

A
(j)
ij
t
+

A
(i)
ii +B11

E (Vl)
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
(276)
=  

B12 +
p
A
(j)
ij H

=  
0B@B12 +pA(j)ij X 1
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
=  

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
+
p
A
(j)
ij X
 1
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
Use the expression for B11 multiply by Vl and simplify by

VlA
(j)
ij

:
p
X 1

A
(j)
ij
t
+

VlA
(j)
ij
 1
Vl

1 + A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
ji

E (Vl)
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
(277)
=  



A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
+
p
X 1
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
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given that:
E (Vl)
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
=
0B@A(j)ij
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1


A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G (Vl)
t
+
p
A
(j)
ji (Vl)
t

 B12G (Vl)t

G (Vl)
t
 1
=
0B@A(j)ij
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1


A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p
X

 

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
= A
(j)
ij
0B@
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p
X


0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CA

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
Equation (277) becomes:
 



A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
+
p
X 1

=
p
X 1

A
(j)
ij
t
A
(j)
ij +

1 + 

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij


0B@
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p
X


0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CA
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that is:
 



A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
+
p
X 1

(278)
=
p
X 1 + 

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff

A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + 1


0B@
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p
X
1CA

0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CA
This quadratic equation for X, when solved for X, allows to nd the all matrix D. Actually, collecting our
previous results:
G (Vl)
t

= X 1

VlA
(j)
ij
t
G = X 1

A
(j)
ij
t
H = X 1
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
E =
0B@pA(j)ij
0B@
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji
1CA B12G
1CA
F =
p
A
(j)
ij
0B@
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1

0B@A(i)jj + A(j)jj 
eff
; B22

H +
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA B12H
Note for the sequel that since the equation for X can be rewriten in a symetric form. Actually, set
Y =
p
X 1 + 

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
the equation (278) is turned to:

Y A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + 1

0BBBB@
 (
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
)! 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p


Yp

 p
 1
 (
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)! 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CCCCA =  Y
or, simplifying by Y :

A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + Y
 1

0BBBB@
 (
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
)! 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p


Yp

 p
 1
 (
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)! 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CCCCA =  1
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which means that the two matrics in the left hand side are each other inverse (up to a minus sign). One
thus also have:0BBBB@
 (
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
)! 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p


Yp

 p
 1
 (
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)! 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CCCCA

A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + Y
 1

=  1
whose transpose is (we recall here that B22 is symetric by construction, as well as A
(i)
jj by assumption of
the model, and

A
(j)
jj

eff
by construction):

A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij +
 
Y t
 1
0BBBB@
 (
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
)! 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

+
p


Y tp

 p
 1
 (
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2 ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
)! 1
  

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
1CCCCA =  1
and then Y t is also solution of the problem, which in turn implies that Xt is also solution of (278).
However, since we look for the unique solution X corresponding to the perturbative solution in powers of ,
one deduce that X is symetric, Xt = X. Moreover, since X =

VlA
(j)
ij
t 
G (Vl)
t
 1
, one can also say that
X 1 =

G (Vl)
t

VlA
(j)
ij
t 1
is symetric. This is useful below.
Having found D, we recover the matrices needed to compute the e¤ective action, by nding an expression
for 12 ((A  C)D + 2B)S . However, since,
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)
= ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A)) + 2C
and C is antisymetric,
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S = ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))S
Which can be rewritten:
1
2
((A  C)D + 2B)S =

0  
0 

E F
G H

+

1 0
0 
S
=

 G+ 1  H
G H + 
S
with:
  =
p
A
(j)
ij
 =
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
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and A(i)ii normalized to 1.
 G+ 1 =
p
A
(j)
ij X
 1

A
(j)
ij
t
+ 1
 H =
p
A
(j)
ij X
 1
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
G =
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;X 1

A
(j)
ij
t
Since X 1 is symetric, as explained before, then  G+ 1 is symetric and moreover  H = (G)t.
Moreover,
H =
p

8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;X 1
8><>:
 


(j)
fjkgk6j

eff
2
; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9>=>;
As a consequence:
1
2
((A  C)D + 2B)S = 1
2
((A  C)D + 2B) =

 G+ 1  H
G H + 

and:

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)
=
0BBBBB@

( G+ 1)   H (H + ) 1 G
 1   ( G+ 1) 1  H


H +  G ( G+ 1) 1  H
 1
  (H + ) 1 G


( G+ 1)   H (H + ) 1 G
 1 H +  G ( G+ 1) 1  H 1
1CCCCCA


0 0
 	

=
0BBB@
  ( G+ 1) 1  H


H +  G ( G+ 1) 1  H
 1

  ( G+ 1) 1  H


H +  G ( G+ 1) 1  H
 1
	
H +  G ( G+ 1) 1  H
 1


H +  G ( G+ 1) 1  H
 1
	
1CCCA
The previous expression can be concatenated again.
H = GV t (V  )
 1
t
= X 1t

H +  G ( G+ 1) 1  H

p
A
(j)
ij G+

A
(i)
ii +B11

E (Vl)
t
+

B12 +
p
A
(j)
ij H

G (Vl)
t
= 0 (279)
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E =
0B@pA(j)ij
0B@
0B@p
8><>:
 


(j)
fkjgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
9>=>;
1CA
 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

G+
p
A
(j)
ji
1CA B12G
1CA
(280)
( G+ 1)
 
  1
 
2G+  
t
 B12G =   (B12 +  H)G
Vl ( G+ 1)
 
  1
 
2G+  
t
 B12G (Vl)t + Vl (B12 +  H)G (Vl)t = 0
(Vl ) (G  + 1 +B
0
21 )
 
 1
 
2G+  
t
 B011G (Vl)t + Vl (B12 +  H)G (Vl)t = 0
(G  + 1 +B021 )

 1

2G (Vl)
t
+ (Vl )
t

 B011G (Vl)t

+

(Vl )
 1
(Vl B
0
11) +H

G (Vl)
t
= 0
(G  + 1 +B021 )

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

+B011 =  H
( G+ 1)
 1
( H +B12)
=   ( G+ 1) 1

( G+ 1)  

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

=   

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

=      1  2G+  t B12G
H + 2   (G+B21) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)
=  

(G  + 1 +B021 )

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

+B011

+ (G+B21)  

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

+ 2
=  

(G  + 1 +B021 )

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

+B011

+ (G  +B021 )

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

+ 2
=  

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011 +B011

+ 2
=   (Vl )t

G (Vl)
t
 1
=  tH 1
B21 = 

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 t
( G+ 1)  
 
 1
 
2G+  
t
 B012G (Vl)t + (B012 +  H)G (Vl)t = 0
( G+ 1)  

 1

2 +  
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B012

+   (B012 +H) = 0
H + 2   (G+B21) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)
H + 2 + (G+B21)  

 1

2 +  
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B012

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 

(G  + 1)

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B12

+ (Vl )
 1
(VlB12)

+ (G+B21)  

 1

2 +  
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B12

+ 2
H + 2   (G+B21) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12) =  H 1
( G+ 1)
 1
( H +B12)

H + 2   (G+B21) ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)
 1
=   ( G+ 1) 1 ( H +B12)H
 
t
 1
=
 
  1
 
2G+  
t
 B12GH  t 1
=   

 1

2 + (Vl )
t

G (Vl)
t
 1
 B011

H
 
t
 1
=      1  2 + tH 1 B011H  t 1
=   

 1

2H
 
t
 1
+ 1

 B011H
 
t
 1
And ultimately the matrices involved in (252) become:
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ii   ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)jj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ji

=  G+ 1   ( H +B12) (H + 2) 1 (G+B21)
Mii = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)

ii
= (Nii)  

 1

2H
 
t
 1
+ 1

 B011H
 
t
 1
 t
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
= (Nii)  

 1

2H
 
t
 1
+ 1

 B011H
 
t
 1
t
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Appendix 5
For the strategic agent, the matrices dening the e¤ective utility are given by 36, with, in this case:
A =
p

 
0 A
(1)
1j +A
(j)
1j
A
(1)
j1 +A
(j)
j1
n
A
(j)
kj ; A
(j)
jk
o !
B =
0BBBB@
Id(1) + A
(j)
1j

A
(j)
jj
 1
A
(j)
j1
p


A
(1)
1j +A
(j)
1j

+

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk

p


A
(1)
j1 +A
(j)
j1

+

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk
t 8<:

A
(1)
jj +A
(j)
jj

;
p

n
A
(j)
kj ; A
(j)
jk
o 9=;
1CCCCA
C =
p

 
0 A
(1)
1j  A(j)1j
 

A
(1)
j1  A(j)j1
 n
A
(j)
kj ; A(j)jk
o !
As described in the text, we need to nd the expression for the matrix D, and the e¤ective utility for the
dominant agent will be deduced from its expression. The matrix D saties the equation:
p

 
0 A
(j)
1j
0
n
A
(j)
jk
o !D2+
0BBB@
1 + A
(j)
ij A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij A
(j)
jk
A
(j)
ij A
(j)
jk
t 8<:

A
(1)
jj +A
(j)
jj

;
p

n
A
(j)
kj ; A
(j)
jk
o
A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk
9=;
1CCCAD+p
 
0 0
A
(j)
j1
n
A
(j)
kj
o !
= 0
(281)
To solve this equation, we partition this matrix as:
D =

E F
G H

and applying (261), (53) appendix 1.b allows to nd all the parameters as a function of H:
E =
p
A
(j)
1j
p

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
A
(1)
jj +A
(j)
jj ; A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk

G+
p
A
(j)
j1

  A(j)1j A(j)jk G

F =
p
A
(j)
1j
p

n
A
(j)
fkjg1>k>j
o 1
A
(i)
jj +A
(j)
jj ; A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkg1>k>j
o
  A(j)1j A(j)jk H

G = H
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o 1
A
(j)
ji
The problem reduces to nd H and H satises (270), whose expression, given our assumptions about the
parameters A(j)jj = A
(1)
jj = 1 in this particular case:
0 =
p

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o
H
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o 1
A
(j)
ji +B21

(282)


A
(j)
ij
n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
 B12H

+
p

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o
H2
+

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
Given our hypothesis concerning the agents interactions, we can use the following normalizations A(j)j1 = ,
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j = (1)  jk where we denote by (1) the matrix lled with 1 in every row. As a consequence, one
can nd the inverse of
n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o
:n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
=
1
N   1 (1  jk) 
N   2
N   1jk =
1
N   1 (1)  (jk)
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A
(j)
j1 A
(j)
1j = 
2 (1), N number of agts. A(j)lj A
(j)
jk = ((N   2) (1) + jk). As a consequence we compute
some intermediate quantities involved in (282):
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

=
n
1 + ; A
(j)
lj A
(j)
jk
o
= 1 + 2 +  (N   2) (1)
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o 1
=
1
N   1 (1)  (jk)
and n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o 1
A
(j)
j1 =

1
N   1 (1)  (jk)

 (1; ::; 1)
t
= 

N
N   1   1

(1; ::; 1)
t
=

N   1 (1; ::; 1)
t
A
(j)
1j
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
=  (1) ((1)  jk) =  (N   1) (1)
We look for a solution for (282) of form:
H =
p
V (1) +
p
W
We rst solve the case for N > 1 and consider N = 1 as a particular case.
Using rst that all the matrices involved in (282) commute leads to:
0 =
p
H + 
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
  
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
H

+
p

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o
H2
+

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
And this expression can be factored ultimately as:
0 =
p
H
n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
+ 

A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij + 1

A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
(283)
+
p

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o
H2   
p
H + 
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
H
Replacing then for the various expressions involved in (283) yields:
0 =

 (V (1) +W )

1
N   1 (1)  (jk)

+ 

2 (1) + 1

 (((1 + 2 +  ((N   2) (1))) (V (1) +W ) + ((1)  jk)))
+ ((1)  jk) (V (1) +W )2   2 ((V (1) +W ) + ((1)  jk))2 (1) ((1)  jk) (V (1) +W )
and this leads to a system of equations:
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0 =
 
(2 + 1)W   W 2   1
0 = V 22
2
N   1 (N   2)N
4 +
 
V 2 N 1 (V (2 + 1) + W (N   2) + 1)  V 22 (V + 1)
 V 22

V   WN 1

(N   2)
!
N3
+
 
V 2 + 22 ((V  W ) (V + 1)  V (W   1))
 2

V   WN 1

(V (2 + 1) + W (N   2) + 1) + V 2 (   W ) (N   2) + V 2W (2+1) 1N 1
!
N2
+
 
22 (W (V + 1) + (W   1) (V  W ))    V 2   2VW 
+2 (   W ) (V (2 + 1) + W (N   2) + 1) + V  (N   2)  2

V   WN 1

(W (2 + 1)  1)
!
N
+
 
V (2 + 1) + 
 
W 2   2VW + 2 (   W ) (W (2 + 1)  1) + W (N   2) + 22W (W   1) + 1
which reduces to:
W =
1


1 + 2  
q
42 + 1

and:
0 = N
(N   1)2 +N2 (1 + )
N   1 V
2
+
2

(N   1)2 +N2 (1 + )

+
 
(2 + )N (N   1)2 + (N   3)N2 + (4N   2) +N   1
N   1 V
+
 
(N   1) + (1 + )2W 2 +  (N   1)  N + 22 + 2   2W + (N   1)  (N   1)2 + 1
N   1
Once V , W , H are recovered, one can ultimately nd the other matrices that determine the dynamics of the
system. For G, one has directly:
G = H
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o 1
A
(j)
ji

p

NV +W
N   1 (1; ::; 1)
t
For E and F we use need the expressions for the matrices involved in the problem:
A
(j)
1j
n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
=  (1; :::; 1)

1
N   1 (1)  (jk)

=  (1; :::; 1)

N
N   1   1

=

N   1 (1; :::; 1)
and
A
(j)
1j
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o
=  (1) ((1)  jk) =  (N   1) (1)
Then E and F are given by:
E =
p
A
(j)
1j
p

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
A
(1)
jj +A
(j)
jj ; A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk

G+
p
A
(j)
j1

  A(j)1j A(j)jk G
=

N   1 (1; :::; 1)

(1 + 2 +  ((N   2) (1)))
p

V N
N   1 (1; :::; 1)
t

+
p
 (1; :::; 1)
t

  (1; :::; 1) ((1)  jk)
p

V N
N   1 (1; :::; 1)
t
=
N
N   1

(1 + 2 +  ((N   2)N))
p

V N
N   1

+
p


  2
p
V N2
= N
p
2
N   1 +NV (1 + )
(N   1)2
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F =
p
A
(j)
1j
p

n
A
(j)
fkjg1>k>j
o 1
A
(i)
jj +A
(j)
jj ; A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkg1>k>j
o
  A(j)1j A(j)jk H

=

N   1 (1; :::; 1)

(1 + 2 +  ((N   2) (1)))
p
V (1) +
p
 ((1)  jk)

   (1; :::; 1) ((1)  jk)
p
V (1)
= (1; :::; 1)


N   1

(1 + 2 +  ((N   2)N))
p
V N +
p
 (N   1)

   (N   1)
p
V N

= (1; :::; 1)
p

N   1 +NV (1 + )
N   1
The case N = 1 has to be considered separately, since for N = 1,
n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o
= 0. We can however
recover the solution by letting
n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o
= , and considering the limit  ! 0. We look for a solution:
H =
p
W . (283) becomes:
W ()
 1
+ 

2 + 1

((1 + )W + ) + W 2   2 (W + )2W
or, when reorganized in W .
  22+ 2 

( + 1)

W 2 +
 
( + 1)
 
2 + 1

+ 2   222W +   2 + 1 = 0
Looking for a solution W = w, yields by a rst order expansion in :
0 = 
 
w
 
( + 1)
 
2 + 1

+ 2

+ 2 + w22 ( + 1) + 1

and the solution w =   1+1 , which allows to recover the solution obtained by solving directly (281):
H =  
p

 + 1
! 0
G = H
n
A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
o 1
A
(j)
ji
= H ()
 1

=  
p

 + 1
 ()
 1
 =  
p

 + 1

E =
p
A
(j)
1j
p

n
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
o 1
A
(1)
jj +A
(j)
jj ; A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk

G+
p
A
(j)
j1

  A(j)1j A(j)jk G

=



()
 1

(1 + )G+
p


  G

! 0
F =
p
A
(j)
1j
p

n
A
(j)
fkjg1>k>j
o 1
A
(i)
jj +A
(j)
jj ; A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk

H +
p

n
A
(j)
fjkg1>k>j
o
  A(j)1j A(j)jk H

=

 ()
 1

(1 + )H +
p


  H

! 0
Having found the matrices E, F , G and H so that the dynamic matrix D for the rst agent is known, one
can nd the e¤ective action. We use the general formula (253) developped in the the previous section:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

(284)
 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
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where we have introduced some objectives X(i)ei , X
(i)e
j for the rst agent. In the text, these objectives are
set to 0, since we want to focus on the dynamical pattern of the system rather than on its equilibrium. The
matrices Mii, Mij , Nii are computed in Appendix 1, (36). They are:
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sii   ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sjj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)Sji

Mii = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)

ii
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C)

ij
where the upperscript S denotes the symetrization of a matrix. We rst need to compute the symetrized
matrix ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))S . Since C is antisymetric,
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S = ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))S
As before, we start with the case N > 1, and we will consider the case N = 1 later. For N > 1, the relevant
matrices are:
(A  C) =
p

 
0 A
(j)
1j
0
n
A
(j)
jk
o ! = p 0 (1; :::; 1)
0 (1)  1

(285)
(A+ C) =
p


0 0
 (1; ::; 1)
t
(1)  1

D =

E F
G H

=
p

 
N2N 1+NV (1+)
(N 1)2 (1; :::; 1)
N 1+NV (1+)
N 1
NV+WN 1 (1; ::; 1)
t
V (1) +W
!
B  A =
0BBB@
1 + A
(j)
ij A
(j)
ji A
(j)
ij A
(j)
jk
A
(j)
ij A
(j)
jk
t 8<:

A
(1)
jj +A
(j)
jj

A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk
9=;
1CCCA
=

1 + 2  (N   1) (1; :::; 1)
( (N   1) (1; :::; 1))t (1 + 2) +  ((N   2) (1))

And we nd:
((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))
=
  
1 + 2

+ 2N NV+WN 1  (1; :::; 1) ( (V N +W ) + (N   1))
 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1)) (1; ::; 1)t  (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)) (1)  W + (1 + 2)

The inverse of this block matrix is given by:
((A  C)D + 2 (B  A)) 1 =

X Y
Z T

with:
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X =
 
2N
NV +W
N   1 +
 
1 + 2
  N2 ( (V N +W ) + (N   1))2 (2   W + 1)
((1 + 2)  W ) ((1 + 2)  W +N (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)))
! 1
Y =   (1; ::; 1)
0B@
0@  (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

(1)
 W + (1 + 2)
1A 1  ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
1CA
Z =  
0@  (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

(1)
 W + (1 + 2)
1A 1  ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
(1; ::; 1)
t
T =
0@  (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))22N NV+WN 1 +(1+2)

(1)
 W + (1 + 2)
1A 1
These terms involve the following quantity:
T =
  
 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
2
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
!
(1) + (1 + 2)  W
! 1
=  

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

(1)
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

 

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

One can compute

((A  C)D + 2 (B  A)) 1 (A+ C)

by using (285). Some blocks are involved in the
computation, that are:
  (1; :::; 1)
 ( (V N +W ) + (N   1)) ( (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)) (1)  W + (1 + 2)) 1  ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
 (1; ::; 1)t
= (1; :::; 1)N2 ( (V N +W ) + (N   1))2
 [ (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)) (1)  ((1 + 2)  W +N (V (N   1) +W +  (N   2)))]
((1 + 2)  W ) ((1 + 2)  W +N (V (N   1) +W +  (N   2)))
 (1; ::; 1)t
  (1; :::; 1) ( (V N +W ) + (N   1))
 ( (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)) (1)  W + (1 + 2)) 1  ( (NV +W ) + (N   1)) (1; ::; 1)t
=
2 ( (V N +W ) + (N   1))2
((1 + 2)  W ) ((1 + 2)  W +N (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)))
  (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))N2   ((1 + 2)  W +N (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)))N
=   N
2 ( (V N +W ) + (N   1))2 (2   W + 1)
((1 + 2)  W ) ((1 + 2)  W +N (V (N   1) +W + (N   2)))
170
  (1; ::; 1)t  ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))

2N
NV +W
N   1 +
 
1 + 2
 1
 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1)) (1; ::; 1)
=  
2 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))2
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
(1)
And as a consequence, the blocks involved in

((A  C)D + 2 (B  A)) 1 (A+ C)

are:
((A  C)D + 2 (B  A)) 1 (A+ C)

11
=

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

N2
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

 

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

N
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1


p

 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
=  

p
N (1 + 2   W ) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1


((A  C)D + 2 (B  A)) 1 (A+ C)

1j
= (1; ::; 1)
(N   1)
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1


  
 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
2
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
!
N
 
 
(1 + 2)  W +N
 
 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
2
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
!!!

p

( (NV +W ) + (N   1))
(1 + 2) + 2N NV+WN 1
=   (1; ::; 1)
p

(N   1) (1 + 2   W ) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

The matrices involved in (284) are then ultimately obtained as:
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N11 =
 
1 + 2

+ 2N
NV +W
N   1
 2 ( (NV +W ) + (N   1))2

0BB@

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

N2
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

 
N

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

1CCA
M11 =   (N11)

p
N (1 + 2   W ) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1
((1 + 2)  W )

(1 + 2)  W +N

 (V (N   1) +W + (N   2))  2 ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

M1j =   (N11) (1; ::; 1)
p
 (N   1) (1 + 2   W ) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1
((1 + 2) W )

(1 + 2) W +N

(V (N   1) +W +  (N   2))  ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

Having found the matrices N11, M11 and M1j , the full action for the system of agents is:
Ueff (Xj (t)) + Ueff (Xi (t)) =
X
j<1

 Xj (t)A(j)jj Xj (t) + 2Xj (t)A(j)jk (Xk (t  1)) + 2Xj (t)A(j)j1 (X1 (t  1))

+
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

Then, the mean dynamic, saddle point of the previous global e¤ective utility, is given by the dynamic
evolution: 
Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Xj (t)

= M1
 
Xi (t  1)  X(i)ei
Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej
!
+M2

Xi (t  1)
Xj (t  1)

with:
M1 =

(N11)
 1
M11 (N11)
 1
M1j
0 0

M2 =

0 0
 (1; ::; 1)
t
(1)  1

On one hand, the previous equation leads to an equilibrium dened by:
Xi   X(i)ei
Xj

= M1
 
Xi   X(i)ei
Xj   X(i)ej
!
+M2

Xi
Xj

that is: 
Xi
Xj

= (1 M) 1
 
X
(i)e
i
0

 M1
 
X
(i)e
i
X
(i)e
j
!!
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with:
M = M1 +M2 =

(N11)
 1
M11 (N11)
 1
M1j
 (1)  1

On the other hand, the matrix M and its eigenvalues yield the dynamical pattern of the system.
M =

(N11)
 1
M11 (N11)
 1
M1j
 (1)  1

=
 
 N
p

N 1
   (1; ::; 1) 

 (1; ::; 1)
t
(1)  1
!
with:

 =
(N   1) (2  W + 1) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
2N NV+WN 1 +(1+
2)
((1 + 2) W )

(1 + 2) W +N

(V (N   1) +W +  (N   2))  ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

whose eigenvalues are:
 1; 1
2
(a+ 1) 1
2
p
a2   2 (N   1) a+ 4Nb
with:
a =  

p
N (2  W + 1) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
2N NV+WN 1 +(1+
2)
((1 + 2) W )

(1 + 2) W +N

(V (N   1) +W +  (N   2))  ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

b =  
N (N   1) (2  W + 1) ((NV+W )+(N 1))
2N NV+WN 1 +(1+
2)
((1 + 2) W )

(1 + 2) W +N

(V (N   1) +W +  (N   2))  ((NV+W )+(N 1))2
(1+2)+2N NV+WN 1

Having found the dynamical pattern for N > 1, we can focus on the case N = 1. For N = 1 the formula
reduce to:
(A  C) =
p


0 
0 0

(A+ C) =
p


0 0
 0

D =
 
1p

E 1p

F
1p

G 1p

H
!
=

0 0
  1+ 0

B  A =

1 + 2 
 1 + 

leading directly to:
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S = ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))S
=

0 
0 0

0 0
  1+ 0

+

1 + 2 
 1 + 

=
 
1 + 2   2+1 
 1 + 
!
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and we nd:

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C) =
0@   2 2+2+1 0
2
(22+2 2++1)
(2+)( 2+2+1) 0
1A
As a consequence, the coe¢ cient for the e¤ective utilities are:
Nii = 1 + 
2   
2
 + 1
   ()2 
 
22 + 2   2 +  + 1 
2 + 

(   2 + 2 + 1)
Mii = (Nii)
2
   2 + 2 + 1
Mij = 0
The previous formula for the equilibrium and the dynamic matrix are still valid. The matrix M is:
M =
 
2
 2+2+1 0
 0
!
with eigenvalues 2  2+2+1 ; 0.
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Appendix 6
Recal that the model described above starts with utilities of the kind:
 1
2
(Yi (t)  Yi (t  1))A (Yi (t)  Yi (t  1)) 1
2

Yi (t)  Y^ (1)i

AD

Yi (t)  Y^ (1)i

+Yi (t)C

Yi (t  1)  Y^ (1)i

(286)
where:
A =
p

0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
B =
0BBBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii
np


A
(i)
ij +A
(j)
ij

; B12
o
np


A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji

; Bt12
o 8>>><>>>:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
p

8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA
C =
p

0BB@
0 A
(i)
ij  A(j)ij
 

A
(i)
ji  A(j)ji
 8<:


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
 A(j)fkjgi>k>j ; A(j)fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
Start with the utilities of the three agents:
 1
2
(n (t) + 1  w (t  1))2   n (t) sn (t  1)
 1
2


1  w (t  1)  ~f
2
  1
2
 (w (t  1)  ~w)2   1
2
s2n (t) 
1
2
s2f (t) 
1
2
s2w (t)
 1
2
(w (t)  w0)2   1
2
n2 (t  1)  n (t  1)w (t)  sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ~f

  sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
and put them in the following form corresponding to our general model:
(n (t) + 1)
2
+ 2n (t) sn (t  1)  2n (t)w (t  1)
= (n (t) + 1)
2
+ 2n (t)
 
1 0 0

s (t  1)  2n (t)w (t  1)
s (t) (Id) s (t) + 

1  w (t  1)  ~f
2
+  (w (t  1)  ~w)2
= s (t) (Id) s (t) + (+ )

w (t  1)  
(+ )

1  ~f

  
(+ )
~w
2
(w (t)  w0)2 + n2 (t  1) + 2n (t  1)w (t) + 2sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ~f

+ 2sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
= (w (t)  w0)2 + n2 (t  1) + 2n (t  1)w (t)  2sf (t  1)

w (t) 

1  ~f

+ 2sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
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E¤ective action for the rst agent:
Starting with the less strategic agent utility
(n (t)) (1) (n (t))  2n (t) (1)w (t  1) + 2n (t)   1 0 0  s (t  1) + 2n (t)
we add some inertia in this agents behavior:
(n (t)) (1) (n (t))  1n (t)n (t  1)  2n (t) (1)w (t  1) + 2n (t)
 
1 0 0

s (t  1) + 2n (t)
and the matrices dened in (286) are:
A =  1
p

B = 1  1
p

C = 0
The equation for the dynamic matrix (287)
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0
reduces to:
AD2 + 2 (B  A)D +AD = 0
with solution
D = 1 
p
 2A 1B
 1
p

2
D2 + 1  1
p
 = 0
D = 1 
s
2
 
1  1
p


1
p

Y^
(1)
i =  
1
1  1
p

in the limit 1 ! 0
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)
= 1
p

0@s2  1  1p
1
p

+ 1
1A+ 21  1p
! 2
and the e¤ective utility (which in this case is also the intermediate e¤ective utility)
Yi (t)  Y^ (1)i + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1

(A+ C)

Yi (t  1)  Y^ (1)i

 ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)

Yi (t)  Y^ (1)i + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1

(A+ C)

Yi (t  1)  Y^ (1)i

is in this limit 1 ! 0:
n (t) 

n(1)

eff

2

n (t) 

n(1)

eff

  2n (t) (1)w (t  1) + 2n (t)   1 0 0  s (t  1)
with 
n(1)

eff
= 0
so that ultimately:
Ueff (n (t)) = 2 (n (t))
2   2n (t) (1)w (t  1) + 2n (t)   1 0 0  s (t  1)
Using (240), the equilibrium value for this agent is just: X(i)ej = n
(1)e
1 = 0.
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E¤ective action for the second agent:
Here again, we can identify the utility for the second agent. The action for the rst agent:
Ueff (n (t)) = 2 (n (t))
2   2n (t) (1)w (t  1) + 2n (t)   1 0 0  s (t  1)
leads to consider the additional quadratic weight w
2(t 1)
2 . Starting with the intertemporal utility for agent
2:
w (t)
2
+ n2 (t  1) + 2n (t  1)w (t)  2sf (t  1)

w (t) 

1  ~f

+ 2sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t  2w (t)w0
the identication of the a¤ective utility in (286) starts by setting:
A =
p


0   12     12    0

B =

1 + 2
p

   12   p

   12    12 + 

C =
p


0
   + 12  
   12

0

The equation for the dynamic matrix D
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0 (287)
since
A  C = 2
p


0   12  0

B  A =

1 + 2 0
0 12 + 

A+ C = 2
p


0  
  12 0

One looks for a solution D =

a b
c d

for (287):
p


0   12  0

a b
c d
2
+

1 + 2 0
0 12 + 

a b
c d

+
p


0  
  12 0

= 0
and:
D =

0 b
c 0

p


0   12  0

0 b
c 0
2
+

1 + 2 0
0 12 + 

0 b
c 0

+
p


0  
  12 0

b

1
2
 + 1

 
p
   1
2
bc
p
 = 0
c

 +
1
2

  1
2
p
   bc
p
 = 0
b =
1
2c
p


c
 
1 + 2
 p
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 
1 + 2
p
c2    4   42 + 22 + 2 + 2 c+   + 2p = 0
c =

2
 
2 + 
   22 2 + 2 + 2 r2 (2 + )  (2)2 2 + 2 + 22   4 ( + 2) (1 + 2)
2 (1 + 2)
p

b =
2 + 2
 
22 +  + 2
 r2 (2 + )  (2)2 2 + 2 + 22   4 ( + 2) (1 + 2)
2 (2 + )2
p

= 1  2     2p +O p2
since C is antisymetric:
1
2
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S = (A  C)D + 2 (B  A)
1
2
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S =
p


0   12  0

0 b
c 0

+

1 + 2 0
0 12 + 

=

1
2    12 c
p
 + 1 0
0  + 12   b
p


From now on the upperscript S will be omitted.As a consequence, the intermediate e¤ective utility (see
appendix 1) is:
Yi (t)  Y^ (1)i + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1

(A+ C)

Yi (t  1)  Y^ (1)i

 ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)

Yi (t)  Y^ (1)i + ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1

(A+ C)

Yi (t  1)  Y^ (1)i

The relevant matrices are then:

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)S
 1
(A+ C) =

2

1
2    12 c
p
 + 1 0
0  + 12   b
p

 1
2
p


0  
  12 0

=
 
0   2
p

2+ cp
 
p

2 2bp+1 0
!
The matrices needed to compute the e¤ective action are then:
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ii   ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)jj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ji

= 1 +
1
2
   c
2
p

= 1 +
1
2

 

2
 
2 + 
   22 2 + 2 + 2 r2 (2 + )  (2)2 2 + 2 + 22   4 ( + 2) (1 + 2)
22 (1 + 2)
Mii = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ii
= 0
Mij = (Nii)
1p


((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
=  

1 +
1
2
   c
p


2
2 +    2cp =  
N^ii = Nii +Mii = Nii = 1 +
1
2
   c
p
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To nd the equilibrium values X(2)ej , we use (240) and our previous result that X
(1)e
1 = 0. Moreover,
given the utility of the second agent, its optimal goal would be w = 0:Then, X(i)j = 0. In that case (240)
becomes: X(i)ej = 0. As a consequence, the e¤ective action:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =  1
2

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

Mii

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

 

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

Mij

1p


Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

+
1
2

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

(Nii)

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
becomes for the second agent:
Ueff (w (t)) =

1 +
1
2
   c
p


w2 (t) 2w (t)n (t  1)+sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ~f

+sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
which implies the inertia:
12 = 
E¤ective Action for the third agent
Starting with the utility for the third agent at time t,
s (t) (Id) s (t) + (+ )

w (t  1)  
(+ )

1  ~f

  
(+ )
~w
2
(288)
and including the additional normalization factor for agents 1 and 2 e¤ective utility:

2
  w (t  1) +    1 0 0  s (t  1)2 + 
2
1 
1 + 12    c
p

 (n (t  1)  sf (t  1) + sw (t  1))2
=

2

w2 (t  1) + 2s2n (t  1)  2w (t  1) sn (t  1) + 2n2 (t  1)
+2s2f (t  1) + 2s2w (t  1)  2n (t  1) sf (t  1) + 2n (t  1) sw (t  1)  2sf (t  1) sw (t  1)

and dening as before: , , !  1
A =
p

2
0BBBB@
0 0 0  0
0 0 0   0
0 0 0 0 
   0 0  1  12
0 0   1  12 0
1CCCCA
B =
1
2
0BBBBB@
2 +  
2
d   d 0
p
   d
  d 2 +  
2
d 0  
p
  d
0 0 2 +  
2
d  
p
p
  p   d+  + 2! p ( 1  )
  d  d
p

p
 ( 1  ) 1 +  2d
1CCCCCA
C =
p

2
0BBBB@
0 0 0   0
0 0 0  0
0 0 0 0  
   0 0 1  12
0 0   1 + 12 0
1CCCCA
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where we set
d = 1 +
1
2
   c
2
p

! = (+ )
The equation for the dynamic matrix D is then:
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0 (289)
0 =
p

0BBBB@
0 0 0  0
0 0 0   0
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0  1
0 0 0  12 0
1CCCCAD2 +
0BBBBB@
2 +  
2
d   d 0 0   d
  d 2 +  
2
d 0 0 

d
0 0 2 +  
2
d   0
0 0   d+  + 2! 0
  d  d 0 0 1 +  
2
d
1CCCCCAD(290)
+
p

0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
   0 0  12
0 0   1 0
1CCCCA
 
B11     1B21
 1  
  1 (B22G+ ) B12G

0@0@ 1 + 2 2   2 0  2 1 + 22 0
0 0 1 + 2
2
1A 
0@  0  0
0 
1A 0  1 12 0
 1
0 0   2

2    2  0
1A 1

0@0@  0  0
0 
1A 0  1 12 0
 1
d+ 2 0
0 1 + 2 2

G+ 

   0
0 0 

 
0@ 0 2 0   2 
  2 0
1AG
1A
Of the type: 
0  
0 

D2 +

B11 B12
B21 B22

D +

0 0
 	

= 0
D =
Dp

with:
  =
0@  0  0
0 
1A
 =

0  1
 12 0

 =

 ( + ) +N22 0
0 1

 = 

   0
0 0 

	 = 

0  12
 1 0

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0@  0  0
0 
1A 0  1 12 0
 1
D =

E F
G H

D2 =

E2 + FG EF + FH
GE +HG GF +H2

The equation for D: 
0  
0 

D2 +

B11 B12
B21 B22

D +

0 0
 	

= 0
can be decomposed in blocks:
  (GE +HG)  
 
GF +H2

 (GE +HG) 
 
GF +H2
 +  B11E +B12G B11F +B12H
B21E +B22G B21F +B22H

+

0 0
 	

= 0
leading to two systems: 
  (GE +HG) + (B11E +B12G) = 0
 (GE +HG) + (B21E +B22G) +  = 0
(GE +HG) =   1 ((B21E +B22G) + )
  1 ((B21E +B22G) + ) = (B11E +B12G)
E =
 
B11     1B21
 1  
  1 (B22G+ ) B12G

and 
 
 
GF +H2

+ (B11F +B12H) = 0

 
GF +H2

+ (B21F +B22H) + 	 = 0
F =
 
B11     1B21
 1  
  1 (B22H + 	) B12H

The two remaining equations: 
  (GE +HG) + (B11E +B12G) = 0
 (GE +HG) + (B21E +B22G) +  = 0
 
 
GF +H2

+ (B11F +B12H) = 0

 
GF +H2

+ (B21F +B22H) + 	 = 0
( G+B11)E + ( HG+B12G) = 0
( G+B11)F +
 
 H2 +B12H

= 0
allow to nd a relation between G and H. Let:
V =

0 1 0
0 0 1

multiply the rst equation by V t.
Multiply the rst equation by

G (V )
t
 1
and the second one by H 1. It yields:
( G+B11)E (V )
t

G (V )
t
 1
= ( G+B11)FH
 1
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and then, since ( G+B11) is square:
E (V )
t

G (V )
t
 1
= FH 1
Using the equation for E and F gives:
E (V )
t

G (V )
t
 1
=
 
B11     1B21
 1
  1

B22 +  (V )
t

G (V )
t
 1 
 B12

FH 1 =
 
B11     1B21
 1  
  1
 
B22 + 	H
 1 B12
  1

B22 +  (V )
t

G (V )
t
 1 
=   1
 
B22 + 	H
 1
multiply by (V )t on the left and simplify by (V )t   1:
 (V )
t

G (V )
t
 1
= 	H 1
 t (V )
t

G (V )
t
 1
= tH 1
since (V  )t = (V  ), it leads ultimately to:
H =

G (V )
t

(V  )
 1
t
This last equation allows to reduce the problem to nd (GV t). Actually, we can take benet from the
arbitraryness of the matrix V to make an other choice. Let
W =

1 0 0
0 0 1

one also have:
H =

G (W )
t

(W )
 1
t
and the two identities for H yield:
G (V )
t

(V  )
 1
=

G (W )
t

(W )
 1
Writing
G =

a b c
d e f

the previous equation leads directly to:
a =  

b
d =  

e
Thus, it remains to determine
GV t =

b c
e f

To do so, recall that:
E =
 
B11     1B21
 1  
  1 (B22G+ ) B12G

=
0B@ 0 0  
f+
2
0 0  f+2
d  +bd+
2b!
(2+2d d2) d
 bd 2b!
2+2d d2 0
1CA
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F =
 
B11     1B21
 1  
  1 (B22H + 	) B12H

=
0B@ 
f+
2 0
  f+2 0
0 d  bd 
2b!
(2+2d d2)
1CA
H =

G (W )
t

(W )
 1
t
=

0 b
  f 0

and insert these relations in (290), the equation for D to nd:
D =
1p

0BBBBB@
0 0   f+2  f+2 0
0 0  f+2   f+2 0
d  +bd+
2b!
(2+2d d2) d
 bd 2b!
2+2d d2 0 0 d
 bd 2b!
(2+2d d2)
  b b 0 0 b
0 0 f   f 0
1CCCCCA
replace b by b and set r2 = 2 + 2, then the equation for b and f are:
0 = b32   32 + bd2f2   bd32 + 2bd2+ bd3 + bf2 + 2bdf   df2
+2bd + 2b32!   2d   bdf2 + 4bd! + 2bdf2!
0 =  fr2   2df + bdfr2   2r2   2f2 + bdr2   2d + 2bdf2
with:
d = 1 +
1
2

  1
2
 
2
 
2 + 
  42 + 2 + 2 r2 (2 + )  (2)2 2 + 2 + 22   4 ( + 2) (1 + 2)
2 (1 + 2)
And the relevant matrices for our problem become:p
2 ((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))
=
0BBBBBB@
2+2d bd2
d 
 +bd
d 0 0 
 +bd
d
 +bdd
2+2d bd2
d 0 0 
 bd
d
0 0 
2+2d+df
d   (f + ) 0
0 0   (f + ) f+d++2! 0
 +bdd 
 bd
d 0 0
d+2 bd2
d
1CCCCCCA
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
((A  C)D + 2 (B  A))S
 1
(A+ C)
=
0BBBBBB@
2+2d bd2
d 
 +bd
d 0 0 
 +bd
d
 +bdd
2+2d bd2
d 0 0 
 bd
d
0 0 
2+2d+df
d   (f + ) 0
0 0   (f + ) f+d++2! 0
 +bdd 
 bd
d 0 0
d+2 bd2
d
1CCCCCCA
 10BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
   0 0  
0 0   1 0
1CCCCA
=
0BBBBB@
0 0  +bd{ 
 bd
{ 0
0 0   bd{ 
 +bd
{ 0
d f+  d f+ 0 0  d f+

2+2d+df
  
2+2d+df
 0 0  
2+2d+df

0 0 
2+2+2d bd2 bd2
{
2+2+2d bd2 bd2
{ 0
1CCCCCA
with:
 = 32 + d2f2   d32 + 2d2+ d3 + f2 + 2df + 2d + 232!   df2 +  22 d! + 2df2!
{ =  2   2   2d+ bd2 + bd2   22 + 2bd2
which leads to the expression for Nii, Mii, Mij :
2ii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ii
  ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)jj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ji

=
0B@ 
2+2d bd2
d 
 +bd
d 0
 +bdd
2+2d bd2
d 0
0 0 
2+2d+df
d
1CA
 
0@ 0  +bdd0  bdd  (f + ) 0
1A f+d++2! 0
0 d+
2 bd2
d
! 1


0 0   (f + )
 +bdd 
 bd
d 0


0BBBBBB@
2+2d bd2
d 
 +bd
d 0 0 
 +bd
d
 +bdd
2+2d bd2
d 0 0 
 bd
d
0 0 
2+2d+df
d   (f + ) 0
0 0   (f + ) f+d++2! 0
 +bdd 
 bd
d 0 0
d+2 bd2
d
1CCCCCCA
=
0B@
 2 2d+bd2 22+2bd2
 d 2+bd2 
 bd
 d 2+bd2 0
  bd d 2+bd2
 2 2d+bd2 22+2bd2
 d 2+bd2 0
0 0 d(f+d++2!)
1CA
Mii = Nii

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ii
= Nii
0B@ 0 0  +bd{0 0   bd{
d f+  d f+ 0
1CA
Mij = Nii

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
= Nii
0B@   bd{ 0 +bd{ 0
0  d f+
1CA
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and the e¤ective utility for the third agent is:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

Nii

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

i

 

Xi (t) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

Mij

Xj (t  1) 

Y^
(1)
i

j

Or, rexpressed in the variables s (t):
Ueff (s (t)) =

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

Nii

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

 

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

Mij
 
w (t  1)   w(3)
eff
n (t  1)   n(3)
eff
!
where the constants 0B@
 
s(3)

eff 
w(3)

eff 
n(3)

eff
1CA = X(3)e
form a 5 dimensional vector. The vector X(3)e satisfy (240), which reduces to:
X(3)e =
0BBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii

B12; 2
p


A
(i)
ij
S

Bt12; 2
p


A
(j)
ji
S 8><>:

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22;
2


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
S
9>=>;
1CCCCCA
 1
(291)

8><>:
0B@ A(i)ii  
p


(i)
ii
2

B
(3)
12
2 ;
p
A
(i)
ij


B
(3)
12
t
2 A
(i)
jj +
B
(3)
22
2
1CA X(i)j 
9>=>;
given that

X
(j)e
j

= 0, as shown in the previous computations for the rst two agents. Moreover (288)
shows that:

X
(i)
j

=


(+ )

1  ~f

+

(+ )
~w
0BBBB@
0
0
0
1
0
1CCCCA
and then (291) simplies as:
X(3)e

(+)

1  ~f

+ (+) ~w

=
0BBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii
n
B12;
p


A
(i)
ij +A
(j)
ij
o
n
Bt12;
p


A
(j)
ji +A
(j)
ji
o 8><>:

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22;
2


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
S
9>=>;
1CCCCA
 1

0BB@

B
(3)
12
2 ;
p
A
(i)
ij

1
0


A
(i)
jj +
B
(3)
22
2

1
0

1CCA
= B 1 
0BB@

B
(3)
12
2 ;
p
A
(i)
ij

1
0


A
(i)
jj +
B
(3)
22
2

1
0

1CCA
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Using again (288) yields A(i)ij = 0, A
(i)
jj =

+  0
0 0

, whereas (239) gives B(3)12 and B
(3)
22 :
B
(3)
12 = 

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

B
(3)
22 = 

A
(j)
kj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
S
Given the e¤ective action for the two rst agents, one has:

(j)
jj

eff
= 0

(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
=

0  p
0 0


A
(j)
jj

eff
=

1 + 12    c
p
 0
0 1

A
(j)
ij =
0@ p 0 p 0
0
p

1A
A
(j)
kj =

0  p
 p 0

B
(3)
12 = 
0@0@ p 0 p 0
0
p

1A 1 + 12    cp 0
0 1
 1
0  p
0 0
1A =
0B@ 0  2
2 
2+ 2cp
0 22 
2+ 2cp
0 0
1CA
B
(3)
22 = 
 
0  p
 p 0

1 + 12    c
p
 0
0 1
 1
0  p
0 0
!
=

0 0
0 22 
2+ 2cp

and then: 0BB@

B
(3)
12
2 ;
p
A
(i)
ij

1
0


A
(i)
jj +
B
(3)
22
2

1
0

1CCA =
0BB@
B
(3)
12
2

1
0


A
(i)
jj +
B
(3)
22
2

1
0

1CCA =  (+ )
so that:
X(3)e = 



1  ~f

+  ~w

B 1
0BBBB@
0
0
0
1
0
1CCCCA
=
0BBBBBBB@
 p (d  ) 2+2d d2C

p
 (d  ) 2+2d d2C
 2d d C
2((1 d)r2+22 d2r2)2+d

(2)
2
2 2d2+22+2r2

+(2)
2
d2
Cp

2(1 d)r22+2d((1 d+)2+r2)+d2(2)2(1+)
C
1CCCCCCCA
with:
C = 2
 
2   d2 + 2! + 2! + 22!   d2!   d2!3
+d

22   22 +  22 2! + 22! + 22! + 22! + 2d2   2d2!2
+d2

 22 + 2 +  22 !   d2 + 2d3
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Global action for the system
Gathering the previous result, one can gather all e¤ective utilities into the global system utility:
Ueff =

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

Nii

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

 

s (t) 

s(3)

eff

Mij
 
w (t  1)   w(3)
eff
n (t  1)   n(3)
eff
!
+ (1  c)w2 (t) + 2w (t)n (t  1) + sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ~f

+ sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
+ (n (t))
2   2n (t)w (t  1) + 2n (t)   1 0 0  s (t  1)
We can rst study the stabilty of the system by having a look on the clasical system associated to this
e¤ective utility. Discarding the equilibrium value, the rst order condition can expressed by:0@ N11 0 00 N22 0
0 0 1
1AX (t) =
0@ M11 M12 M13M21 M22 M23
M31 M32 0
1AX (t  1)
where X (t) concatenates in column the vectors s (t), w (t) and n (t). The solution of the system is then:
X (t) =
0@ (N11) 1M11 (N11) 1M12 (N11) 1M13(N22) 1M21 (N22) 1M22 (N22) 1M23
M31 M32 0
1AX (t  1) (292)
 MX (t  1)
Recall that
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
and as a consequence one obtains the various matrices involved in the dynamics:
(N11)
 1
M11 =

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

11
=
0B@ 0 0 
+2b12
%
0 0  +2b12%
1
  (   bd)   (   bd) 0
1CA
(N11)
 1
(M12;M13) =

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

12
;

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

13

=
0B@  
+2b12
% 0
+2b12
% 0
0   1 12 (   bd)
1CA
with:
% = 2b2   2   2   2   2 + 2b2 + 2b212 + b22 + b22 + b2212 + b2212
+2b212 + 2b
212
and: 
(N22)
 1
M21 (N22)
 1
M22 (N22)
 1
M23
M31 M32 0

=


d  d 0 0  d
0 0   1 0

The determinant has three nul eigenvalues, and the two last ones satisfy:
 = 
p
2 (d+ 2   bd2)

s
  d22 (f + )
d ( 2d+ (bd  ) r2   22 + 2bd2)
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with r2 = 2 +2. Then one can study these eigenvalues numerically as functions of the system parame-
ters. This will be the goal of next paragraph.
The e¤ective utility allows also to study the stability of the all structure in interaction with a large set
of similar structures. We rewrite:
Ueff =
 
X (t)  Xe
0@ N11 0 00 N22 0
0 0 1
1A X (t)  Xe   X (t)  Xe
0@ 0 M12 M130 0 0
0 0 0
1A X (t  1)  Xe(293)
 

X (t)  X(2)2
0@ M11 0 0M21 M22 M23
M31 M32 0
1AX (t  1)
where:
Xe =

X(1)e; 0; 0
t
and:
X
(2)
2 =


(+ )

1  ~f

+

(+ )
~w
0BBBB@
0
0
0
1
0
1CCCCA
Then, the saddle point equation for the equilibrium value X, derived from (293):
0 = 2
0@ N11 0 00 N22 0
0 0 1
1A  X   Xe  2
0@ 0 M12 M130 0 0
0 0 0
1AS   X   Xe
 
0@ M11 0 0M21 M22 M23
M31 M32 0
1A X  
0@ M11 0 0M21 M22 M23
M31 M32 0
1At  X   X(2)2 
or, which is equivalent:
2
 
N  MS   X   Xe =
0@ M11 0 0M21 M22 M23
M31 M32 0
1A Xe +
0@ M11 0 0M21 M22 M23
M31 M32 0
1At  Xe   X(2)2  (294)
 2MS Xe   (M 0)t X(2)2
whose solution is:
X = Xe +
 
N  MS 1MS Xe   1
2
(M 0)t X(2)2

(295)
We can now express Ueff (X (t)) as:
Ueff
 
X

=
 
X   Xe N   (M  M 0)S   X   Xe   X   X(2)2 M 0 X
=

MS Xe   1
2
(M 0)t X(2)2
t  
N  MS 1 N   (M  M 0)S  N  MS 1MS Xe   1
2
(M 0)t X(2)2

 

X   X(2)2

M 0 X
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Ueff (X (t)) =
 
X (t)  XN  X (t)  X   X (t)  XNM  X (t  1)  X
+Ueff
 
X

=
 
X (t)  XN  X (t)  X   X (t)  XM  X (t  1)  X
+
 
X   Xe N   (M  M 0)S   X   Xe   X   X(2)2 M 0 X
An other convenient form for Ueff (X (t)) in the sequel is obtained by writing its continuous time
approximation (179), plus its constant term:
Ueff (X (t)) =
 
X (t)  X  N  MS  X (t)  X+ 1
2
(X (t) X (t  1))  MS +N (X (t) X (t  1))(296)
   X (t)  XMA  X (t  1)  X
+
 
X   Xe N   (M  M 0)S   X   Xe   X   X(2)2 M 0 X
One can also consider that some externalities produce an inertia term of the form: with  > 0, that will seen
below as stabilizing the system, so that ultimately:
Ueff (X (t)) =
 
X (t)  X  N  MS  X (t)  X (297)
+
1
2
(X (t) X (t  1))  N +MS (X (t) X (t  1))   X (t)  XMA  X (t  1)  X
+
 
X   Xe N   (M  M 0)S   X   Xe   X   X(2)2 M 0 X
For the purpose of some applications, we record the particular results for  ! 0. As explained before, in
that case, the e¤ective utility simplies to the initial utility:
(n (t) + 1)
2
+ 2n (t) sn (t  1)  2n (t)w (t  1)
= (n (t) + 1)
2
+ 2n (t)
 
1 0 0

s (t  1)  2n (t)w (t  1)
s (t) (Id) s (t) + 

1  w (t  1)  ~f
2
+  (w (t  1)  ~w)2
= s (t) (Id) s (t) + (+ )

w (t  1)  
(+ )

1  ~f

  
(+ )
~w
2
(w (t)  w0)2 + n2 (t  1) + 2n (t  1)w (t) + 2sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ~f

+ 2sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
= (w (t)  w0)2 + n2 (t  1) + 2n (t  1)w (t)  2sf (t  1)

w (t) 

1  ~f

+ 2sw (t  1)
 
w (t)  ~t
That can be gathered in a matricial expression:
Ueff (X (t)) = (X (t) X1) I (X (t) X1)  2X (t)MX (t  1)
with:
M =
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
   0 0  
0 0   1 0
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
r cos ()  r sin () 0 0  
0 0   1 0
1CCCCA and X1 =
0BBBB@
0
0
0
w0
 1
1CCCCA
The saddle point equation:
X = (1 M) 1X1
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yields the "constant term":
Ueff
 
X

=
 
X  X1
  
X  X1
  2 XM X
=

M (1 M) 1X1
t 
M (1 M) 1X1

  2

(1 M) 1X1
t
M (1 M) 1X1
=

(1 M) 1X1
t  
M tM   2M (1 M) 1X1
and we can gather these results:
Ueff (X (t)) =
 
X (t)  X I  X (t)  X 2X (t)MX (t  1)+(1 M) 1X1t  M tM   2M (1 M) 1X1
that can be rewritten as in (297):
Ueff (X (t)) =
 
X (t)  X  I  MS  X (t)  X+ 1
2
(X (t) X (t  1))  2 +MS (X (t) X (t  1))   X (t)  XMA  X (t  1)  X(298)
+

(1 M) 1X1
t  
M tM   2M (1 M) 1X1
The matrices involved in the previous expression are:
 
M tM   2M =
0BBBB@
0 0 0 r cos () 0
0 0 0  r sin () 0
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0  1
0 0 0   0
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
r cos ()  r sin () 0 0  
0 0   1 0
1CCCCA
 2
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
r cos ()  r sin () 0 0  
0 0   1 0
1CCCCA
=
0BBBB@
r2 cos2   r2 cos  sin  0 0  r cos 
 r2 cos  sin  r2 sin2  0 0 r sin 
0 0 2   0
 2r cos  2r sin    1 2
 r cos  r sin   2 2 2
1CCCCA
(1 M) 1 =
0BBBB@
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
 r cos  1 r sin  1   1   1 1  1
r cos  1  r sin  1    1 1 1   1 1
1CCCCA
(1 M) 1X1 =
0BBBB@
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
 r cos  1 r sin  1   1   1 1  1
r cos  1  r sin  1    1 1 1   1 1
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
0
0
0
w0
 1
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
0
0
0
  1 1 ( + w0)
1
 1 (w0 + 1)
1CCCCA
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
(1 M) 1X1
t  
M tM   2M (1 M) 1X1
=
 
0 0 0   1 1 ( + w0) 1 1 (w0 + 1)


0BBBB@
r2 cos2   r2 cos  sin  0 0  r cos 
 r2 cos  sin    12r2 (cos 2   1) 0 0 r sin 
0 0 2   0
 2r cos  2r sin    1 2
 r cos  r sin   2 2 2
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
0
0
0
  1 1 ( + w0)
1
 1 (w0 + 1)
1CCCCA
=   1
(   1)2
  2w20 + 2w20 + 2w0 + 2 + w20 + 2w0
N +MS = I +MS =
1
2
0BBBB@
2 0 0 r cos  0
0 2 0  r sin  0
0 0 2 0 
r cos   r sin  0 2     1
0 0      1 2
1CCCCA
I  MS = 1
2
0BBBB@
2 0 0  r cos () 0
0 2 0 r sin () 0
0 0 2 0  
 r cos () r sin () 0 2  + 1
0 0    + 1 2
1CCCCA
with eigenvalues 1 1
2
p
2
s
2 + (1 + )
2
+ r2


r
2 + (1 + )
2
+ r2
2
  4r22
MA =
0BBBB@
0 0 0   12r cos  0
0 0 0 12r sin  0
0 0 0 0   12
1
2r cos    12r sin  0 0   12 (   1)
0 0 12
1
2 (   1) 0
1CCCCA
For some values of the parameters, the eigenvalues of I MS are positives.
For the purpose of section 9, we need to nd a matrix relevant to the computation of (182):p
N +M (S)

N  M (S) + 2M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)
p
N +M (S)
The eigenvalues of this matrix will tell if the eld theoretic version of the three agents model, which describes
the interaction of a large number of copies of the three agents system, will present some stable pattern (if
the eigenvalues are positive), or some unstable ones (for negative eigenvalues). To compute
p
N +M (S) we
rewrite I +MS by using the previous change of variable. One has:
I +MS =
1
2
0BBBB@
2 0 0 R sin (v) cos  0
0 2 0  R sin (v) sin  0
0 0 2 0 R cos (v) cosu
R sin (v) cos   R sin (v) sin  0 2  R cos (v) sinu
0 0 R cos (v) cosu  R cos (v) sinu 2
1CCCCA
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The parameters R inserted in I +MS are dened by:
s2 = 2 + (1 + )
2
R2 =
 
s2 + r2

s = R cos (v) ; r = R sin (v)
 = s cosu; (1 + ) = s sinu
We will restrict to the  = 4 = u. By setting the internal parameters to the same value it reduces the
problem to compare relative strength of these parameters to N , which is equal to I and to the magnitude of
its action, which is read through R. Then:
I +MS =
1
2
0BBBB@
2 0 0 R2 0
0 2 0  R2 0
0 0 2 0 R2
R
2  R2 0 2  R2
0 0 R2  R2 2
1CCCCA ; I  MS = 12
0BBBB@
2 0 0  R2 0
0 2 0 R2 0
0 0 2 0  R2
 R2 R2 0 2 R2
0 0  R2 R2 2
1CCCCA
MA =
1
2
0BBBB@
0 0 0  R2 0
0 0 0 R2 0
0 0 0 0  R2
R
2  R2 0 0 R2
0 0 R2  R2 0
1CCCCA
p
N +M (S)

N  M (S) + 2M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)
p
N +M (S)
The matrix
p
N +M (S) is computed by the diagonalization of N +M (S) whose eigenvectors and eigenvalues
are: 
1
2
p
2   12
p
2  p2
q
1
2   14
p
2  2
q
1
2   14
p
2  p2
q
1
2   14
p
2 1

for 1  1
2
R
r
1
2
  1
4
p
2
1
2
p
2   12
p
2
p
2
q
1
2   14
p
2 + 2
q
1
2   14
p
2
p
2
q
1
2   14
p
2 1

for 1 +
1
2
R
r
1
2
  1
4
p
2
  12
p
2 12
p
2
p
2
q
1
4
p
2 + 12   2
q
1
4
p
2 + 12
p
2
q
1
4
p
2 + 12 1

for 1  1
2
R
r
1
4
p
2 +
1
2
  12
p
2 12
p
2 2
q
1
4
p
2 + 12  
p
2
q
1
4
p
2 + 12  
p
2
q
1
4
p
2 + 12 1

for 1 +
1
2
R
r
1
4
p
2 +
1
2 
1 1 0 0 0

for 1
Moreover one computes directly that:
N  M (S) + 2M (A)

M (S) +N
 1
M (A)
=
0BBBBBB@
1
8R
2 8R2 128
R4 32R2+128 + 1   18R2 8R
2 128
R4 32R2+128  4 R
3
R4 32R2+128
1
2R
3 R2 8
R4 32R2+128   14R  16 R
2
R4 32R2+128
  18R2 8R
2 128
R4 32R2+128
1
8R
2 8R2 128
R4 32R2+128 + 1 4
R3
R4 32R2+128
1
4R  12R3 R
2 8
R4 32R2+128 16
R2
R4 32R2+128
 4 R3R4 32R2+128 4 R
3
R4 32R2+128 2R
2 R2 8
R4 32R2+128 + 1  4R2 R
2 4
R4 32R2+128
1
2R
3 R2 16
R4 32R2+128   14R
R3 R
2 8
2R4 64R2+256   14R 14R R3 R
2 8
2R4 64R2+256  4R2 R
2 4
R4 32R2+128 2R
2 5R2 24
R4 32R2+128 + 1
1
4R  12 R
5
R4 32R2+128
 16 R2R4 32R2+128 16 R
2
R4 32R2+128 R
3 R2 16
2R4 64R2+256   14R 14R  12 R
5
R4 32R2+128 2R
2 R2 16
R4 32R2+128 + 1
1CCCCCCA
These formula allow to compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors ofp
M (S)

N   2M (S) +M (A)

M (S) +

M (S)
 1
M (A)
p
M (S)
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For large r, the eigenvalues become negative since the magnitude of the parameters induces an instability.
For R 6 1 one nds a stable dynamics, and we report the eigenvalues for R = 0:5 and 1 as examples.
For R = 0:5, the eigenvalues are: (0:835 29; 0:874 28; 0:929 90; 0:973 32; 1).
For R = 0:3, the eigenvalues are: (0:286 17; 0:350 47; 0:735 61; 0:900 95; 1).
For R = 2, the eigenvalues are: ( 1: 431 8; 0:811 19; 0:452 54; 0:798 76; 1).
Moreover the matrices of eigenvectors, multiplied by
p
I +M (S) yields the eigenvectors, in the initial
coordinates corresponding to these eigenvalues. The results are:0BBBB@
1: 553 6 1: 007 4 0:969 08 0:729 91 1:0
 1: 553 6  1: 007 4  0:969 08  0:729 91 1:0
 3: 752 8 0:417 13 6: 874 5 10 2  10: 278 0
9: 059 7 0:173 09  0:166 22  4: 256 7 0
 2: 199 0 1: 424 7  1: 370 3 1: 033 1 0
1CCCCA for R = 0:5
0BBBB@
1: 566 1 1: 027 3 0:876 21 0:705 86 1: 000 00
 1: 566 1  1: 027 3  0:876 21  0:705 86 1: 000 00
 2: 041 8 0:788 05 0:115 32  5: 362 2 0
4: 928 7 0:326 79  0:278 44  2: 221 1 0
 2: 216 1: 452 5  1: 239 1 0:998 3 0
1CCCCA for R = 1
Then one can check from the eigenvectors matrices that the more stable directions are the one for which the
system moves maximaly towards the directions of the substructures. In that case this direction of motion
relaxes the stress imposed by the dominating structure. The more stable solution is mainly driven toward
the second, intermediate agent, which acts as a pivotal point in the stability. Other modes are alternatively
driven mainly into the direction of one of the subtructures.
The eigenvalue 1 and its eigenvector is a particular case. Due to the exceeding number of parameters
compared to the directions of oscillations, this eigenvalue corresponds to an internal oscillation of the third
agent, and does not involve the two others.
On the other hand, for R = 2 the relevant matrix of eigenvectors is:0BBBB@
1: 055 4 1: 569 9 0:710 46 0:670 57 1:0
 1: 055 4  1: 569 9  0:710 46  0:670 57 1:0
1: 099 6  1: 506 8 0:126 98  3: 751 3 0
0:455 46 3: 637 8  0:306 65  1: 553 8 0
1: 492 6  2: 220 2  1: 004 7 0:948 35 0
1CCCCA
one has a reversed result. The two unstables directions correspond to a motion mainly in the direction of the
substructures. Actually, for R = 2 the parameters of the interactions are strong enough, so that the coupled
oscillations between the two substructures present an unstable pattern.
Results for various types of uncertainty
We compare the results for the classical dynamics for various degree of uncertainty 2 in agents behaviors.
We look at three examples, mild uncertainty 2 = 1, full uncertainty, 2 ! 1, no uncertainty 2 ! 0,
which converges to the classical case.
The most interesting case for us will be 2 = 1, the two others one being bechmarks cases. Some
interpretations will be given in the text, in section 2. Here, we give the relevant parameters for each of these
cases, but the interpretations will rely on the eigenvalues of the dynamic system, since these eigenvalues
describe the pattern of behavior of the structure as a whole. Recall that these eigenvalues are given by:
 = 
p
2 (d+ 2   bd2)
r
N
D
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with:
N = 32   d32   d23 + 2d2+ d3 + f2 + 2df + 2d + 232!   df2 +  22 d! + 2df2!
D = d
  2d+ (bd  ) r2   22 + 2bd2
  32 + d2f2   d32 + 2d2+ d3 + f2 + 2df + 2d + 232!   df2 +N2d! + 2df2!
For 2 ! 0, one nds for the parameters of the system and its eigenvalues, to the second order in :
d =
1
2

1 + 2 +
q 
2 + 1
2   422
b =

d
f =  
 = 
r
 
d
=
vuuut 2
1 + 2 +
q 
2 + 1
2   422 =
p 

1  
2
2
 
   2+O  3
and we recover the classical results as needed.
For 2 !1, one obtains:
d = 1 +
1
2

  1
2

2
 
2 + 
   22 2 + 2 + 2 r2 (2 + )  (2)2 2 + 2 + 22   4 ( + 2) (1 + 2)
2 (1 + 2)
= 1 + o
 
1
(2)
2
!
b = o
 
1
(2)
2
!
f =   
2 + 1
and the eigenvalues are:
 = 
vuut2 (1 + 2) (2)2 !
( 2   22)

(2)
2
!

= p 
As said before, the case for 2 = 1 is the most interestng for us, since in gneral it corresponds to what we
aim at modeling: agents anticipating other agents, but taking into account for uncertain intrinsic behaviors.
The computations to the second order in , simplify to yield the following values for the parameters:
b =    !2
f =  
d = 1  2  2   
 = p    1
2
2
p   !r2 +    2+O  3
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Appendix 7
We start again with the postulated e¤ective action
Ueff (Xj (t)) = Yj (t)

Nii 0
0 0

Yj (t)  2Yj (t)

Mii Mij
0 0

Yj (t  1)
+
X
i>k>j
2Xj (t)A
(j)
jk (Xk (t  1)) + V (j)eff (Yj (t))
Ueff (Yj (t)) = Yj (t)
 
A
(j)
jj

eff
0
0 0
!
Yj (t)  2Yj (t)
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
0 0
!
Yj (t  1)
+
X
i>k>j
2Xj (t)A
(j)
jk (Xk (t  1)) + V (j)eff (Yj (t))
with V (j)eff (Xj (t)) a certain function ofXj (t), that depends on the potentials V
(i)
i (Xi (t)) and V
(i)
j (Xj (t  1)).
Note that for the sake of the exposition we discard all the constants X(i)j ,... X
(i)e
j but that they can be
reintroduced at the end of the computation.
Recall that (11) allows to nd recursively the utilities Ueff (Xj (t)) :
exp (Ueff (Xi (t))) =
Z
exp

U
(i)
t
 Y
rk(j)<rk(i)
Y
s>t
exp
0@X
s>t
Ueff (Xj (s))
N
1A dXj (s) (299)
As recorded in the text, we rewrite the utilities in terms of the variables Yi (t). We use the general form (44)
U
(i)
t =
X
k>0
Yi (t+ k)

A
(i)
ii 0
0 0

Yi (t+ k) + Yi (t+ k   1)
 
 (i)ii 0
0 A
(i)
fjjg
!
Yi (t+ k   1)
+Yi (t+ k)
 
0 
1
2A
(i)
ij

1
2A
(i)
ji 0
!
Yi (t+ k   1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1)) +
X
k>0
kV
(i)
i
 
Xi (t+ k)

k
2
!
+
X
j<i
 
V
(i)
j
 
Yj ((t+ k)  1)

k 1
2
!!
The normalization of exp (Ueff (Yj (t))) is obtained by letting:
C
Z
exp (Ueff (Yj (t))) (d (Yj (t))) = 1
writing:
Ueff (Yj (t)) = Yj (t)

A
(j)
jj

eff
Yj (t)  2Yj (t)
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A
+V
(j)
eff (Yj (t))
 Uquadeff (Yj (t)) + V (j)eff (Yj (t))
then
Z
exp (Ueff (Yj (t))) (d (Yj (t))) =
Z
exp

Uquadeff (Yj (t)) + V
(j)
eff (Yj (t))

(d (Yj (t)))
= exp

V
(j)
eff

@
@Uj
Z
exp

Uquadeff (Yj (t))

(d (Yj (t)))
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with:
Uj =
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A
To compute Z
exp

Uquadeff (Yj (t))

(d (Yj (t)))
we use that:
Uquadeff (Yj (t)) =
0@Yj (t) + A(j)jj  1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A1At A(j)jj 
eff

0@Yj (t) + A(j)jj  1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A1A
 
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1At


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A
which yields, up to an irrelevant constant:Z
exp

Uquadeff (Yj (t))

(d (Yj (t)))
= exp
0@ 
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1At


A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Xk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A1A
= exp

  (Uj)t

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
Uj

and
exp

V
(j)
eff

@
@Uj
Z
exp

Uquadeff (Yj (t))

(d (Yj (t)))
= exp

V
(j)
eff

@
@Uj

exp

  (Uj)t

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
Uj

and the normalization factor:
exp

V
(j)
eff

@
@Uj

exp

  (Uj)t

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
Uj
 1
 exp

(Uj)
t

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
Uj + V^
(j)
eff (Uj)

this choice of decomposition being justied by the fact that for V (j)eff = 0, one recovers a normalization of
exp

(Uj)
t

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
Uj

, as in the quadratic case.
This normalization factor has to be added to the global weight (i.e. the normalized e¤ective utility) to
be taken into account for agent i is then, similarly to Appendix 1:
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Ueff (Yj (t))
=
X
t>0
Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii +B11 B12
Bt12

A
(j)
jj

eff
+ A
(i)
jj ; B22
 1AYi (t)
+2
1
2Yi (t)
0@  (i)ii A(i)ij
A
(j)
ji


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1) + V^ (j)eff (U)
where MS = 12 (M +M
t) for any matrix M , and
B11 = A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
ji
B12 =

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ; 

A
(j)
ij

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

B22 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
A
(j)
lj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
A
(j)
jk ;

 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
t 
A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff



A
(j)
kj

A
(j)
jj
 1
eff
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff
S
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
As a consequence, the total weight appearing in (299) is the same as in appendix 1, plus the non quadratic
contributions due to V (i)i (Xi (t)), V
(i)
j (Xj (t  1)) and V (j)eff (Yj (t)). The same operations can be thus
performed and in the end the total weight to integrate in the R.H.S. of (299) is
W =
X
s>t

 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1)

(300)
+Yi (t)BYi (t) +
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
+
X
k>0
k
0@V (i)i
 
(Yi (t+ k))i

k
2
!
+
X
j<i
 
V
(i)
j
 
Yj ((t+ k)  1)

k 1
2
!!
+
1
N
V^
(j)
eff
 
Uj (t+ k   1)

k 1
2
!1A
=
X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1)
+Yi (t)BYi (t) +
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t) 
X
k>0
(2 l)k
0@X
l>3
X
n1;:::nl
B(i)n1;:::nl (Yi (t+ k))n1 ::: (Yi (t+ k))nl
1A
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with:
A =
p

0BB@
 (i)ii A(i)ij +A(j)ij
A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji
8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
B =
0BBBBBB@
A
(i)
ii +B11  
p

(i)
ii
np


A
(i)
ij +A
(j)
ij

; B12
o
np


A
(i)
ji +A
(j)
ji

; Bt12
o 8>>><>>>:
A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
; B22
p

8<:
 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2
; A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j ; A
(j)
fjkgi>k>j
9=;
9>>>=>>>;
1CCCCCCA
C =
p

0BB@
0 A
(i)
ij  A(j)ij
 

A
(i)
ji  A(j)ji
 8<:


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
2 ;
 


(j)
fjkgj>k

eff
2 ;
 A(j)fkjgi>k>j ; A(j)fjkgi>k>j
9=;
1CCA
and
Uj (t  1) =
0@ X
i>k>j
A
(j)
jk Yk (t  1) 
 

(j)
jj

eff


(j)
fjkgk<j

eff

Yj (t  1)
1A
The potential:
V
(i)
i
 
(Yi (t+ k))i

k
2
!
+
X
j<i
 
V
(i)
j
 
Yj ((t+ k)  1)

k 1
2
!!
+
1
N
V^
(j)
eff
 
Uj (t+ k   1)

k 1
2
!
depends only on Yi (t+ k) and will be denoted V^ (i)

Yi(t+k)

k
2

.
Then the integral in (11) is computed in the following way. Write:
exp (W ) = exp
 X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s)
+ (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1) + Yi (t)BYi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)

 
X
s>t
s tkV^ (i)
 
Yi (s)

s t
2
!
=
(
exp
 
 
X
s>t
s tkV^ (i)
 
1

s t
2
@
@ (Ji (s))
!!
exp
 X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s)
+ (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1) + Ji (s)Yi (s) + Yi (t)BYi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)

Ji(s)=0
where Ji (s) is an external source term. Then we have to compute in the rst place the integral of a very
similar weight as in the quadratic case. The only di¤erence is the appearance of the source term. However,
it is known that such a term does not modify the fact that the successive gaussian integrals can be evaluated
at the saddle point.
The action we have to consider is then:X
s>t

 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1) + Ji (s)Yi (s)

(301)
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and the equation for the classical solution of (300) is then of the usual Euler Lagrange type and quite
similar to (245):
A (Yi (s+ 1)  2Yi (s) + Yi (s  1)) + 2BYi (s)  C (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s  1)) + Ji (s) = 0 (302)
and its solution is of the kind:
Yi (s) = D
s t (Yi (t) + Fi (s)) (303)
with Fi (t) = 0 and where the equation for the matrix D is given in Appendix 4:
(A  C)D2 + 2 (B  A)D + (A+ C) = 0
we insert (303) in (302) which leads to:
A
 
D2 (Fi (s+ 1)  Fi (s))  (Fi (s)  Fi (s  1))
 C  D2 (Fi (s+ 1)  Fi (s)) + (Fi (s)  Fi (s  1))+Ji (s) = 0
Let:
Gi (s) = (Fi (s)  Fi (s  1))
the equation for Gi is
A
 
D2Gi (s+ 1) Gi (s)
  C  D2Gi (s+ 1) +Gi (s)+ Ji (s) = 0
or:
(A  C)D2Gi (s+ 1)  (A+ C)Gi (s) + Ji (s) = 0
  (2 (B  A)D + (A+ C))Gi (s+ 1)  (A+ C)Gi (s) + Ji (s) = 0
and its solution is:
Gi (s) = (A+ C)
 1X
n>0
 
(A  C)D2n Ji (s+ n)
and then:
Fi (s) = (A+ C)
 1 X
t<us
X
n>0
 
(A  C)D2n Ji (u+ n) (304)
to satisfy the initial condition Fi (t) = 0.
Replacing the solution (246) in (301), this last quantity can be evaluated in the same way as in appendix
1. One nd a quadratic term, as in appendix 1:
1
2
Yi (t)A (Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t)) + 1
2
(Yi (t+ 1)  Yi (t))CYi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
and an additional term coming from the source term. It appears to be an innite sum
1
2
X
s>t
Ji (s)Yi (s) =
1
2
X
s>t
Ji (s)D
s t (Yi (t) + Fi (s))
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using (246) and (304) it yields an overall contribution:
1
2
Yi (t)A (D (Yi (t) + Fi (t+ 1))  Yi (t)) + 1
2
(D (Yi (t) + Fi (t+ 1))  Yi (t))CYi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
+
1
2
X
s>t
Ji (s)Yi (s)
=
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1))Yi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t) +
1
2
Yi (t) (A  C)DFi (t+ 1)
+
1
2
X
s>t
Ji (s)D
s tYi (t) +
1
2
X
s>t
X
t<us
X
n>0
Ji (s) (A+ C)
 1  
(A  C)D2n Ji (u+ n)
=
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1))Yi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
+
1
2
Yi (t) (A  C)D (A+ C) 1
X
n>0
 
(A  C)D2n Ji (t+ n+ 1)
+
1
2
X
s>t
Ji (s)D
s tYi (t) +
1
2
X
s>t
X
t<us
X
n>0
Ji (s) (A+ C)
 1  
(A  C)D2n Ji (u+ n)
=
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1))Yi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
+
1
2
X
s>t
Yi (t)
 
Ds t
t
+ (A  C)D (A+ C) 1  (A  C)D2n Ji (s)
+
1
2
X
s>t
X
t<us
X
n>0
Ji (s) (A+ C)
 1  
(A  C)D2n Ji (u+ n)
Then, adding the time t contributions leads to:
Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
1AYi (t) +pYi (t)
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1)) + V (i)i (Xi (t))
+
1
2
Yi (t)
X
s>t
 
Ds t
t
+ (A  C)D (A+ C) 1  (A  C)D2n Ji (s)
+
1
2
X
s>t
X
t<us
X
n>0
Ji (s) (A+ C)
 1  
(A  C)D2n Ji (u+ n)
As before, the term V (i)j (Xj (t  1)) has been discarded, since it depends only on t  1 and will be cancelled
by the nomalization.
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After computations similar to that of appendix 1, the integral over Yi (t), j < i yields the e¤ective action:
A =  1
2
(Yi (t))iMii

(Yi (t  1))i +
 
Ds t
t
+ (A  C)D (A+ C) 1  (A  C)D2n Ji (s)
i

 1
2
(Yi (t))Mij

(Yi (t  1))j +
 
Ds t
t
+ (A  C)D (A+ C) 1  (A  C)D2n Ji (s)
j

+
1
2
(Yi (t))i (Nii) (Yi (t))i +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
1
2
tX
s>t
 
Ds t
t
+ (A  C)D (A+ C) 1  (A  C)D2n Ji (s)t
 (A+ C)
X
s>t
 
Ds t
t
+ (A  C)D (A+ C) 1  (A  C)D2n Ji (s)
+
1
2
X
s>t
X
t<us
X
n>0
Ji (s) (A+ C)
 1  
(A  C)D2n Ji (u+ n)
where the matrices used in the previous expression are given by:
Nii = ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ii   ((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ij

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)jj
 1 
((A  C) (D   2) + 2B)ji

Mii = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ii
Mij = (Nii)

((A  C) (D   2) + 2B) 1 (A+ C)

ij
Remark that applying 1

s t
2
@
@(Ji(s))
to exp (A) produces a term:
((Yi (t))i + F (Ji (s))) exp (A)
where F (Ji (s)) is a linear function of FJi (s). As a consequence, one shows recursively that:
@
@ (Ji (s1))
:::
@
@ (Ji (sn))
exp (A) = F(n) ((Yi (t))i ; Ji (s1) :::Ji (s1)) exp (A)
for some function F(n) ((Yi (t))i ; Ji (s1) :::Ji (s1)). As a consequence:
ln
0@(exp  X
s>t
s tkV^ (i)
 
1

s t
2
@
@ (Ji (s))
!!
exp (A)
)
Ji(s)=0
1A
=  1
2
(Yi (t))iMii (Yi (t  1))i  
1
2
(Yi (t))Mij (Yi (t  1))j
+
1
2
(Yi (t))i (Nii) (Yi (t))i +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1)) + V (i)eff (Yi (t))
where V (i)eff (Yi (t)) is some function obtained by the application of the derivatives
@
@(Ji(s1))
appearing in
the series expnsion of exp

 Ps>t s tkV^ (i) 1

s t
2
@
@(Ji(s))

and then setting Ji (s) = 0. The previous
expression is then the expected formula for Ueff (Xi (t)).
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Appendix 8
One applies the method of appendix 1, but using the recursive form for the agents e¤ective utility:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

(305)
 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
X
j6i
Xi (t)K
(i)
ij
 
E
(i)
t
X
s
Zj (s)
!
E
(i)
t
P
s Zj (s) = Zj (s) for s 6 t. It can be reduced to the form of appendix 1:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

Nii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Miip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
Mijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
by the shift X(i)ei ! X(i)ei + (Nii) 1
P
j6iK
(i)
ij

E
(i)
t
P
s Zj (s)

Then, since one considers the computation of Ueff (Xi (t)) for an agent i, all e¤ective actions Ueff (Xj (t))
for j < i have to be modied by this shift: X(j)ej ! X(j)ej +(Njj) 1
P
k6j K
(i)
jk

E
(j)
t
P
s Zk (s)

. It is known
that the saddle point computation to obtain the integrals over Xi (s) and Xj (s) is still valid when the X
(j)e
j
depend on t (which is the case here after the shift), then the all method of appendix 1 applies.
Before integration, one then arrives to the intermediate e¤ective utility (242):

X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) +

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

B

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

+ (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1) + Yi (t)BYi (t)
+
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
Integration over Yi (s), s > t would lead to (251), but recall that for Xi (s) = (Yi (s))i one has to impose
the constraint Xi (s) = Bi (s) + E
(i)
t Zi (s)   Bi (s+ 1) for all s, as well as the transversality condition
Bi (s)! 0, t! T . For a matter of convenience, in the sequel, we will write Zi (s) for E(i)t Zi (s) and restore
this notation in the end.
One can thus integrate over the vector which is the concatenation of Bi (s) + Zi (s)   Bi (s+ 1) and
(Yi (s))j for j < i and s > t. One changes the variables Bi (s) = B
0
i (s)  
P
i>0 Zi (s+ i), so that Bi (s) +
Zi (s)   Bi (s+ 1) = B0i (s)   B0i (s+ 1) and the transversality condition is B0i (s) ! 0, t ! T . Then the
integrals over B0i (s) can be changed by change of variables as integrals over B
0
i (s) B0i (s+ 1)
The result of the integration is thus (249):
1
2
Yi (t) ((A  C) (D   1))Yi (t) + 1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
with a di¤erence with case studied in Appendix 1: as in the simple exemple presented in the text, the series
of integrals over Bi (s) results in replacing in (251) Xi (t) by B0i (s) B0i (s+ 1). The result for the integration
is thus:
1
2
Y^i (t) ((A  C) (D   1)) Y^i (t) + 1
2
Y^i (t)AY^i (t)
with:
Y^i (t) =

B0i (t) B0i (t+ 1)
(Yi (s))j for j < i

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and where B0i (s) B0i (s+ 1) satises:
(B0i (s) B0i (s+ 1)) = D (B0i (s  1) B0i (s))
(the matrix D is the dynamic matrix (247)). This relation alongside with the transversality condition allows
to rewrite the sum:
B0i (t+ 1) = (B
0
i (t+ 1) B0i (t+ 2)) + :::+ (B0i (T   1) B0i (T ))
=
 
1 +D2 + :::+DT

(B0i (t+ 1) B0i (t+ 2))
=
D
 
1 DT 
1 D (B
0
i (t) B0i (t+ 1))
where we used B0i (T ) = 0. As a consequence:
(B0i (t) B0i (t+ 1)) =
(1 D)
D (1 DT )B
0
i (t+ 1)
and we are left with:
1
2
Y^i (t) ((A  C) (D   1)) Y^i (t) + 1
2
Y^i (t)AY^i (t)
with:
Y^i (t) =
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )B
0
i (t+ 1)
(Yi (s))j for j < i
!
=
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )

Bi (t+ 1) +
P
i>0 Zi (s+ i)

(Yi (s))j for j < i
!
then we use the constraint recursively to write:
Bi (t+ 1) +
X
s>t
Zi (s) =  
X
s6t
Xi (s) +
X
s
Zi (s)
and then:
Y^i (t) =
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )

 Ps6tXi (s) +Ps Zi (s)
(Yi (s))j for j < i
!
Thus, as in appendix 1 formula (251), one adds contributions due to specic (i.e. non e¤ective) time t
utility (we also change the sign of the rst component of Y^i (t), using the fact that the utiliy is quadratic)
to obtain a non integrated e¤ective utility:
U^ inteff (Yi (t)) =
1
2
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )
P
s6tXi (s) 
P
s Zi (s)

(Yi (s))j for j < i
!
((A  C) (D   1) +A) (306)

 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )
P
s6tXi (s) 
P
s Zi (s)

(Yi (s))j for j < i
!
+Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
1AYi (t) +pYi (t)
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1)
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
Using that, see (250) and (251):
Yi (t)
0@ A(i)ii 0
0 A
(i)
jj +

A
(j)
jj

eff
1AYi (t) +pYi (t)
0@  (i)ii 2A(i)ij
2A
(j)
ji

 


(j)
fkjgk6j

eff
; 2A
(j)
fkjgi>k>j
 1AYi (t  1)
= Yi (t) (B  A)Yi (t) + Yi (t) (A+ C)Yi (t  1)
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and developping in (306) the quadratic terms in
P
s6tXi (s) 
P
s Zi (s) as Xi (t) +
P
s<tXi (s) 
P
s Zi (s)
as well as discarding terms that do not depend on Xi (t) and (Yi (t))j for j < i yields:
U^ inteff (Yi (t)) =
1
2
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )

Xi (t)
(Yi (t))j for j < i
!
((A  C)D)
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )

Xi (t)
(Yi (t))j for j < i
!
+Yi (t) (B  A)Yi (t) + Yi (t) (A+ C)Yi (t  1) +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )
  P
s<tXi (s) 
P
s Zi (s)

0
!
((A  C)D)
 
(1 D)
D(1 DT )

Xi (t)
(Yi (t))j for j < i
!
=
1
2
Yi (t)P
t ((A  C)D)PYi (t)
+Yi (t) (B  A)Yi (t) + Yi (t) (A+ C)Yi (t  1) +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!
P ti ((A  C)D) (Yi (t))j
+
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!
(1 D)
D (1 DT )
t
((A  C)D)

(1 D)
D (1 DT )

Xi (t)
=
1
2
Yi (t)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)Yi (t) + Yi (t) (A+ C)Yi (t  1)
+
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!
P ti ((A  C)D) ~PYi (t) +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!
P ti ((A  C)D)PiXi (t)
where:
P =

Pi 0
0 1j

; ~P =

0 0
0 1j

Pi =

(1 D)
D (1 DT )

1j = identity matrix for the block j < i
Then, to obtain the e¤ective utility for Xi (t) one can integrate over the (Yi (t))j for j < i.
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Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Yi (t) +
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1
 (A+ C) (Yi (t  1)) + ~P t ((A  C)D)Pi
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!!
i
 (Nii)

Yi (t) +
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1
(A+ C) (Yi (t  1)) + ~P t ((A  C)D)Pi
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!!
i
+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!
P ti ((A  C)D)PiXi (t)
  1
2
((Yi (t))iMii (Yi (t  1))i + T ) 
1
2

(Yi (t))Mij (Yi (t  1))j + T

+
1
2
(Yi (t))i (Nii) (Yi (t))i +
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+
 X
s<t
Xi (s) 
X
s
Zi (s)
!
P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)PiXi (t)(307
where the matrices used in the previous expression are given by:
Nii =
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ii
(308)
   P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1
ij
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
jj
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ji

Mii = (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ii
Mij = (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ij
and where the "T" means the transpose of the expression in the same parenthesis. Then, as explained in
the text, the terms X
s<t
Xi (s)
!
P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)PiXi (t)
(309)
may be approximated by:
(Xi (t) +Xi (t  1))

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)PiXi (t)
and these terms may be included in the quadratic terms of the e¤ective utility to produce the result announced
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in (305) with (and restoring
P
s Zi (s)!

E
(i)
t
P
s Zi (s)

):
Nii =
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ii
(310)
   P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1
ij
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
jj
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ji

+

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pi
Mii = (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ii
+

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pi
Mij = (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ij
K
(i)
ii =

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pi
Note also that in (305), the terms X(j)ej have to be shifted by X
(j)e
j ! X(j)ej +(Njj) 1
P
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and as a consequence, (240) implies that X(i)ei is shifted by
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Keeping the i th coordinate of this shift and computing the expansion of the terms including  X(i)ej in the
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e¤ective utility (305) yields a contribution:
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In the approximation of the continuous limit0@X
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and the all contribution due to the constraint reduces to:
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which implies that:
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Now, if we were to keep the terms (309) without approximation, the e¤ective utility (305) should be
modied from the begining to include some additional lag terms:
Ueff (Xi (t)) =
1
2

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

N
(0)
ii

Xi (t)  X(i)ei

 

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
M (0)iip


Xi (t)  X(i)ei

(Ue¤fnlbsbs)
 
X
j<i

Xi (t)  X(i)ei
M (0)ijp


Xj (t  1)  X(i)ej

+
X
j>i
2Xi (t)A
(i)
ij (Xj (t  1))
+Xi (t)Mi
 
E
(i)
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X
s
Zi (s)
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+
X
j6i
X
s<t
Xj (s) 
(i;n)
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These terms modify the matrices A, B, and C in (243) by modifying the inertia terms (j)fkjgk6j as a sum

(j)
fkjgk6j ! (j)fkjgk6j +
X
n>2

(j;n)
fkjgk6jL
n 1
and as well for their transpose:

(j)
fjkgj>k ! (j)fjkgj>k +
X
n>2

(j;n)
fjkgj>kL
n 1
and these operators are included in the computations that are similar to the previous one. Now, the
saddle point equation (245) is still valid, as well as its solution (246). However two modications have to
be included. First, Given that the saddle point equation is derived from (244):

X
s>t
 1
2
(Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))A (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1)) + Yi (s)BYi (s) + (Yi (s)  Yi (s  1))CYi (s  1)
+Yi (t)BYi (t) +
1
2
Yi (t)AYi (t)
and since this equation includes coupling between Yi (t) and Yi (t n), due to the inertia terms (j;n)fkjgk6jLn 1,
then in (245):

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

A (Yi (s+ 1)  2Yi (s) + Yi (s  1))+2Yi (s)BYi (s) 

Yi (s)  Y^ (1)i

C (Yi (s+ 1)  Yi (s  1)) = 0
this fact is taken into account by replacing in A, B, C the terms (j;n)fkjgk6jL
n 1 by (j;n)fkjgk6j
 
Ln 1 + L (n 1)

(this is the analog of the symetrization process appearing in this kind of equations but translated to the lag
operators level L! L 1 in this transposition), and as well for their transpose (j;n)fjkgj>kLn 1 that have to be
replaced by (j;n)fjkgj>k
 
Ln 1 + L (n 1)

.
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Second, one can rst solve formaly for D as in (246) by letting:
Yi (s) = D
t sYi (t)
and the solution is formally the same as if no inertia was present. But this equation, solves D as a function
D


(j;n)
fkjgk6j
 
Ln 1 + L (n 1)

; 
(j;n)
fjkgj>k
 
Ln 1 + L (n 1)

. Let us call ~D this solution. To nd the "true"
matrix D as a function of the parameters, one replaces in Yi (s+ 1) = DYi (s), and in that case:
DYi (s) = ~D


(j;n)
fkjgk6j

Ln 1 + L (n 1)

; 
(j;n)
fjkgj>k

Ln 1 + L (n 1)

Yi (s)
and given the solution Yi (t), LYi (s) = DYi (s), the previous relation can also be written:
DYi (s) = ~D


(j;n)
fkjgk6j

Dn 1 +D (n 1)

; 
(j;n)
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
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which yields the equation for D:
D = ~D


(j;n)
fkjgk6j

Dn 1 +D (n 1)

; 
(j;n)
fjkgj>k

Dn 1 +D (n 1)

Then this equation can be solved as a series expansion in the (j;n)fkjgk6j . In fact, as seen in the text, the
inertial term are of order 1T where T is the characteristic length of the interaction process. As such, T is the
"largest" parameter in the system, and the series expansion can be stopped at the rst order.
Once D has been found, the resolution is the same as before. One arrives at the e¤ective action given in
(307), which yields ultimately the required form (103). Then, one expands the coe¢ cients involved in (307)
as series (j;n)fkjgk6j to obtain:
N
(0)
ii =
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ii
   P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1
ij
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
jj
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A)
ji

+

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pii
zeroth
M
(0)
ii =
h
(Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ii
+

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pii
zeroth
M
(0)
ij =

(Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 (A+ C)
ij

zeroth
Mi =

P ti ((A  C)D) ~P (Nii)
 
P t ((A  C)D)P + 2 (B  A) 1 + P ti ((A  C)D)Pi
the subscript zeroth standing for the zeroth order expansion in the (j;n)fkjgk6j . The expression for the
matrices N (0)ii , M
(0)
ii and M
(0)
ij are the same as the one presented in (310) since N
(0)
ii , M
(0)
ii and M
(0)
ij are
obtained by the zeroth order expansion of Ueff (Xi (t)) in 
(j;n)
fkjgk6j and thus their expression is similar to the
case without constraint. The higher order terms in the expansion, in fact the rst order being su¢ cient, will
be gathered to yield the terms
P
j6i
P
s<tXj (s)NiXi (t). We do not present any detailled formula here,
since it depends for each particular case on the form of ~D as a function of the (j;n)fkjgk6j .
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Appendix 9
An operator of the form
 r2 + ax2 +  =   r+pax  r+pax+ +pa
has eigenvalues
n
p
a+ +
p
a = (n+ 1)
p
a+ 
with eigenvectors:
'n (x) =
p
a

 1
4
r
1
2nn!
Hn

a
1
4x

exp

 
p
a
2
x2

where the Hn

a
1
4x

are the Hermite polynomials. The Green function
G =
  r2 + ax2 +  1
which is equal to the propagator:
G (x; y) = h	 (x) 	 (y)i
is given by:
G (x; y) =
X
n
'n (x)'
y
m (x)
(n+ 1)
p
a+ 
Applying this results to our problem yields G (x; y):
G (x; y) = hxj 1 r2k +m2i +
 
(xi)k  
 
Yeff

k

(i)k
 
(xi)k  
 
Yeff

k
 jyi
=
X
n
 n (x)
1
m2i +
 
n+ 12

(i)k
 n (y)
210
Appendix 10
As explained in the text, we have to compute the Green function under the following form:
G (x; y) = P (0; s; xi; yi)
*
exp
 
  1
T
Z s
0
X (u) du
 Z T
0
X (u) du
!!+
=
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
  (x y)22s

p
s
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Where X (u) a brownian motion starting at xi at time 0 and reaching yi at time s and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
 1
s
Z s
0
X (u) du
Z s
0
X (u) du

is the expectation value of exp

1
s
 R s
0
X (u) du
2
given the process X (u).
The appearance of the factor P (0; s; xi; yi) in (162a) comes from the fact that in (161) the measure is
not normalized, and (161) is computed for the measure of a free Brownian motion. The global weight for
the path starting at xi at time 0 and reaching yi at time s is thus not equal to 1 but to P (0; s; xi; yi). We
then decompose X (u) as:
X (u) =

t
s
x+
s  t
s
y

+

B (u) 
u
s

B (s)

where B (u) is a free brownian motion. Then, the use of Ito formula yields:Z s
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and one obtains:
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0
 
s
2   u
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
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0
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 
s
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s
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
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12s
3
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so that:*
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using classical methods of di¤erential stochastic equations: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
+
Z s
0
Z u1
0
g (u1; u2) dB (u2) dB (u1)

= exp

  1
2s2
Z s
0
f2 (u) du  1
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In the text, we consider several approximation that yield a simplied form of the Green function. These
hypothesis are justied in the text. We assume rst that  < , and s ' 1 . Moreover the individual
uctuations jx  yj, which are of order ps ' p

, will be neglected with respect to the mean path x+y2
over the all duration of interaction. It translates in x+y2 >> jx  yj and since jx  yj is of order 
p
s ' p

, 
x+y
2
2
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 
x+y
2
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 .
Then one can rewrite some contributions:
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the error made in neglecting 
2s3
6
 
x+y
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being lower than 16 . One has, in rst approximation:
G (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24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To nd a eld formalism including G (; x; y), the green function modied by the constraints one has to nd
a di¤erential equation satised by G (; x; y), and one does so by rst computing: 
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!
G (; x; y)
Using that:
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As a consequence G (; x; y) satises the following di¤erential equation:
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Then use our assumptions about the parameters to obtain:
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2
32
x y

r
2

+
 
x+y
2
2 < 3 jx  yjr
2

+
 
x+y
2
2 <<  < 
2
x  y
2 = jx  yj2 << x+ y2
2
2
1 +
x y

r2+  x+y2 2
2

+
 
x+y
2
2 < 2p  x+y2  +  jx  yjr2+  x+y2 2
< <  +  < 2
and the di¤erential equation reduces to:
 (x  y) =
 
2
2
r2   2
 
+

x+ y
2
2!!
G (; x; y)
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Appendix 11
When some discount rate is introduced, we go back to the initial individual agent formulation and modify
it accordingly. Recall that the transition probabilities between two consecutive state variables of the system
are dened by (89):
hBs+1j jBsi =
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
U (Cs) +
X
i>0
U (Cs+i)
!
but now, the constraint rewrites:
Bs+1 = (1 + r) (Bs + Ys   Cs)
or equivalently:
Cs = Bs + Ys   Bs+1
(1 + r)
Then, the integral over the Bs+i is similar to the previous one, since one can change the variables:
Bs+i
(1+r)i
!
Bs+i for i > 1.
=
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
   Cs   C2  X
i>0
 
Cs+i   C
2!
=
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
 

Bs + Ys   Bs+1
(1 + r)
  C
2
 
X
i>0

Bs+i + Ys+i   Bs+i+1
(1 + r)
  C
2!
=
Z TY
i=2
(1 + r)
i
dB0s+i exp
0@ Bs + Ys   Bs+1
(1 + r)
  C
2
 
X
i>0
(1 + r)
i
 
B0s+i  B0s+i+1 +
Ys+i   C
(1 + r)
i
!21A
=
 
TY
i=2
(1 + r)
i
!
exp
0@ Bs + Ys   Bs+1
(1 + r)
  C
2
  1P
i>0 (1 + r)
 i
 
Bs+1
(1 + r)
+
X
i>0
Ys+i   C
(1 + r)
i
!21A
=
 
TY
i=2
(1 + r)
i
!
exp
0@ Bs + Ys   Bs+1
(1 + r)
  C
2
  r
(1 + r)
T   1
 
Bs+1
(1 + r)
+
X
i>0
Ys+i   C
(1 + r)
i
!21A (313)
where the sum has been performed up to T where T is the time horizon dened previously.
The factor
TY
i=2
(1 + r)
i can be included in the normalization factor, as explained before, and then we are
left with:
hBs+1j jBsi =
Z TY
i=2
dBs+i exp
 
U (Cs) +
X
i>0
U (Cs+i)
!
= exp
0@ Bs + Ys   Bs+1
(1 + r)
  C
2
  r
 
Bs+1
(1 + r)
+
X
i>0
Ys+i   C
(1 + r)
i
!21A (314)
which is similar to (89), except the 1(1+r) factor in front of Bs+1 and the (1 + r)
i multiplying
 
Ys+i   C

.
One also replaces T by 1r . Then the previous analysis following (89) applies, except that, writing Bs+1 as a
function of the past is now:
Bs+1 =
X
i60
Ys+i
(1 + r)
i
 
X
i60
Cs+i
(1 + r)
i
(315)
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that will lead directly to the weight, after normalization:
exp
0@ Cs   1
r + 
C
2
  2r
(1 + r)
T   1 + 
Cs
 X
i<0
Cs+i
(1 + r)
i
!
+
2r
(1 + r)
T   1 + 
Cs
0@X
i60
Ys+i
(1 + r)
i
+
X
i>0
Y
(1 + r)
i
1A1A
The global weight, over all periods is then:
exp
 
 
X
s

Cs   1
r + 
C
2
  2r
(1 + r)
T   1 + r
X
s1;s2
Cs1 (1 + r)
js2 s1j Cs2 (316)
+
2r
(1 + r)
T   1 + r
X
s1;s2
Cs1

(1 + r)
s1 s2 Es1 (Ys2)
!
with Es1Ys2 = (1 + r)
s2 s1 Ys2 if s2 6 s1 Es1Ys2 = (1 + r)
s2 s1 Y if s1 6 s2.
Now, switching to an endogenous expression for Ys2 , we introduce an index i to describe a set of N
agents. Each of them is described by an action C(i)s and has an endowment Y
(i)
s = 
P
j C
(j)
s . The global
weight for the set of agents is then:
exp
 
 
X
s

C(i)s  

1
r + 
C
2
  2r
(1 + r)
T   1 + r
X
i
X
s1;s2
C(i)s1 (1 + r)
js2 s1j C(i)s2 (317)
  2r
(1 + r)
T   1 + r
X
s1;s2
X
i;j
C(i)s1

(1 + r)
s2 s1 C(j)s1
1A
To understand the eld theoretic equivalent of the two last terms in (317), one proceeds as follows. First,
neglecting as before the term proportional to , we turn to a continuous representation:
exp
 
 
Z s
0
ds1

C(i)s1  

1
r + 
C
2
  2r
exp (rT )  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2 (318)
  2r
exp (rT )  1
Z s
0
ds1
Z s
0
ds2
X
i;j
C(i)s1

exp (r (s2   s1))C(j)s2
1A
The second term of (318):
  2r
exp (rT )  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
can be introduced in very similar way to the case r = 0, in (318), but now, terms of the form exp (r (s2   s1))
are inserted:Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt

  2r
exp (rT )  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
!
=
*
exp
 
  2r
exp (rT )  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
!+
where the Brackets denote the expectation for a Brownian path moving between x and y during a time s.
As before, describing the estimated interaction duration time T by s, one is left with:Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt

  2r
exp (rT )  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
!
=
*
exp
 
  2r
exp (rs)  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
!+
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We write:
X (u) =

u
s
x+
s  u
s
y

+

B (u) 
u
s

B (s)

where B (u) is a free brownian motion. As before, to our order of approximation, in integrals of the kind:
Z s
0
exp (ru)X (u) du

=
Z s
0
exp (ru)

u
s
x+
s  u
s
y

du+
Z s
0

B (u) 
u
s

B (s)

du

we can neglect contribution due to the ito integrals and approximate X (u) by
 
u
sx+
s u
s y

. Then:X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1Xs1 exp (r (s2   s1))Xs2
=
Z s
0

v
s
x+
s  v
s
y

exp (rv)

1
r

y   exp ( rv)

v
s
x+
s  v
s
y

+
1
sr2
(1  exp ( rv)) (x  y)

dv
=
Z s
0
 
1
r
 
v
s
x+
s  v
s
y

exp (rv) y  

v
s
x+
s  v
s
y
2!
+
 
v
sx+
s v
s y

sr2
(exp (rv)  1) (x  y)
!
dv
Each term in the previous integral can be computed directly:Z s
0
 
1
r
 
v
s
x+
s  v
s
y

exp (rv) y  

v
s
x+
s  v
s
y
2!!
dv
=
1
r2
(x exp (rs)  y) y   1
sr3
y (x  y) (exp (rs)  1)  1
3r
s
 
x2 + xy + y2

Z s
0
  
v
sx+
s v
s y

sr2
(exp (rv)  1) (x  y)
!
dv
=
1
r3s2
(x  y)

s (ersx  y)  1
r
(ers   1) (x  y)

  1
2r2
(x  y) (x+ y)
So that one nds: X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1Xs1 exp (r (s2   s1))Xs2
=
1
r2
(x exp (rs)  y) y   1
sr3
y (x  y) (exp (rs)  1)  1
3r
s
 
x2 + xy + y2

+
1
r3s2
(x  y)

s (ersx  y)  1
r
(ers   1) (x  y)

  1
2r2
(x  y) (x+ y)
One can simplify this result for two di¤erent regimes. In the rst one, the interaction duration is relatively
short so that (rs) << 1, or, which is equivalent,
 
r


<< 1 since 1 is the mean duration, and in that case,
in rst approximation:
2
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1Xs1 exp (r (s2   s1))Xs2 =
1
4
s2 (x+ y)
2
+
1
15
(rs) s2
 
x2 + 3xy + y2

The second term appears as a correction with respect to the case with no discount rate in the constraint.
Since rs << 1 one can approximate s by its mean 1 , then rs ' r and:
2
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1Xs1 exp (r (s2   s1))Xs2 = s2
"
x+ y
2
2
+
1
15
r

 
5

x+ y
2
2
 

x  y
2
2!#
(319)
= s2
"
x+ y
2
2 
1 +
r
3

  1
15
r


x  y
2
2#
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then including the discount rate keeps the global form of the green function, but reduces the binding tendency
to set x = y. Due to the discount rate, the various periods are no more equivalent, which is reducing the
smoothing behavior. This reduction reects in the introduction of the term    115 r
 
x y
2
2
. Actually, (319)
implies that in the approximation rs << 1:
2r
exp (rs)  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
' 2
s
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
= s
"
x+ y
2
2 
1 +
r
3

  1
15
r


x  y
2
2#
which leads, as in the text to the following Green function:
G (; x; y) = L
24exp1
s
Z s
0
X (u) du
Z s
0
X (u) du
 exp  (x y)22s p
s
35
= exp
 "
x+ y
2
2 
1 +
r
3

  1
15
r


x  y
2
2#
@
@
!
exp
  p2 x y p
2
=
exp

 
r
2

+
 
x+y
2
2  
1 + r3
  115 r  x y2 2 x y r
2

+
 
x+y
2
2  
1 + r3
  115 r  x y2 2
G (; x; y) which satises:
 (x  y) =
2664r2   + q (x; y)2

  1
2 (+ q (x; y))
0BB@
0BB@ 6q (x; y)(+ q (x; y)) + 12
x y

 q (x; y)r
2

+
 
x+y
2
2 + 4q (x; y)
x  y
2
1CCA
1CCA
 1 +
p
2 (+ q (x; y))
2 (+ q (x; y))


2 (x+ y)

1 +
r
3

  2
15
r

(x  y)

H (x  y) H (y   x)

p
2 (+ q (x; y))  1

G (; x; y)
with:
q (x; y) =

x+ y
2
2 
1 +
r
3

  1
15
r


x  y
2
2
In the limit  << 1, one nds then a quadratic term in the action:
	y (x)
"
r2   +
 
x+y
2
2  
1 + r3
  115 r  x y2 2
2
  2
x  y
2
#
	 (y) (320)
= 	y (x)
"
r2   +
 
x+y
2
2  
1 + r3

2
 

2  1
15
r

 x  y
2
#
	 (y)
and the presence of r 6= 0 reduces, as announced, the second smoothing term x y 2 that constrains x   y
to oscillate around 0.
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The second regime is more appropriate, since it focuses on the long run e¤ect of a discount rate. Actually,
for rs > 1, the interaction process is su¢ ciently long to allow the discount rate r to impact the dynamic
system. In that case:
2r
exp (rs)  1
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
' 2r
exp (rs)
X
i
Z s
0
ds2
Z s2
0
ds1C
(i)
s1 exp (r (s2   s1))C(i)s2
' 2r (y   x (1  rs)) (x  y (1  rs))
r4s2
' 2xy
r
and this modies the Green function as:
G (; x; y) =
exp
  p2 x y   2xyr p
2
which satises:
r2   
2

G (; x; y) =  (x  y) +

4y2
r2
G (; x; y) + 4
xy
r
p
2
x  y
 G (; x; y)
which leads to the quadratic term:
	y (x)
"
r2   
2
  2x
2 + y2
r2
  4
p
2xy
r
(H (x  y) H (y   x))
#
	 (y) (321)
The third term in (318) can also be written
exp
0@  21
r + 
X
i;j
Z s
0
ds1 exp ( rs1)C(i)s1
Z s
0
ds2 exp (rs2)C
(j)
s2
1A (322)
We have seen previously how to introduce the eld theoretic counterpart of such a product. One has to
nd the counterpart of each term exp
R s
0
ds1 exp ( rs1)C(i)s1

and exp
R s
0
ds2 exp (rs2)C
(j)
s2

, and then to
take simply the product of the eld equivalent quantities. We then focus only on
R s
0
ds2 exp (rs2)C
(i)
s2 , and
compute its expectation in the path integral to nd its eld theoretic formulation.
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
exp
Z s
0
ds1 exp ( rs1)C(i)s1

Z s
0
ds1:::
Z sn
0
ds2nC
(i)
s1 exp (rs1)C
(i)
s2 exp (rs2) :::C
(i)
sn 1 exp (rsn 1)C
(i)
sn exp (rsn)

=
X
n
Z s
0
ds1:::
Z sn
0
ds2nC
(i)
s1 exp (rs1)C
(i)
s2 exp (rs2) :::C
(i)
sn 1 exp (rsn 1)C
(i)
sn exp (rsn)

where the expectation hAi of any expression A is computed for the weightZ
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
and the path integral leads to contributions:
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Z s
0
ds1:::
Z sn
0
ds2nC
(i)
s1 exp (rs1)C
(i)
s2 exp (rs2) :::C
(i)
sn 1 exp (rsn 1)C
(i)
sn exp (rsn)

(323)
=
Z Z s
0
ds1:::
Z s2n
0
ds2nP (0; s1; xi; X1)X1 exp (rs1)P (s1; s2; X1; X2)X2:::Xn exp (rsn)
P (sn 1; sn; Xn 1; X2n)P (sn; s;Xn; yi) dX1:::dXn
Writing:
exp (rs1) ::: exp (rsn)
= exp (nrs1) ::: exp (2r (sn 1   sn 2)) exp (r (sn   sn 1))
(323) can be transformed as:Z s
0
ds1:::
Z sn
0
ds2nC
(i)
s1 exp (rs1)C
(i)
s2 exp (rs2) :::C
(i)
sn 1 exp (rsn 1)C
(i)
sn exp (rsn)

=
Z Z s
0
ds1:::
Z s2n
0
ds2nP (0; s1; xi; X1)X1 exp (nrs1)P (s1; s2; X1; X2)X2:::Xn exp (r (sn   sn 1))
P (sn 1; sn; X2n 1; X2n)P (sn; s;X2n; yi) dX1:::dX2n
whose Laplace transform is:
G+nr X G+(n 1)r X  :::G+r X GG+nr X G+(n 1)r X  :::G+r X G (324)
One can nd an approximation for such contributions by the following trick. Actually, write the convolution
of the Green functions, without the interacting term X as:
G+nr G+(n 1)r  ::: G+r G
as a product of operators:  
G 1 + nr
  
G 1 + (n  1) r :::  G 1 + rG 1
And this product is formally a product series
nY
k=1

(rG)
 1
+ k

=
N ! 

(rG)
 1
+ 1

rN 

(rG)
 1
+N + 1

Using asymptotic expansion for  

(rG)
 1
+ 1

and  

(rG)
 1
+N + 1

, assuming r small, yields:
N ! 

(rG)
 1
+ 1

rN 

(rG)
 1
+N + 1
 = N !
rN
exp

 

(rG)
 1
+N + 1

ln

(rG)
 1
+N + 1

 

(rG)
 1
+ 1

ln

(rG)
 1
+ 1

Factor the rst term in the exponential by (rG) 1 + 1 leads to a rst order expansion:
(rG)
 1
+N + 1

ln

(rG)
 1
+N + 1

=

(rG)
 1
+ 1

ln

(rG)
 1
+ 1

+N

ln

(rG)
 1
+ 1

+ 1

+
1
2
N2
(rG)
 1
+ 1

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and:
N ! 

(rG)
 1
+ 1

rN 

(rG)
 1
+N + 1
 = N !
rN
exp
0@ N ln(rG) 1 + 1+ 1  1
2
N2
(rG)
 1
+ 1

1A
=
N !
rN

(rG)
 1
+ 1
 N
exp ( N) exp
0@ 1
2
N2
(rG)
 1
+ 1

1A
= N !

(G)
 1
+ r
 N
exp ( N) exp
0@ 1
2
N2r
(G)
 1
+ r

1A
' N !

(G)
N

exp ( N) exp
0@ NrG  1
2
N2r
(G)
 1
+ r

1A
The terms in the series expansion becomes negligible for a value of N , denoted N that is proportional 11 aij
and then the previous contributions are approximated by:
G+nr X G+(n 1)r X  :::G+r X G
exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr
(1 + rG)

G

' exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

and then, (324): rewrites
G+nr X G+(n 1)r X  :::G+r X G (325)
' G 

exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

X

G 

exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

X


:::G 

exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

X

G
where:
exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

X

=
1
2

exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

X +X exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

This leads to an interaction potential:
exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G

X

and a eld contribution:Z
	y (x)

exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G (x; y)

x+ y
2

	y (y) dxdy (326)
We can come back to our problem and nd the eld counterpart of: (322).
Similarly to (326), the term
exp
Z s
0
ds1 exp ( rs1)C(i)s1

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induces a eld counterpart:Z
	y (x)

exp

r +
1
2
Nr

G (x; y)

x+ y
2

	y (y) dxdy (327)
Then the expansion of
exp
0@X
i;j
Z s
0
ds1 exp ( rs1)C(i)s1
Z s
0
ds2 exp (rs2)C
(j)
s2
1A
yields contributions of the form:Z Z s
0
ds1:::
Z s2n
0
ds2nP (0; s1; xi; X1)X1 exp (rs1)P (s1; s2; X1; X2)X2:::Xn exp (rsn)
P (sn 1; sn; Xn 1; X2n)P (sn; s;Xn; yi) dX1:::dXn

Z Z s
0
ds01:::
Z s2n
0
ds02nP (0; s
0
1; xi; X
0
1)X
0
1 exp ( rs01)P (s01; s02; X 01; X 02)X 02:::X 0n exp ( rs0n)
P  s0n 1; s0n; X 0n 1; X 02nP (s0n; s0; X 0n; yi) dX 01:::dX 02n
and as previously, using (326) and (327), in eld theoretic formalism it leads to the potential:Z
	y (x)

exp

 

r +
1
2
Nr

G (x; y)

x+ y
2

	y (y) dxdy


Z
	y (w)

exp

r +
1
2
Nr

G (w; z)

w + y
2

	y (z) dwdz

The Green function introduced here are similar to (164) and includes the constraint at the individual
level. Ultimately, gathering this result and (321) we are left with the following action with constraint and
discount rate in the case r >> 1:
S
n
	(k)
o
k=1:::M

(328)
=
1
2
X
k
Z
dX^
(1)
k dX^
(2)
k 	
(k)y

X^
(2)
k
 hh
r
X^
(1)
k

r
X^
(1)
k
 M (1)k

X^
(1)
k  

~X

k

+m2k + V

X^
(1)
k
i


X^
(1)
k   X^(2)k

+2

X^
(1)
k
2
+

X^
(2)
k
2
r2
  4
p
2X^
(1)
k X^
(2)
k
r

H

X^
(1)
k   X^(2)k

 H

X^
(2)
k   X^(1)k

| {z }
constraint, individual level
3775	(k)y X^(2)k 
+
X
k
X
n
Vn
n
X^
(i)
k
o
16i6n
 Y
16i6n
	(k)y

X^
(i)
k

	(k)

X^
(i)
k

| {z }
intra species interaction
+
X
m
X
k1:::km
X
n1:::nm
Vn1:::nm
 
X^
(inj )
kj

16inj6nj
!
mY
j=1
Y
16inj6nj
	(kj)y

X^
(inj )
kj

	(kj)

X^
(inj )
kj

| {z }
inter species interaction
+
P
k1;k2
ak1;k2
R R 
	(k1)y

X^
(1)
k1

exp

   r + 12 NrGX^(1)k1 ; X^(2)k1  X^(1)k1 +X^(2)k12 	(k1) X^(2)k1  dX^(1)k1 dX^(2)k1
 R R 	(k2)y X^(1)k2 exp r + 12 NrGX^(1)k2 ; X^(2)k2  X^(1)k2 +X^(2)k22 	(k2) X^(2)k2  dX^(1)k2 dX^(2)k2| {z }
constraint, collective level
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Appendix 12
Case 1: one type of agents
The inclusion of the term:
  f
T
X
i
X
s1;s2
C(i)s1 C
(j)
s2 (329)
in the eld formalism is performed as in the derivation of (132) and (137). If we consider that the time
horizon T is constant, the eld theoretic counterpart of (329) is obtained by adding the term
  f
T
Z
	 (x) 	y (x) (xy) 	 (y) 	y (y) dxdy
to the eld action, for a total of:
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
"
 r2 + 
2
+ x2

 (x  y) +
 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x  y
2
#
	 (y) dxdy
  f
T
Z
	 (x) 	y (x) (xy) 	 (y) 	y (y) dxdy
However, doing so implies that the functional S (	) which is not bounded from below. Actually, if 	 (x)
is of norm
p
, the last term of the previous expression is of order   fT 2, whereas the other terms are of
order . As a consequence for  su¢ ciently large, S (	) becomes negative. The system is thus unstable and
nothing can be said about any equilibrium. However we can turn this di¢ culty by recalling that the time
horizon can be considered as being related to s, the duration of the interaction process. The most simple
assumption is to set T = s.
In that case, we can adapt (132) to include a factor 1T in the following way. We will proceed for an
arbitrary potential and apply the result to our particular case. Inserting any potential Vk (xi1 (tk) :::xik (tk))
in the description in terms of path integral was given by:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
(330)

X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (tk) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
=
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik

( 1)k
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)


X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
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and inserting a factor 1
Tk 1 =
1
sk 1 in this expression yields:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
(331)
 1
sk 1
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (tk) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
=
X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik

( 1)k
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)


X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si) 1
sk 1
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
=
Z 1

d
k 1X
k>2
X
i1;:::ik

( 1)k
Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)


X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
as a consequence of the Laplace transform properties. Then, as we did to nd (129), the next step is to
exponentiate (331) as:
X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t)
 exp
0@ X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt

  1
s
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (t1) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
1A
= exp
 
 
Z 1

d
k 1 Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)
!
K=0

X
N
1
N !
NY
i=1
Z
exp ( si)
Z
Dxi (t) exp
 
 
X
i
Z xi(s)=yi
xi(0)=xi

_x2i
2
(t) +K (xi (t)) dt
!
The translation of this operation to the eld formalism is then straightforward. As we did for (137),
nding the equivalent of the potential
  1
sk 1
X
i1;:::ik
Z xi(s)=y
xi(0)=x
Vk (xi1 (t1) :::xik (tk)) dt1:::dtk
in terms of elds corresponds to act with the operator:
exp
 
 
Z 1

d
k 1 Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)
!
on the eld path integral:Z
exp ( S (	))D	D	y
= exp
 
 
Z
	y (x)
"
 r2 + 
2
+ x2 +K (x)

 (x  y) +
 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x  y
2
#
	 (y) dxdy
!
D	D	y
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and let K (x)  0 for a result:
exp
 
 
Z 1

d
k 1 Z
dxi1 :::dxikVk (xi1 :::xik)

K (xi1)
:::

K (xik)
!Z
exp (S (	))D	D	y
= exp
 
 
Z
	y (x)
"
 r2 + 
2
+ x2

 (x  y) +
 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x  y
2
#
	 (y) dxdy
+
Z
2(k 1) R
	y (x) 	 (x)
k 1 X
i1;:::ik
	 (xi1) :::	 (xik)Vk (xi1 :::xik) 	
y (xi1) :::	
y (xik) dx1:::dxk
1AD	D	y
Applied to our case we can now assert that the equivalent of   fs
P
i
P
s1;s2
C
(i)
s1 C
(i)
s2 on the eld theoretic
side is:
  f
2R
	y (x) 	 (x) dx
Z
	 (x) 	y (x) (xy) 	 (y) 	y (y) dxdy
for a total action:
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
"
 r2 + 
2
+ x2

 (x  y) +
 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x  y
2
#
	 (y) dxdy
  f
2R
	y (x) 	 (x) dx
Z
	 (x) 	y (x) (xy) 	 (y) 	y (y) dxdy
If we keep the hypothesis of the text, we can neglect the initial inertia, and the action reduces to:
S (	) '
Z
dx	 (x)
 
x2 + 2

	y (x) +
Z
dxdy	y (x)
" 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x  y
2
#
	 (y)
  f
2R
	y (x) 	y (x) dx
Z
	 (x) 	y (x) (xy) 	 (y) 	y (y) dxdy
with 2 = 2 .
Case 2: several types of agents
We proceed in the same way as for the case of a single type of agents. The interaction term
exp
0@ 1
T
X
i;
Z s
0
Z s
0
C
(i);
t
0@X
j;
fC
(j);
u
1A dtdu
1A
for T = s has a eld theoretic counterpart which is found as in the previous paragraph, by letting the
operator
exp
0@ Z 1

d
X
;
Z
dxdxVk (x; x)

K (x)

K (x)
1A
act on:
exp
 
 
X

S ((	))
!
where:
S ((	)) =
X

 Z
dx	
y (x)

x2 +

2
+K (x)

	 (x) +
Z
dxdy	
y (x)
" 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x   y
2
#
	 (y)
!
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and then set K (x) = 0. It yields directly an interaction term:
  
2P

R
	y (x) 	 (x) dx
X
;
f
Z
	y (x)x	 (x)
 Z
	y (x)x	 (x)

for a total action functional:
S ((	)) =
X

 Z
dx	
y (x)
 
x2 + 
2

	 (x) +
Z
dxdy	
y (x)
" 
x+y
2
2
2
+ 2
x   y
2
#
	 (y)
!
  
2P

R
	y (x) 	 (x) dx
X
;
f
Z
	y (x)x	 (x)
 Z
	y (x)x	 (x)

with 2 = 2 .
Case 3: endogenous interest rates
We start with the following function
Ueff (Ci) =
Z
C2i (t) dt+2
Z
t>s
exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Ci (s)Ci (t) dsdt 2
Z
t>s
Ci (t) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Yi (s) dsdt
(332)
and transform the last two terms. We will omit the common factor  in the computation. One rst obtains:
2
Z
t>s
exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Ci (s)Ci (t) dsdt  2
Z
t>s
Ci (t) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

Yi (s) dsdt (333)
= 2
Z
t>s

rKi (s)  _Ki (s) + Fi (Ki (s))

exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

rKi (t)  _Ki (t) + Fi (Ki (t))

dsdt
 2
Z
t>s
Fi (Ki (s)) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v) dv

rKi (t)  _Ki (t) + Fi (Ki (t))

dsdt
= 2
Z
t>s

rKi (s)  _Ki (s)

exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
+2
Z
t>s

rKi (s)  _Ki (s)

exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

rKi (t)  _Ki (t)

dsdt
We compute separately these two expressions. The last term can be decomposed as:Z
t>s

rKi (s)  _Ki (s)

exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

rKi (t)  _Ki (t)

dsdt (334)
=
Z
t>s
_Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

_Ki (t) dsdt 
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

_Ki (t) dsdt
 
Z
t>s
_Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

rKi (t) dsdt
+
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

r (t)Ki (t) dsdt
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The rst term in (334) is:Z
t>s
_Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

_Ki (t) dsdt
=
Z
Ki (t) _Ki (t) dt 
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

_Ki (t) dsdt
=
1
2

K2i (t)
T
0
 
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

_Ki (t) dsdt
The border terms that can be neglected (no accumulation at 0 and T ), so that to the rst order in r (334)
simplies: Z
t>s

r (s)Ki (s)  _Ki (s)

exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

r (t)Ki (t)  _Ki (t)

dsdt
=  
Z
t>s
_Ki (s) r (t)Ki (t) dsdt
 2
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s) _Ki (t) dsdt
=  
Z
r (t)K2i (t) dt+ 2
Z
r (s)K2i (s) ds
=
Z
r (t)K2i (t) dt
by assuming again that Ki (0) = Ki (T ) = 0. The rst term in (333) can also be simplied at the rst order
in r: Z
t>s

r (s)Ki (s)  _Ki (s)

exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
=  
Z
t>s

r (s)Ki (s) + _Ki (s)

exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
+2
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
=  
Z
t>s
d
ds

Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
+2
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s) exp

 
Z t
s
r (v)

Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
=  
Z
Ki (t)Fi (Ki (t)) dt+ 2
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s)Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
Then, using (332) and (333) and reintroducing the factor , Ueff (Ci) can be written:
Ueff (Ci) =
Z
C2i (t) dt  2
Z
Fi (Ki (t))Ki (t) dt+ 2
Z
r (t)K2i (t) dt+ 4
Z
t>s
r (s)Ki (s)Fi (Ki (t)) dsdt
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Case 3: Saddle points and stability: general form of the second
order variation
We start by writing the second order variation in a convenient way. A straightforward computation yields:
1
2
2S (	) = 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x' (x) + 4
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
 Z
	y1 (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy(335)
+
4
N
Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx
Z
'y (y)F (y)' (y) dy
+
8
N
Re
Z
'y (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

Re
Z
'y (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy

and the last term can be decomposed in a useful way for the sequel. Assume that F (x)   F 0 (x)x > 0 (if
the reverse is true the role of F 0 (x)x and F (x) are exchanged), then
8
N
Re
Z
'y (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

Re
Z
'y (x)F (x) 	1 (x) dx

=
8
N
Re
Z
'y (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

Re
Z
'y (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

+
8
N
Re
Z
'y (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

Re
Z
'y (y) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x) 	1 (x) dx

The last expression can be estimated by the Cauchy Schwarz inequality as:ReZ 'y (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dxReZ 'y (y) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x) 	1 (x) dx
<
sZ
('y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx)
sZ
	y1 (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

sZ 
	y1 (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x) 	1 (x) dx
sZ
'y (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x)' (x) dx
Letting then
A =
Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

B =
Z
	y1 (y)F (y) 	1 (y) dy
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the three last terms in (335) can be regrouped and estimated in the following way:
4
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
 Z
	y1 (x)F (x) 	1 (x) dx+
4
N
Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx
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
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 Z
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N
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N
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
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Z
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
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
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
>
4
N
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 Z
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N
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
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N
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 Z
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N
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0 (x)x	1 (x) dx
Z  
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
 8
N
sZ
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
sZ 
	y1 (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x) 	1 (x) dx
sZ
'y (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x)' (x) dx
=
8
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
 Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

+
4
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
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	y1 (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x) 	1 (x) dx
+
4
N
Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx
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'y (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x)' (x) dx
 8
N
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('y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx)
sZ
	y1 (x)F 0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

sZ 
	y1 (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x) 	1 (x) dx
sZ
'y (x) (F (x)  F 0 (x)x)' (x) dx
=
8
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
 Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

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4
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 sZ
('y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx)
sZ 
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sZ
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>
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 Z 
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
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and inserting this in (335) yields:
1
2
2S (	) > 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x' (x) (336)
+
8
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
 Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

= 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x+ 8
N
AF 0 (x)x

' (x)
If F 0 (x)x  F (x) > 0 we have rather:
1
2
2S (	) > 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x' (x) (337)
+
8
N
Z  
'y (x)F (x)' (x) dx
 Z 
	y1 (x)F (x) 	1 (x) dx

= 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x+ 8
N
BF (x)

' (x)
This can be positive depending on the parameters of the model. The sign of 2S (	) will be studied for
each case in the next paragraphs of this section.
Case 3: Saddle points and stability: example of scale economy
Now, to understand further the non trivial vacuum in the model of this paragraph, we will assume some
particular forms for F (x). We start with the action of the rst case where
F (x) = c (x  f (x))
and the action given by (177):
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
  r2   4f (x) (x  f (x))	 (x) dx+16
N
Z
	y (x)x	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x) (x  f (x)) 	 (x) dx

The saddle point equation is:
0 =
  r2   4f (x) (x  f (x))	 (x) + 16
N
(A (x  f (x)) +Bx) 	 (x)
with: Z
R+
	y (x)x	 (x) dx = AZ
R+
	y (x) (x  f (x)) 	 (x) dx = B
and this equation can be reorganized:
0 =  r2	 (x) +

16A
N
  4f (x)

(x  f (x)) + 16B
N
x

	 (x)
For 16AN   4f (x) + 16BN > 0, a square integrable solution on R+ exists. Given that f (x) is slowly varying, a
rst approximation for the saddle point equation is:
0 =
  r2   4f (x) (x  f (x))	 (x) + 16
N
(A (x  f (x)) +Bx) 	 (x) (338)
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Now, we factor 	 (x) = a	1 (x) with 	1 (x) of norm 1. Then (338) becomes:
0 =
  r2   4f (x) (x  f (x))+ 16a2
N
(A (x  f (x)) +Bx)

	1 (x)
=
0@0@ r2 + 16a2
N
(A+B)  4f (x)
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16a
2B
N

1A1A1A	1 (x)
where the constants A and B have been redened as:Z
R+
	y1 (x)x	1 (x) dx = A (339)Z
R+
	y1 (x) (x  f (x)) 	1 (x) dx = B
The solution 	1 (x) is proportionnal to an Airy function:
	1 (x) = Ai
0@ 3r16Aa2
N
  4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16a
2B
N

1A1A
with the following normalization condition:
Z
R+
2
0@Ai
0@ 3r16Aa2
N
  4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16a
2B
N

1A1A1A2 dx = 1
To have a minimum, one needs to show that the action S (	) is bounded from below. Note that given the
saddle point equation:
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
  r2   4f (x) (x  f (x))	 (x) dx+ 16
N
Z
	y (x)x	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x) (x  f (x)) 	 (x) dx

=  16a
4
N
Z
	y1 (x) (A (x  f (x)) +Bx) 	1 (x) +
16a2
N
Z
	y1 (x)x	1 (x) dx
Z
	y1 (x) (x  f (x)) 	1 (x) dx

=  32
N
ABa4 +
16
N
ABa4 =  16
N
ABa4 < 0
One thus has to show that Aa2 and are Ba2 bounded.
To do so, one uses the normalization equation and the dening equations for A and B rewritten as:
Z
R+
2
0@Ai
0@ 3r16Aa2
N
  4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16a
2B
N

1A1A1A2 dx = 1
2
Z
R+
x
0@Ai
0@ 3r16Aa2
N
  4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N

1A1A1A2 dx = A
2
Z
R+
(x  f (x))
0@Ai
0@ 3r16Aa2
N
  4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N

1A1A1A2 dx = B
By a change of variable
u =
3
r
16Aa2
N
  4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
0@x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16a
2B
N

1A
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and using that f (x) is slowly varying, and that f (0) = 0, so that
x 

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16a
2B
N

is increasing from 0 to +1, one gets, in rst approximation (f (x) is considered as constant and can be
replaced by its mean f): Z
R+
2 (Ai (u))
2 du
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
= 1
2
Z
R+
0@ u
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
+

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N

1A (Ai (u))2 du
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
= A
2
Z
R+
0@ u
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
+

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
   f (x)
1A (Ai (u))2 du
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
= B
As a consequence 2 is of order 3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N , and then:
Z
R+
0@ u
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
+

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N

1A (Ai (u))2 du = dA
Z
R+
0@ u
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
+

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x) 
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
   f (x)
1A (Ai (u))2 du
3
q
16Aa2
N   4f (x) + 16Ba
2
N
= dB
with d =
R
R+ (Ai (u))
2
du. In rst approximation A = B and one is reduced to the following relation between
A and a: Z
R+
0@ u
3
q
32Aa2
N   4f (x)
+

16Aa2
N   4f (x)

f (x)
32Aa2
N   4f (x)
1A (Ai (u))2 du = dA
We replace f (x) by f , so that this relation becomes
Z
R+
0@ u
3
q
32Aa2
N   4f (x)
+
f
2
1A (Ai (u))2 du = dA
or, in a more compact form:
e
3
q
32Aa2
N   4 f
+
f
2
d = dA
where we dened e =
R
R+ u (Ai (u))
2
du. The relation between A and a reduces to:
e3 =

dA 
f
2
d
3
32Aa2
N
  4 f

(340)
In most cases, depending on f , this equation has a positive solution with 32Aa
2
N   4 f > 0 as needed. Now,
for a!1
A =
N
32a2
0B@4 f + e3
f
2d
3
1CA
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As a consequence Aa2 is then bounded and has a maximum, so that S (	) is bounded from below and has
a minimum for the value of a that maximizes Aa2.
The second order variation simplies in that particular case as follows. Here, F 0 (x)x > F (x) and (337)
applies:
1
2
2S (	) > 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x' (x)
+
8
N
Z  
'y (x)F (x)' (x) dx
 Z 
	y1 (x)F (x) 	1 (x) dx

= 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x+ 8
N
BF (x)

' (x)
and here it writes:
'y (x)

 r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x+ 32
N
AF (x)

' (x)
= 'y (x)

 r2   4f (x) (x  f (x)) + 32
N
B (x  f (x))

'y (x)
= 'y (x)

 r2 +

32
N
B   4f (x)

(x  f (x))

'y (x)

8
N
B   4f (x)

'

32a2
N
A  4f (x)

> 0
in our assumptions, and thus:
1
2
2S (	) > 0
Case 3: Saddle points and stability: example of increasing return
to scale
The second case we consider is:
F (x) = x+ cx2
with 0 < c < 1 which measures an increasing return to scale. In that case:
S (	) = 2
Z
	y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x	 (x) dx
+
44
N
Z  
	y (x)F 0 (x)x	 (x) dx
 Z
	y (y)F (y) 	 (y) dy
= 2
Z
	y (x)
 r2 +  x+ cx2  cx2   x	 (x) dx
+
44
N
Z
	y (x) (1 + 2cx)x	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

' 2
Z
	y (x)
 r2 +  c2x4   x2	 (x) dx
+
44
N
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ 2cx2

	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

and the saddle point equation is:
 r2 + c2x4 +

4c
N
(A+ 2B)  1

x2 +
4x
N
(A+B)

	 (x) = 0
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with:
A = 2
Z
R+
	y (x)
 
x+ 2cx2

	 (x) dx

B = 2
Z
R+
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

One shows in appendiw 6.a that the action S (	) is bounded from below and that it has a minimum
obtained as a rst order correction in c ot the function :
	0 (x) =  exp
0@ 
q
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
2

x+
2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
21A
This can be reorganized as:"
 r2 + c2x4 +

4c
N
(A+ 2B)  1

x+
2
N
(A+B)
4c
N (A+ 2B)  1
2
 

2
N
(A+B)
4c
N (A+ 2B)  1
2#
	 (x) = 0
We write the solution 	 (x) = 	1 (x), and 	1 (x) has a norm equal to 1. The saddle point equation
becomes ultimately:"
 r2 + c2x4 +

4c
N
2 (A+ 2B)  1

x+
2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
2
 

2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
2#
	 (x) = 0
with:
A =
Z
R+
	y1 (x)
 
x+ 2cx2

	1 (x) dx

B =
Z
R+
	y1 (x)
 
x+ cx2

	1 (x) dx

Note that the action at the saddle point solution is equal to:
S (	) =
Z
	y (x)
 r2 +  c2x4   x2	 (x) dx+ 4
N
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ 2cx2

	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

=  2
Z
	y (x)

4
N
 
A
 
x+ cx2

+
 
x+ 2cx2

B

	 (x) dx
+
4
N
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ 2cx2

	 (x) dx
Z
	y (x)
 
x+ cx2

	 (x) dx

=  

44
N
(AB +AB)

+
44
N
AB =  4
4
N
AB < 0
As before, one has to show that this is bounded from below.
We start rst by soving the saddle point equation. Since c << 1, the term c2x4 can be treated pertur-
batively and one rather solves:"
 r2 +

4c
N
2 (A+ 2B)  1

x+
2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
2
 

2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
2#
	 (x) = 0
adding some corrections due to c2x4 later. The change of variable
x0 = 4
r
4c
N
2 (A+ 2B)  1

x+
2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1

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for
4c
N
2 (A+ 2B)  1 > 0
yields the saddle point in a normalized form:h
 r2x0 + (x0)2   
i
	 (x) = 0 (341)
with:
 =

2
N
2(A+B)
4c
N 
2(A+2B) 1
2
q
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
=
 
2
N 
2 (A+B)
2 
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1 52
X4   (3X   1)5
, Solution is: f[X = 0:535 62]gThe equation (341) has a bounded solution only if  = 2n + 1 with n a non
negative integer. The solution of norm 1 in that case is:
	n (x
0) = Hn (x0) exp
 
  (x
0)2
2
!
with Hn (x0) the n-th Hermite polynomial. The condition to nd a solution of norm 1 is thus: 
2
N 
2 (A+B)
2 
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1 52 = 2n+ 1 (342)
where
A+B =
Z
R+
	n (x
0)
 
2x+ 3cx2

	n (x
0) dx

(A+ 2B) =
Z
R+
	n (x
0)
 
3x+ 4cx2

	n (x
0) dx

and:
x =
x0
4
q
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
  2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
These equations are show that 2A and 2B are of same order, and then (342) yields that
2
N
2 (A+B)  1
(2n+ 1)
2 (343)
so that
S (	) =  4 4
N
AB < 0
has its minimum for n = 0. More precisely, for n = 0, (342) gives: 
2
N 
2 (A+B)
2 
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1 52 = 1
and thus in the rst approximation A = B, 4cN 
2A = 1 and 4cN 
2 (A+ 2B)  1 = 2.
As a consequence, one has shown that the action S (	) is bounded from below and that its minimum is
obtained for:
	0 (x
0) = exp
 
  (x
0)2
2
!
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or, coming back to the initial variable:
	0 (x) = exp
0@ 
q
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
2

x+
2
N
2 (A+B)
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1
21A
The inclusion of the corrective term c2x4 can be done perturbatively. To the second order, the eigenvalues
of the operator in the left hand side of (341) are transformed as:
E0n = En + c h	0 (x)jx4 j	0 (x)i+ c2
1X
l=1;l 6=n
h	n (x)jx4 j	l (x)i2
En   El
with En = 2n+ 1 and (342) is modied as: 
2
N 
2 (A+B)
2 
4c
N 
2 (A+ 2B)  1 52 (344)
= 2n+ 1 + c h	0 (x)jx4 j	0 (x)i   c2
1X
l=1
h	0 (x)jx4 j	l (x)i2
2l
Moreover the eigenvector 	0 (x) is also modied:
j	00 (y)i = j	00 (y)i   c
1X
l=1
h	l (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
2l
j	l (y)i
+c2
1X
l=1
1X
m=1
h	l (x)jx4 j	m (y)i h	m (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
4lm
j	l (y)i
 c2
1X
l=1
h	0 (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i h	l (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
4l2
j	l (y)i
 c
2
2
1X
l=1
h	0 (x)jx4 j	l (y)i h	l (x)jx4 j	0 (y)i
4l2
j	0 (y)i
These relations modies to the second order the values of A, B and . However, as 2 (A+B) remains of
the same order as 2 (A+ 2B) and since the corrections to the right hand side of (342) given by (344) are
nite (only few elements of matrices h	0 (x)jx4 j	l (x)i are non nul), then the asymptotic behavior:
2A  1
(2n+ 1)
2
remains valid. As a consequence, S (	) is bounded from below and 	00 (x) is the minimum of S (	).
Now, to study the stability we have to compute 2S (	). Here
F 0 (x)x  F (x) = x+ 2cx2    x+ cx2
= cx2 > 0
and thus (336) applies:
1
2
2S (	) > 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x' (x)
+
8
N
Z  
'y (x)F 0 (x)x' (x) dx
 Z 
	y1 (x)F
0 (x)x	1 (x) dx

= 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x+ 8
N
AF 0 (x)x

' (x)
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which, in this particular case, becomes:
1
2
2S (	) > 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x' (x)
+
8
N
Z  
'y (x)F (x)' (x) dx
 Z 
	y1 (x)F (x) 	1 (x) dx

= 'y (x)
  r2 +  F 2 (x)  2F (x)x+ 82
N
BF (x)

' (x)
= 'y (x)

 r2 +  c2x4   x2+ 82
N
B
 
x+ cx2

' (x)
= 'y (x)

 r2 +  x+ cx2cx2   x+ 82
N
B

' (x)
Given (343) and n = 0 for the minimum, 2N 
2 (A+B)  4N 2B  1(2n+1)2 = 1
cx2   x+ 8
2
N
B  cx2   x+ 2
and this is positive for c > 18 . In this range
1
2
2S (	) > 0.
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Appendix 13
Stabilization of a nite number of negative eigenvalues by an inter-
action potential
We start with the saddle point equation described in the text.
0 = K	 (y) + 2U (y) 	 (y)
Z  
	 (y2)U (y2) 	
y (y2)

dy2 (345)
with:
K =

 1
2
r

M (S)
 1
r+ yM (A)r+ yNy

+m2
Normalize 	 (x) =
p
	1 (x) where  =
R
	y1 (y) 	1 (y) dy. The saddle point equation including this
potential can also be written:
0 = K	1 (y) + 2U (y1) 	1 (y)
Z 
	1 (y2)U (y2) 	
y
1 (y2)

dy2 (346)
If, as assumed before, K has a negative lowest eigenvalue 0, with eigenvector 	(n) (y) then, one can nd a
solution (	1 (y) ;  > 0) of (346).
Then, expand
	1 (y) =
X
n>0
an	
(n) (y)
with
P
n>0 janj2 = 1, where 	(n) (y) are norm one eigenvectors of K with eigenvalues n. Then, take the
scalar product of (346) with 	y1 (y1):
0 =
Z
	y1 (y1)K	1 (y) dy
+2
Z
	y1 (y1)U (y1) 	1 (y1) dy1
Z 
	1 (y2)U (y2) 	
y
1 (y2)

dy2
which allows to nd :
 =  1
2
h	1jK j	1i
(h	1jU j	1i)2
Thus, if we nd a solution with  > 0, this solution j	1i is mainly a combination of negative eigenstates of
K, so that h	1jK j	1i < 0.
Given that: 
 1
2
r

M (S)
 1
r+ yM (A)r+ yNy

	1 (y) =
X
n
ann	
(n) (y)
(346) rewrites:
0 = K	1 (y)  h	1jK j	1i
(h	1jU j	1i)2
U (y1) 	1 (y)
Z 
	1 (y2)U (y2) 	
y
1 (y2)

dy2
= K	1 (y)  h	1jK j	1ih	1jU j	1iU (y1) 	1 (y)
or, equivalently:
	1 (y) =
h	1jK j	1i
h	1jU j	1iK
 1U (y1) 	1 (y) (347)
238
This relation can be written in any orthonormal basis. Using 	1 (y) =
P
n>0 an	
(n) (y) with
P
n>0 janj2 = 1
and 	(n) (y) the eigenvectors ofK for the value k and to order them by increasing eigenvalue, so that 	(0) (y)
is the state with the lowest eigenvalue 0 < 0 by assumption.
Using the norm condition
P
n>0 janj2 = 1, and that the previous systems of equation has one relation of
dependence, one can get rid of a0 (up to an irrelevant phase) and reduce the system to:
an =
h	1jK j	1i
(h	1jU j	1i)
0@X
m>0
D
	(n) (y1)
K 1U (y1) 	(m) (y1)E am
1A for n > 1
with
P
n>1 janj2 6 1 and where a0 is replaced in the sums in the numerator and denominator by
q
1 Pn>1 janj2.
As a consequence the system has a solution (an), if the application:
(an)n>1 7!
0@ h	jK j	i
(h	jU j	i)
0@X
m>1
D
	(n) (y1)
K 1U (y1) 	(m) (y1)E am + D	(n) (y1)U (y1) 	(0) (y1)Es1 X
n>1
janj2
1A1A
n>1
has a xed point. This possibility arises depending on the properties of the potential U . To get a more
precise account for this point write the application as:
  : j	in>1 7!
0@ K 1U
h	jU j	i
h	jKj	i
 j	i
1A
n>1
where ()n>1 denotes the projection on the space of eigenvalues n > 1. Let 0 < c < 1, any arbitrary constant.
Assume that U preserves the space V generated by the negative eigenstates, so that   denes an appli-
cation V ! V . We also assume that if 0 is eigenstates of K, it is an isolated point.
A xed point exists in the ball B  V of radius c, P<0n>1 janj2 6 c, where P<0n>1 runs over the negative
eigenstates, if for any state j	i of B
j	i =
<0X
n>1
an	
(n) (y)
such that
P<0
n>1 janj2 6 c (and thus ja0j2 > 1  c):
0@ K 1U
h	jU j	i
h	jKj	i
 j	i
1A
n>1

2
=
h	j

U
 
K 1
2
U

j	i0
jh	jU j	ij2
jh	jKj	ij2
6 c
with
h	j

U
 
K 1
2
U

j	i0 =
X
n>1
h	jUK 1
	(n)ED	(n)K 1U j	i
=
X
n>0
h	jUK 1 	(n)E2   h	jUK 1 	(0)ED	(0)K 1U j	i
= h	j

U
 
K 1
2
U

j	i   h	jUK 1
	(0)ED	(0)K 1U j	i
so that:
0@ K 1U
h	jU j	i
h	jKj	i
 j	i
1A
n>1

2
=
jh	jK j	ij2
jh	jU j	ij2

h	j

U
 
K 1
2
U

j	i   h	jUK 1
	(0)ED	(0)K 1U j	i
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Then, a su¢ cient condition to have a xed point, and thus a non trivial solution to (346) is that
jh	jK j	ij2
jh	jU j	ij2

h	j

U
 
K 1
2
U

j	i   h	jUK 1
	(0)ED	(0)K 1U j	i < 1  c
for all j	i. This is achieved for example if U develops along the negative eigenstates of K and if the overlap
of U and K is concentrated around
	(0), that is:
U =
	(0)EU0 D	(0)+ <0X
i;j>0;i+j 6=0
	(i)EUij D	(j)+ :::
with UiU0 << 1. Actually, in that case: jh	jU j	ij
2 > (U0 (1  c))2 and jh	jK j	ij2 < 20 and then:
jh	jK j	ij2
jh	jU j	ij2

h	j

U
 
K 1
2
U

j	i   h	jUK 1
	(0)ED	(0)K 1U j	i
6 
2
0
(U0 (1  c))2

h	j

U
 
K 1
2
U

j	i   h	jUK 1
	(0)ED	(0)K 1U j	i
6 
2
0
(U0 (1  c))2
<0X
i>0;k>0;;j>0
Uij
1
2j
Ujk
and this is lower than c for UijU0 small enough. As a consequence j	1i is also peaked around
	(0), and
 =   12 h	1jKj	1i(h	1jU j	1i) is positive as needed. Then, a xed point exists in B, and thus on the space of all states,
for the type of potential considered. The minimum of S (	) is reached for the xed point with lowest S (	).
The interpretation of this case is clear. A positive potential of interaction counter balances the direction
of instability and allow the composed system of two structure two stabilize around a composite extremum.
 1
2
r

M (S)
 1
r+ yM (A)r+ yNy +m2

 (y   y1)
+2U (y)  (y   y1)
Z  
	 (y2)U (y2) 	
y (y2)

dy2 + 2	 (y)U (y)U (y1) 	
y (y1)
To inspect if the solution we found is a minimum, one has to compute the second order variation h'j @2S@	1(x)@	1(x) j'i.
The variation ' (y) is arbitary but can be considered of norm 1, since this norm can be factored from the sec-
ond order variation, and that only the sign of this variation matters. If one nds condtions on the potential
to have
h'j @
2S
@	1 (x) @	1 (x)
j'i > 0
we will have found a lower minimum than 	 (x) 0, since, in that case:
S (	) =
Z
	 (y)

 1
2
r

M (S)
 1
r+ yM (A)r+ yNy +m2

	y (y) dy
+
Z  
	 (y2)U (y2) 	
y (y2)

dy2
2
which is equal, given (345):
S (	) =  
Z  
	 (y2)U (y2) 	
y (y2)

dy2
2
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Now, the second order variation h'j @2S@	1(x)@	1(x) j'i is computed as:Z
' (y)K'y (y) dy
+2
Z
' (y)U (y)'y (y) dy
Z 
	1 (y2)U (y2) 	
y
1 (y2)

dy2 + 2
Z 	1U (y)'y (y) dy2
= h'jK j'i   h	1jK j	1ih	1jU j	1i
"
h'jU j'i+ jh'jU j	1ij
2
h	1jU j	1i
#
=
1
h	1jU j	1i
 
h'jK j'i h	1jU j	1i   h	1jK j	1i
 
h'jU j'i+ jh'jU j	1ij
2
h	1jU j	1i
!!
> 1h	1jU j	1i (h'jK j'i h	1jU j	1i   h	1jK j	1i h'jU j'i)
Given that the saddle point solution satises (347):
	1 (y) =
h	1jK j	1i
h	1jU j	1iK
 1U (y1) 	1 (y)
1 =
h	1jK j	1i
h	1jU j	1i h	1jK
 1U j	1i
one can write:
h'jK j'i h	1jU j	1i   h	1jK j	1i h'jU j'i
= h	1jU j	1i

h'jK j'i   1h	1jK 1U j	1i h'jU j'i

h'j @
2S
@	1 (x) @	1 (x)
j'i
= h'jK j'i   h	1jK j	1ih	1jU j	1i
"
h'jU j'i+ jh'jU j	1ij
2
h	1jU j	1i
#
= h'jK j'i   1h	1jK 1U j	1i
"
h'jU j'i+ jh'jU j	1ij
2
h	1jU j	1i
#
> 0   h'jU j'ih	1jK 1U j	1i
> 0   U0h	1jK 1U j	1i
where 0 is the lowest eigenvalue of and U0 (which is negative by assumption), the minimum eigenvalue of
U0. Then:
h'j @
2S
@	1 (x) @	1 (x)
j'i > 0   U0h	1jK 1U j	1i
and this is positive if
U0 > 0 h	1jK 1U j	1i
that is if the potential is strong enough to compensate for the instability of the system.
Instability due to non linear terms
We generalize the previous paragraph by considering the instability introduced by a more general term than
m2. Assume that the operator K (for m2 = 0) has been set in a basis such that it rewrites in a diagonal
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form
K =  1
2
r2 + yD0y (348)
where D is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues i > 0 that ensure the stability of each fundamental
structure without the perturbation . Assume that due to the interactions among the structures components,
a potential V (y) with a negative minimum is added to K to yield:
K1 =  1
2
r2 + yD0y + V (y) (349)
Operator (349) has the form of an harmonic oscillator plus a perturbation term.
The eigenvalues of K are En1;:::;nk =
Pk
i=1 nik
p
i+
k
2 where k is the number of components of y, y = (yi)
and the n1; :::; nk are natural integers.
The eigenfunctions 	(n1;:::;nk)1 (x) corresponding to these eigenvalues of Harmonic oscillators are:
	
(n1;:::;nk)
1 (y) =
kY
i=1
'ni (yi)
'n (x) =
p
a

 1
4
r
1
2nn!
Hn

a
1
4x

exp

 
p
a
2
x2

where the Hn are the Hermite polynomials. Then, introducing the eigenvalues modify both the eigenvalues
and eigenfunctions as series expansion of C. We choose a perturbation that shifts essentially the lowest
eigenstates of K, that is quadratic and antisymetric (the quadratic and symetric part being included in D0
by a series expansion and we assume that this part does not a¤ect the sign of D0s eigenvalues). We choose
for the potential the particular form
 yV A (y;r)r
which describes, as  yMAr the internal interaction inside the structure, but taking into account non linear
terms (as resulting for non linear utilities for example).
The perturbation can be rewriten, using the usual creation and destruction operators as:
 yVr =    a+ + a V A  a+   a 
= 2a+V (A)a 
since V (A) is antisymetric. Note that a+ and a  have dim y = k components: a+   a+i  and a    a i 
and y = (a+ + a ), r = (a+   a ). To model that this potential modies mainly the lowest eigenstates of
K, we choose: 
	
(n01;:::;n
0
k)
1 (y)
V (A) 	(n1;:::;nk)1 (y)E = (n01;:::;n0k);(n1;:::;nk)f ((n1; :::; nk))
with f ((n1; :::; nk)) is a quickly decreasing function of n21 + :::+ n
2
k.
Since V (A) is antisymetric, and for the ground state 	(0;:::;0)1 (y), a
+V (A)a 	(0;:::;0)1 (y) = 0 and one can
then deduce that the series expansion for the perturbed ground state is nul. Thus one still have a state
	
(0;:::;0)
1 (y) with eigenvalue
k
2 .
As a consequence: 
 1
2
r2   yV (A)r+ yD0y

	
(0;:::;0)
1 (y)
=

 1
2
r2 + yD0y

	
(0;:::;0)
1 (y)
=
k
2
	
(0;:::;0)
1 (y)
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and the saddle point equation is not satised.
This situation changes for the rst excited states. Consider 	(1;i)1 (y) = 	
(0;:;1;::;0)
1 (y) with the 1 set in the
i th position. These are the rst excited energy levels, the closest to 	(0;:::;0)1 (y) with energy Ei =
p
i +
k
2 .
The perturbation expansion for the eigenvalue of
 1
2
r2   yV (A)r+ yD0y

to the second order is then:
E0i = Ei + 4
kX
j=1;j 6=i
D	(1;i)1 (y) a+V (A)ij a  	(1;j)1 (y)E2p
i  
p
j
(350)
= Ei +
kX
j=1;j 6=i
4

V
(A)
ij
2
p
i  
p
j
=
p
i +
k
2
+
kX
j=1;j 6=i
4

V
(A)
ij
2
p
i  
p
j
Note that, due to the hypothesis on f , the shift E0n1;:::;nk in En1;:::;nk can be neglected for n
2
1 + :::+n
2
k >> 1.
One can thus focus on the rst eigenstates.
We call
	0(1;i)1 (y)E the corresponding eigenvector to E0i:
	0(1;i)1 (y)E = 	(1;i)1 (y)E+ kX
j=1;j 6=i
2V
(A)
ij
i ()  j ()
	(1;j)1 (y)E
+
kX
j=1;j 6=i
kX
l=1;j 6=i
4V
(A)
jl V
(A)
li p
i  
p
l
  p
i  
p
j
 	(1;j)1 (y)E
+2
kX
j=1;j 6=i

V
(A)
ij
2
 p
i  
p
j
2 	(1;i)1 (y)E
This approximation is valid if we assume that V (A) is relatively small with respect to the i and this
assumption is necessary if the fundamental structures are assumed to have a certain stability. If we rank the
i in increasing order, equation (350) shows that the eigenvalue E01 is driven below E1. It means that the
equilibrium of the system is reduced by its internal interactions/tensions. For a su¢ cient magnitude of the
perturbation, one may have E01 < 0 and the previous analysis concerning the stabilization of the system by
the interaction between structures apply. Remark, that some other rst excited states may be also driven
below 0, by the perturbation, but the number of such eigenstates remains nite given our assumptions about
the potential V . Higher order excited states have eigenvalues increasing with n21 + ::: + n
2
k = a, whereas, f
decreases with a.
Generalization to several types of interacting structures
We consider k elds in interacting, characterized independently by an operator:
Kl =

 1
2
(rl)2   ylM (A)l rl + ylDlyl + Vl (yl)

for l = 1; :::; k, where the Vl (yl) have a negative minimal eigenvalue. The saddle point equations for the
elds with interaction are then
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0 = Kl	l (yl) +
 
@
@	yl (y)
Z
V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xk)pk
 h
	1 (x1) 	
y
1 (x1)
i
p1
:::
h
	l (xl) 	
y
l (xl)
i
pl
:::
h
	k (xk) 	
y
k (xk)
i
pk
d (x1)p1 :::d (xk)pk

= Kl	l (yl) + pl
Z
V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xk)pk
 h
	1 (x1) 	
y
1 (x1)
i
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:::h
	l (xl) 	
y
l (xl)
i
pl 1
:::
h
	k (xk) 	
y
k (xk)
i
pk
d (x1)p1 :::d (xk)pk

	l (y)
where (xl)pl represents pl copies of the coordinates xl and
h
	l (xl) 	
y
l (xl)
i
pl
indicates a product of pl inde-
pendent copies of 	l (xl) 	
y
l (xl). The interaction involves then pl copies of the l-th structure. Then, one
normalizes
	l (xl) =
p
l	
(1)
l (xl)
where 	(1)l (xl) is of norm 1 and the saddle point equations rewrites:
0 = Kl	
(1)
l (yl) + pl
 
kY
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(i)
pi
!
l
(351)
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y
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i
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h
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pk
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l (y)
As in the previous case of simililar structures interaction, one can multiply by 	(1)yl (xl) and integrate to
nd:
0 =
D
	
(1)
l (yl)
Kl 	(1)l (yl)E+ pl
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pi
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Where we denedh	(1)1 (x1)i
p1
::: [	l (xl)]pl 1 ::: [	k (xk)]pk

2 (H1)
p1 
 ::: (H1)
pl 1 :::
 (Hk)
pk
the state corresponding to the product of elds
h
	
(1)
1 (x1)
i
p1
::: [	l (xl)]pl ::: [	k (xk)]pk where the Hl are the
state spaces for the structures l = 1; ; ; k. Similarly, the individual elds 	(1)l (yl) are know seen as vector on
a tensor product space:
	
(1)
l (yl) 
	(1)l (yl)E
 1
 :::
 1 2 (H1)
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 (Hk)
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The value of the l are found to satisfy:
l =  pl
 
kY
i=1
(i)
pi
!

h
	
(1)
1 (x1)
i
p1
::: [	l (xl)]pl ::: [	k (xk)]pk
 V (x1)p1 ; :::; (xk)pk h	(1)1 (x1)ip1 ::: [	l (xl)]pl ::: [	k (xk)]pk

D
	
(1)
l (yl)
Kl 	(1)l (yl)E
for l = 1:::k, and
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is computed by the product of the k previous relations:
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, so that one 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kY
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! 1
1 Pk
l=1
pl D
	
(1)
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As before we ssume that V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xk)pk

preserves the eigenstates of the Kl (our results would be
preserved if they are only preserved in rst approximation).
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As in the one eld case, replacing the values of the l in (351), leads to a xed point equation:
Kl
	(1)l (yl)E =  pl
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for l = 1:::k, where V

(x1)p1 ; :::; (xk)pk

is now seen as an operator V on (H1)

p1 
 ::: 
 (Hk)
pk . The
partial amplitude:h
	
(1)
1 (x1)
i
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::: [	l (xl)]pl 1 ::: [	k (xk)]pk
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is then an operator on Vl.
As in the one eld case, one can developp the elds 	(1)l (yl) in a basis of eigenvectors of Kl, and since V
preserves the negative eigenstates, we can restrict the sum on these states (this will be implicit in the sequel)
	
(1)
l (yl) =
X
n>0
an;l	
(n)
l (yl) with
X
n>0
janj2 = 1
and 	(n)l (yl) are eigenvectors of Kl with negative eigenvalues ordered such that 	
(0)
l (y) is the eigenvector
for the lowest eigenvalue 0;l.
The equations (353) are not independent for the coe¢ cients an;l This can be seen by multiplying both
sides of (353) by 	yl (xl) and to integrate to obtain a trivial relation. Actually,
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	(1)l (yl)E (354)
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is trivial given the denition of
0B@ kY
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l
. Thus, one can look for a solution of (353) by choosing the
coe¢ cients a0;l with
a20;l = cl 6= 0 (355)
, so that the solution we are looking for is a perturbative expansion around the minimum of the Kl. Rewrite
rst
Kl
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is an operator on Vl. It can be written more compactly as:	(1)l (yl)E (357)
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where
	(1)l (yl)E is the vector with l components 	(1)l (yl)E, andK, (K) 1 V are the diagonal matrices
with components Kl, (Kl)
 1
Vl on the diagonal. The vector
D
	
(1)
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Kl 	(1)l (yl)E (K) 1 V 	(1)l (y)
has l components
D
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Then, replacing for a0;l in (357) implies that
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denes an application from V = V1  ::: Vk where the Vl are the negative eigenstates of the Kl. Moreover,
using the condition (355) for the norm implies that solving  is equivalent to nd a xed point for this
application on the ball of radius c in the nite dimensional space V (0)1  :::V (0)k where V (0)1 is the orthogonal
of the lowest eigenstate in V1. Given the denition of ':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where V0 is the minimum of the potential, and 0;sup the lowest eigenvalue among the 0;l, l = 1:::; k.
Then we arrive to similar conclusion as in the one structure case. A xed point exist, and then a solution
to the saddle point equation (353) if the minimum of the potential is strong enough, and if the potential is
mainly localized oriented in the directions of instabilty to compensate them. Actually, in that case:X
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Once a saddle point is found, the stability is studied through the second order variation:X
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l bl j'li. Given that the potential V can be
considered as being symetric with respect to the identical copies of the structure with coordinates (xl), one
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represent the matrix element between two elds congurations, and this is assumed to be positive since we
look for a binding interaction. This is satised for a potentil with separate variable, as the one designed in
the one eld case. Then:X
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using (352), it reduces to:X
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Assuming as before that if some of the Kl have 0 as eigenvalue, this eigenvalue is an isolated point one
obtains: X
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where 0;inf is the closest to 0 negative eigenvalue of the operators Kl. Then the saddle point is a minimum
for a large enough potential, set along the negative eigenvlues.
Note that a larger k makes stability more di¢ cult to achieve. At this minimum one has:
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and using (352):
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Then, for pl = 1, the minimum is S (	l (yl)) = 0, and we have two states corresponding to this level, the
saddle point solution 	l (yl) and 0.
For pl > 2, S (	l (yl)) < 0 and the non trivial saddle point 	l (yl) is the only minimum.
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Appendix 14
E¤ective action for the rst eld:
We start with e¤ective action Sef: (	i1 (xi1))
Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) = S (	i1 (xi1)) +
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2
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and study the possibility for a non nul minimum, i.e. a minimum with  6= 0.
We rst consider the case  > 0.
If  > 0 remark that, if S (	i1 (xi1)) > 0, The function Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) is an increasing function in 
and the only minimum of Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) is for  = 0. Then if
1
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2
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2
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< 0, so that one replaces m2i2 !  m2i2 with m2i2 > 0.
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1
2 (i2)   m2i1 < 0. The minimum for S (	i1 (xi1)) is obtained if
	i1 (xi1) is in the fundamental state 	
(0)
i1
(xi1) that is the eigenstate of (208) for n = 0.
	
(0)
i1
(xi1) =
p
a

 1
4
H0

a
1
4x

exp

 
p
a
2
x2

=
p
a

 1
4
exp

 
p
a
2
x2

For n = 0 one then has:
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The derivative in  leads to:
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This is increasing for  close to 0 and decreasing for  large.
Then, one can nd the conditions for a minimum with  6= 0. Actually, since @Sef:(	i1(xi1))@ !
1
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have a phase transition h	i1 (xi1)i 6= 0.
For  > 0, the conditions for a phase transition are then:
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The case  < 0 is studied in a similar way.
If 12 (i1)+m
2
i1
< 0 (that ism2i1 is negative),
@Sef:(	i1(xi1))
@ < 0, there is no minimum, the action decreases
with  which is the (squared) norm of 	i1 (xi1). That case means that Sef: (	i1 (xi1)) is unbounded from
below, which is meaningless. The model breaks out for this values of the parameters and this case has to be
ruled out.
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is increasing for  close to 0 and decreasing for  large. Since
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the minimum is for h	i1 (xi1)i = 0.
E¤ective action for the second eld:
As explained in the core of the text, the integration of the action for the rst agent yields the e¤ective action
for the second one:
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Remark rst that for  > 0 and
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< 0 or  < 0 and
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Thus, being unbouded from below, the model breaks down (Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) being unbouded, one cannot
dene a probability exp ( Sef: (	i2 (xi2)))).
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In other words, for 
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< 0, it is not possible to dene an e¤ective action for 	i2 (xi2).
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There is no solution to
@
@
Sef: (	i2 (xi2))
and this derivative is positive. As a consequence, the minimum for Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) is reached at  = 0.
If 12i2 + m
2
i2
< 0, (359) may have a solution, but in that case, the second derivative @@Sef: (	i2 (xi2))
is negative, the extremum is thus a maximum, and the minimum for Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) is reached at  = 0.
The case  < 0 and
 
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
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< 0 is treated similarly: The rst order condition can be written
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and we come back to the case  > 0 and
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Then, gathering all the results of this paragraph, the only vacuum of Sef: (	i2 (xi2)) is  = 0, as announced
in the text.
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